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ABSTRACT

This handbook, one of a series designed to be useful to the military and others with an interest in foreign affairs, contains basic facts about the social, economic, political, and military institutions and practices of Cambodia. There are four major sections to the handbook. Section one describes the general character of the society and examines the physical environment and population, the history of the country, the social system, living conditions, language education, artistic and intellectual expression, and religion. Section two looks at the governmental system, political dynamics, and foreign relations. In section three the character and structure of the economy, agriculture, industry, trade, and transportation are examined. National defense and internal security are the topics treated in section four. An extensive bibliography of other published sources is provided. (Author/RM)

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AREA HANDBOOK for the KHMER REPUBLIC (CAMBODIA)

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FOREWORD

This volume is one of a series of handbooks prepared by Foreign Area Studies (FAS) of The American University, designed to be useful to military and other personnel who need a convenient compilation of basic facts about the social, economic, political, and military institutions and practices of various countries. The emphasis is on objective description of the nation's present society and the kinds of possible or probable changes that might be expected in the future. The handbook seeks to present as full and as balanced an integrated exposition as limitations on space and research time permit. It was compiled from information available in openly published material. An extensive bibliography is provided to permit recourse to other published sources for more detailed information. There has been no attempt to express any specific point of view or to make policy recommendations. The contents of the handbook represent the work of the authors and FAS and do not represent the official view of the United States government.

An effort has been made to make the handbook as comprehensive as possible. It can be expected, however, that the material, interpretations, and conclusions are subject to modification in the light of new information and developments. Such corrections, additions, and suggestions for factual, interpretive, or other change as readers may have will be welcomed for use in future revisions. Comments may be addressed to:

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PREFACE

Major changes have occurred in Cambodia since the appearance of the 1968 edition of the *Area Handbook for Cambodia*, the most important of which were the establishment of a republican form of government and the involuntary embroilment of the new republic in the war in Indochina. This volume brings up to date (July 1, 1972) the material on this Southeast Asian country, which since the late 1960s has increasingly come into the international picture.

The material, completely revised and presented in a somewhat more consolidated form than in the earlier edition, attempts to furnish an objective description of the social, political, and economic features of Cambodian society. Because of the turbulent situation in the country, information was not always as complete as might be desired; this should be kept in mind by the reader.

The authors express their appreciation to Madeline E. Ehrman, Kem Sos, and Lim Hak Kheang, who reviewed and offered informed advice on a number of chapters. They are also indebted to Gerald L. Kamens, who made available for the current volume research materials that would have been extremely difficult or impossible to obtain otherwise. The authors also wish to acknowledge the great value of May Mayko Ebihara's unique study on Cambodian village life, which was consulted extensively in the preparation of the social chapters. Acknowledgement is also made of the contribution of material in the early stage of the study by Sylvan M. Berman.

Khmer Republic has been the official name for Cambodia since October 9, 1970. Because of the longstanding use of Cambodia as the designation in English for the country, however, both Khmer Republic and Cambodia have been employed interchangeably for the period since establishment of the republic.

Unless otherwise specified, the ton measure used in this edition of the handbook is the metric ton. The country's currency unit, the riel, has had a varying exchange rate over the years. The reader is referred to Chapter 11, Character and Structure of the Economy, for details concerning the rates in effect at different times.

The spelling of Cambodian place names follows *Cambodia: Official Standard Names Gazetteer*, second edition, 1971, approved by the United States Board on Geographic Names; however, diacritical marks have been omitted. English spellings follow those contained in *Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary*.

The 1968 edition of the *Area Handbook for Cambodia* was prepared by a team headed by Frederick P. Munson and co-authored by Kenneth W. Martindale, David S. McMorris, Kathryn E. Parachini, William N. Raiford, and Charles Townsend.

COUNTRY SUMMARY

1. COUNTRY: Khmer Republic, since October 9, 1970; until then a kingdom tracing its dynastic beginning to A.D. 802. Cambodians trace their history back to a state founded sometime in the first century A.D. Under French Protectorate from 1864 to 1946; gained full independence in 1953 after several years of limited self-rule. National capital: Phnom Penh, with a population of 1.7 million in mid-1972. As of mid-1972 the country was divided into roughly equal parts—one under control of the republican government, and the other under domestic insurgents, aided by Vietnamese Communists.

2. SIZE, TOPOGRAPHY, AND CLIMATE: Area about 69,900 square miles; nearly two thirds forested. Three-fourths of the country consists of central plains with elevations generally under 300 feet. The highest elevation (5,810 feet) in Cardamom Range in the southwest. Near the center of the country is the Tonle Sap, largest fresh-water lake in Southeast Asia. Mekong River traverses country from north to south. Climate tropical, monsoonal; rainy season from mid-April to October, dry season rest of the year.

3. POPULATION: Estimated at 7.1 million in mid-1972, with annual growth rate of 2.2 percent. Of the total population, estimated 2 million persons were refugees in 1972. Urban areas accounted for about 13 percent of the population in 1971; resettling of refugees in cities was significantly changing distribution pattern in 1972. Average population density about 100 persons per square mile; greatest concentrations along the lower Mekong and Tonle Basak rivers.

4. ETHNIC GROUPS AND LANGUAGES: About 85 percent of the population is ethnic Khmer (Cambodian); Chinese, Vietnamese, Cham, and diverse upland tribal groups make up remainder. National language is Khmer, spoken by at least 85 percent of population; members of various minority groups often can speak Khmer in addition to their own languages. French is the accepted language in intellectual and professional circles regardless of ethnic distinction.

5. RELIGION: Theravada Buddhism is the state religion and is practiced by at least 85 percent of the population. Remainder of the population includes some Muslims, small numbers of Mahayana Buddhists, and Roman Catholics and tribal groups practicing a variety of tribal religions.

6. EDUCATION: Public education is free at all levels for those qualified. In school year 1969/70 about 936,000 students enrolled in public primary schools, 112,000 students in secondary schools, 5,800 in technical and vocational schools, and 9,100 in universities. Government-subsidized Buddhist schools (primary, secondary, and university) had additional 28,500 students. Private schools, operated mostly by minority ethnic groups under government license, had about 62,700 students in primary and secondary schools in 1969/70 school year. Literacy, about 60 percent. Educational system disrupted extensively since 1970 because of the war.

7. HEALTH: Considerable progress in public health since independence, but the country suffers from a severe shortage of trained physicians, medical personnel, and facilities. Major diseases: tuberculosis, malaria, dengue fever, diphtheria, filariasis, leprosy, trachoma, small pox, typhoid fever; intestinal parasites are common. Life expectancy is forty-six to forty-seven years.

8. GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS: Republic and centralized state with a presidential system of government in mid-1972. National government divided into an executive branch, a bicameral legislature, and an independent judiciary. Political system, legitimized by new constitution promulgated in May 1972, was still in a formative, experimental stage. Legitimacy and authority of republican government under challenge in 1970-72 period by domestic insurgent forces under titular leadership of Peking-based Prince Norodom Sihanouk, former chief of state. Insurgent forces apparently in control, in mid-1972, of about 50 percent of Cambodian territory inhabited by as much as 30 percent of the population. The country's political subdivisions included: twenty-one provinces; five autonomous municipalities; districts; communes (townships); and villages. In so-called liberated areas insurgents had established their own political infrastructures.

9. INTERNATIONAL MEMBERSHIPS: Member of the United Nations and its specialized agencies as well as some development-oriented, nonpolitical, and nonmilitary regional organizations. Officially declared neutral and nonaligned.

10. ECONOMY: Predominantly agrarian and, since March 1970, dependent heavily on foreign aid; single largest donor of economic help was the United States. Although deficient in known mineral resources, has an abundance of fertile soil, water, and forest resources. In 1969 agriculture contributed 38 percent of the gross national product; industry, 19 percent. Per capita income equivalent to about US$136 in 1971. From 1964 to 1970 economic development hampered by shortage of domestic capital; budget revenues, 15 to 20 percent below expenditures in this period.

11. LABOR: Roughly 80 percent of economically active popula-

tion engaged in agriculture: about 70 percent in rice cultivation; the remainder in mining, manufacturing, construction, utilities, commerce and banking, communications, and services. The 1962 census, latest available figure to mid-1972, showed 2.5 million (or 63 percent) of persons age ten and above as economically active.

12. CURRENCY: Currency unit is the riel, having an open market exchange rate (in mid-1972) of 186 riels to US$1.

13. EXPORTS AND IMPORTS: Virtually all exports agricultural products; major exports are rice and rice products, rubber, and corn and corn products. Major export markets are Senegal, Hong Kong, France, and Singapore. Normal annual export earnings about US$[illegible]0 million. Exports nearly halted in 1971 by war conditions. Major import categories: chemical (including pharmaceuticals), machinery, textiles, iron and steel, automotive equipment, and petroleum products. Normal annual import spending about US$85 million. Essential imports in mid-1972 being maintained by United States economic aid, averaging US$40 million annually.

14. COMMUNICATIONS: Radio, with two networks and eleven transmitter stations, government operated; estimated over 1 million receivers throughout country. Two television transmitter stations, also government operated; estimated 40,000 to 50,000 sets. Estimated 8,500 telephones in 1971. Word-of-mouth communication still an important medium, but radio is principal means of disseminating news and information.

15. HIGHWAYS AND RAILROADS: Roads and trails totaled some 12,000 miles in 1969; 1,632 miles were asphalted, and another 1,370 miles were of gravel or laterite. Road network, centered on Phnom Penh, adequate for peacetime traffic. In mid-1972 much of the road system in republican areas outside Phnom Penh was closed, seriously damaged, or unusable except by convoys under military protection. Two railroad lines from Phnom Penh: southwest to Kampong Saom (168 miles) and northwest through Battambang to the Thai border (239 miles); both inoperable in mid-1972 because of hostilities.

16. PORTS AND WATER TRANSPORTATION: Two major ports: Kampong Saom (Sihanoukville), a seaport, equipped to handle 1 million tons of cargo a year; Phnom Penh, an inland port, less important for international trade. Warfare greatly reduced utilization of Kampong Saom and required naval convoy operations for transit via Mekong River to and from Phnom Penh port. Internal waterways, totaling 1,000 miles at high water, play important part in domestic trade; usually heavily used but greatly disrupted by hostilities.

17. CIVIL AVIATION: Air Cambodge, the national flag carrier,

operated international routes from Phnom Penh to Bangkok, Hong Kong, Saigon, and Singapore, as well as domestic flights to several provincial capitals. Major international airport is at Phnom Penh (Pouthichentong); lesser ones, at Phsar Ream (near Kampong Saom) and Siemreab. Some expansion of domestic air routes begun in 1971 to supplement internal land communications.

18. NATIONAL DEFENSE AND INTERNAL SECURITY: Total strength of republican forces estimated in mid-1972 at 200,000 men, with another 140,000 in paramilitary troops; almost all were army. Navy's strength is about 1,600 men; that of air force, about 2,400. In 1970–72 period almost all the resources needed to support republican forces came from the United States. Authorized national police strength, about 3,600 men in 1971. In mid-1972 hardcore Cambodian communist forces (Red Khmers) estimated at 30,000 men; they were backed up by combined North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces of approximately 60,000 men, well entrenched in Cambodia's eastern border provinces.

KHMER REPUBLIC (CAMBODIA)

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
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KAMPONG THUM
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KRACHEH
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Mekong River
MONDOL KIRI
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KAMPONG CHAM
NOTE
1 ODONGK MEANCHEY
Odongk
2 VIHEAR SUOR
Khum Kampong Ampil
KAMPONG SPOE
Phnum Penh
Kampong Spoe
Prey Veng
Koh Kong
KAOH KONG
Kompong Speu
KANDAL
PREY VENG
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SOUTH CHINA SEA
14
12
10
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BURMA
N. VIETNAM
LAOS
THAILAND
CAMBODIA
S. VIETNAM
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National capital
Province capital
Autonomous municipality
International boundary
Province boundary
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MILES

Figure 1. Khmer Republic (Cambodia)

SECTION I. SOCIAL

CHAPTER 1

GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE SOCIETY

One of the most striking aspects of Cambodian society is the high degree of homogeneity found in its majority group, the ethnic Khmer. The Khmer, who trace their country's origin back to the indianized kingdom of Fu-nan founded in the first century of the Christian Era, are welded into a unitary body by a common language, a long common cultural heritage, and a strong common adherence to Theravada Buddhism, the religion of both the Khmer elite and the masses since the thirteenth century.

Political leaders of all shades, including both those of the Khmer Republic and of the dissident National United Front of Cambodia, with which the republic was in armed conflict in 1972, call for preservation of the main customs and traditions that have given Khmer society its present-day character and individuality. In particular, stress is placed by both sides upon the values and virtues inherited from the civilization of the Angkor period, a time of Khmer greatness from the ninth to the fifteenth century when Khmer literature flourished and sculpture and architecture—exemplified by Angkor Wat, the most outstanding architectural work in Southeast Asia—reached a zenith.

Khmer homogeneity in 1972, however, was best described as a loose cohesion of individuals who felt themselves simply part of a body of like persons. This feeling could not be equated with a sense of nationalism, as thought of in the West but, given the proper external emotional stimulus, it possessed the potential for transformation into a nationalistic attitude. This possibility was apparent to leaders of the republic and of the front as well. The Lon Nol government, for its part, was attempting to arouse a spirit of Khmer nationalism—and support for itself—by centering attention on the Vietnamese character of the invasion of Cambodian territory, whereas the National United Front of Cambodia was using the theme of anti-Americanism to the same ends. It seemed clear that, whatever the outcome of the hostilities underway in 1972, these efforts were bound to strengthen in the popular mind the concept of a national Khmer state.

Apart from the main body of the population are the Chinese, Vietnamese, Cham, and various tribal groups collectively known as Khmer Loeu. Together these several ethnic minorities constitute roughly one-ninth of the total population. They largely follow their own traditions and customs, although over the past one or two centuries some Chinese have merged into the dominant Khmer society. The influence of the Cham and Khmer Loeu has been relatively minor, but that of the Chinese has been of some consequence because of their long domination of much of the country's trade. The Vietnamese (many of whom came to Cambodia during the French Protectorate period) in particular remain a group apart, the focus of much Khmer animosity, which stems largely from the lengthy history of conflict between Cambodia and Vietnam.

Another noticeable feature of Cambodian society is its largely agricultural and rural nature. The vast majority of the Khmer live in villages of a few hundred to about 1,000 persons and are engaged in subsistence agriculture, chiefly rice culture. Large landholders are few, and landless tenants are relatively unknown. A surplus of agricultural land permits the farmer to move with comparative ease when he so decides, and migration is frequent. Food is sufficient in normal times, and farmers generally have a reasonably adequate standard of living. Movement to urban areas has occurred, and there was a large influx of refugees, especially into Phnom Penh, after the outbreak of hostilities in 1970. There appeared, however, to be no widespread discontent with rural life among the nation's farmers.

Since independence the governments, both of Prince Norodom Sihanouk and—since his deposition in 1970—of the Khmer Republic, have pursued modernization of the economy based on a policy of moderate development of industry aimed at producing goods chiefly for the domestic market. The Sihanouk government initiated economic plans in 1956, 1960, and 1968. Although a measure of success was attained under the first two plans, both had to be extended, and achievments did not match plan goals. This was largely owing to lack of experience and the shortage of capital and trained indigenous personnel; unsound economic decisions by Prince Sihanouk also played a part. The 1968 plan was scarcely underway when hostilities broke out in early 1970 and, to all intents, brought it to a halt.

Economic development has been dependent very largely upon foreign aid. Such aid, chiefly furnished by the United States, was providing considerable support to the national budget in the early 1960s. This support resulted in government spending that was well above the level permissible under ordinary circumstances by the nation's overall earning capacity. In 1963 Prince Sihanouk, then head of state, abruptly terminated United States aid. The prince, who was obsessed by a belief in the advantages of nationalization, soon afterward nationalized banking and foreign trade. The loss of United States funds was not matched from other foreign sources, and government operation of foreign trade proved to be considerably less efficient than had been that of private firms.

Budgetary deficits increased in the mid-1960s. Austerity measures were introduced, but the economic situation continued to deteriorate. By 1968 events had forced Prince Sihanouk to accept some liberalization of his earlier emphasis on nationalization, allowing greater private sector participation in the economy. This concession still proved inadequate to stem the economic decline, and increased pressure for a more extensive denationalization was brought on the prince by various members of the government. The prince and leftist advisers bitterly opposed this policy. In early 1970, immediately after his departure for France to obtain medical treatment, the government enacted new liberalization methods. Subsequent to Prince Sihanouk's deposition, other measures by the republican government removed all but a very few restrictions on private enterprise.

Political affairs and policymaking, similar to decisionmaking in economic matters, were dominated from independence in 1953 through 1969 by Prince Sihanouk. This period was one of essentially autocratic rule. The prince, in fact, conducted a personalized form of government in which he often dealt directly with the broad mass of the peasantry.

Two political bodies formed during this time helped him to further his personal control, but at the same time these bodies also acted to retard political institution building. The People's Socialist Community, organized in 1955, encompassed persons of all political spectra; and its predominance in the political scene, as well as its being the only channel of entry into political office, effectively stifled any further development of autonomous democratic party structures. The National Congress, also organized in 1955 and eventually constitutionalized, was a public forum comprised of government officials and of selected persons from the provinces. It was used by Prince Sihanouk to demonstrate his position as head of the administration and to ensure that resolutions embodying his wishes be transmitted to the National Assembly and made into law.

The nation's political power was, at the beginning of 1970, in the hands of an elite group consisting of probably not more than 100 individuals headed by Prince Sihanouk. Its members were mainly French educated; many had aristocratic backgrounds; and a few held senior military ranks. This group, increasingly disturbed by the prince's opposition to economic reforms and also by his inability to prevent growing North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese communist use and control of areas in Cambodia's eastern provinces, decided to remove him as head of state. This action was taken in March 1970 through the National Assembly.

A brief period of indecision existed thereafter on the continuation of the monarchical system, but after public demands the country officially became the Khmer Republic in October 1970. A new constitution, promulgated in May 1972, proclaimed Cambodia a democratic republic devoted to liberty, equality, fraternity, progress, and happiness for its people and called for the renaissance and renewed advancement of Khmer culture.

In contrast with the earlier 1947 Constitution, which declared that all powers emanated from the king, the new constitution placed the source of power in the people. It provided for a governmental system with a balance of power among the three main branches of government. The central governmental structure consisted of a comparatively strong executive, aided by a cabinet; a bicameral legislature; and an independent judiciary. The president can serve only two terms.

The republican system of government is new in Cambodia. The ingrained tradition of a strong central authority remains, and only time can show whether the newly established form of government with its democratic counterbalances will become fully operative and a part of the accepted practice of the political elite. Most of this elite in the republican government in 1972 had been members of the same group during the Sihanouk era. Their new head, President Lon Nol, however, has voiced strong support for a widening of the political power base and for the development of a viable two-party system.

Geopolitical factors, principally Cambodia's position between two historically aggressive neighbors, Thailand and Vietnam, have been main determinants in the formation of the country's foreign policy. Located in the southwestern part of the Indochinese peninsula, Cambodia consists mainly of a large central basin of generally low-lying terrain. Mountainous areas border most of the basin. To the west, however, a break in the peripheral highlands provided an invasion route for Thai power beginning in the fourteenth century. Thai pressures and encroachment continued during the next five centuries, with only occasional and brief interruptions, until the establishment of the French Protectorate over Cambodia in 1864.

Parallel with the later Thai incursions, the Vietnamese to the east began agressively pushing into the lower Mekong delta region, which was then part of the Cambodian kingdom, annexing areas of the region as they advanced. Vietnamese pressures for further concessions continued, and by the mid-1800s Cambodia had been forced to accept dual vassalage. Faced with the likelihood of an eventual partition between its two neighbors, Cambodia then sought a way out through acceptance of the protectorate status.

Although this move allowed the country to maintain its separate existence, it, in fact, resulted in eventual reduction to a French colony. The king continued to be a national symbol, and the Cambodian court bureaucracy was maintained, but effective power was centered in French local administrators. The French, moreover, during much of the protectorate period, instead of training Cambodians for positions of authority found it more convenient to use French-speaking Vietnamese, further exacerbating existing Khmer-Vietnamese antagonisms.

Independence from France in 1953 was welcomed, but it was accompanied by a return to the historical feeling of insecurity. The new government enunciated a policy of neutrality, and this was given the force of law in 1957 by an act of Parliament. This measure also carried a proscription against entering into any foreign agreement based on ideological grounds, although it provided that help could be secured from any friendly source if aggression against Cambodia occurred.

During the 1960s Prince Sihanouk maneuvered, sometimes almost desperately, to maintain his country's territorial integrity and to prevent Cambodian involvement in the Vietnam war. The republican government, after the prince's deposition, announced the country's continued adherence to a policy of strict neutrality. It appealed shortly thereafter for foreign military assistance to help expel the North Vietnamese; this request was made to all countries, regardless of their ideological beliefs.

The government's basic stand in 1972 continued to be a return to neutrality when conditions permitted. Its position differed little from the policy advocated by the National United Front of Cambodia of peaceful coexistence, nonalignment, and neutralism.

CHAPTER 2

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT AND POPULATION

The Khmer (Cambodia) covers 69,898 square miles in the southwestern part of the Indochinese peninsula. It lies completely within the tropics; its southernmost points are only slightly more than 10° above the equator. Roughly square in shape, the country is bounded on the north by Thailand and Laos, on the east and southeast by the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), and on the west by the Gulf of Thailand and by Thailand (see fig. 1).

Much of the country's area is a rolling plain. Dominant features are the large, approximately centrally located Tonle Sap (Great Lake) and the Mekong River, which traverses the country from north to south.

The climate is monsoonal and has marked wet and dry seasons of relatively equal length. Both temperatures and humidities are generally high throughout the year. Forest growth covers about two-thirds of the country but has been degraded somewhat in the more readily accessible areas by burning and by shifting agriculture.

Fish are abundant both in the Gulf of Thailand and in the fresh water of the Tonle Sap and the Mekong. Wild animals, birds, reptiles, and insects are the usual Asian tropical varieties and are without special importance to the economy or to the health of the people.

The natural resources of the country appear to be limited to some iron ore, lesser quantities of manganese, and exploitable phosphate and limestone rock. Some precious stones are found. The Mekong has some hydroelectric generating potential near the Cambodia-Laos frontier, but elsewhere the potential is minor; no other energy sources of any significance within the country were known in 1972.

The population was estimated at over 7 million persons in 1972; the annual growth rate was 2.2 percent. For centuries a large majority of the population, mostly ethnic Khmer, was settled in small farming villages principally located along the lower Mekong River valley and in the area around the Tonle Sap. From independence in 1953 the rate of growth of urbanization was higher than that of the general population, but the trend toward urban

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centers remained relatively slow throughout the latter 1950s and the 1960s. Certain places, including Phnom Penh, Batdambang, and Kampong Cham, registered substantial increases, but by the start of the 1970s only about 13 percent of the total population lived in urban communities.

The growing warfare that followed the deposition of Prince Norodom Sihanouk as head of state in early 1970, however, resulted in massive displacements among the population (see ch. 9; ch. 14). It has been estimated that during 1970 and 1971 almost 2 million persons became refugees. Most of this number (approximately one-third of the population) moved to urban centers, vastly increasing their size.

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

Topography

Three-quarters of the area of the Khmer Republic consists of the Cambodian Basin. This basin's economic importance and population density and the general homogeneity of the people inhabiting it are such as to warrant considering the country essentially a single region. Rimming the basin on the southwest are the Cardamom and Elephant mountain ranges. On the north is the Dangrek Range, and to the northeast and east lies higher land that merges into the Central Highlands of South Vietnam (see fig. 2).

The basin's terrain consists chiefly of plains with elevations generally under 300 feet. Where the altitude increases slightly, the terrain becomes more rolling or dissected. The Cardamom Range, trending generally in a northwest-southeast direction, has elevations rising to over 5,000 feet; an eastern spur of this range reaches a height of 5,810 feet, the highest point in the country. The Elephant Range, running south and southeastward form the Cardamom, has elevations above 3,000 feet. These two ranges are bordered on the Gulf of Thailand side by a narrow coastal plain that was largely isolated until the opening of the port of Kampong Saom (Sihanoukville) in 1960 and the construction of a connecting road and rail line from the port to Phnom Penh.

The Dangrek Range at the northern rim of the basin consists of a steep escarpment with an average elevation of about 1,600 feet. The escarpment faces southward and constitutes the southern edge of the Khorat Plateau in Thailand. The watershed along the escarpment marks the boundary between Thailand and the Khmer Republic. In general the escarpment impedes easy communication between the two countries. Between the western part

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of the Dangrek and northern part of the Cardamom ranges, however, lies an extension of the Cambodian Basin that merges into lowlands in Thailand, allowing easy access to Bangkok.

The eastern end of the Dangrek Range and the northeastern highlands are separated by the valley of the Mekong, which offers a communication route between Cambodia and Laos. To the southeast the basin joins the Mekong delta, which, extending into South Vietnam, provides both water and land communications between the two countries.


THAILAND
LAOS
DANGREK
MOUNTAINS
HIGH WATER LINE
Tonle
Sap
Tonle
Sap
Mekong River
3 635
5 633
5 801
CARDAMOM MOUNTAINS
PHNOM PENH
Mekong
River
Tonle Bassac
ELEPHANT MOUNTAINS
3 547
SOUTH VIETNAM
GULF
OF
THAILAND
SOUTH
CHINA
SEA

Figure 2. Khmer Republic (Cambodia), Physical Features

Soils

The soils are of two main types: alluvial soils deposited in relatively recent times around the Tonle Sap and by riverine flooding and soils that have resulted from rock decay. The first type is particularly extensive in the areas around Phnom Penh and to the south of that city. These soils are subjected to deep annual flooding during the rainy season. They are fertile and are used chiefly for cultivation of rice.

The second type, much more extensively distributed, is red to brown in color and deeply weathered. In the plains areas of the Cambodian Basin these soils are mostly covered with forests, although in a few places they underlie savanna vegetation In the more hilly and mountainous parts of the country such soils are reported to be quite deep in some places; they are usually also covered with forest growth. The agricultural potential of most of this soil type is generally moderate to low. With proper management and employment of fertilizers, however, they can be used for food and commercial crop production.

Climate

The climate, monsoonal like that of all of southern and southeastern Asia, is known as tropical wet and dry because of its distinctly marked seasonal differences. The monsoonal airflows are caused by annually alternating high and low pressures over the central Asian landmass. During the high pressure period in summer, moisture-laden air—the Southwest Monsoon—is drawn landward from the Indian Ocean vicinity. The flow is reversed during winter, and the Northeast Monsoon sends back dry air. The Southwest Monsoon brings the rainy season from mid-April to mid-September or early October, and the Northeast Monsoon flow of drier and cooler air lasts from early November to March. Short transition periods intervene between the alternating seasons, which are marked by some difference in humidity but little in temperature. Temperatures are fairly uniform throughout the basin area, with only small variations from the average annual mean of around 77°F. The maximum mean is about 83°F; the minimum mean, about 72°F. Maximum temperatures of over 90°F, however, are common and just before the start of the rainy season may rise to over 100°F. Minimum temperatures rarely fall below 50°F.

Rainfall from April to September in the Cambodian Basin averages fifty to seventy-five inches annually, with considerable variation from year to year. Rainfall around the basin increases with elevation. It is heaviest in the mountains along the coast in the southwest, which receive from 100 to more than 200 inches of precipitation annually as the Southwest Monsoon reaches the coast (see fig. 3). This area of greatest rainfall, however, drains mostly to the ocean; only a small quantity goes into the rivers flowing into the basin. The relative humidity is high at night throughout the year, usually exceeding 90 percent. During the daytime in the dry season it averages about 50 percent or slightly lower but in the rainy period may remain above 60 percent.

Drainage

The drainage pattern of the Cambodian Basin is centered on the Mekong River and the Tonle Sap. With the exception of a small part of southeastern Cambodia, rivers in the basin drain into these two dominant features of the drainage system. In the southwest the Cardamom and Elephant ranges form a separate drainage divide. To the east of this divide the rivers flow into the Tonle Sap, whereas those to the west debouch into the Gulf of Thailand. Toward the southern end of the Elephant Range, however, some small rivers flow southward on the eastern side of the divide, emptying into the gulf because of the topography.

The Mekong in Cambodia flows southward from the Cambodia-Laos border to below the provincial capital of Kracheh, where it turns westward then southwestward to Phnom Penh. There are


NE
NE
80-120
80-120
SW
60-80
Tonle Sap
40-60
SW
Tonle Sap
Mekong River
OVER 140
80-120
60-80
80-120
SW
120-140
NE
Tonle Bassac
OVER 140
FIGURES REPRESENT ANNUAL RAINFALL IN INCHES

Figure 3. Khmer Republic (Cambodia), Rainfall and Monsoon Airflow

extensive rapids above Kracheh. From Kampong Cham the gradient becomes extremely low, and inundation of areas along the river occurs at flood stage—June through November—through breaks in the natural levees that have built up along its course. From Phnom Penh the river flows generally southeastward. It divides at this point into two principal channels, the new one being known as the Tonle Basak River, which flows independently from there on through the delta area into the South China Sea.

The river's flow is monsoonal — that is, its high and low level points are related to the wet and dry climatic periods that characterize its course through Southeast Asia. Its annual flood waters and the great expansion of the Tonle Sap, which reaches its maximum area in September or early October, are natural factors around which revolve the lives of a considerable part of the country's population. Tonle Sap was once an arm of the sea but was made an inland lake by the gradual silting up of the Mekong delta. The raising of the shore level prevented entry of tidal waters and eventually resulted in the conversion of the Tonle Sap into a freshwater body.

Connected to the Mekong River by the Tonle Sab River, the great lake acts as a natural reservoir during the Mekong's flood period. The cresting waters of the Mekong are too great for discharge by its silted channels and those of its tributaries below the confluence with the Tonle Sab River. During this time the Mekong's waters back up, reversing the flow of the Tonle Sab, and enlarge the area of the Tonle Sap from a low of about 1,000 square miles in the dry season to 4,000 or more square miles at the height of flooding.

When the Mekong's level lowers, the Tonle Sab River again discharges the waters of the Tonle Sap. As the lake retreats, it leaves a new layer of sediment. Poor drainage immediately around the lake and the annual flooding have made a considerable area around it marshland during the dry season that is unusable for agriculture. The amount of sediment carried into the lake during the Mekong's flood stage appeared to be greater than that discharged later through the Tonle Sab River. Gradual silting of the lake would seem to be occurring—the Tonle Sap during low-water level is only about five feet deep, compared with between forty-five and fifty feet at flood stage.

Flora and Fauna

Nearly three-quarters of the Khmer Republic was estimated in the early 1960s to be woodland, covering about 33 million acres. Forty percent of forest was open woodlands, consisting predominantly of tropical broad-leaf, deciduous species, found almost entirely in the basin area. Another one-third was dense rain forest and broad-leaf evergreen forest growing in the southwestern mountains and at higher elevations in the northeast. About a fifth, found mainly east of the Mekong, was dense woodlands of mixed deciduous species. Bamboo stands accounted for about 3 percent of the forested area. Other minor forest growth included moist evergreen forests in the south and west, swamp forest around the Tonle Sap and parts of the Mekong River, and stands of mangroves in some areas along the coast.

There has been considerable deforestation in the plains area. Burning is estimated to ravage about 2.5 million acres annually despite the government's efforts to control the practice. At higher altitudes slash-and-burn agricultural practices decrease the forest cover on a less extensive scale. Both practices result not only in reduction of standing timber but also in degradation of forest species in the succeeding growth. The open forests of the plains, ranging to the lower density of savanna growth, supply abundant firewood, but trees suitable for use as timber are in moderate-to-sparse supply.

The larger species of wildlife are found principally in the higher elevations in the northeast, northwest, and southwest of the country, where there are various kinds of large and small deer, buffalo, elephants, wild oxen, rhinoceros, boar, bears, and some of the greater cats, such as tigers and panthers. The greatest numbers of the larger animals are found in the upper foothills of the Dangrek Range in the northern part of the country. It is here that a species of wild ox known as *koprei*, unique to the Khmer Republic, is found. Monkeys and reptiles, such as lizards, snakes, and crocodiles, are common. Exotic birds, as well as egrets, herons, wild ducks, geese, and pheasants are plentiful in much of the country. Insects include disease vectors such as mosquitoes, several varieties of which transmit malaria.

In general wildlife has not been of economic importance to the agricultural Khmer, although they and the minority peoples have hunted a number of the species for meat to add to their mainly vegetable diet. The French and the succeeding royal government took some measures to protect the more important game species, in part to promote tourism; this included prohibition of the killing of wild elephants.

The freshwater fishery resources of the Tonle Sap and the Mekong and other Cambodian rivers are probably the greatest in Southeast Asia. Saltwater varieties of fish are found in the Gulf of Thailand. The waters of the Tonle Sap support an extraordinary quantity of fish because of a favorable combination of ecological and climatic factors. The seasonally flooded areas produce plankton especially effective as food for the numerous varieties of migratory and nonmigratory fish, which spawn there at high water. As the flood waters recede, the numbers of fish that escape to the permanent shallow lake form an exceptionally dense concentration. The fact that some species of fish have been identified as adaptations of marine forms provides evidence of the conversion, probably within historic times, of the Tonlė Sap into a freshwater lake from an arm of the sea. In the early 1950s it was estimated that the fish population of the lake was seventy pounds per acre, or four times that of the North Atlantic fishing grounds. Since then catches have decreased, apparently reflecting a reduction in the number of fish caused by overfishing, greater sedimentation, and changes in the plant life in the lake.

Natural Resources

The mineral resources of the country have not been systematically investigated. Partial surveys conducted during the period of the French Protectorate revealed some mineral deposits but none of magnitude. The results of investigations carried on by a mission from the People's Republic of China (PRC) during the late 1950s and in the 1960s were termed "very encouraging."

The PRC group reinvestigated long-known iron ore deposits in Kampong Thum Province and concluded that 5.2 million tons of ore could be commercially extracted. Western sources have cited possible resources of high-grade iron ore in the northern part of the country ranging from 2.5 million to 4.8 million tons. The PRC mission also reported manganese ore in two places in Kampong Thum Province, estimated to total about 120,000 tons.

In late 1969 the Cambodian government granted a permit for offshore exploration in the Gulf of Thailand for petroleum to a French company. By 1972, however, there were no reports that oil had been located. Deposits of phosphate and limestone rock and of clay of exploitable quality and quantity were reported. Salt and coal have been reported at unspecified locations.

Rubies, sapphires, zircons have been mined in the country since at least the late 1800s, mostly at Ba Kev in Stoeng Treng Province and at Pailin in Batdambang Province; exploitation has been sporadic since 1912. Gold and silver deposits—none extensive—have been reported in several parts of the country.

The country's hydroelectric generating potential is considerable. The major potential was on the Mekong River at Stoeng Treng and, to a lesser extent, at Kracheh. Other sites of minor importance were on rivers located in the highlands of the northeastern and north-central parts of the country. An engineering study of the rivers flowing into the Tonle Sap showed them to have little if any exploitable potential (probably because of the high seasonal

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variation of their flow). In the higher precipitation area of the southwest mountains a hydroelectric generating installation had been built, but it was not of major capacity. In general, the use of water potential appeared to be more significant to expansion of irrigation.

BOUNDARIES AND ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS

The international boundaries of Cambodia were largely established by the French. The border with Thailand was set by agreements between France and Siam (Thailand) during the colonial period. The Kingdom of Cambodia and the Khmer Republic, as independent successor states to the French Protectorate have recognized this boundary.

As demarcated, the boundary with Thailand is 449 miles long. It coincides with natural features only in its northern sector, where it follows the watershed along the Dangrek Range escarpment. A small area encompassing the ruins of the temple of Preah Vihear, located in the eastern sector of the Dangrek Range, was claimed by both Cambodia and Thailand; the dispute was adjudicated in Cambodia's favor in 1962 by the International Court of Justice (see ch. 3).

Boundaries with Laos (336 miles) and South Vietnam (763 miles) were the result largely of French administrative decisions. They do not follow major landform divisions. Cambodia questioned both boundaries. By 1972 the boundary differences with Laos had been settled. There remained, however, some eleven separate points of disagreement on the Khmer Repuplic-South Vietnam boundary, the most extensive single area in dispute being in the Mekong delta area.

The remaining sector of the Khmer Republic boundary is its seacoast along the Gulf of Thailand. This is about 100 miles in a straight line, but it is heavily indented and, including small offshore islands, the total coastline is actually about 300 miles. Delimitation of territorial waters in the gulf became a problem as a result of the granting of overlapping oil exploration permits by Thailand, South Vietnam, and the Khmer Republic. Cambodia undertook negotiations with both neighboring countries in 1971 to resolve differences among them, but this had not been accomplished by early 1972.

In the eastern highlands, the customary range of habitation of the minority ethnic groups in some cases straddles the border between Cambodia and South Vietnam; this border was reported to be poorly marked. Its location assumed importance during the Vietnam war because it marked the point of entry into South Vietnam of men and supplies moved from North Vietnam down the Ho Chi Minh Trail complex through Laos and Cambodia. The extension of hostilities into Cambodia in 1970 and changes in the country's foreign policy temporarily lessened the political importance of the boundary (see ch. 10; ch. 3).

As of 1972 the Khmer Republic was divided, for administrative purposes, into twenty-one provinces (*khet*), five autonomous municipalities, and an undetermined number of communes (*khum*). Provinces were subdivided into districts (*srok*); and communes, into villages (*phumi*). Under a law adopted in October 1969, the government had also constituted a number of subprovinces (*anukhet*) made up of one or more districts (see ch. 8).

SETTLEMENT PATTERNS

The Khmer and the permanently settled minority peoples—Chinese, Vietnamese, and Cham—are concentrated chiefly on the cultivated land along the Mekong River and around the Tonle Sap. In the area of greatest concentration in the southeastern part of the country—along the lower Mekong and the Tonle Basak rivers—the farming population is clustered on elevations safe from the annual floods. Commonly, they are in villages (each distinguishable by its local *wat*—see Glossary) in nearly continuous lines along the natural levees that form the river banks. The villages of farmers around the Tonle Sap are built on ground edging the swampland that is annually inundated. The houses in villages, whose inhabitants are engaged primarily in fishing in the lake, are either built on stilts and are entirely surrounded when the lake rises or are floating houses, anchored to the lake bottom.

Urban areas are frequently located along navigable rivers. Phnom Penh, the only developed urban center in the country, is situated at the confluence of the Mekong and Tonle Sab rivers, where the Mekong delta begins. Some administrative centers, however, have developed away from waterways. In most towns classified as urban centers, the built-up urban area is only part of a large village.

The minority Khmer Loeu (upland Khmer), found mainly in the forested high plateaus and mountain valleys along the northeastern and eastern frontier, live in small villages that are usually widely scattered. Because of their practice of slash-and-burn agriculture their settlements are essentially temporary and are moved from time to time (see ch. 4).

MANMADE FEATURES

The country had about 3,700 miles of provincial and national highways, and the center of the road network was at Phnom Penh.

Major urban centers were linked by all-weather roads. The road system to the north and northeast was poorly developed. Roads to the east that formed important routes to Saigon have not been regularly usable since the 1960s because of the conflict in South Vietnam and the spillover of the fighting into eastern Cambodia in the early 1970s. A railroad connects Phnom Penh with Bangkok through the gap between the Dangrek and Cardamom ranges in the northwestern part of the country. Another line completed in the late 1960s connects the capital with the port of Kampong Saom (Sihanoukville).

Major permanent airports were located at Phnom Penh and Siemreab (the latter designed chiefly for tourist traffic to Angkor Wat). In all about fifty airfields were found throughout the country; many, however, had temporary surfaces. Smaller airfields permitted communication with border areas not otherwise accessible by road or by navigable rivers. Major ports have been developed at Phnom Penh and Kampong Saom.

POPULATION

Population Structure

As of mid-1972 the only census of Cambodia was that taken in 1962. This showed a population, at the time, of 5.7 million people. Since the 1960s the annual population growth rate has been estimated at 2.2 percent, the lowest in Southeast Asia. Based on this growth rate the mid-1972 population was estimated at 7.1 million.

The 1962 census showed that a high proportion of the population was young; about 46 percent were under fifteen years of age, compared with 41 percent in Southeast Asia generally. Fifty-two percent of the population was between fifteen and sixty-four years of age, and 2 percent was sixty-five years of age or older. The economically active group between the ages of fifteen and fifty-nine, both male and female, constituted 50 percent of the population. There was near equality between the numbers of males and females in the population.

The population was ethnically homogeneous in contrast to the diversity of much of Southeast Asia. The census showed that about 80 percent of the people were ethnic (lowland) Khmer. The balance of the population included Chinese, Vietnamese, Cham, and the upland tribal groups (Khmer Loeu). Estimates since the census place the ethnic Khmer at about 85 percent of the population. Chinese number 425,000. Vietnamese were estimated at 300,000 to 400,000; about half of the Vietnamese were repatriated to South Vietnam in 1970 and 1971. The Cham, about 80,000 in number, were settled in the lowlands. They were largely agricultural and differentiated from the Khmer, among whom they lived, chiefly by adherence to Islam. In addition there were as many as 70,000 upland dwellers grouped together under the classification of Khmer Loeu (see ch. 4).

Population Distribution

The average density of population was estimated at about 100 persons per square mile in 1972; distribution throughout the country was very uneven, however. Population was heaviest in the south-central provinces, which contained slightly over half of the country's people at the beginning of the 1970s. Kandal Province, in which Phnom Penh is located, was the most heavily populated (the 1962 census showed more than 480 persons per square mile) and ranks among the most densely populated areas of mainland Southeast Asia. The least populated provinces were Kaoh Kong, located along the coast and stretching back into the Cardamom Range, and the three northeastern provinces; the 1962 census, for instance, showed Mondol Kiri Province with fewer than three persons per square mile.

The Khmer have been a predominantly rural people. The 1962 census classified 83 percent of the population as rural, 7 percent as semiurban (localities of 2,000 to 9,999 inhabitants),and 10 percent as urban. At that time, the population of Phnom Penh was 393,995. As a result of a trend to urbanization since then, it was estimated that urban areas contained about 13 percent of the population in 1971; over 10 percent of urban inhabitants lived in Phnom Penh. By 1972 the distribution of the country's population apparently had been changed significantly by the flight of refugees largely to urban areas.

The Khmer farming population has shown a high internal mobility. Studies cite instances of the complete disappearance of entire hamlets within a few years. A 1966 study of a village of 258 inhabitants in a densely populated area of Kampong Cham Province found that in the 1961–66 period 20 percent of its original 1961 residents had left. At the end of the period immigrants accounted for 24 percent of the population. This internal migration seemed for the most part to be from one farming village to another, or in some cases to newly opened land, rather than rural-urban migration or the reverse (see ch. 4).

A considerable number of Khmer resided outside the republic in parts of Thailand and South Vietnam that were formerly parts of the earlier Cambodian kingdoms (see ch. 3). Those in Thailand were estimated to number 250,000 in 1970; they were living in areas beyond Cambodia's west and northwest boundaries. The Khmer in South Vietnam have been estimated to number as many as 500,000; they resided almost entirely in the Mekong delta region.

The larger non-Khmer elements of the population—the Chinese and Vietnamese—tended to be urban residents. The Chinese, however, also formed a significant rural agricultural minority in the southwestern coastal areas. Some Vietnamese were also engaged in fishing on the Tonle Sap and in farming in the central-eastern areas near South Vietnam. The Cham lived generally in agricultural communities much like those of the Khmer. The upland tribal groups were found mostly in the sparsely inhabited regions around the periphery of the Cambodian Basin (see ch. 4).

There were small numbers of Europeans and some Asians other than Chinese in the country. The French, the most numerous of the Europeans, were occupied as advisers to the government, in such professions as medicine and teaching, and as businessmen in individual and corporate enterprises. The Asians other than Chinese were mainly Indian and Pakistani businessmen and moneylenders.

Population Dynamics

Vital statistics were largely nonexistent in 1972. United Nations estimates placed the crude birth rate at 47.8 per 1,000 persons in 1966 and the death rate at 15.6 per 1,000 persons. The Office of Population, United States Agency for International Development, estimated birth and death rates in 1970 at forty-two and twenty per 1,000 persons, respectively. The indicated annual growth rate in both cases was about 2.2 percent, which if maintained would result in doubling of the population in thirty-two years.

There were no known organizations in the country in 1972 concerned with family planning activities. The government has shown no interest in population planning or control measures. Oral contraceptives were reportedly available, but a French Protectorate anticontraceptive law of 1920 was still in force. Khmer law made abortion illegal.

A sample survey made in 1959 in 345 villages showed that life expectancy at birth was then 44.2 years for males and 43.3 years for females. A detailed analysis of the 1962 census statistics showed that mortality had probably started to decline after 1945, and this decline was expected to continue; the analysis indicated that by 1970 life expectancy had increased by about 2.5 years, with a higher improvement for females than for males. The analysis also concluded that fertility had shown signs of declining.

International migration has been negligible in population growth. The government has enforced restrictive immigration and naturalization laws that made entry into the country for permanent residence difficult. It was not known whether any relaxation of these laws had occurred in insurgent-held areas.

Refugees

The population of the northeastern part of the country was affected to some extent beginning in 1961 by the military movements and actions in that area connected with the hostilities in Vietnam. Beginning in early 1970 the broadening and intensification of hostilities within the country had had a greatly increased effect on a larger part of the population and had resulted in a massive displacement of people (see ch. 10; ch. 14).

The government has very roughly estimated that more than 2 million people were displaced within the country between March 1970 and September 1971. The largest number were ethnic Khmer fleeing from insurgent-controlled territory and Khmer escaping areas of combat and air strike activities. In addition to this internal refugee movement, it was further estimated that 10,000 Khmer had fled to South Vietnam; 2,000 to Laos; and 1,600 to Thailand.

Many resident Vietnamese had become refugees, both because of military activities and because, in some places at least, they were treated as enemy aliens and were interned. The larger Vietnamese refugee groups originated in the eastern part of the country, whereas internees from the west appeared to be residents of various localities taken into custody by the army. Both groups were included in the Vietnamese who were repatriated to South Vietnam in 1970 and 1971. It was not known how many of the 200,000 Vietnamese remaining in the country were in a refugee status. In all probability, however, the Vietnamese minority in the republican government-held part of the country has been reduced permanently; the traditional Khmer animosity toward them made it unlikely that they would be allowed to return there (see ch. 4).

Only a small percentage of the refugees had registered with the government. There were only a small number of Khmer in refugee camps, and it was thought that the majority had somehow found their own shelter or had joined relatives. The location of the great majority was a matter of guesswork (see ch. 5). Many had presumably moved to Phnom Penh, the population of which was reported to have doubled since early 1970, reaching an estimated 1.2 million by September 1971. Several provincial capitals had experienced comparable increases in population. The longer term effect of the movement—in possible changes in population distribution and settlement patterns, as well as on the economy—could not be estimated.

CHAPTER 3

HISTORICAL SETTING

Cambodia, since October 1970 officially the Khmer Republic, shares with the other nations of the Indochina Peninsula a varied and turbulent history. Tracing its roots back to the Kingdom of Fu-nan, founded in the first century A.D., Cambodia vied for centuries for domination of the rich, fertile lands that form the lower Mekong River valley and the central plain area around the Tonle Sap (Great Lake) in the northwestern part of present-day Cambodia. In frequent wars and armed revolts, especially from the fifteenth century, the nation had to contend with its neighbors Vietnam and Siam (now Thailand) for supremacy of these areas, undergoing through the centuries a series of vicissitudes that saw its status range from that of a ruling power to that of a vassal state. At the height of their power in the beginning of the thirteenth century Cambodians ruled not only what constitutes modern Cambodia but also parts of Vietnam, Laos, the Malay Peninsula, and the basin of the Chao Phraya River in present-day southwestern Thailand.

The country's history can be divided into five distinct periods. The first, that of the kingdoms of Fu-nan and Chen-la, extended from the beginning of the Christian Era to the end of the eighth century. This was followed by the Kambuja (or Angkor) period, lasting until the early 1400s. Cambodia then entered a 400-year period of decline and struggle for existence that saw the country eventually reduced to a vassal of neighboring Thailand and Vietnam and finally ended with the establishment of the French Protectorate in 1864. French control continued for ninety years, and Cambodia then reemerged as an independent state in the mid-twentieth century.

During the first millennium A.D. the region in which Khmer civilization developed was subjected to the almost continuous but peaceful pressure of Indian culture and became, in effect, the site of one of several indianized states on the peninsula. The Indians brought to the area their philosophy and literature, their art and architecture, and their traditional views on life and social organization. This affected the conduct of the monarchy and the practice of religion and of the law and significantly influenced the social order. Indian culture brought the Brahmanic cult of the *devaraja* (god-king), which was adopted by the royal court and the elite. Buddhism was initially introduced in the Mahayana form, but this form eventually was replaced by Theravada Buddism, which continued to be the country's predominant religion (see ch. 7).

During the years from approximately A.D. 802 to 1432, known as the Kambuja or Angkor era, the country enjoyed a period of ascendancy and attained notable heights in its culture, artistic expression, and the extent of its domains. At its peak the empire extended from the Annamite Chain in present-day South Vietnam to the Gulf of Thailand. The arts flourished, particularly the native architecture, and the temples at Angkor were erected during this period. These temples have become a national symbol, and a stylized representation of the towers of Angkor Wat is a central theme in the design of Cambodia's flag. The kings of that era, notably Jayavarman II and Jayavarman VII, have an honored place in local history and legend.

Persistent external pressures and growing internal strife brought the classical Angkor period to a close. The country entered an era of political and cultural decline, and for the next 400 years, until 1864, it was barely able to maintain its territory and even its independence in the face of recurring onslaughts by belligerent neighbors, particularly Siam and Vietnam.

The nation did manage to survive, but by the mid-nineteenth century the desire for security and survival led indirectly to acceptance of French protection, which was climaxed in 1864 by the establishment of a protectorate that made Cambodia virtually a colony of France. The French Protectorate lasted until 1946 when Cambodia became an autonomous state within the French Union, taking the first steps toward becoming a fully independent nation once more. In addition to giving the country a welcome respite of peace, the protectorate provided a cultural legacy that has left a decided French imprint, particularly on the upper strata of the society. In 1972 French influences were readily apparent in the use of language, education, the economy, jurisprudence, social life, and the armed forces.

PREHISTORY

Archaeological evidence indicates that parts of present-day Cambodia were inhabited during the first and second millennia B.C. by peoples having a Neolithic culture. By the beginning of the Christian Era the inhabitants had developed relatively stable, organized societies whose civilization had gone well beyond the primitive stage. The more advanced groups were located along the coast and in the lower Mekong River valley and delta regions, where they practiced irrigated rice culture and employed domesticated animals.

Scholars believe that these peoples may have been of Malayo-Polynesian origin and related to the ancestors of the groups who now people archipelagic Southeast Asia and many of the islands of the Pacific Ocean. These people probably merged with the Mon-Khmers who arrived at a later date. They worked metals, including both iron and bronze, and possessed navigational skills. The Khmer who populate present-day Cambodia apparently migrated from Southeast China to the Indochina Peninsula before the start of the Christian Era. They are believed to have arrived in advance of their present Vietnamese, Thai, and Lao neighbors.

THE INDIANIZED KINGDOMS

Fu-nan

Fu-nan, the earliest and most significant of the indianized states, is generally claimed by Cambodians to have been the first Khmer kingdom in the area. Founded in the first century A.D., it was located on the lower reaches of the Mekong River in the area of the delta. The first historical reference to Fu-nan was by a Chinese mission that visited the country in the third century. The name Fu-nan derives from the Chinese and is believed by modern scholars to be a Chinese rendition of the old Khmer word *bnam* (modern *Phnom*) meaning mountain. What the Funanese called themselves, however, is not known.

According to an early Chinese account the Funanese capital, known as Vyadhapura, was located on the Mekong River near the present-day village of Phumi Banam, in Prey Veng Province. The Capital was then about 125 miles from the sea. (The coastline of the delta area in those days was considerably north of its present location.)

During the early period of its history, the population was probably concentrated in the area along the Mekong River and along the Tonle Sab River below the great lake. Traffic and communications were mostly waterborne on the river and its delta tributaries. The area was a natural region for the development of fishing and rice-growing economy. Maritime trade played an important part in the development of Fu-nan, but the country's expansion was most likely based on the exploitation of agriculture, and there is evidence of the existence at that time of an extensive irrigation system in the heart of the region. Indianization, however, appears to have given Fu-nan its character and influenced its development.

According to legend, the Fu-nan dynasty originated through the marriage of an Indian Brahman named Kaundinya II to the daughter of the Naga snake god king who ruled over the local soil and waters. The king is said to have given the young couple the land as a dowry. The new state prospered and through the conquest of neighboring areas greatly extended its domains. By the fifth century Fu-nan exercised control over the lower Mekong River and parts of its delta, as well as the area around Tonle Sap. It also commanded tribute from smaller states in present-day northern Cambodia, southern Laos, southern Thailand, and the northern portion of the Malay Peninsula.

Indianization during this period proceeded apace, fostered and encouraged by frequent contacts through the exchange of visiting traders, travelers, and diplomats. Indian immigrants, believed to have arrived in the fourth and fifth centuries, furthered the process. By the time of Kaundinya II, who ruled in the fifth century, the country was thoroughly indianized. There was widespread use of the Sanskrit language among the elite; the laws of Manu, the Indian legal code, were put into effect; and an Indic alphabet had been introduced. A modified form of such an alphabet and parts of the legal code are still in use.

Fu-nan's preeminence reached its zenith during the reign of Kaundinya II. The king maintained a high degree of internal security and had reasonably good external relations with his neighbors and surrounding territories. He increased trade with India and China and pursued a China policy that effectively avoided serious confrontation with the powerful empire to the north. During his reign he sent two tributary missions to China; this China policy was adhered to by his successors until the time of the last king of a fully autonomous Fu-nan, Rudravarman, who ascended the throne in A.D. 514.

Beginning in the early sixth century frequent civil wars and dynastic strife seriously undermined the kingdom's stability, making it relatively easy prey to incursions by hostile neighbors. In the latter part of the sixth century the country was attacked from the north by one of its subject territories, the Kingdom of Chen-la. Fu-nan was defeated, the king fled, and the capital was transferred to the site of Angkor Borei in present-day Takev Province. Chen-la did not fully consolidate its conquest until the seventh century, but in the end it became the dominant power in the area and, in a reversal of roles, Fu-nan become its vassal state.

Chen–la

The people of Chen-la are known to have been Khmers. Once their domination of Fu-nan was fully established, they embarked on a course of conquest that was to continue for the next 300 years.

They subjugated central and upper Laos, annexed portions of the Cochin China area of present-day South Vietnam, and brought western Cambodia and southern Thailand under their direct control.

The first Chen-la king whose rule extended over the newly acquired Fu-nan was Bhavavarman, who was apparently the grandson of the Fu-nan king Rudravarman. He and his successors used this relationship to bolster their claims to the legitimacy of their rule, while they gained additional support by preserving intact the Funanese governmental, social, and religious institutions. In the eighth century, however, factional disputes among members of the royal family resulted in the splitting of the kingdom into rival northern and southern sectors. According to a Chinese dynastic chronicle, *The History of the T'ang,* the two separate parts were known as Land Chen-la and Water Chen-la. The names indicate a northern and a southern half, or upper and lower Chen-la.

There followed a period of some turmoil and confusion, and details of the country's course at this point have been the subject of considerable controversy among scholars of Cambodian history. The main facts, however, although challenged in some quarters, appear to be relatively well established. During the approximate span of the eighth century the northern portion, or upper Chen-la, apparently maintained a relatively stable existence. Lower Chen-la underwent a period of constant turbulence, however, rival, and in some cases non-Khmer, dynasties vied for power, and the country was torn by disorder and disunity.

Late in the eighth century lower Chen-la was subjected to piratical Indonesian attacks, although it is not firmly established whether they were from Java, Sumatra, or the Malay Peninsula. Toward the end of the eighth century the country was apparently a vassal of the Sailendra dynasty of Java. The last of the Water Chen-la rulers was allegedly killed around A.D. 790 by a Javanese monarch whom he had offended. The ultimate victor in the civil strife after the death of this ruler was a prince with ties to Sambhupura, a minor Khmer state above the delta. His assumption of the throne in A.D. 802 as Jayavarman II marked the successful liberation from Javanese suzerainty and initiated the unification of the fragmented elements of the nation. This marked the close of the Chen-la era and the beginning of the Kambuja (or Angkor) period of Cambodian history.

Kambuja (or Angkor)

The Kambuja (or Angkor) period lasted from the early ninth century A.D. until the middle of the fifteenth century. Cultural contacts with India continued, and a flourishing literature in Sanskrit developed. The period is called the Classical Era, and during its some 500 years Cambodia attained its zenith in the arts and in the extent of its territory. The name *Kambuja,* westernized into *Cambodia,* is derived from Kambu Svayambhuva, the legendary founder of the original Khmer dynasty.

Kambuja was founded by Jayavarman II, who is said to have lived temporarily in Java, either as an exile or as a hostage, before being nominated by the Javanese as King of Water Chen-la. Upon his assumption of the throne he promptly restored the cult of the *devaraja,* threw off the overlordship of Java, and embarked on a campaign of conquest. He consolidated his power in the region surrounding the great lake of Tonle Sap and established his capital, Hariharalaya, near the site where Angkor was subsequently built.

Upper and lower Chen-la were peaceably reunited during the reign of Jendravarman II (A.D. 944–968). As the empire continued its expansion, the state increasingly became an imperial theocracy. The deified monarch was the designated protector of the state religion, guardian of the sacred law, proprietor of the soil, and owner of the kingdom and its subjects. All officials, estimated to number some 4,000 in the tenth century, were royal appointees and bound to the reigning king by loyalty oaths and through the consignment of their daughters to the royal harem. Provincial administration and supervision of military installations, as well as police, justice, and corvée—or forced—labor functions, were entrusted to royal, court-level ministers of state. With the exception of about thirty districts administered directly by royal governors, vassal states enjoyed varying degrees of local autonomy under liege monarchs.

During the reign of Suryavarman II (1112-ca. 1150) territory was further extended by a series of successful wars: against the Kingdom of Champa, whose people were the Cham of Malayo-Polynesian stock, in the area of present-day South Vietnam; against the Annamese, in northern Vietnam; and against peoples to the west of Kambuja as far as the Irrawaddy River in Burma. Suryavarman II was also the builder of Angkor Wat, the largest religious edifice in the world and considered to be the greatest single architectural work in Southeast Asia. He is also credited with having developed an extensive network of roads and a large irrigation and reservoir system. His reign was followed, however, by thirty years of dynastic upheaval that resulted in a costly war against marauding Chams, who destroyed the city of Angkor in 1177. The invaders were ultimately repulsed by Jayavarman VII (1181-ca. 1215), in whose reign the empire reached its greatest territorial extent. He was the builder of the great capital city complex of Angkor

Thom, in the Angkor area, including its ten miles of walls and the temple of Bayon.

These periods of conquest and construction kept the court and the aristocracy preoccupied with their wars and their building of new capitals and temples, but these were activities with which the common people could scarcely identify. The people could accept the monarchy as the source of authority and preserver of law and order, and they benefited from the effective management of the extensive hydraulic and irrigation system; however, the demanding building programs and the expansionist wars necessitated heavy taxes and forced labor. Around the mid-twelfth century the exploited peasants began to express their discontent in a long series of revolts.

Upon the death of Jayavarman VII, Khmer power entered a period of decline that was to lead to the eventual disintegration of the empire. Continuing peasant revolts against royal demands for labor and military service contributed to this decline, but economic problems brought about by increasing royal neglect of the country's hydraulic works were also an important factor. These developments coincided with a growth of power and influence of the neighboring Thai peoples, who in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries began to challenge the authority of Angkor in the Chao Phraya River basin (in which Bangkok is located) and along the upper Mekong. Finally, the widespread, popular adoption of Theravada Buddhism during the thirteenth century spread a new philosophy that advocated the salvation of the individual through his own efforts and did not lend doctrinal support to a society based on an opulent aristocracy maintained through the virtual slavery of the masses.

In the thirteenth century independent Thai kingdoms were established in former Khmer territory. In 1353 a Thai army captured Angkor; it was recaptured later, but wars with the Thai continued. Angkor was looted a number of times, and thousands of artists and scholars were carried off into slavery in Siam, including the entire Cambodian ballet. At this time, too, Khmer territory north of the present-day Laotian border was lost to the Lao kingdom of Lan Xang.

Warfare, which appears to have gone on relatively continuously between the Thai and Khmer throughout the latter half of the fourteenth century and early part of the fifteenth century, culminated with the Siamese capture and sack of Angkor Thom in 1431. This led to its abandonment as the capital of the empire. The fall of Angkor marked the end of a definite cultural cycle—which produced the magnificent architecture, temples and monuments, sculptures, decorations, and Sanskrit inscriptions—and brought to a close the Kambuja era.

STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL (1432–1864)

During the next four centuries the country's energies were frequently occupied with resisting the aggressive onslaughts of its belligerent neighbors, Siam and Vietnam. After the fall of Angkor the capital was moved, in 1434, to the site of present-day Phnom Penh. A period of relative peace appears to have prevailed until 1473, at which time the Siamese again attacked. They were forced to withdraw three years later. Toward the end of the 1400s and in the early 1500s internal dynastic strife occurred. This was ended about 1516 when Ang Chan, a member of the royal line, firmly established himself as ruler.

Ang Chan's rule lasted half a century, during which time Cambodia regained some of its earlier glory. The capital was moved north of Phnom Penh to Lovek (now Khum Peam Lvek) on the Tonle Sab River. The new capital was protected by stone fortifications, and a number of Buddhist temples were built within its limits. Ang Chan invaded Siam in 1531 and successfully repelled a subsequent counterattack. About the mid-1500s dynastic dissension in Siam and Burmese attacks upon that country weakened it. Ang Chan again invaded Siam on a number of occasions and in 1564 reached the Siamese capital of Ayuttha, which he found occupied by the Burmese.

Ang Chan's successors continued to attack Siam; however, in the early 1580s Phra Naret emerged as a powerful new Siamese leader and, to assist him against Burma, entered into a treaty with the Cambodian ruler at that time. A falling-out occurred that led to Siamese attacks on Cambodia and eventually, in 1594, to the capture of Lovek. A Siamese military governor was placed over the city, and for the first time a degree of alien political control was established over the kingdom.

After the withdrawal from Angkor and its highly developed agricultural economy, the royal court appears to have become more dependent on commerce to provide revenues. The Khmer peasants, however, at the time were not equipped to handle trade (there had been little domestic trade since most areas of the country were generally self-sufficient), and foreign traders quickly took over. Some were from other Southeast Asian and South Asian countries, but the majority of this new group seems to have been Chinese. The Chinese established themselves in Phnom Penh, where by the early 1600s they were estimated to make up about one-seventh of the population. They lived in a separate enclave, which they ran more or less independently of the Khmer authorities. Other non-Khmer groups apparently functioned much the same way. The pattern of Chinese extraterritoriality continued to exist until 1958 (see ch. 4).

European countries, which were rapidly expanding their trade in Southeast Asia in the sixteenth century, showed little interest in Cambodia. Early European contacts were principally by missionaries and by both Portuguese and Spanish adventurers who arrived in Cambodia after the mid-1500s. Buddhist opposition caused the missionaries to leave, but during the last decade of the century in particular the Cambodian political scene was greatly affected by actions initiated by Spanish soldiers of fortune. In 1593, as the Siamese were pressing toward Lovek, King Sattha requested help through the Spaniards from the Spanish governor of the Philippines. Aid was sent but arrived too late; the Spaniards found that Lovek had already fallen and that King Sattha was a refugee in Laos. The Spanish expedition withdrew, but two members of its party went via Vietnam to Laos, where they discovered that King Sattha and his eldest son had died. The Cambodian court learned of the Spaniards' presence and, apparently somewhat terrified, asked Sattha's second son to return as king.

This he did, in 1597, and was installed as Barom Rachea II. He brought with him the two adventurers who had an immense influence over him. Additional Spaniards arrived, and efforts were made to have the king accept a Spanish protectorate. In 1599, however, a major incident involving the Spaniards and the Malays erupted in Phnom Penh. This resulted in the death of most of the Spaniards and brought to an end the Spanish intervention in Cambodia. Dutch trading interests established themselves at Phnom Penh in the early 1600s. In the 1640s Dutch residents were seized and some were killed. A treaty was signed with the Dutch in 1655, but it failed to give them the monopoly they wanted, and European commercial interest in Cambodia generally ceased. This interest was not revived until the arrival of the French after the mid-nineteenth century.

From the early 1600s until the establishment of the French Protectorate in 1864, Siam and Vietnam struggled for control of Cambodia. Various Cambodian kings sought the support of either country at times in an effort to maintain a degree of independence or attempted to set one against the other to the same end. In 1620 an alliance with the Vietnamese was confirmed by the marriage of King Jayajettha to a Vietnamese princess, who was the daughter of King Sai Vuong of the Nguyen dynasty, which controlled Vietnam below the seventeenth parallel. The alliance served to ease Siamese pressures for a time but had far-reaching consequences. Vietnamese migrants had been pushing from the north into Cambodian territory in the Mekong delta region, and in 1623 Cambodia acceded to a Vietnamese request to establish a customhouse at Prei Kor, the site of the present city of Saigon. These steps led to further Vietnamese settlement in the delta and, eventually, to its complete loss to Vietnam.

There were periods in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries during which Cambodia's neighbors were preoccupied with internal or external strife that afforded the beleagured country a breathing spell. The Vietnamese were involved in a lengthy civil war until 1674, but upon its conclusion they promptly proceeded to annex sizable areas of contiguous Cambodian territory in the delta. For the next 100 years they used as pretexts for their continued expansion the alleged mistreatment of Vietnamese colonists in the delta; by the end of the eighteenth century they had extended their control to the limits encompassed in 1972 by the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam).

Siam, which might have been courted as an ally against Vietnamese incursions in the eighteenth century, was itself involved in a major conflict with Burma, during which the Thai capital of Ayudhya was besieged and destroyed (1767). The Siamese quickly recovered, however, and soon reasserted their dominion over Cambodia. The youthful king Ang Eng, a refugee in the Siamese court, was installed in 1795 in the Cambodian capital at Odongk (to which it had been moved from Lovek in the early 1600s) with the support of Siamese troops. Siam at the same time quietly annexed Cambodia's three northernmost provinces. The provinces of Batdambang and Siemreab (their boundaries differed from those of the present-day provinces of the same name) also became essentially a Siamese fief.

A renewed struggle between Siam and Vietnam for control of the country in the early 1800s resulted in a period of Vietnamese domination. In 1841 Cambodia revolted against Vietnamese rule, and Siam took up the struggle against Vietnam. After several years of fighting, an accord was reached among Cambodia and its two neighbors placing Cambodia under the joint suzerainty of both Vietnam and Siam. At the request of Cambodia Ang Duong, the grandson of Ang Eng, was installed as king in 1846 but subject to dual vassalage.

Ang Duong appears to have feared that his neighbors would sooner or later partition Cambodia between them. In an effort to secure a strong protector, he appealed to Napoleon III of France for assistance but was unsuccessful.

Ang Duong's son Norodom ascended the throne in 1859. Norodom resumed negotiations for French protection in 1862 with the French resident in Saigon; in mid-1862 Vietnam had ceded Saigon and the three eastern provinces of Cochin China to France. An agreement was reached, but before it could be ratified, Norodom, who was still uncrowned, was pressured by the

Siamese into concluding a treaty reconfirming Siamese suzerainty over Cambodia. A factor was the Siamese possession of the Cambodian crown and royal regalia, which had been captured as booty some years before.

In 1863 the French offered to transform the right of suzerainty acquired from Vietnam into a protectorate over Cambodia. Norodom accepted the offer but, while the French were weighing ratification in Paris, Siam threatened to invade Cambodia and to retain the royal insignia. The French moved to block Siam from asserting further claims to dominion over Cambodia, although they did recognize Siam's suzerainty over the provinces of Batdambang and Siemreab. They finally compelled Siam to return the royal regalia, and it was delivered to the Cambodian capital at Odongk; the French resident himself crowned Norodom king there on July 3, 1864. It was not until 1867, however, that the French succeeded in persuading Siam to renounce its last claims to dominion over Cambodia.

The agreement with France was formalized in the Protectorate Treaty of 1863, and the convention announcing the protectorate was proclaimed in 1864. The arrangement provided for French protection against external attack and also against internal disorder. This was a favorable stipulation for Norodom, as his brother Si Votha, who wanted the throne for himself, was preparing to renew dissident activity that could well provoke Siamese intervention. In return, Cambodia permitted the French to settle in the country and granted rights to exploit the land, bring goods in free of duty, and establish separate courts for foreigners. France made no claims on Siam at the time for Batdambang and Siemreab; however, the two provinces were recovered under the terms of a Franco-Siamese treaty in 1907.

THE FRENCH PROTECTORATE (1864–1946)

The Franco-Cambodian Treaty of 1863 gave France exclusive control of foreign affairs and the obligation to defend Cambodia against external and internal enemies. A French *résident supérieur* (governor general) was installed in Phnom Penh, where King Norodom had moved his capital. The governor general had widespread political, economic, and social powers and in effect became the ruler of the country. The protectorate was not unopposed, and there were a number of minor revolts in the 1860s and 1870s; they were put down by the French with relative ease, however. About the beginning of the 1880s King Norodom began asserting his independence—this was at a time when France was preoccupied in Tonkin. In 1884 he refused to join in a proposed customs union with Annam and Cochin China. In response, the French governor general of Cochin China moved troops and gunboats on Phnom Penh from Saigon and threatened the royal palace. The king was coerced into signing a new convention, one more stringent than the treaty of 1863, that made Cambodia a de facto colony of France. This occasioned a new revolt, led by Si Votha, which broke out in early 1885 and was not put down until mid-1886 after severe losses to the French.

Control of the country was exercised through a hierarchy of *résidents* (local governors) located strategically throughout the kingdom; the king remained as a national symbol and religious head. A centralized, bureaucratic Cambodian administration was maintained, but its ranking officials were powerless figureheads. Most traditional social customs and institutions were left largely intact, although the French early embarked on a broad program of economic development and reform (see Socioeconomic Development, this ch.). After 1887 Cambodia became part of the Indochina Union, which included Annam, Tonkin, Cochin China, Laos, and Chan-chiang—a French leasehold on the coast of the South China Sea.

France's primary interest in Cambodia was its strategic location with respect to the coastal area of France's new acquisition—the Indochinese peninsula (present-day Vietnam). It served as a buffer state against a challenge from Siam, or even England, which was active in India and Burma. The principal French preoccupation, therefore, was the maintenance of order and internal security. They did little to train Cambodians for administrative positions of any responsibility and made extensive use of the Vietnamese, in whom they had more confidence. It was not until after 1936 that Cambodians were used at any but the lowest administrative levels.

When King Norodom died in 1904 after a forty-five-year reign, his kingdom was peaceful and prosperous but powerless. At French instigation his sons were passed over, and his brother Sisowath came to the throne. The latter reigned until 1927 and was succeeded by his son Sisowath Monivong, who reigned until 1941. The French, however, considered Monivong's son Monireth to be too independent minded. Beset by the war in Europe and Japanese pressures on Indochina, they brought about the selection as king of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, a great-grandson of Norodom through the paternal line. This feat was effected through control of the Cambodian Council of Ministers and treaty agreements that made all the king's actions subject to the approval of the governor general.

The selection of Prince Sihanouk was justified on the basis of a dispute over the throne between the Norodom and Sisowath branches of the royal family. The French felt that Prince Sihanouk, with his ties to both sides, would help to reconcile the dynastic disagreements. Moreover, the youthful prince, who was in high school in Saigon at the time of his selection, was considered a docile and malleable candidate.

After the establishment of the Vichy government in 1940, the Japanese forces moved into Vietnam and displaced French authority. The government of Thailand (Siam had changed its name in 1939), taking advantage of an accommodation with Japan, presented a note to the Vichy government requesting assurances that in the event of an interruption of French sovereignty its former Cambodian (and Laotian) territories would be returned to Thailand. The request was rejected, and resulting strained relations led to a series of border incidents. In January 1941 a Thai force invaded Cambodia. The land fighting was indecisive, but the Vichy French defeated the Thai forces in a naval engagement off the Thai island of Ko Chang in the Gulf of Thailand. At this point the Japanese intervened and compelled the French authorities to agree to a treaty ceding to Thailand the provinces of Batdambang and Siemreab.

In mid-1941 Japanese forces entered Cambodia, but until early 1945 the Japanese permitted the Vichy French to continue nominal control. They then dissolved the entire French colonial administration and urged Cambodia (along with Laos and Vietnam) to declare its independence but within the Japanese-sponsored Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. King Sihanouk declared Cambodian independence on March 12, 1945. A nationalist leader, Son Ngoc Thanh, who had been in Japan since 1942, returned to Cambodia in May and was appointed foreign minister. On the eve of Japan's surrender on August 15, 1945, a new anti-French government was set up by Son Ngoc Thanh, himself acting as prime minister. In October an Allied force occupied Phnom Penh, and Son Ngoc Thanh was arrested for collaboration with the Japanese and sent into exile in France to be under house arrest. Some of his supporters went to northwestern Cambodia, then still under Thai control, where they banded into the Free Khmer (Khmer Issarak, later known as Khmer Serei—see Glossary). Their goal was complete independence from France.

King Sihanouk then agreed to send delegates—with the provision that they be considered representatives of an independent nation—to Saigon to negotiate a new arrangement for France's relations with Cambodia. The result was an agreement, signed in January 1946, that recognized Cambodia as an autonomous state within the French Union. In practice, however, final authority on most vital issues remained in the hands of the French commissioner. France also undertook to negotiate the return of the provinces ceded to Thailand in 1941, and this was effected in November.

EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN STATE

In September 1946 the Consultative Assembly was elected by adult male suffrage for the purpose of considering a draft constitution drawn up by a joint French-Cambodian commission. Two main political groups competed for power in this election: the Liberal Party, which was actually conservative and largely composed of upper level civil servants, landowners, and persons associated with the royal court; and the Democratic Party, which drew its membership from lower government officials, teachers, and younger elements who wanted a change in the existing order. This party also attracted members from the Khmer Issarak, who were supporters of Son Ngoc Thanh, who had been granted amnesty. Fundamentally, the two parties differed on the limits of royal authority and continuance of French rule. The Liberal Party, whose members held a vested interest in the existing system, generally favored the prolongation of French control and a strong monarchy. The Democratic Party, on the other hand, wanted French rule ended (although it favored the French parliamentary system) and restriction of the king to strictly formal constitutional functions.

In the elections the Democratic Party obtained a substantial majority. The party rejected the draft constitution and passed its own version. The new constitution, although not to his liking, was promulgated by King Sihanouk on May 6, 1947. It appeared to limit the king for the most part to functions customary in a constitutional monarchy; however, it was actually unclear on his powers, a point that King Sihanouk later used to advantage. It also recognized the king as spiritual head of the state.

Elections were held in December 1947 for the first representative National Assembly, which was convened in January 1948. A body called the Council of the Kingdom, which was largely an advisory group, was convened the following month. The Democratic Party won a large majority in the new assembly. Meanwhile, the party's original head, a member of the royal family who constituted a unifying force, had died, and the party came largely under the control of the Khmer Issarak.

Dissension among Democratic Party members was rampant in 1948 and continued when Yem Sambaur, leader of a dissident faction, became prime minister in early 1949. The party appeared united only in one respect—their opposition to legislation sponsored by the king or his supporters. In particular, the Democratic Party opposed the king's attitude of acceptance of independence within the French Union, proposed in a treaty offered by the French in late 1948; they insisted on unencumbered national freedom. King Sihanouk's position appears, however, to have been based on realistic considerations and the belief that this was the best deal obtainable.

Determined to prevent ratification of the treaty, Democratic Party assemblymen passed a motion of censure against Yem Sambaur (who had withdrawn from the party). The prime minister thereupon, with the king's approval, dissolved the assembly in September 1949. The treaty was then agreed upon by an exchange of letters between the two governments and went into effect in November 1949; assembly ratification of this treaty was never subsequently secured.

The treaty granted Cambodia qualified independence. The protectorate was formally abrogated, and the country was given control of most phases of its internal administration. It was, however, still required to coordinate foreign policy matters with the High Council of the French Union, and France retained certain authority with respect to judicial and economic affairs. Newly authorized Cambodian armed forces were under Cambodian command, but control of wartime military operations remained in French hands. France was also permitted to maintain military bases on Cambodian territory. In 1950 the country was accorded diplomatic recognition by the United States and most noncommunist powers but, in Asia, only Thailand and South Korea extended recognition.

New elections were not held until September 1951. In the meantime King Sihanouk ruled through a provisional government appointed by himself and headed by Yem Sambaur. The principal reason given by the king for retaining the reins of power was increased activity by the Khmer Issarak—not all of whom had accepted the offered amnesty—and invasion by the Viet Minh (see Glossary). He was greatly concerned over Viet Minh infiltration, which had started in a small way around 1946 but had increased as the Khmer Issarak in the field broke up into a number of separate groups. Some of these groups came under Viet Minh control, but Khmer-Vietnamese antagonism prevented any large-scale cooperation. The Viet Minh, therefore, began setting up their own Communist-controlled organizations. These drew to some extent on the resident Vietnamese population for members and support. In early 1950 Viet Minh action also resulted in the establishment of a resistance government on Cambodian soil. Although this was fronted by Cambodians, little evidence exists of any substantial participation in this movement by the Khmer Issarak. The following year the Viet Minh announced formation of the Joint National Front for Indochina, which included members of the Khmer Issarak.

The Democratic Party won the September 1951 elections, but in the new National Assembly, seated in October, it failed once more to come up with a firm program. The party also strained its relations with the king by shifting many competent civil servants to reward party loyalty. In an effort to secure a more dynamic government, the king had obtained the release of Son Ngoc Thanh from the French; Son returned to Cambodia in October 1951. Near the end of the year, Son began demanding the withdrawal of French troops and continued this demand in early 1952 in a weekly newspaper he founded. The newspaper was forced to cease publication in March, and Son fled Phnom Penh to join the Khmer Issarak. Demonstrations broke out against the French. The actions of the government under the Democratic Party were ineffective (as were its moves against the Khmer Issarak). At the same time, intraparty disputes concerning the monarchy arose.

In June 1952 King Sihanouk announced dismissal of the cabinet and his assumption of control of the government as prime minister for three years in order to restore order in the National administration, enforce security throughout the nation, and try to get full independence for the country. Then, without constitutional sanction, he dissolved the legislature in January 1953 and proclaimed martial law.

The king exercised direct rule for almost three years, from June 1952 to February 1955. After dissolution of the assembly in January 1953 he created an advisory council to supplant the national legislature; appointed his father regent; and set off, in March 1953, on what he called a pleasure trip to Europe, Canada, and the United States but which was actually an intensive campaign to bring before the world the case for complete independence for Cambodia. The temper of the country at the time was such that it appeared clear that, if he did not soon achieve Cambodia's complete independence, public opinion would switch to Son Ngoc Thanh, leader of the Khmer Issarak, which was fully committed to attaining that goal. The king returned to Cambodia in May with few apparent results. At home, however, elements of the Khmer Issarak came over to the government side. To further dramatize his effort, the king left Phnom Penh in June and went to Bangkok, announcing that he would not return until the French gave assurances that full independence would be granted. He did, however, return to Siemreab, which was then autonomously controlled by Cambodian troops, and worked on plans for resistance if the French did not meet his terms.

Faced with rising militancy throughout the country and beset with a deteriorating military situation in Vietnam and Laos, the French government, on July 3, 1953, declared itself ready to grant full independence to the three Associated States. Cambodia, however, took a firm stand, insisting on its own terms, which included sovereignty over its defense establishment, its courts, and its currency. The French yielded; the police and the judiciary were transferred to Cambodian control at the end of August, and on September 1 the country was placed under its own military command. Under the terms of an additional agreement signed in October, the French army relinquished operational control of all military forces except those east of the Mekong River, which included three Khmer battalions operating in the area. King Sihanouk, now a hero in the eyes of his people, returned to Phnom Penh, and on November 9, 1953, Independence Day was celebrated. The final step of the transfer of economic controls was taken in 1954.

INDEPENDENT CAMBODIA

Although independence was achieved, a threat to its continued existence was soon posed by the Viet Minh. Some additional Khmer Issarak joined the government, but at the same time Viet Minh activities increased. In early April 1954 several regular Viet Minh battalions entered Cambodia. Cambodian forces attacked but did not bring about their complete withdrawal. In part, this Viet Minh action may have had the purpose of strengthening the Viet Minh position at the international Geneva Conference, which had been called for late April to restore, among other things, peace in Indochina.

The Geneva Conference was attended by representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), Cambodia, France, Great Britain, Laos, the People's Republic of China, the State of Vietnam (predecessor of South Vietnam), the Soviet Union, and the United States. The discussions on Indochina began on May 8, 1954. The North Vietnamese attempted to get representation for the resistance government that had been set up in 1951 but failed. On July 21, 1954, the conference reached an agreement calling for a cessation of hostilities in Indochina. It stipulated with respect to Cambodia that all Viet Minh military forces be withdrawn within ninety days and that Cambodian resistance forces be demobilized within thirty days. In a separate agreement signed by the Cambodian representative, the French and the Viet Minh agreed to withdraw all forces from Cambodia by late October 1954.

The communist representatives in Geneva attempted to force a position of neutrality on the Indochina states. They also wanted the inclusion of a provision that would, in essence, prevent the basing of United States troops on their territory—Cambodia had earlier appealed to the United States for aid. Cambodia adamantly refused to agree to this, and its terms were finally accepted (see ch. 10).

The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Cambodia (commonly known as the International Control Commission) was established by the agreement. Made up of representatives from Canada, India, and Poland, it supervised the cease-fire, withdrawal of foreign troops, release of prisoners of war, and overall compliance with the terms of the agreement. The French Union forces were withdrawn, and in October 1954 most of the Viet Minh forces also were withdrawn. Son Ngoc Thanh, the only remaining dissident Khmer Issarak leader of any stature, announced (from exile in Thailand) his submission to the government. He requested an audience with the king but was refused, and he remained in exile.

The Geneva Agreement had also provided for national elections to be held. In 1955 King Sihanouk called for a nationwide referendum to determine whether or not he had fulfilled his mandate of attaining the independence and security of his country. As a special privilege, monks and members of the armed forces, usually barred from the franchise by the constitution, were given permission to vote. The king obtained 99.8 percent of the total ballots cast. He then announced that he was proposing major constitutional changes that would be submitted to a referendum. The changes would, in essence, do away with the political party system and result in the removal of power from all sources except the king. Considerable oppositon developed, and the government then announced that elections would be held according to the existing constitution. On March 2, 1955, the king abdicated in favor of his father, Norodom Suramarit, and declared that this action was necessary in order to be free to enter fully into political life without the restrictions placed on the monarch by the constitution.

Although no longer king, Sihanouk was still a prince of the royal family and surrounded by the aura of his previous position. Moreover, he had gained additional prestige during his crusade for independence, and doubts as to his patriotism, a key factor in some dissidents' justification of their seeming disloyalty to him, had been for the most part removed. Exercising his new freedom, Prince Sihanouk promptly started building a political organization known as the People's Socialist Community (Sangkum Reastr Niyum—commonly called Sangkum). Its stated objectives were to unify the country; instill patriotism and loyalty in the Khmer tradition; inspire opposition to injustice, bribery, and corruption; develop a regard for the ordinary people; and maintain loyalty to the monarchy and Buddhism (both considered essential to achievement of party goals). It also pledged to press for needed constitutional reforms.

National elections were held in September 1955. The chief opponents of the Sangkum were the Democratic Party and the smaller, procommunist People's Party (Pracheachon), which was supported largely by leftist-leaning former members of the Khmer Issarak. The Sangkum won 83 percent of the votes cast and all the seats in the National Assembly. The elections were observed by the International Control Commission, which expressed the view that the political settlement envisaged in the Geneva Agreement had been attained. In October a new government was formed, and Prince Sihanouk was its prime minister.

In late 1954 the government had enunciated a policy of neutrality for Cambodia. Prince Sihanouk restated this position after the 1955 election victory of the Sangkum, and three months later, on entering into an agreement with the United States for military assistance, he emphasized that the agreement meant no change in Cambodia's neutralist stance. In February 1956, as if to point out his independence, he visited the People's Republic of China (PRC) and while in Peking signed a friendship declaration with the PRC. In April 1956 the country's neutralist policy was further confirmed by a national congress of the Sangkum. At the same time, military alliances with any foreign powers and association with the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) were rejected—SEATO's unilateral extension of protection to Cambodia had also been rejected earlier by Prince Sihanouk after the 1955 election. This policy of neutralism subsequently characterized Cambodia's international stand in the latter 1950s and throughout the 1960s (see ch. 10).

The government's neutralist policy and relations with communist countries were received with little enthusiasm by Cambodia's neighbors, Thailand and South Vietnam. Border disputes arose that resulted in frequent skirmishes and temporary closing of frontiers. Diplomatic relations with Thailand were broken off in 1958 but were restored the following year through the mediation of the United Nations. They were again severed in 1961 and continued in that state throughout the 1960s.

Relations with South Vietnam were, if anything, more strained. There were continuing recriminations concerning Cambodian treatment of the Vietnamese minority in Cambodia and South Vietnamese treatment of Cambodians (principally living in the Mekong delta region and known as the Khmer Krom) in South Vietnam. South Vietnam also, during the 1960s, accused Cambodia of permitting Viet Cong sanctuaries on Cambodian territory and of allowing the transit of materials and supplies from North Vietnam to communist-controlled areas in South Vietnam. Cambodia, for its part, charged South Vietnam (also Thailand) with harboring members of the Khmer Serei (formerly, Khmer Issarak) who were attempting to destroy the established Cambodian government.

In early 1959 the government reported the discovery of a plot against the regime, allegedly organized in Bangkok by Son Ngoc Thanh, the leader of the Khmer Serei. Later that year the governor of Siemreab Province, a former member of the Khmer Issarak, led an armed revolt. The uprising was quickly suppressed, but the Cambodian government charged that it had been abetted by the United States and South Vietnam. Relations with South Vietnam were broken by Cambodia in 1963, and those with the United States, in 1965 (see ch. 10). In 1967 Cambodia recognized the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, and recognition was also given to the communist Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam when that organization was set up in 1969.

Although the Sangkum won a notable victory in 1955, it was not followed by political stability. Between 1955 and the succeeding election held in March 1958, nine governments were formed, four of them led by Prince Sihanouk; the prince retired during this time on several occasions but returned essentially to restore a semblance of stability. The instability appears to have been largely caused by the heterogeneous nature of the Sangkum—and consequently of the National Assembly—and the divergent interests of its members, which resulted in internal dissensions. Organized opposition played a minor part, and in the 1958 elections it was offered only by the People's Party, which put up two candidates, neither of whom won.

In July 1958 Prince Sihanouk, who had been out of office for over a year, again assumed the premiership. In April 1960 King Suramarit died, and the prince resigned as prime minister. A referendum was held in early June that indicated overwhelming support for his policies. Demonstrations then occurred supporting him, and he was asked by the National Assembly to assume control of the government again under the title of head of state;

this he did on June 20. The queen (widow of the late king) remained resident in the palace as a symbol of the monarchy but had none of the constitutional powers of a reigning ruler. Prince Sihanouk remained leader of the Sangkum and became supreme commander of the armed forces; the High Council of the Throne was set up as a link between the executive and the monarchy.

As the 1960s began, organized opposition to Prince Sihanouk and the Sangkum no longer existed, having disappeared after the 1958 election. As the 1960s progressed, within the Sangkum some questioning of policies developed related to economic problems and the gradual extension of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong presence and the government's inability to cope with it. Resentment also arose over the prince's autocratic style of leadership. In general, however, these factors did not present a major threat to Prince Sihanouk's position, and he continued to dominate the political scene throughout the 1960 decade (see ch. 9; ch. 11; ch. 14).

SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The primary purpose of the French in establishing their protectorate in 1864 was to protect French interests in the area comprising present-day Vietnam. This attitude underwent little noticeable change during the eighty years of the protectorate. Nevertheless, the introduction during the period of social and political measures based on French concepts had a general effect upon Cambodian society (see ch. 4).

An early example of such measures was the abolition of debt slavery in 1884. Before then, debtors were bound to a master in essentially the same way as captives became slaves in previous periods. Such debt slavery carried much of the debasement of status and personality that was earlier associated with enslavement after conquest and captivity. The colonial regime also introduced a modern judicial and police system patterned after that of France, and Cambodian armed forces were organized and trained in the French tradition. The Cambodian government made some revisions after independence in the courts, the penal code, and the police, but through the 1960s these remained essentially French in character, as did the armed forces (see ch. 8; ch. 14).

French influence upon education was also profound. At the start of the protectorate, education was handled entirely by monks who taught male children in local temple schools. Except for the establishment of a few new French primary schools in some provincial capitals, little was done to expand education until 1911. In that year King Sisowath decreed mandatory education for all boys at the age of eight years, to be given at the temple schools. The decree was largely ignored, however.

Shortly after the 1911 decree the state began establishing a limited number of schools, modeled along French lines, in different parts of the country. A new effort to extend education was made in 1916 when the king decreed that all children within a certain radius of these schools were to be sent to them upon reaching ten years of age. This decree was also generally ignored.

Then in 1918 the French administration initiated a permanent educational system for Cambodia as part of plans to establish the French school system throughout all Indochina. Meager results were obtained in Cambodia, however, because of a decided Cambodian preference for the traditional schools. Another attempt to introduce modern education began in the mid-1920s through modernization of teaching methods and the curriculum in the temple schools. This idea was acceptable to many parents, and the system was gradually expanded (see ch. 6).

Throughout the protectorate period the French exhibited little interest in providing Cambodians with education beyond the primary level and relied instead upon French-trained Vietnamese for government and clerical staff. There was no indication, moreover, that they wanted an elite with modern education; such persons might have questioned French control of the country. Thus, at the outbreak of World War II only one school on the secondary level existed in Cambodia, but a few students were sent to secondary schools in Vietnam. Higher education was entirely nonexistent, and the small number of Cambodians who received such an education obtained it at universities in France.

Somewhat belatedly the need for better trained Cambodians to fill higher level civil service and other positions was recognized. Secondary education was expanded beginning in the 1940s (although it still remained under the control of the French), and at full independence in 1953 nine public secondary schools were reported to be in operation. The emphasis placed by Prince Sihanouk on education during the latter 1950s and especially in the 1960s led to a rapid increase in number. Thus by the school year 1966/67 the country had 110 public and forty private secondary schools whose combined enrollment was almost 88,000 students. The emphasis on education that occurred after independence also led to the founding in 1959 of the Royal Khmer University at Phnom Penh (since 1970 known as the University of Phnom Penh) and during the middle of the 1960s to the establishment of several other universities.

The development of nationalism stimulated efforts to give a more Khmer character to education and to reduce the French emphasis on classical studies; at the same time the government attempted to create a greater interest in technical education. The educational system, however, was not appreciably affected by this program until the early 1960s and, despite these efforts, French influences still remained strong in the latter 1960s.

The most prominent feature of the national economy before establishment of the French Protectorate was its self-sufficiency. The economy consisted of hundreds of localized subsistence units, each in effect self-contained and each producing its own necessities and using only as much land as was needed to supply the local population with food until the next harvest, plus a small surplus for festive occasions and local barter. There was little foreign trade.

During the protectorate there was no general reshaping of the economy, although the introduction of the cultivation of rubber and corn had an important impact. The French essentially developed Cambodia as a colonial extension of their own industrialized society, orienting the Cambodian economy principally toward the growing of primary products. A limited infrastructure of roads and a rail line were built; however, no special emphasis was given to the expansion and diversification of industry. Such industry as was established was small and designed primarily to process part of the raw materials output for local consumption. On the other hand, trading firms and banks (both mostly foreign) were founded to handle and finance internal and foreign commerce. Most of the business class, both indigenous and foreign, devoted its energies to trade.

Of economic significance during this time were the coming of Vietnamese immigrants and, especially, the growth of the Chinese population in the country, both by natural increase and immigration. The Vietnamese came as laborers on the rubber plantations and as administrative and clerical workers in the government. As their numbers increased, they also began to play an important part in the economy as fishermen and operators of small businesses. The Chinese had been in Cambodia for several centuries before the arrival of the French (see Struggle for Survival, this ch.). Their influence already permeated the whole fabric of commercial life, and this influence increased during the protectorate, since no restrictions were placed by the French on the occupations in which they could engage. Moreover, Cambodia was treated by the French as a hinterland to Cochin China, with the result that Chinese merchants in Cambodia not only served Cambodia but also provided goods and produce needed in other parts of Indochina—at cheaper prices than French companies could.

At independence in 1953 Chinese constituted most of the village shopkeepers and handled most of the retail trade in manufactured goods, the rice trade, and much of the export-import trade. In agriculture they engaged generally in growing more specialized crops, such as vegetables, around urban areas, and the growing of pepper was a Chinese monopoly. Finance and credit were widely furnished by numerous Chinese small moneylenders. (Chinese also moved into the banking business in the 1930s.)

The growth of nationalism that followed the end of World War II and the subsequent attainment of national independence was accompanied by a rise in commercial consciousness on the part of the majority Khmer population. More Khmer entered both the commercial and industrial fields, and the government assisted this movement through immigration legislation in 1956 that restricted certain occupations to Cambodian nationals. This affected both Chinese and Vietnamese. The Chinese, however, simply moved into other commercial operations. The considerable number of persons of mixed Chinese-Khmer parentage who were able to become citizens were unaffected (see ch. 4).

Cambodia entered upon independence with an exceedingly underdeveloped economy; many factors, however, existed favoring economic growth. Among these were an abundance of good, arable land, a surplus of agricultural produce for export, and a large water resources potential. Rural society had developed an equitable distribution of farmland, and there was no traditional landed aristocracy. The country was already producing a fairly wide variety of simpler types of industrial products.

Offsetting these advantages were the scarcity of funds for capital investment; insufficiently trained personnel to implement government plans; a low per capita income; and inadequate power, transport, and communications facilities. Furthermore, there were no significant known deposits of coal, iron, or petroleum (see ch. 12).

A two-year development plan was undertaken in 1956 and 1957. Its objectives were not attained in the allotted time, and it was extended through 1959. The plan was heavily dependent on foreign aid for financing, which alone accounted for 70 percent of the expenditures made during the originally scheduled first two years. (The United States provided over 62 percent of this amount.) Although based largely on foreign assistance, the plan represented, in a way, a step toward the attainment of national financial autonomy after years of almost complete dependence on France. One of its important accomplishments was the construction of a modern port at Kampong Saom (then Sihanoukville). This provided an alternative port to—and helped to break the monopoly of—Saigon, through which most of Cambodia's trade was handled.

In 1960 a more elaborate five-year plan was initiated. It relied more on domestic resources than the earlier plan but was still dependent upon foreign help—of which United States aid constituted a considerable part—for fulfillment. In late 1963, in the midst of the plan, Prince Sihanouk terminated United States assistance, apparently in part because he was disturbed by the recent overthrow of President Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam; in part by antigovernment activities of the Khmer Serei, behind both of which he saw the hand of the United States; and in part because he considered United States aid as detrimental to the development of self-reliance by the Cambodian people (see ch. 9).

Economic development was slowed as a result, although the government turned to loans from other foreign states to permit continuance of its investment policy. Then, in 1964, the government claimed that the major projects included in the five-year plan had absorbed all of the country's executive, technical, and financial capacity, and it decided to allow an additional two years (1965 and 1966) for completion of these projects already underway—no new ones were to be initiated. In the main, however, the fulfillment of the plan was moderately successful in terms of industrial plants constructed and at least the initial outputs generated; actual outlays for infrastructure were greater than expected, however, and those to increase productive capacity in agriculture, industry, and mining were less than originally planned. A second five-year plan was adopted in 1967 but was not initiated until 1968 (see ch. 11).

In late 1963 Prince Sihanouk, apparently to offset in part the effects anticipated from loss of funds resulting from his termination of the United States aid program, announced a policy of self-help that involved the nationalization of banking, foreign trade, and insurance. Foreign trade, the most important of the three, was nationalized in 1964; and a state trading company, the National Export-Import Corporation, was established to handle the export-import business. The declared purpose of this move was to give Cambodian nationals a greater role in the country's trading activities, eliminate middlemen, and conserve foreign exchange through the limiting of unnecessary luxury imports. An unstated, but at least partial reason for this action was government concern over the dominance of commerce by the Chinese community and its control and manipulation of prices (see ch. 13).

The government was already involved directly in domestic trade through the Royal Office of Cooperation (established in 1956), whose major objectives were to narrow the margins between retail and wholesale prices; bring about a shift in control, ownership, and administration of domestic trade from Chinese merchants to Cambodian nationals; and effect a lowering of interest rates charged by moneylenders. The mechanism used to carry out this effort consisted of credit, consumer, and producer cooperatives.

After the nationalization of these three economic sectors, the inflow of official capital investment funds from Western sources became negligible. At the same time investment in productive enterprises by domestic private capital virtually ceased, many of the available funds going instead into real estate and residential construction, particularly in Phnom Penh. There were also reports of some domestic capital flight overseas. Government expenditures began to exceed receipts, and an austerity program was undertaken. Despite austerity measures, deterioration in the economic situation continued. Finally, in March 1968 the government adopted a new policy allotting certain industrial development solely to the private sector.

Material improvement, however, did not occur, and near the end of 1968 Prince Sihanouk announced that the economy was being shifted to an "open" type and that the period of a closed, self-reliant one had been ended. The Committee for Economic and Financial Recovery was set up, but during the first half of 1969 it failed to produce effective countermeasures to improve the economic picture. In August 1969 the government, headed by Prime Minister Penn Nouth, resigned, and a new government, with Lieutenant General Lon Nol as prime minister, took over and was given blanket authority to solve the country's economic problems.

CHAPTER 4

SOCIAL SYSTEM

In mid-1972 the Khmer Republic (Cambodia) was embroiled in the Indochinese war. One effect was that some of its most venerable social institutions had been or were being abandoned or threatened. Beginning in mid-1970 the war had precipitated the movement of large numbers of people, refugees who had fled from the war zone and communist-held territories into the urban centers controlled by the republican government, especially Phnom Penh. Another movement of social significance involved the largely involuntary repatriation to South Vietnam of many of the Vietnamese residents in the country. Also important was the presence in varying numbers in the country of both North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese who were participating in the war. Not only the people but also their allegiance were in a state of flux as various parts of the country were won or lost by the republican government or by its principal adversary, the National United Front of Cambodia (Front Uni National de Kampuchéa — FUNK), necessitating choices by the resident population as to whether to stay or go (see ch. 5; ch. 9; ch. 14).

During the early 1970s the social status of different groups shifted; the military became more important within the elite group, and the hereditary elite—the royal family and the nobility—lost some its status. Persons of high military rank dominated the leadership of the government of the Khmer Republic; they were also powerful in the FUNK regime. In the case of the FUNK, however, the military leaders were mostly foreigners (Vietnamese) and had less formally recognized status, since the FUNK was anxious to avoid calling attention to the important role played by Vietnamese within its ranks. As for the hereditary elite, its formal ranks and titles had been officially abolished, although members of the group still retained much informal prestige. The former monarch of Cambodia, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, headed a government-in-exile in Peking, the self-proclaimed Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia (Gouvernement Royal d'Union Nationale de Kampuchéa—GRUNK); however, neither the GRUNK nor the government of the Khmer Republic was advocating the restoration of the monarchy, although Cambodia had been headed by a king for perhaps 2,000 years before the abolition of the monarchy in 1970.

In addition to promoting the social status of the military and reducing that of the hereditary traditional elite, the republic introduced new institutions designed to mobilize and direct the population in areas it controlled. For the most part these were subsumed under the so-called general mobilization plan. This plan was put into effect in mid-1970 by the republican government in order to establish and maintain security in the country; it would presumably last only as long as was necessary to deal with the threat to the republic (see ch. 14). Little was known of the institutions of social organization and control established in FUNK areas. Various mass organizations, which appeared similar to those found in communist countries, were reported in existence by FUNK information media, but details were lacking.

Even before the outbreak of hostilities in mid-1970, Cambodian society had begun to change. During the 1960s a very great expansion of the public educational system and a nationwide literacy campaign had precipitated changes in Cambodian social aspirations and in social mobility. A drift to the cities had begun, and by the mid-1960s there were already beginning to be large numbers of unemployed and underemployed youths in Phnom Penh and other larger towns who regarded themselves as overqualified for peasant farming or manual labor.

Nonetheless, until the beginning of hostilities that followed the deposition of Prince Sihanouk in March 1970, society in Cambodia had been noted for the remarkable continuity of its institutions over many centuries. Moreover, despite the war, in mid-1972, the essential features of Cambodian society remained what they had been—Khmer, Theravada Buddhist, and rural. Life for the Khmer villagers (who constituted perhaps 80 percent of the population) was still conducted along essentially the same lines and guided by the same values that had prevailed for 500 years, although the pace of change had accelerated greatly during the 1960s (see ch. 3; ch. 7). A substantial portion of the countryside, however, came under communist control in the early 1970s, and it remained to be seen to what extent the Communists would wish, or be able, to reorient society in the areas they controlled.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

The region included in Cambodia has been inhabited by ethnic Khmer at least as far back as the Chen-la period (sixth to ninth centuries A.D.) (see ch. 3). By the fifteenth century, after the fall of Angkor to the Thai, there were a number of clearly delineated strata in Khmer society. Society was headed by the king and a hereditary aristocracy that included the royal family, the nobility, and a small but prestigious caste of court Brahmans. Next in status was a royally appointed civil service composed primarily of commoners; although nonhereditary, it tended to be self-replenishing. Next in status came freemen, primarily farmers; and finally, slaves.

The king in theory owned all the land and supported the royal family, nobility, and the civil service by granting them a share of the taxes, revenues, and labor for specified ricefields. The land not specifically set aside for royal purposes, however, was farmed by freemen as if it were their own, and use rights were passed on to their heirs. Land was plentiful, and most farmers could subsist on the land at their disposal.

Set apart from secular society but receiving the highest deference even from the king was the *sangha* (see Glossary). Also apart were the indigenous highlanders, the Khmer Loeu (literally, upland Cambodians) formerly called *phnong* (slaves), who were largely ignored by the Khmer except when they were captured and made to serve as slaves.

In the fifteenth century the Cham, also known as Cham-Malay, a refugee population from the dying Kingdom of Champa, which had its capital in what is now the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), arrived in rural Cambodia. Their descendants—in recent years officially designated Khmer Islam (Muslim Cambodians)— live in discrete villages primarily and have seldom intermarried with the Khmer. They have remained on friendly terms with the majority ethnic group, however.

An urban Chinese community was performing various commercial and artisan functions in Cambodia as early as the fifteenth century, and by 1609 a Portuguese observer reported that 3,000 of Phnom Penh's 20,000 inhabitants were Chinese. In the eighteenth century some Hainanese began growing pepper in Kampot Province. Large migrations of Chinese into Cambodia took place in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Chinese community has dominated commerce, small industry, and crafts in the country (see ch. 3).

After the mid-nineteenth century two other foreign communities came to prominence in Cambodia: the French and the Vietnamese. Although very small, the French community had a great impact on Cambodian society, beginning in the mid-1860s with the establishment of a French protectorate over the kingdom. The Khmer king, although retaining the traditional symbols of authority and the sumptuary rituals, came, in actuality, under the authority of the French *résident supérieur* (governor general). Various basic royal and social institutions were abolished, among them slavery and the royal domain over land. The royal civil service, composed of Khmer, was replaced by one headed by the French and employing substantial numbers of French-language-educated Vietnamese at the middle and lower levels. Other Vietnamese served as clerks for private firms, artisans, teachers, and domestic servants. The Vietnamese community became about as big as, and in many respects more influential than, the Chinese.

In other respects the French regime interfered little with the traditional life of the Khmer majority. A slight amount of economic development was attempted by the French, the most important being the establishment of rubber plantations, but these plantations employed mostly Vietnamese laborers. The urban community expanded somewhat and, with it, the supply of goods and services to meet its needs; communications were improved; and some Western-style education was introduced. These modern developments affected the nonindigenous peoples far more than the Khmer. Phnom Penh, especially, but also a few of the larger towns, came to have French restaurants, wide boulevards, secondary schools, theaters, and other modern institutions and goods, but life of the rural Cambodian was little affected by these things.

As a result of World War II and the Vietnamese war against the French that ensued, the concept of nationalism burgeoned in Cambodia, and some Khmer began agitating and fighting for independence from French control. After total independence was achieved in late 1953, the Vietnamese were ousted from their control over the middle and lower ranks of the Cambodian civil service, and the Khmer were restored to positions of political authority throughout the government. The middle class outside of government service remained, however, overwhelmingly nonindigenous, primarily Chinese and Vietnamese, and the Khmer peasantry continued in its age-old ways.

Efforts were made to modernize and galvanize the peasantry by King (after 1955, Prince) Norodom Sihanouk, a Western-educated member of the Khmer royal family who came to the throne in 1941 while still a youth. King Sihanouk abdicated in 1955 and between 1955 and 1970 served variously as party leader, prime minister, and head of state. Prince Sihanouk worked to modernize Cambodian society beginning in 1955 through the medium of the national political organization that he organized and led, the People's Socialist Community (Sangkum Reastr Niyum, commonly called the Sangkum) and its auxiliary organization for youth, the Royal Khmer Socialist Youth (Jeunesse Socialiste Royale Khmère—JSRK). In the 1960s there were additional efforts to modernize society through expanding literacy and secular education.

As part of this effort at modernization, Western secular ideas of liberty, equality, democracy, and social justice were promulgated, especially among schoolchildren. Simultaneously, Marxist ideas, introduced into Cambodia by Viet Minh forces during the 1946–54 Franco-Vietnamese war and by university students returning from France, were spread by resident Marxists, both indigenous and Vietnamese (see ch. 3). Thus, by the early 1970s these new ideas and values had had at least two decades to percolate. Observers have suggested that the introduction of these new ideologies helped facilitate the overthrow, with little public outcry, of Cambodia's age-old monarchic system and the disestablishment of the royal and noble classes. Although it could not be said that the new social ideologies had been widely accepted by the early 1970s, they were helping to erode some of the foundations of the traditional social hierarchy.

SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN AREAS CONTROLLED BY THE REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT

Probably only about half of the country's area was under the control of the republican government in mid-1972, but an estimated two-thirds of the people lived there. The ethnic composition of the republican territory was overwhelmingly Khmer. There were also several hundred thousand resident Chinese, more than half living in the larger urban centers, especially Phnom Penh and Batdambang. The Chinese constituted the country's largest ethnic minority at that time.

The resident Vietnamese community, once the country's largest minority had been greatly reduced in territory controlled by the republican government after mid-1970. About one-third to one-half of the remaining Vietnamese resident community lived in Phnom Penh, but others lived around the Tonle Sap (Great Lake) and along the Tonle Sab and the lower Mekong rivers; there were also Vietnamese in some provincial towns. The largest rural minority in areas controlled by the republican government was the Khmer Islam. Most Khmer Loeu lived in areas that had come under FUNK control.

The major urban centers had undergone population changes in the early 1970s. Whereas in 1962 two-thirds of Phnom Penh was ethnic Khmer, in 1972 a far higher proportion was Khmer. The repatriation of large numbers of Vietnamese, together with a great influx of Khmer, seeking refuge from the war and the communist regime, had helped to produce this change in ethnic composition.

Should security return to their villages, large numbers of Khmer refugees in Phnom Penh and other towns would be likely to return to the countryside. It would be unlikely, however, for the urban areas to revert to the degree of foreign ethnicity they exhibited before World War II.

A drift to the cities by educated youth and other persons seeking to improve their status began during the 1940s; by 1959, for instance, nearly half of Phnom Penh's residents had been born elsewhere. The establishment of an independent Cambodia produced many jobs in the government for Khmer at upper and middle levels as well as at lower levels. The number of jobs did not keep pace with the educational expansion, however, and by the mid-1960s thousands of educated youths were unsuccessfully seeking whitecollar jobs in Phnom Penh.

There was some geographical instability among the population of the areas controlled by the republican government in the early 1970s. In addition to the departure of the Vietnamese and the move to towns under control of the republican government of thousands of Khmer villagers, there were also, reportedly, thousands of families of military personnel who were moving with the soldiers, even into battle zones, forced into the danger area by their financial dependence upon their soldier relatives for the means of subsistence. Efforts were being made by the government in mid-1972 to rectify this situation. The ministry charged with community development in January 1972 was reported to be seeking land on which to resettle soldiers' dependents so that they could subsist while the men fought.

The extent of domestic migration brought about by the war has been considerable. The Ministry of Public Health, Welfare, and Pharmaceutical Development estimated that more than 2 million persons had been displaced either temporarily or continually by the war in the period from March 1970 to September 1971; in March 1971 the government estimated, in addition to other types of property damage, that between 100,000 and 150,000 homes had been destroyed.

The social disruption caused by moving has to some degree been mitigated for the Khmer by the relative homogeneity of Khmer rural society—the similarity of institutions in the different regions—and by the farflung network of friends and relatives that most Khmer villagers have connecting them to cities, towns, and other villages. Because of strong social ties between Khmer villagers and Phnom Penh residents, large numbers of refugees found food and shelter privately at the homes of Khmer urbanites and did not have to depend on institutional charity or government support. Geographic mobility is not, in any case, as disruptive to Khmer peasant society as it is to some others. A high rate of geographic mobility of the Khmer peasantry has long been noted by scholars. The Khmer villagers, either individually, as households, or as entire communities, have often been willing to move away from their village of origin, usually in order to take advantage of available farmland elsewhere.

Khmer

Stratification

There are three main social strata among the Khmer—upper, middle, and lower. An individual's membership in a stratum is determined mainly by wealth, power, prestige, occupation, education, and style of living. Before mid-1970, when royal and noble titles were extant, the highest ranks of the upper strata were largely filled by those born into them. Under the republican regime all royal and noble titles were invalidated, and even the honorific "excellency," which had been used for present and past incumbents of high government office, was supposed to be abandoned. The only titles of social significance legally in use in connection with the upper strata were those gained through achievement—chiefly military but also governmental and Buddhist clerical titles. The primacy of military titles as a mark of status in secular Khmer society was indicated by the example of former Prince Sisowath Sirik Matak; serving as deputy prime minister (the second highest ranking political figure in the country), he was usually addressed by the military title of lieutenant general, which he had been recently granted.

Despite the loss of title, a foreign observer noted in mid-1971 that deferential greeting styles and behavior toward former royalty still persisted. Although they no longer had an officially recognized status, members of this group still had prestige because they had more money, more prestigious employment, and a higher level of education than persons of middle and lower strata. Their income and employment levels were a result of their experience under the French, who ruled through them. Many of the aristocrats had received a French-language education, and in Phnom Penh in the early 1970s it was still reportedly a mark of high status to be able to speak and read French well and to be familiar with French manners and ways of living. English, however, was rapidly becoming popular.

Whereas members of the inherited aristocracy had formerly been the most powerful members of the country's social elite, in the early 1970s senior military officers held the most influential positions. Their prestige, however, tended to fluctuate with the fortunes of war. Furthermore, an antimilitary bias could be detected within the ranks of the civilian upper group and among members of the country's small, urban-based, politically influential intellectuals. The intellectual elite included many civil servants, professional people, university students, and some members of the Buddhist clerical hierarchies. Symptomatic of the cleavage within the nation's urban elite were antigovernment and antimilitary strikes by students and demonstrations by monks in 1971 and 1972 in Phnom Penh. The student strikes were serious enough to result in the closing for a time of three institutions of higher learning in late April 1972.

Much of the friction within the elite group and the resentment against it by outsiders have resulted from the efforts of various groups to gain political power. The political elite was reported by foreign observers in the early 1970s to consist of fewer than 100 persons; the leadership, with few exceptions, was made up of persons who had held high positions in the Sihanouk period as well. Educated young people were alleged to be frustrated by their inability to gain political power and were organizing to demand some (see ch. 9).

Top echelons of government could not be divided simply into military and nonmilitary. Although the military echelon was prominent, many persons holding senior military ranks in 1972 had acquired them recently, having formerly held positions in the civil government. Others, notably Marshal Lon Nol, had risen to high rank within the armed forces and from there gained political power.

The army appeared in the early 1970s to be offering an important avenue of social mobility. For example, Lon Nol was of poor peasant origin. A 1967 survey of cadet officers noted that some 60 percent were sons of farmers.

The status of monks has changed very little in those areas controlled by the republican government. Their influence on secular affairs has always been carefully circumscribed and has become increasingly limited as the result of the secularization of the education system (see ch. 6). Monks until 1972 had been constitutionally without the right to vote, a legal sanction that was reinforced by monastic tradition, which obliged the *sangha* to avoid involvement in secular matters (see ch. 7).

Whether they are novices, fully ordained monks, or monks with clerical titles indicative of higher rank, members of the *sangha* have always received deference from the laity; in the time of the monarchy even the king was obliged to prostrate himself before members of the *sangha*. Although it is true that the *sangha* as a whole is regarded by Khmer as morally superior to, and socially distinct from, lay society, deference by laymen to *sangha* members is not necessarily an indication of high regard for the individual monk; rather it indicates respect for the institution of monkhood.

Acts of deference to *sangha* members are also regarded as means of earning merit. High-ranking Buddhist clerics are, however, members of the national elite and are the only Cambodians for whom the special speech forms (formerly also used when addressing royalty) are still applicable under the republican regime.

The middle stratum in Khmer society in the early 1970s was small and, like the upper group, primarily urban. It consisted of businessmen, merchants, all but the richest and most important professional persons, middle and lower ranking government servants, white-collar workers for private firms, and middle and lower ranking military officers. Except for the civil servants and the military, members of the group have usually been nonindigenous; most of the country's trade, commerce, and industry has been in the hands of Chinese, and many other middle-level positions up to mid-1970 had been filled by Vietnamese. Whether a substantial number of the vacancies left by the repatriation of Vietnamese had been, or would be, filled by Khmer or Chinese was not known in mid-1972; there were reports that some Vietnamese shopkeepers had returned to Phnom Penh in 1972. Laws designed to remove commerce, industry, and numerous nonagricultural activities from domination by noncitizens began to be enacted in the 1950s, but twenty years later such regulations had not yet succeeded in changing markedly the ethnic composition of the country's middle stratum (see ch. 3).

The overwhelming majority of Khmer in the early 1970s belonged to the lowest social stratum. Within that group, the peasantry predominated. Also included were some full-time craftsmen and fishermen (although these had been primarily Vietnamese until mid-1970) and a larger number of unskilled laborers, such as pedicab drivers, many of whom worked for certain periods in the urban centers but retained close links with their rural community of origin.

Cambodia in the early 1970s was still basically a country of rural farming communities. New criteria of social status have exerted considerable influence in the urban setting, but the traditional values and ways of the rural majority have given the society its dominant characteristics.

There are few status distinctions in the individualistic atmosphere of the rural village; these distinctions depend primarily on individual qualities rather than membership in a particular social group or class. The primary components of status and prestige are age, sex (men are generally accorded a higher social status), moral behavior, and religious piety. Ninety percent of the Khmer own their own land, and few own more than they can till. There are some differences in wealth among rural Khmer, but they are not pronounced and have counted little in status determination. Wealth alone is not an indication of authority or prestige but can be an instrument for achieving them. Because one gains both prestige and religious merit from donations for religious concerns, the accumulation of money to spend becomes important. The greater the amount of money given to the temple and the monks, the greater is the respect accorded the giver.

Relative age continues to be a major determinant of status in the rural social structure. Social etiquette demands respectful behavior toward all persons of older generations, and speech forms reflect generational and age distinctions. The oldest male in the village will not necessarily have the most prestige and authority, but his advanced age automatically entitles him to some.

Good character and a reputation for piety are also essential for high status. The quality of religious devotion that is admired in the Buddhist monk is equally respected in a layman. If he does not possess exceptional piety, a man cannot gain an exalted position in his community no matter what other admirable qualities he may possess. A selfless concern for others and a cheerful kindliness are among the most important character traits for a leader to have, and intemperance in any form is the biggest failing.

In their relations with people outside the local status structure, villagers accord respect and honor to those who possess authority or prestige. High-ranking monks, important government officials, and wealthy aristocrats are in this category. Villagers rarely interact with such persons and therefore have little basis to judge the personal qualities that determine status.

Social Mobility

Efforts to improve one's social status tend to take place largely in an urban setting. Within the village a sense that all are, or should be, social equals is strong. Within Khmer villages, deference is reserved for monks and the elderly; the highest prestige for laymen accrues to those who are pious and exhibit good character—generosity, warmth, good nature, unselfish compassion for others, honesty, temperance, chastity, and avoidance of quarrels. Although villagers' misdeeds are generally known to all in the community, it is possible for a person to make a fresh start and improve his reputation. The break with the past, however, has to be clear cut and publicly announced.

Abrupt changes in social status continually occur in Khmer villages when individual males enter and emerge from the *sangha*. Persons seeking to change their secular social position, however, are generally obliged to go to the provincial towns or, more likely, to Phnom Penh, where opportunities for upward mobility are more readily available. Opportunities in government service, especially white-collar positions, are the most highly prized by educated Khmer youths, but such opportunities have not kept pace with the numbers receiving secondary and advanced education. The dissatisfaction of educated youths with the job market became more evident after the March 1970 change in government (see ch. 9).

The relatively low regard for business is illustrated by the preference of most young educated Khmer for government service to business managerial positions, even though (at the entry level at least) private business pays its administrators better than does the government. It has not been unusual, however, for senior government officials to also hold business managerial posts, especially in state-owned enterprises.

Although advancement within the *sangha* hierarchy has traditionally been the major means for a peasant's son to achieve high status, the armed forces have become an important avenue of social mobility for rural youth. Marshal Lon Nol is typical of many military officers with humble rural origins. His high political prestige reportedly comes in large measure from his personal reputation for honesty, piety, and selflessness, essentially the same virtues that bring high prestige in Khmer village society.

Family

The family household is the basic and only well-defined enduring social unit in Khmer society. Rural communities often develop out of clusters of households of close kin. The rural family household is also the basic unit of production and consumption and often acts, and is treated, as a unit for purposes of labor exchange and contributions to the *wat* (see Glossary). The typical family household consists of a single, independent, self-supporting married couple and their unmarried children; often a grandparent or a set of grandparents is also resident.

The main responsibility of the family is not veneration of the past but rearing the new generation. Its obligations to the older generations are narrowly defined in space, in time, and in the closeness of family ties. Ties between related families tend to be loose and informal and shaped more by circumstance and personal preference than by rule.

Relationships within the family of parents and children, however, are precisely defined by tradition and law. Tradition, supported by Buddhist precept, places great emphasis on formality and on the respect paid to those of senior age or generation. Law, supported by tradition, affirms the mutual obligations of parents and children for maintenance and support. The legal aspect of these family relationships is incorporated in numerous articles of the 1920 Civil Code (revised in 1951). The code covers marriage, divorce, the legal rights of wives, the status of plural wives, adoption, guardianship, parental authority, and inheritance.

Within the framework of religious precept, secular tradition, and national law, the Khmer family is a relatively conservative and stable institution. The relationship between parents and children is the closest and most durable of all Khmer social connections. Nevertheless, in 1972 some impact on the institution of the family by changing times was apparent, especially in urban areas where a modernizing economy had reduced the economic role of the household unit. Whereas formerly the family had been the institution best able to establish the individual's role in the larger society, in the early 1970s other institutions, such as the schools and government-sponsored social organizations, were assuming an increasingly larger responsibility for socialization of the new generation.

Although the ideal family consists of a married couple and their unmarried children, it is not always possible for a newly married couple to establish immediately their own separate residence, either for financial or for other reasons. Under these circumstances it is not unusual for the couple to reside temporarily with either the husband's or the wife's parents. In some villages it is customary for a married daughter and her husband to live with her parents until the birth of their first child. Generally, a married child remains in the household to care for the parents in their old age; this is with the understanding that the house will belong to the young couple when the parents die.

Polygyny is legally sanctioned, but polygynous marriages are rare and, in the rural areas, almost nonexistent; few village men have the money to support more than one wife. Polygynous marriage is socially acceptable and constitutes a status symbol for a wealthy man. Opposition to the custom has been voiced primarily by a small group of well-educated urban women, but the rural woman is also reluctant to allow polygyny. An anthropologist who observed a village in 1960 noted that, of two attempts made that year by village men to persuade their first wives to allow them to take second wives, neither succeeded. In both instances, the first wife was outspoken in her opposition.

In March 1972 members of a Phnom Penh women's club composed of wives of professional men demanded that the new constitution then being drafted outlaw polygyny. The new constitution that went into effect in May 1972, however, made no mention of polygyny. Concubinage exists but, as with polygyny, it is practiced more frequently by wealthy urbanites than by men in the villages, where it is extremely rare. Unlike second wives, concubines have no legal contractual rights, do not receive alimony after separation, and have no rights to property belonging to a deceased patron.

To be without children is considered a misfortune, although a very large family is not necessarily considered a good thing. The birth of a child of either sex is always a welcome event. Children may be legally adopted, informally adopted, or borrowed for longer or shorter periods—generally from close kin. In the case of legally adopted children, they have the same rights and obligations as children born into the family. Informally adopted children usually have the same rights and duties in practice, but in cases of dispute over inheritance their legal position is weaker. Borrowed children do not sever their ties with their real parents and do not generally inherit from the foster parents' estates.

With the exception of the traditional hereditary elite—royalty, nobility, and the Brahman priests—bilateral descent prevails among the Khmer; the child traces descent equally through the father's and the mother's lines. There is usually no difference in the relationship with relatives on either side of the family, and no distinctions are made in the terms used to refer to them. In general, the ties between generations and between related households are loose and informal. Individuals have little interest in their remote ancestors and rarely remember them beyond a few generations. A married couple expects to give aid or financial assistance to needy parents and to brothers or sisters of either spouse, but there is often a conscious effort to avoid involvement with more remote relatives. Friction among kin is not sanctioned by society; in some rural areas conflict within the household is believed to be punished by *meba* (ancestral spirits), and innocent household residents are made to suffer for the misbehavior of other household members.

Among descendants, legal sons and daughters may inherit equally the real and personal property of their parents. In practice, the parents often dictate unequal shares. They may give a larger share to the offspring who has taken special care of them and a smaller share to the one who has made a prosperous marriage. Division of parents' property is directed by their written or verbal will. The common practice in rural areas is for parents to inform their children verbally of their wishes regarding the future division of their possessions. After marriage a wife may continue to own her inherited property and may dispose of it as she sees fit.

The kinship relationships of the royal family were similar to those of other Khmer but, for purposes of succession to the throne and inheritance of titles, descent was traced in the father's line for five generations from a reigning monarch. This descent group was, in the time of the monarchy, the one from which the next king was chosen. A second group descended from royalty, patrilineally connected to reigning monarchs from six to ten generations back, constituted the Khmer nobility and had traditionally received certain titles, duties, and privileges. Another patrilineal descent group was that of the *bakou* (Brahman court priests), who performed the devaraja (god-king) rituals for the king (see ch. 6). The priests no longer had this function after the monarchy was abolished in 1970, but in September 1970 an observer reported that they were continuing to serve the state as custodians of national (formerly royal) treasures.

Surnames, made officially mandatory in 1910 by the French, are usually handed down patrilineally. The French decree required that the wives and children taken the name of the family household head as the surname. In practice, however, except among the urban educated Khmer, the surname (which always precedes the given name) has been used only for official documents; it is commonly omitted, even by high government officials who have titles. For example, Prince Sihanouk and Lieutenant General Sirik Matak have often been addressed without their surnames, which are, respectively, Norodom and Sisowath.

Legally, the head of the family is the husband, but in practice the wife's domestic authority is virtually equal and in some matters superior to the authority of her husband. Family relationships are determined primarily by generation, next by age among members of the same generation, and then by sex. The husband often addresses his wife by a term that means little sister and is addressed by her as big brother. The two fill complementary roles and have equally important responsibilities and duties.

The husband is responsible for housing and feeding all members of the family. In rural areas he does the heavier work involved in preparing the fields for seeding and cultivating the crops. In cities the pattern is somewhat different. Houses are usually built by others, and food is purchased in the marketplace instead of being grown in family fields. The major responsibility for the family's support, however, is still borne by the husband.

The wife occupies a key position in the household, and in many ways the prosperity, well-being, and reputation of the family revolve around her. Her ethical and religious influence over the younger generation, particularly the daughters, is very important. As a mentor of the social and moral values of the Khmer culture, she is highly regarded in the society. She is usually a more devout Buddhist than her husband, and she has the sole responsibility for training her daughters, whose good conduct will bring prestige to the family. It is generally the wife who controls the family budget.

A newly married couple more commonly lives near the wife's family than the husband's, all other things being equal. Among the warmest kin relationships are those between kinswomen and those between related males and females, such as mother to child, elder sister to younger sibling, aunt to niece or nephew, and grandmother to grandchild.

Relatives by marriage are often regarded as being as close kin as are blood relatives, and the relative one chooses as a close associate is optional, determined by circumstances and individual preferences. There is much visiting back and forth among kinsmen, especially exchanges of visits between parents and adult children.

One is more likely to borrow money (often without interest) from a relative than from a nonrelative, and kin are generally well represented at life-cycle rites; but, in most respects, especially in village society, neighbors and friends are as likely as are kin to be close associates, helpers in tasks requiring the efforts of more than one household, and attendants at various household festivities. The Khmer commonly refer to close friends by the kin terms felt to be appropriate to the friends' relative ages and relationship.

Family relationships are regarded as the basic model for all friendly social relations. When a Khmer is forced by circumstance to go to live elsewhere where no kin dwell, he will often establish a fictive kinship relationship with someone at the new place. Often the work associate will become a *thoa* (fictive) brother, upon receiving permission from his mother, who will then become *thoa* mother to the newcomer. The *thoa* relationship can be as close and enduring as the participants choose to make it.

Visits to the capital or to provincial towns are often for the purpose of, and usually involve, meetings with real or fictive kin. Kin connections thus help bring villagers into contact with the urban centers. This extensive network of social relationships proved signficant in the early 1970s when hundreds of thousands of rural Khmer sought temporary refuge in urban centers.

Life-Cycle

Babies are treated affectionately by everyone and spend most of their waking hours lying or sitting on someone's lap or straddling someone's hip. Children in villages are usually breastfed until the next baby arrives or sometimes as late as age three or four. Even young children, however, are encouraged to be independent, to the degree they are able, and to care for themselves to some extent.

Until age three or four the Khmer child receives much attention, but few demands are made on him. Then (or earlier if a new child is born to the family) the child receives less attention and is expected to feed and bathe himself and control elimination. At age five he begins socializing more with other children, and many girls by then have been granted considerable responsibility in caring for younger siblings. The girls generally enjoy a new baby as if it were a doll. Although children's games often stress skill, they do not focus on winning, and there are no games involving competing teams or in which one person is pitted against all the others.

By about age six most children are doing some simple daily chores, such as collecting kindling wood. At seven or eight nearly all children of both sexes go to school. Except in Phnom Penh, where crowded conditions have necessitated double and triple shifts, in the early 1970s school lasted for six hours a day, five days a week, nine months a year. An anthropologist working in a village near Phnom Penh in 1960 noted a very low rate of absenteeism, which she attributed to the high value parents placed on their children's receiving some education. Government statistics, however, indicate a very high dropout rate nationwide beginning after the first grade (see ch. 6). Most Khmer children were receiving only the first few years of elementary schooling before the fighting of 1970 disrupted education.

The child who has passed the infant stage is expected to begin conforming to norms of politeness and obedience. At this time, the father, previously as affectionate as the mother, begins his permanent retreat into a relatively remote and authoritarian role. Young children learn to show the proper forms of respect toward their parents and toward members of the *sangha*, both in behavior and in forms of address.

A girl of ten knows how to perform such household duties as cooking a meal, sewing, and caring for younger children. She also has begun to learn about marketing by joining her mother on trips to the marketplace. A boy knows how to tend draft animals and learns techniques of agriculture by working with his father and older brothers.

The authority of parents over children is absolute and usually continues until children are married, even though an individual who has reached the age of eighteen is legally an adult. Parents usually exercise their authority sparingly, preferring to teach approved behavior by means of examples set by adults and older children. Sharp reprimands and physical punishment are avoided as much as possible, and children are seldom afraid of their parents. On the few occasions when rebellion or opposition arises and an open break appears imminent, the parents usually forego the punishment rather than sacrifice a child's happiness.

The relationship pattern among siblings is based on age. Older brothers and sisters use the familiar form of language in referring to younger children and use their given names in addressing them. Younger brothers and sisters are taught to use the respectful form of language and refer to their older brothers and sisters as "big brother" and "big sister." The use of these different language forms indicates the behavior patterns of each age group toward the other. The reputation of a family depends greatly upon the behavior of children toward their elders. The members of the younger generation, regardless of age, are required to use the respectful form of language and appropriate behavior toward all members of the older generation.

A boy may enter the *sangha* as a temple boy at about age seven or, most likely, between the ages of eleven and nineteen and may serve a time as a novice monk. A major duty of parents is to prepare their son for service as a novice or, after age twenty, preferably as a fully ordained monk.

Throughout childhood, Khmer children most often play with those of their own age and sex, but mixed groups sometimes play together. In adolescence, however, sex segregation is the rule except when the young people are supervised. The supervision is more strictly observed for girls, especially those of the higher social circles. In villages adolescent girls go nowhere unless they are escorted, if only by a child. Virginity of brides is valued, premarital sex is deplored and, although there are on rare occasions girls who start marriage already pregnant, this is a cause for shame to the girl's family. Parents prevent young children from gaining much knowledge about sex, feeling that too much knowledge can lead to desire and eventually to trouble.

In the early 1970s no rites set off the entry into adolescence, but behavior changed gradually. Adolescents contributed more to the household's production than they had when younger. Even rural children, if opportunities permitted, took on extra jobs to earn money for their own use and to contribute to the household budget. They began to be very concerned about their appearance and were no longer referred to as children but were called by terms that mean unmarried female and unmarried male. They were by then also conscious of their personal moral responsibility for their behavior; by action and words adolescents indicated a desire to earn merit, improve their *karma* (see Glossary), and avoid the retribution of spirits (*kmauit*) for misbehavior.

The search for a potential spouse is a major preoccupation of most adolescents. Young people of the same village see each other often in a variety of situations and have many chances to become acquainted. Ideally, a young man who has decided upon a particular girl asks his parents to begin marriage arrangements. His family selects a go-between who makes inquiries and conducts negotiations with the girl's family. Each family carefully searches out the good and bad points concerning the character, relative social status, and financial position of the other. The girl herself has the right to veto any proposed marriage. In practice, however, children often have little choice in the selection of their marriage partner. It is not uncommon for the parents to select a spouse for their son or daughter, since they feel that it is their responsibility to arrange a suitable match. The strength of family ties plus the respect and obedience owed to elders usually cause young people to acquiesce to their parents' wishes.

A man usually marries between the ages of nineteen and twenty-five; and a girl, between sixteen and twenty-two. According to law, the minimum age for marriage is fourteen for girls and seventeen for boys, although a special exception to this is sometimes allowed. Minors below the age of eighteen cannot marry without the consent of their parents.

The Khmer marriage establishes a new nuclear family and connects the family members of the bride and bridegroom in a kin relationship. Legally, the binding act is the declaration of the marriage to the chief of the commune in which the bride resides and the presentation to him of the birth certificates of the bride and bridegroom. Most marriages are legally declared. The traditional marriage ceremony, however, remains more important to the young couple and their families than does the legal act.

The date of the wedding is determined by having an astrologer consult the horoscopes of the engaged couple. Both the propitious time for the ceremony and the success of the marriage are believed to be influenced by the astrological signs under which the participants were born.

The traditional wedding is a lavish and elaborate affair lasting for a day and a half; before World War II a wedding took three days. It is accompanied by feasts for the invited guests, music, and dancing. Buddhist monks are invited to participate with their prayers, but the *achaa* (life-cycle practitioner) plays the principal role and directs the ceremony (see ch. 7).

In the city, marriage patterns have been greatly modified by Chinese, Vietnamese, and French influences. Traditional ceremonies, once marked by ancient symbolism, have become much simpler. Marriage banquets, which formerly were prepared by the parents of the bride and bridegroom, are now often held in a restaurant. Sometimes the invited guests number between 200 and

1,200 people, each one bringing a gift of money. Much of this money is used to defray the costly wedding expenses and, should there be any left, it is given to the young couple to help them get established.

Public displays of affection between husband and wife are not regarded as proper, but there is often real affection between spouses. It can be assumed that enduring marriages last because of the basic compatibility of the couple since divorce is without stigma, regarded as preferable to discord, and since the divorcée is almost always welcome to return to her parents' home.

Divorce is legal and relatively easy to obtain, but it is not particulary common. A married couple may be divorced in cases of incompatibility, prolonged absence without good reason, failure of the husband to provide for the family, or adultery on the part of the wife. Some grounds apply equally to both husband and wife: blows, wounds, or grave injuries to either spouse or to the children; conviction on a criminal charge; immoral or dishonest conduct; and refusal to permit sexual intercourse for more than one year.

When a first wife is divorced, the second wife may be elevated to her position. This is accomplished by a declaration before a civil court officer in the presence of two witnesses. A divorced woman cannot remarry for ten months after the date of her divorce, but a divorced man may marry at any time.

Each spouse retains whatever property he or she brought to the marriage, and anything gained through common effort is divided equally. Second wives may keep only their own property, but they also have the right to receive alimony for subsistence if they were not the cause of the divorce.

In case of divorce the Civil Code gives the court the power to grant custody of the children to either parent, in accordance with what it judges to be in the children's best interests. Usually custody of the child is given to the mother until the age of fifteen. Thereafter, a girl lives with the mother and a boy lives with the father until age sixteen, at which time the child may live with the parent of his choice. The parent who does not receive custody of the child has the obligation to pay toward costs of education and rearing.

It is far more common for one to be widowed than divorced. Young widows and widowers often remarry; if they have many dependent children they may have to choose less desirable spouses (older, less attractive looking, or poorer) than were available when they first married, but the new spouse is generally received on essentially the same footing as the previous one. Those whose spouses die when they are in their late forties or fifties generally remain single thereafter and turn over the main responsibilities of the household to a resident married child and spouse.

After age fifty the Khmer enter a period when they receive special deference from their juniors, enjoy relative leisure, and begin to concern themselves with preparing for the next incarnation by devoting more attention to detaching themselves from secular concerns; they now spend thought and effort on improving their *karma*. The women often shave or crop their hair very short after menopause, as if to symbolize the renunciation of vanity and the neutralization of their sex. Both men and women in these years devote far more attention to formal acts of Buddhist piety than in their younger years.

Respect for elders shows itself in seeking their advice, inviting them to take important roles in life-cycle ceremonies, and following their suggestions. Formality and reserve do not necessarily accompany this deference, however. Old people, especially women, give and receive affection in an open and demonstrative way and engage in much good-humored, two-sided teasing and joking with younger people.

According to the Buddhist belief of the Khmer, death does not represent the end of life but an alternate aspect of existence. After death the Khmer expects to be reborn in another life. The traditional death rites are believed to aid the deceased by paving the way to a better incarnation. It is an obligation of the survivors to perform these rites to the best of their ability. Funerals, next to weddings, are the most elaborate life-cycle ceremonies and often entail large expenditures of money. Cremation is the usual culmination of the death rite, but occasionally burial is specifically requested.

Extra-Household Social Relations

Beyond the household unit—usually the nuclear family—there are no organized kin groups in Khmer commoner society. Many hamlets and villages began as clusters of interrelated households. It is customary where possible for the second generation to live near the parents of the wife (most commonly) or the husband; thus, within a short time a neighborhood emerges consisting of closely connected kin. It is therefore difficult in some cases to distinguish between community allegiances to the village or hamlet and kin loyalties.

Even in villages in which extensive kin connections are lacking, there is a genuine sense of identification with the hamlet and often with the *phumi* (village) as well. Most *phumi* range in size from a few hundred or so people to about 1,000. After World War II, however, smaller villages were merged to make larger units, often at governmental command, in order to improve rural security at a time of internecine and Viet Minh guerrilla activity. A typical *phumi* studied in 1960 had 800 inhabitants divided into three hamlets.

In villages where there is one community *wat,* the round of Buddhist festivals, holy days, and community activities in its support are the major activities binding the village together. In some villages, however, there are several *wat* drawing support from different hamlets. In such cases, there is no single institution that draws the entire community together as a unit. In urban centers and in some rural villages near the capital, there are *wat* belonging to the less popular but more prestigious Thommayut order as well as to the Mohanikay order (see ch. 7). In such cases, adherence to the different orders can be a cause for occasional factionalism within the village community.

There is, despite a lack of overt ties, a strong sense of belonging to one's own community. Outsiders are usually stereotyped as bad people, not to be trusted. Khmer hesitate to visit, and avoid settling in, villages where they do not have relatives or good friends. The immediately neighboring communities, within roughly a ten-mile radius, often include communities that are well known to each other and linked by a network of intermarriage, kinship, and friendship resulting from generations of intermarriage. The parcellation of land, resulting from Khmer inheritance practices, has led Khmer often to marry outside the village and to farm the spouse's land.

The two major organizations that connect Khmer males to the wider community are the *sangha* and the armed forces. In June 1968 it was estimated by the director of the Buddhist Institute in Phnom Penh that there were nearly 100,000 members of the *sangha* at that time. Most Khmer males at some time during their lives enter the *sangha* for at least a month and often longer. Travel to other *wat,* except during the rainy-season Buddhist retreat period, is easy for *sangha* members since they are assured free food and lodging everywhere there is a *wat.* The time spent by boys and men in the *sangha* conforming to the monastic rules and behavior patterns has been important in maintaining the homogeneity and continuity of Khmer values and institutions.

Between early 1970 and mid-1972 the republican forces grew from some 35,000 troops to about 200,000 and thus constituted a larger organization than did the *sangha.* The social effects of this massive armed mobilization in terms of reducing rural parochialism were presumably considerable, but information was lacking.

Another modern institution drawing a large popular membership has been the state school system, which had over 1 million students in school year 1969/70 and which had replaced the *wat* as the main source of literacy and academic learning. These schools have been

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of special significance to Khmer society in that they draw pupils from the female population also, thus providing Khmer girls with their first experience of participating in a formal organization that is not based on kinship and preparing them for the possibility of pursuing nondomestic careers.

Although in 1970 most Khmer, male and female, were receiving only some elementary education, the student population had expanded enormously compared to a decade earlier (see ch. 6). In urban areas, especially Phnom Penh, where there were substantial numbers of students with secondary and higher education, youth and student organizations in the early 1970s had become politically vocal and on several occasions led, or participated in, political demonstrations. Should this student group continue to expand and to be politically active, significant changes might result in the size and character of the country's political elite (see ch. 9).

Aside from the *sangha* and the schools, Khmer village life, until the early 1970s, had little to do with organized activity, although under the Sihanouk regime efforts had been made to mobilize villagers to participate in the government-sponsored Sangkum and its affiliated youth organization. Until the great expansion of the armed forces in mid-1970, the only military activity engaged in by most Khmer males was participation of all able-bodied male villagers in the village militia.

The chief of the district (a subdivision of a province) was the seniormost outsider with whom villagers commonly interacted (see ch. 8). The district chief, who was a civil servant, generally received deference from the villagers and was treated as an important individual; however, behavior toward him was usually polite but distant. Far closer and friendlier relations commonly existed between villagers and the chief of the commune (the next lower administrative level). The commune chief was the highest ranking administrator to be chosen locally. He was usually a man whose income and way of living were slightly, but not excessively, higher than those of the villagers who chose him.

In mid-1970 the republican government decreed a general mobilization of Cambodian citizens that involved all civilian men and women between the ages of eighteen and sixty in the national effort to eliminate subversion, counter invasion, unite the country, and improve the lives of the people. Each citizen was instructed to "consider himself mobilized in the service of the nation and to contribute to the extent of his powers in the defense of the endangered homeland" (see ch. 14). The country was organized for general mobilization purposes into units of ten houses, five such groups forming a block. In rural areas the blocks were grouped under the village administration and connected to the center in

Phnom Penh through a hierarchy operating at the commune, district, and province levels. In urban areas ten houses were also the basic unit. Above this were larger units, from fifty-house blocks to the town-wide level. A Cambodian government official stated in a newspaper interview published in May 1971 that in towns each block elected a representative who maintained a continuing dialogue with the authorities on behalf of his electors.

The purposes of the general mobilization were also officially declared to be concerned as much with national development and instilling democratic and economically progressive values in the people as they were with maintaining and improving security. The security aspects were important, however, and block members were under obligation to note and report immediately to the authorities any "suspicious strangers who may appear in the block."

In addition to the various territorial groupings, over sixty committees were established as part of the general mobilization with the purpose of organizing and activating the Khmer public in certain directions. The committees created included ones with such diverse roles as commemorating those who died as a result of Vietnamese communist action; exploring the nation's potential mineral resources, especially petroleum; collecting, assembling, and analyzing public opinion; and providing "spiritual information" to general mobilization cadres.

Efforts to bring the central government into closer contact with the general public were being made as part of the general mobilization. Some volunteer teachers were reportedly sent to remote parts of the country to make contact with the people living there. Road-building designed to increase contact and improve relations between the central government and villages formerly isolated from the outside world was also being carried out. Psychological warfare units connected with the armed forces of the republican government were working to activiate the loyalties of villagers to the republic. The improvement in literacy, which occurred during the 1960s, and widespread ownership of transistor radios have been of great importance in shattering village isolation and making Cambodians throughout the country less parochial than formerly.

Other Ethnic Groups

Whereas the values and institutions of the Khmer predominate, there are several important minority groups in the country, each with its own set of values and institutions. Of these, the Khmer Loeu (upland Khmer), are indigenous. The Khmer Loeu are all rural inhabitants, and in mid-1972 most lived in areas that had been for some time in the hands of the National United Front of Cambodia (Front Uni National de Kampuchéa—FUNK). The

Cham (Khmer Islam), who arrived in Cambodia in historic times, are also rural.

The Chinese, the bulk of whom came to Cambodia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, were in mid-1972 the largest foreign community. More than half of them lived in major urban centers. Chinese immigration to Cambodia had generally ceased before the mid-1950s.

The Vietnamese resident community had been the largest foreign community from the latter half of the nineteenth century until the mid-twentieth century. During the early 1970s it suffered a severe reduction; many of those who remained were probably urban dwellers.

Some Europeans, mostly French, and some persons with origins on the Indian subcontinent lived in Phnom Penh, Batdambang, and some of the smaller urban centers. There also existed in mid-1972 in areas controlled by the republican government an influential minority consisting of ethnic Khmer from the Mekong delta areas of South Vietnam. These people, known as Khmer Krom (literally, lowland Khmer), were in most ways part of the greater Khmer society but in some respects distinct from them. Several thousand of them were serving in the armed forces of the republican government.

Khmer Loeu

The Khmer Loeu are indigenous hill people belonging to several ethnolinguistic groups. They form the majority population in Rotanokiri and Mondol Kiri provinces and are also present in significant numbers in Kracheh and Stoeng Treng provinces. There are also some Khmer Loeu in western Cambodia along the Thai border and small numbers in northern, north-central, and southern areas.

There are no population statistics for some of these groups, and others are inadequately reported. In 1971 the total number of Khmer Loeu was variously estimated from 40,000 to over 100,000. Although few in number, the hill people have been important to the security of the country since they are the dominant people along part of the nation's frontier.

Personal decorations, more than anything else, distinguish the Khmer Loeu from the ethnic Khmer. They take various forms, such as piercing and elongating the lobes of the ear, in which heavy ivory earplugs may be inserted; wearing heavy copper or brass bangles on the wrists and ankles; extracting or filing teeth; and having extensive tattoos on arms, chest, and forehead. These practices are diminishing, particularly among men who have had outside contacts and among children who have attended school. Clothing is simple and consists of a loincloth for the men and a short skirt made of coarse cotton or other fiber for the women.

Most Khmer Loeu live in scattered villages of a few hundred people. Extended kin groups based on matrilineal or patrilineal descent are in many cases the most important social units. Each settlement is an independent and largely self-sufficient unit. Some groups are governed by a village headman or a council of elders, although others appear to have no permanent political offices.

The Khmer Loeu subsist primarily by growing hill rice, which they cultivate by the slash-and-burn method (see ch. 12). Some corn, yams, and tobacco are also raised, and most villages have a few pigs and chickens that may be slaughtered for food; some also have buffalo for draft use and for animal sacrifice. Men perform the heavier work associated with slash-and-burn agriculture, whereas women plant the fields and gather produce from wild plants. Hunting and fishing are important means of supplementing the diet.

There are many types of housing, varying according to tribal custom. Some groups seem to prefer to live as nuclear family households, whereas others live in multifamily longhouses. Most houses are mounted on log piles that stand four to six feet high. The space underneath the house may be used as a pigsty or for chickens and for storage.

With the exception of some groups, such as the Kui (Khoy), who have become virtually assimilated into the Khmer society, the Khmer Loeu are adherents of tribal religions stressing the worship of various kinds of spirits including, in some cases, ancestral spirits. Religion is usually centered in the family household in which most rituals are performed. Communal religious activity occurs primarily in time of crisis—epidemic, drought, or pestilence—but there are also community rituals that are executed at other times. Such rites are usually accompanied by feasting and heavy drinking. In most communities there are religious practitioners who are believed to have supernatural powers for dealing with the world of the spirits.

Little agreement exists among those who have attempted to classify the various Khmer Loeu groups according to group names and ethnic distinctions. Some authorities state that there are thirteen separate groups, but only fragmentary information is available on some of them. The principal groups are probably the Rhade, Jarai, Stieng, Kui, Pear, Saoch, Brao, and Chong.

The Rhade and Jarai, who live along the South Vietnam border, speak Malayo-Polynesian languages commonly classified as upland Cham. The others mentioned speak languages of the Mon-Khmer language family. The Stieng live in eastern Cambodia; the Pear and Saoch, in the western mountains; and the Brao, near the border with Laos. The Kui settlements are in the north, interspersed among those of the Khmer. Most Kui have adopted Khmer customs and the Theravada Buddhist religion and grow irrigated rice. The other hill tribes have proved more resistant to assimilation.

French policy during the protectorate period was not one of active control of the Khmer Loeu or any vigorous interference in their affairs. Some resettlement projects were attempted, but they were few in number and had only limited success. French army commanders looked upon the Khmer Loeu as an excellent source of manpower for the army outposts and recruited large numbers of them. Many Khmer Loeu have continued this tradition by enlisting in the Cambodian army.

The Cambodian government in the 1960s undertook a broad civic action program—for which the army had responsibility—among the Khmer Loeu in the provinces of Kaoh Kong, Stoeng Treng, Rotanokiri, and Mondol Kiri. This program was carried out in accordance with the national policy of educating the Khmer Loeu and assimilating them into Cambodian cultural traditions. Many thousands were resettled in the Chlong district and other areas of Kracheh Province, and there was also resettlement in Stoeng Treng and Rotanokiri provinces. It was government practice to offer monetary and other inducements to the Khmer Loeu to move to the new settlements.

In an effort to assimilate the Khmer Loeu, schools were provided in which Khmer and French, as well as Cambodian history and religion, were taught. Buddhist monks were sent to live in Khmer Loeu communities, and groups of ethnic Khmer were resettled in Khmer Loeu villages. Each large village had a resident government representative whose function was not only to govern but also to disseminate information and encourage the Khmer Loeu to learn the Cambodian way of life.

In the late 1960s an estimated 5,000 hill people in eastern Cambodia rose in rebellion against the government and demanded self-determination and independence. The government press reported that local leaders loyal to the national government had been assassinated by the rebels and that there was widespread resentment by the hill people against ethnic Khmer immigrant settlers and noncooperation with the Cambodian army in its anti-Vietnamese Communist campaign.

North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese Communists exploited this conflict and actively recruited Khmer Loeu—in some cases using force. In late 1970 the defense of Rotanokiri and Mondol Kiri provinces against the Vietnamese Communists was abandoned by the republican government, and some 9,000 republican army personnel and their dependents, as well as some villagers, were evacuated. These provinces, with their Khmer Loeu majorities, then came, ostensibly at least, politically under FUNK control (see ch. 9).

Social identification and political efforts at alliance with hill people of South Vietnam (as well as the Cham and Khmer Krom of both South Vietnam and Cambodia) have been reported. An organization of hill peoples of South Vietnam was reported as expressing the desire in mid-1970 for the establishment of a joint armed force composed of and led by hill peoples of Laos, the Khmer Republic, and South Vietnam to maintain security in their areas.

Cham

The Kingdom of Champa once extended over much of southeastern Indochina, but in the fifteenth century the Cham were conquered by the Vietnamese, who then annexed most of their territory. Soon thereafter the Cham elite and much of the population fled to Cambodia. At some point, the Cham were converted to Islam, and they have remained devout Muslims.

The Cham dress is distinctive. The *batik*, a sarong similar to the Khmer *sampot* (the national costume), is the main item of apparel and is worn knotted at the waist. Over the *batik* women wear a closely fitted blouse opened at the throat with tight sleeves. Men wear a shirt over the *batik* and sometimes an ankle-length robe. Bright color combinations, such as red and green stripes on a white background, are popular for men.

Most Cham live in compact villages in Kampong Cham Province. Some Cham, however, live in urban areas where they engage in trade and industry. Chruoy Changvar, near Phnom Penh, is considered the spiritual center of the Cham. Several high Muslim officials live there, including the supreme chief of the Cham.

The Cham are engaged primarily in farming and are considered adept at raising water buffalo. They serve as butchers of cattle for the Khmer, who are forbidden to kill by Buddhist precept. They are also often fishermen and boatbuilders.

The Cham speak the Cham language at home and use Arabic and Malay (in Arabic script), which they learn in Koranic schools, in religious contexts. Khmer is the language of trade and commerce, and most Cham speak it fluently, although often with a pidgin quality. The Cham maintain close contact with the Khmer Loeu with whom they trade, and they have also maintained relatively favorable contact with the ethnic Khmer and have adopted many aspects of Khmer culture, although their religion has inhibited intermarriage with non-Muslims. Historically, royal favor was granted the Cham, and their supreme chief was appointed by the king and was a member of the royal court. Most ethnic Khmer, however, regard the Cham as being somewhat inferior culturally and religiously, in part because of the Cham practice of slaughtering animals.

According to one source in 1970, there exists a small Malay community that is grouped with the Cham that may have arrived in Cambodia as early as the thirteenth century. These are concentrated at Chruoy Changvar. These Malays have intermarried extensively with the Cham and are integrated religiously in the one nationwide Islamic Association, which has its headquarters in Phnom Penh and has representatives down to the village mosque level. There were reported in 1970 to be 132 mosques in the country.

Chinese

In the late 1960s there were an estimated 425,000 ethnic Chinese in Cambodia, of whom about three-fifths were urban dwellers and the remaining two-fifths were rural residents. In rural areas they acted as shopkeepers, rice buyers and processors, and moneylenders in Khmer villages. In urban areas they were mainly engaged in commerce. An estimated 135,000 of the total lived in Phnom Penh, and an additional 14,000, in Batdambang, the country's second largest city. It is probable that some rural Chinese moved to Phnom Penh and to provincial capitals and towns in territory held by the republican government after the outbreak of hostilities in early 1970 (see ch. 2).

Chinese relations with the ethnic Khmer have generally been relatively friendly. Many Chinese adopted Khmer culture, and many have married Khmer women. Some of the Sino-Khmers were fully assimilated into the Khmer community, and the remainder became part of the Chinese community; no distinct Sino-Khmer group developed. Friendly relations have been explained in part as owing also to the presence of another large non-Khmer group, the Vietnamese, against whom any feeling of hostility toward resident foreign elements has been usually directed.

The large-scale repatriation of Vietnamese that occurred after the outbreak of fighting in early 1970 removed, at least in part, the focus of Khmer animosity, and it remained to be seen whether this would be turned toward the Chinese. Some reaction was indicated in the closing of Chinese schools and in the campaigns initiated in Phnom Penh in mid-1971 to Cambodianize the city. The campaign—related to the central government's effort to emphasize Khmer nationalism—included instructions from the city government for all shops and stores to use signboards in Cambodian letters and for communication in shops, restaurants, and hotels to be conducted in Cambodian.

The war and its effect upon the economy have brought some reactions that, on the surface, appear to have an anti-Chinese content. A number of Chinese-owned stores were burned in Batdambang, and it was reported in mid-1971 that shakedowns by armed soldiers of Chinese shops in Phnom Penh were common. In August 1971 a number of Chinese were tried for "economic sabotage." It is possible, however, that these activities were not as much reactions against the Chinese as they were against the Chinese dominance of the economy, making Chinese businessmen targets for charges of profiteering and for being the cause of rising prices.

Dialect group has been the most important criterion for subdividing the resident Chinese population of Cambodia. The reasons for this are partly historical. A system was devised by the Annamese (Vietnamese) emperor Gia Long in the early nineteenth century for administering that country's substantial Chinese community. Under the system the Chinese were divided into groups according to area of origin in China and dialect group. Each *bang* (dialect group) was under the jurisdiction of its own leaders for law, order, and the collection of taxes. *Bang* leaders served as intermediaries between members of the dialect group and the Vietnamese administration.

When the French took control of Indochina, they followed this practice, extending it to Cambodia in 1892. Five *bang* (which the French called *congrégations*) were established in Cambodia. These served the Cantonese, Hokkien, Teochiu, Hakka, and Hainanese dialect groups. The French gave the head of the *bang* (*chef de congrégation*) of each province or administrative region considerable authority. Every Chinese was required to belong to a *bang*. Only with the permission of appropriate head of a *bang* could a Chinese move from one province to another. If the head declared an individual no longer acceptable, he was deported by the French authorities.

In 1958 the *congrégation* system of administering the resident Chinese community was terminated. During the 1960s Chinese affairs tended to be handled in Phnom Penh by the Chinese Hospital Committee, an organization set up to fund and administer a hospital previously established for the Chinese community. The committee, which was the largest association of Chinese merchants in the country, was required by the organization's constitution to choose its fifteen board members as follows: six Teochiu, three Cantonese, two Hokkienese, two Hakka, and two Hainanese. The hospital board reflected the composition and constituted the recognized leadership of Phnom Penh's Chinese community. In smaller towns and cities the local Chinese school board often served a similar function, providing a place for the seniormost Chinese leaders to meet regularly and to have their leadership formally recognized.

In January 1971 the government officially authorized the formation of a new body, the Federated Association of Chinese of Cambodia. The federation was the first organization to embrace the entire country's resident Chinese. According to its statutes the federation was designed to "aid Chinese nationals in the social, cultural, public health, and medical fields," to administer the property owned jointly by the Chinese community in Phnom Penh and elsewhere, and to promote friendly relations between Cambodians and Chinese. Although only persons or corporate bodies of Chinese nationality could be active members and hold elective office, Chinese persons of Cambodian nationality could be honorary voting members. In mid-1972 it seemed likely that this organization would replace the Chinese Hospital Committee of Phnom Penh as the most important organization for the Cambodian Chinese; its leaders, elected and nonelected, could be expected to be the recognized leaders of the resident Chinese community. The establishment of one nationwide organization was likely to continue the trend evident since the early 1960s in the Chinese community to transcend the dialect group allegiance in many aspects of its social, political, and economic relations.

Dialect group, however, continued to be the single most important focus for loyalty within the Chinese community, and in each of the various voluntary associations found among the country's Chinese one dialect group is almost always overwhelmingly preponderant, especially at the leadership level. The largest group consists of the Teochiu, who in the late 1960s made up some 75 percent of the Chinese population. The Teochiu constitute 90 percent of the Chinese living in rural Cambodia, where they run village stores, control rural credit and rice-marketing facilities, and grow vegetables for sale. In urban areas they have also been engaged in the import-export business, the sale of pharmaceuticals, and street peddling.

The Cantonese, the next largest group, have been largely urban. They were numerically the majority in Cambodia before large Teochiu migrations began in the late 1930s. The majority of Cantonese in the late 1960s lived in Phnom Penh and the cities of Batdambang and Kampong Cham. They were commonly found in the transportation and construction businesses, and many were carpenters or mechanics.

The Hokkien community has some of the country's richest Chinese, and they have been commonly found in import-export and banking concerns; Hokkienese also often run hardware and food stores. The Hainanese started out as pepper growers in Kampot Province and continued to be dominant in this field in the early 1970s. Many migrated to Phnom Penh, where in the late 1960s they reportedly had a virtual monopoly on the hotel and restaurant businesses. They also often ran tailor shops and haberdasheries.

The Hakka are the most recently arrived. In the 1960s they were reported to be living mainly in Phnom Penh, and others were found in rural areas of Takev Province. A small, relatively isolated group of Hakka lived in Rotanokiri Province. In the capital many dentists, sellers of traditional Chinese medicines, and shoemakers were Hakka.

Vietnamese

There is a long history of Cambodian-Vietnamese wars, of Vietnamese annexation of Cambodian territory, and of Vietnamese suzerainty over Cambodia that has resulted in hostile feelings of Khmer for their eastern neighbors (see ch. 3). Thus, although the Khmer have been disturbed by the amount of control of the economy by Chinese, it is against the Vietnamese resident minority that they have felt the stronger animus. The Vietnamese were also employed by the French as middle and lower level functionaries in the protectorate administration and received the brunt of what Khmer nationalist and anticolonialist sentiment existed.

Such a history also exists for Thai-Cambodian relations. The Khmer, however, share the same religion and many aspects of culture with the Thai, links that have helped in some measure to ameliorate relations between them. In the case of the Vietnamese, however, no such cultural identity exists. The Vietnamese, alone in Southeast Asia, fall within the Sinitic rather than the Indic cultural sphere. Even Vietnamese Buddhists have little in common with the Khmer Buddhists since the Vietnamese are adherents to the Mahayana school of Buddhism, whereas the Khmer are Theravadins (see ch. 7). In way of dress, in kinship organization, and in numerous other values and institutions, the Vietnamese differ markedly from the Khmer, and these differences are felt to be abrasive by the majority group.

The spilling of the Vietnam war over into Cambodia in the 1960s and early 1970s also exacerbated Khmer animosity toward Vietnamese and resulted in serious outbreaks of violence against them in different parts of the country during February and March 1970. On a much larger scale, distrust of the Vietnamese resident community was a contributing factor to the decision of the republican government in mid-1970 to round up a very substantial proportion of the resident Vietnamese population—some estimate at least 200,000 or roughly half of Cambodia's Vietnamese—for repatriation to South Vietnam. In some cases repatriation occurred after a period spent in guarded internment camps. It was not known in mid-1972 how many Vietnamese former residents remained in the country or where they lived. Among those being repatriated, it was noted that there were relatively few men between the ages of twenty and thirty and, although unable to provide proof of this contention, many Khmer believed that the missing young men had joined the Vietnamese guerrilla forces in Cambodia.

Most Vietnamese had lived in urban centers; however, substantial numbers had been settled along the lower Mekong, and some 25,000 or more were freshwater fishermen living along the shores of the Tonle Sap. Several thousand had also lived in Kracheh Province, where they provided the bulk of the labor on French-owned rubber estates. In the cities Vietnamese had been employed since Cambodia's independence as white-collar workers in private businesses, artisans of various types, and domestic servants, and a few were doctors and professional personnel. The rubber estate workers, as well as the shopkeepers of Phnom Penh, were reportedly predominantly of North Vietnamese origin, but the remainder were from South Vietnam.

Adding further to Khmer anti-Vietnamese feelings were tens of thousands of Vietnamese communist troops in eastern Cambodia, where they staffed supply lines and sanctuary bases for the war in Vietnam. Parts of eastern Cambodia also contained South Vietnamese troops engaged in fighting Vietnamese Communists there (see ch. 14). Despite Khmer antipathies, however, both the republican regime and the FUNK have called upon and accepted the assistance of Vietnamese armed units. In the case of the FUNK almost the entire functioning (although not the nominal) leadership, its trusted cadres, and the vast majority of its fighting men were widely reported to be Vietnamese Communists.

Other Foreign Minorities

The most influential foreign community for its size has been the French. The French population constituted a nonpermanent group made up of commercial executives, teachers, and plantation administrators. French influence, however, was much greater than the number of French residents would indicate. The long years of French rule and the introduction of the French educational system had a profound influence, particularly on the aristocratic elite.

Admiration for French culture was deeply rooted but mixed with some resentment. Many members of the royal family and other aristocratic families have studied in France and have learned the French way of life, but they have been careful to safeguard Khmer culture and to be identified with everything Khmer.

About 20,000 Thai have long lived as farmers in the northwestern provinces of Siemreab and Batdambang.. These two provinces at various times have been held by Thailand (see ch. 3). The Thai rarely live in the same communities with the Khmer, and there is little interaction between the two groups. It has been estimated that some 5,000 Lao also live in Cambodia.

In Pailin (Batdambang Province) and in Ba Kev (Stoeng Treng Province) there were reported to be Burmese settlements. The inhabitants retained Burmese citizenship and earned their living as prospectors, jewel cutters, and gem merchants. Like the Thai and Lao, the Burmese were Theravada Buddhists.

More alien was the very small South Asian community. Most originated in French enclaves on the Indian subcontinent and were less popular with the Khmer than the Chinese, Thai, Lao, and Burmese. They have been active in commerce and as money lenders.

Khmer Krom

In mid-1972 several hundred thousand ethnic Khmer resided in Thailand and South Vietnam; and roughly 5,000, in Laos. Those in South Vietnam were called the Khmer Krom and were the remnant of the Khmer community that had dominated the Mekong delta region since before the time of Angkor. The Khmer Krom have formed a substantial and essentially unassimilated minority in South Vietnam.

In the 1920s and 1930s many Khmer Krom came to Phnom Penh in order to complete their studies. Many stayed on in Phnom Penh, where they found jobs in government service, especially as teachers in the state schools. In 1972 these long-established Khmer Krom immigrants were in many respects indistinguishable from Cambodian Khmer. Nonetheless, they have preserved some unique characteristics, a regional accent, and a sense of separate group identity. Most of the Khmer Krom in Phnom Penh in the early 1970s also reportedly retained ties of kin friendship, and some even claimed land in the Mekong delta area of Vietnam. Although they are essentially of one culture with Cambodain Khmer, Khmer Krom practices show traces of evidence that the inhabitants of the Mekong delta area were less influenced by culture carried overland from Thailand than were the Khmer in Cambodia. Thus, although the Khmer Krom are Theravada Buddhists, many of them in the early 1970s still maintained household altars dedicated to the Hindu god Siva. In other respects also, they maintained a greater allegiance to Brahmanical beliefs and practices such as had prevailed in their area in ancient times (see ch. 3; ch. 7).

The Cambodian government has for many years expressed concern and dissatisfaction over the treatment of the Khmer Krom by the Vietnamese government (see ch. 10). In the early 1960s the government of Prince Sihanouk supported nationalist activity by the Khmer Krom against the South Vietnamese administration, which under Ngo Dinh Diem was pursuing a policy of forced assimilation of Khmer Krom into the dominant Vietnamese society. The Khmer Krom movement, called the Struggle Front of the Khmer of Lower Cambodia, advocated the return of the Vietnamese provinces of the lower Mekong to Cambodia.

SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN AREAS OUTSIDE REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT CONTROL

Shortly after being deposed Prince Sihanouk announced from Peking the formation of the National United Front of Cambodia (Front Uni National de Kampuchéa—FUNK) and its political arm, the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia (Gouvernement Royal d'Union Nationale de Kampuchéa—GRUNK) (see ch. 10). Major support within Cambodia for these organizations has come from the North Vietnamese armed forces and the South Vietnamese Communists. Efforts by the FUNK to recruit support from the Khmer peasantry have been hampered by the peasant's historic tendency to remain aloof from dissident movements and his animosity toward the Vietnamese generally. Moreover, since some 90 percent of the farmers own the land they till, it has been difficult to find people sufficiently alienated or discontented to actively support opposition to the republican government.

Khmer adherence to Theravada Buddhist values has to some extent inhibited the appeal of communism. Although the essential atheism of Buddhism as practiced in Cambodia makes communism in some ways more acceptable than Christianity (which has made virtually no headway among the Khmer), it conflicts with the Buddhist insistence on individual responsibility and on the necessity for individual freedom to make and break social ties. In addition, it has been widely reported, in information media of the republican government, that Vietnamese Communists force the Khmer *sangha* to labor for its food; this practice—in direct contravention of the most basic law of Theravadin monasticism—has shocked and angered many Khmer.

In Khmer Loeu areas of the northeast where the Vietnamese Communists have been installed since the mid-1960s, relations with the hill people have been reasonably cordial where contact and demands upon the inhabitants have been limited. When they have been pressed excessively for men and matériel, however, the Khmer Loeu have fought back.

In Khmer areas the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces have shown great care to avoid angering the local people; they have paid for most of their food (although complaints have been voiced at the prices paid) and have abstained from raping, looting, or offensive conduct. They have publicized alleged incidents of this type purportedly committed by troops of the republican government and those of South Vietnam operating in Cambodia. The practice has been for the Vietnamese armed forces to do the bulk of the fighting in order to gain control of a particular rural area and then for the FUNK forces (which include some Cambodians conspicuously placed to seem more numerous than they are) to try and establish a political base of support at the village level and recruit troops for the FUNK (see ch. 9).

Public policy statements by FUNK (which claims to be an indigenous organization) and GRUNK spokesmen have been couched in terms that would avoid offending any potential supporters. Stress has been placed on the values shared in common with Buddhists. Thus, in March 1971 Hu Nim, alleged to be GRUNK minister of information, was quoted as saying:

> Buddha teaches the faithful to display solidarity, do good, pure, and benevolent deeds, practice, honesty and justice and avoid all bad, rotten, dishonest, and unjust acts and debauchery. These Buddhist Commandments are incorporated in the political program of FUNK. . . . Noteworthy is the fact that national traditions are fully respected and developed. . . . According to the strict program of the FUNK, Buddhism is the state religion. This is the enlightened and correct policy of FUNK toward workers and peasants who are considered the foundation of construction.

CHAPTER 5

LIVING CONDITIONS

In the 1960s food and shelter could be obtained without difficulty in most places, and progress was being made in the building of schools and health facilities and in improving agricultural production. By 1972 living conditions had deteriorated as a result of the intensified military operations by the forces of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) and the communist forces of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) and counteraction by Cambodian and South Vietnamese forces. The scope of government welfare projects had also been greatly restricted.

The major adverse factor was the lack of physical security in some parts of the country, especially in the rural areas. More than 2 million persons had been displaced by military activities at one time or another after March 1970. Some families had returned to their native villages after a respite in the fighting, only to have to take flight again when the village once more became a combat area. The massive influx of refugees into the urban areas had aggravated housing conditions and imposed additional burdens on public utilities. Phnom Penh was particularly affected; its population was reported to have doubled during 1970.

Some supply routes were blocked or destroyed, hampering distribution and creating temporary shortages in rice and other essential commodities. Rising prices and the lack of consumer goods created dissatisfaction and unrest among the population in various areas.

The principal welfare efforts of the government and the international voluntary agencies were aimed at the resettlement and rehabilitation of refugees. There were also some governmental efforts on behalf of wounded or dead soldiers and their families (see ch. 14). About 200,000 of an estimated 2 million refugees were dependent upon the government for the necessities of life. A few were accommodated in camps, but most were living with relatives or were housed in squatter shacks in the peripheral areas of Phnom Penh and provincial capitals. Because of logistical and transportation difficulties, many refugees outside Phnom Penh lacked adequate supplies of food, medicine, and clothing.

A large proportion of the population was debilitated by chronic ailments; life expectancy of an individual at birth was forty-six or forty-seven years. The major diseases—intestinal infections, tuberculosis, and malaria—were caused mainly by the lack of sanitation facilities and ignorance of health practices. Although significant improvement had been made in the field of preventive medicine, especially in antimalarial spraying and vaccination for smallpox, wartime conditions prevented the systematic follow-up of these measures.

There were only a few hundred trained physicians in the country, and in rural areas schoolteachers have provided some modern medical care. Western medicines have gained much popularity, mainly because of the observable efficacy of antibiotics.

The severe shortage of medical personnel and facilities has been aggravated by the increased demand for such services as a result of military operations. The activities of enemy forces have seriously restricted practically all programs and efforts designed to improve health conditions. Many medical facilities have been destroyed and their staffs killed, kidnapped, or threatened.

PUBLIC HEALTH

Types and Incidence of Illness

Public health problems fall into three general categories: contagious diseases, which are unrelated to faulty sanitary conditions or a lack of basic health education on the part of the population; diseases caused by poor sanitary conditions and poor hygiene practices; and disabilities and deaths resulting largely from lack of adequate medical services.

In the first category are malaria, dengue fever, diphtheria, whooping cough, filariasis, leprosy, trachoma, tuberculosis, and smallpox. The second category—diseases transmitted by water, food, filth, and flies—includes cholera, typhoid fever, intestinal parasites, and scabies and other skin infections. The third category consists of such ailments as respiratory infections resulting in pneumonia, untreated appendicitis, unset fractures, which often heal with deformity, maternal and newborn baby deaths caused by lack of health supervision during pregnancy, and acute infectious diseases, such as meningitis, which are curable with adequate treatment but are sometimes fatal without it.

Mosquitos bearing malaria, filariasis, and dengue fever are found in the foothills and near streams and rivers after the rainy season, when the flow of water becomes sluggish. The common housefly, a transmitter of filth-borne diseases, is ubiquitous and rife just before and during the rainy season. Rats are prevalent and serve as the hosts of fleas carrying plague. Leeches can cause running sores that are difficult to heal.

Perhaps as many as 5 percent of the people have annual malarial attacks, the areas of greatest incidence being in the plateaus and foothills. Both amoebic and bacillary dysentery occur. Only about 100 cases of typhoid fever are reported annually, but the figure is only a small fraction of the estimated total number of cases. Data on the incidence of other diseases were lacking in mid-1972.

Accurate annual mortality rates for the entire population are not available, but a detailed analysis of the 1962 census statistics showed that the presumed decline in mortality beginning in 1945 was then likely to continue. The outbreak of hostilities in March 1970 has presumably increased the death rate of young men. The causes of death are generally difficult to ascertain because the majority take place in the home, and the type of illness may not be reported or even known to the family of the deceased.

Sanitation

Sanitary conditions in Phnom Penh and a few of the other principal urban centers in the 1960s and early 1970s were superior to those prevailing in the countryside. There was some fragmentary evidence in mid-1972, however, that the influx of refugees in the early 1970s had overburdened urban facilities. In the capital city three water purification plants provide treatment facilities usually adequate for peacetime conditions, although the water is often contaminated during its distribution. Many houses do not have running water, but most have some kind of toilet facility.

Although there is a regular garbage collection service, scavenging dogs sometimes overturn garbage cans and scatter the contents over sidewalks and streets. Sewage is disposed of largely in septic tanks. In the 1960s the population had cooperated well with public authorities in keeping streets and properties tidy and continued to do so in the early 1970s.

Refrigeration facilities are limited. Meat, unless well cooked, is likely to cause dysentery. Raw fruits and vegetables are often contaminated on the outer surface, but those that can be peeled may be eaten raw.

In rural areas sanitary practices are often primitive. Rivers and streams are common sources of water for cooking and drinking, but people sometimes draw water for these purposes from the same watercourse that is used for bathing, washing clothes, and disposing of garbage and other waste material. Villages are customarily without any systematic waste disposal facilities. The custom of keeping cattle, pigs, and poultry under the houses has been a hazard to health, but during the 1960s stables, pigsties, and henhouses were being built, as were individual or collective granaries to keep rats and other pests in check.

Medical Personnel

When the country attained its independence in 1953, the government had to face a serious problem presented by the departure of nearly all the medical personnel brought in by the French. At that time there had been very few Cambodians who had been schooled as doctors, pharmacists, nurses, or paramedical personnel. To correct this critical situation the government established a school of medicine and a school of nursing. Foreign aid funds, to which the United States contributed, were used for this purpose.

The training of personnel started slowly because students lacked educational prerequisites and young women were initially reluctant to enter the nursing field. Strenuous efforts were made to expand the facilities for elementary and secondary education, to improve the quality of the instruction, and to stimulate interest in higher level technical education of all kinds, including public health (see ch. 6). In the first half of the 1960s the few European and Cambodian physicians who had been trained abroad and a few support personnel did the best they could to meet the country's medical needs.

The Royal Faculty of Medicine of Cambodia (in 1972 the Faculty of Medicine, Pharmacy, and Paramedical Sciences) was created in 1953. It trained only health officers until 1958, when it enrolled its first class (graduates of the full thirteen years of preparatory education) in a seven-year course leading to the doctor of medicine degree (see ch. 6). In 1962 the faculty became part of the present University of Phnom Penh, and in 1967 it expanded its teaching program to include training for dentists and medical specialists. By the late 1960s nearly 500 medical students were enrolled, and it was announced that many of the graduates of the Faculty of Medicine, Pharmacy, and Paramedical Sciences would become teachers. In that manner the country's own medical specialists would gradually replace foreigners; this change began in 1967. In 1971, according to a report published by the Ministry of Public Health, thirty-three medical instructors were specialists in sixteen branches of medical study. The number of foreigners in this total was not specified.

A report by the Ministry of Public Health stated that in September 1971 there were 367 physicians and health officers (individuals who have completed a four-year course in medicine but who are not fully qualified doctors) available for service to the civilian population. This total compared to a figure of 462 such persons available in March 1970; the difference of ninety-five persons was primarily the result of medical employees joining the country's miliary forces. Of the 367 physicians and health officers serving civilians in September 1971, twenty-six physicians were engaged in eighteen medical specialties, according to the Ministry of Public Health.

The 1971 report of the Ministry of Public Health also included a prediction of the number of medical students expected to complete their training within the next five years. For 1971 the estimate was twenty-four; for 1972, forty-one; for 1973, sixty; for 1974, sixty-four; and for 1975, seventy-five. The University of Phnom Penh remained open in 1970/71. Whether the invasion by North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese communist troops had induced or forced some of these students to halt their medical education for governmental service in a civilian or military capacity could not be determined in mid-1972.

Before the outbreak of large-scale hostilities in March 1970, the School of Nurses and Midwives—the training center for nurses, auxiliary nurses, and midwives—had also furnished the training of sanitary agents. The sanitary agent, who received four years of medical training with particular emphasis on sanitation and preventive medicine, had provided much of the limited medical assistance available in the countryside. Information on whether the School of Nurses and Midwives was still in operation was not available in mid-1972.

In a country where an entire province might have only one or two physicians, the service of sanitary agents was considered essential. In 1971 there were 476—all trained since 1955. In areas controlled by the republican government they worked in provincial capitals and the larger villages; working along with mobile medical teams, they provided medical treatment, studied the incidence of disease, gave inoculations, and presented lectures and demonstrations in health and sanitation practices to rural people.

The number of nurses had almost quintupled between 1955 and March 1970, reaching a total of 2,929 in that month, but by September 1971 only 1,670 were available to civilians because of the movement of medical personnel into the military forces. Although nursing had remained primarily a man's profession, particularly for those nurses staffing the rural dispensaries and infirmaries, the number of women nurses had increased substantially in the 1955–70 period. They treated small wounds and minor illnesses and worked with the mobile medical teams. For more serious cases, they arranged appointments with the provincial public health doctor on his regular rounds. The shortage of nurses had intensified after the outbreak of major hostilities in March 1970; in part it was countered by the traditional practice that a person entering a rural hospital or health center be accompanied by one or more members of his family who would care for him and would often provide his food.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s midwives delivered almost half of the country's babies, saw most of their mothers on at least one prenatal visit, and carried on a rudimentary child clinic program. There was a distinction between the regular midwife—trained at the School of Nurses and Midwives—and the rural midwife. The rural midwife usually operated out of her own village home and traveled widely throughout the countryside, if security conditions permitted, providing varied services both to mother and child.

The government-controlled areas in March 1970 had eighty-one pharmacists. Most had been trained in the Faculty of Pharmacy, which was established at the University of Phnom Penh in 1961; only four had been registered in 1955. As of September 1971 the number of pharmacists available for service to the general population had declined to sixty-three.

Pharmaceuticals

In mid-1972 a severe shortage of all types of pharmaceutical products existed as a result of the invasion by North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese communist forces. Because of the extreme scarcity of medicines, refugees who used governmental facilities were not provided with free medicines. They were instead given prescriptions to buy at their own local pharmacies; foreign observers reported that, because the refugees had no money, they usually went without medicine.

The government had reportedly requested the inclusion of a quantity of pharmaceuticals in the United States economic assistance program. The United States Agency for International Development (AID) was unwilling to include finished pharmaceutical products in this program because of inadequacies in the government's control system for pharmaceuticals and their possible diversion to North Vietnamese or South Vietnamese communist forces. In the eleven months ending November 30, 1971, pharmaceutical products to a value of US$4.3 million were imported, using sources of foreign exchange outside the United States commodity import program (see ch. 11; ch. 13). A relatively small amount of medicines was received in 1971 from sources other than the United States.

Hospital Facilities

When the country achieved independence, its hospital facilities were few, and most of the buildings were thirty-five or more years old and badly in need of repair. In the period between independence and the outbreak of large-scale hostilities in March 1970, there had been a great deal of improvement. Old buildings had been replaced, new ones had been added, and much new equipment had been installed. In general, however, the shortage of hospital facilities had run parallel to that of medical personnel.

The data available in mid-1972 on hospital facilities were conflicting. The most recent authoritative statement appeared to be a government compilation published in October 1971, which stated that twenty-nine hospitals were in operation in March 1970. Of these, sixteen were later destroyed or damaged in the fighting, leaving thirteen in operation as of September 1971. These figures referred to civilian public establishments only. In mid-1972 data were lacking on the status of the four private hospitals, the four rubber plantation hospitals, and the few private clinics and various school and company medical facilities known to have been operating in the late 1960s. Civilian hospitals treated military patients; but military hospitals were not under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Public Health, Welfare, and Pharmaceutical Development, and they usually did not treat war-related civilian casualties (see ch. 14).

Hospital facilities in Phnom Penh, much more adequate than those elsewhere in the country, in the late 1960s served 500,000 persons in surrounding portions of Kandal Province as well as the residents of the capital city. At that time there were seven hospitals (five of which were also teaching institutions), several private clinics, twenty-two public dispensaries infirmaries, and six military infirmaries.

The largest of the general hospitals, the Preah Ket Mealea Hospital, with 1,000 beds, accounted for about one-sixth of the 6,186 hospital beds in the country in March 1970. The other principal hospitals in the city were the 500-bed Soviet-Khmer Friendship Hospital, which had been built with extensive Soviet assistance, the Preah Monivong military installation, and the French-operated Calmette Hospital. All of these had operating theaters. Four other metropolitan theaters, located in private clinics in the city, gave the capital almost half of the total eighteen operating theaters available in the country in the late 1960s.

United States official visitors who inspected the Soviet-Khmer Friendship Hospital in October 1971 stated that, although the hospital facility appeared rather impressive, most of the equipment was no longer operable. At that time the hospital was extremely crowded, poorly equipped, unsanitary, and understaffed. In March and April 1971 the hospital had a daily peak load of 1,200 patients; in late 1971 it had a staff of twenty-seven doctors and a total of

1,009 patients. The hospital director stated that at least eighty doctors were needed.

The staff offices of the hospital had been converted into the emergency unit. Some rooms in this unit had nearly wall-to-wall beds; folding cots were used because of a shortage of beds. The visitors noted patients lying on wooden benches and on grass mats on the floor. The surgical wards, where the wounded civilian and military patients were kept, were very crowded. Patients were in the hallways and the lobby, and rooms that usually would contain three beds contained from six to eight.

Conditions in the maternity ward were also crowded. Mothers and newborn babies—some less than twelve hours old—were lying on folding cots in the hallways. Because of the shortage of beds and nursery baskets, the babies were sleeping with their mothers on folding cots without sheets or other bedcovers. The hospital director told the visitors that there was nothing he could do to alleviate the situation because adequate facilities, equipment, and supplies simply were not available.

Two major establishments devoted to medical care were located outside of Phnom Penh. The one serving the largest number of patients was the Troeung Leprosarium in Kampong Cham Province; in the late 1960s it usually had nearly 2,000 residents. Sonn Mann Hospital, the government mental hospital at Takhmau, a few miles south of Phnom Penh, was built to care for 300 patients.

The mental hospital was visited by a group of officials from the United States General Accounting Office in October 1971. At the time of their visit the hospital had about 1,100 patients and was staffed by six doctors, twenty-two nurses, one midwife, fifty-four administrative employees, and eighty-nine guards. None of the professional staff had received specialized training in psychiatry. The visitors described conditions at the hospital as "appalling" and also reported that sanitary conditions were very poor.

Two provincial hospitals, one in Kampong Chhnang Province and one in Batdambang Province, were also surveyed by the same visiting group of United States officials. Because of inadequate facilities at the Kampong Chhnang Hospital, all serious casualties were evacuated to Phnom Penh. Shortages of staff and of all types of medical supplies, equipment, and medicines were observed. Conditions at Batdambang Hospital appeared generally adequate; facilities were relatively modern, clean, and not crowded. The hospital had a total capacity of 250 beds, of which 161 were occupied at the time of the visit. The hospital contained two surgical units, two delivery rooms, an X-ray room, and a laboratory, all of which appeared clean and well equipped.

Hospitals in the countryside, seldom more than one to a province, were in the 1960s supplemented by rural health centers that gave a skeletal kind of hospital care and had a few beds. The objective of the health center system established in the 1960s was to provide prenatal and postnatal care for mothers and infants; vaccination and inoculation against contagious diseases; theoretical and practical instruction for student doctors, nurses, and midwives; and environmental and health improvement programs consisting of consultations and demonstrations. It was, accordingly, to be the focal point of the rural medical system.

As originally envisaged, the plan called for the establishment of a center in each of the country's districts. One health officer, three male or female nurses, and three midwives would be assigned to each center. The center would include a clinic of twenty-two beds for regular pediatric and maternity cases. In the late 1960s the health center system expansion program was continuing with government support. Only a few of these units had been placed in operation, however, and some were smaller than envisaged in the pilot operations. The varying data on the number of health centers in operation in March 1970 indicated that from twenty-five to twenty-nine were functioning at that time. Conflicting statistics furnished by the government indicated that either ten or thirteen of these had been destroyed or damaged in the fighting after March 1970 and that another five were in areas outside government control as of September 1971.

The large number of hospitals and other medical facilities constructed during the 1960s had been made possible partly by extensive foreign assistance, and much of the more sophisticated hospital equipment had come in the form of donations from abroad. Despite the increase in the number of facilities, in the late 1960s they were still so few and the population of the country was so scattered that many people had nowhere nearby to go for medical attention. To counter this deficiency a mobile medical team system, designed to quickly provide the closest possible approximation to the services available at rural health posts, had been initiated. Whether this program was still in operation in mid-1972 and, if so, to what degree could not be determined from the information available at that time.

Popular Beliefs and Practices

Many generations have practiced the ancient methods of combating illness suggested by monks, sorcerers, and diviners (see ch. 7). In some instances these methods have proved sound by modern medical standards—for example, chaulmoogra oil in the treatment of leprosy, herb teas for intestinal ailments, and frequent bathing as a basic hygienic measure. It is not clear to what extent bathing is regarded as a health measure rather than as a rite. In general, the traditional treatment consists of protective magic designed to propitiate the good spirits and drive out the evil ones (see ch. 7).

Some spirits, though mainly beneficent, are believed to be sensitive about their rights and are capable of causing illness in persons who do not show the proper respect or propitiate them at the right times. Most spirits, however, are thought to be malevolent; by entering the body they may cause illness and can be driven out only by a sorcerer. Various preventive or curative measures, which combine magic, prayer, and specific medicinal potions, are used. Amulets are sometimes worn on the body as popular means of warding off the spirits or of hastening the cure. When evil spirits are suspected of being the cause of an illness, a sorcerer is summoned. Prayer and native medicines also have their part in healing. The remedies include special plants, oils, and potions and may combine symbolic, magical, and medicinal aspects.

Traditional ideas about nutrition sometimes contribute to health problems. For example, large protuberant bellies in undernourished children, resulting from a combination of underfeeding and intestinal parasites, are considered by many mothers as evidence of feeding them too much fish. Solid foods are not ordinarily given to infants until they are at least ten months old, in the belief that these foods are too rich for the baby's stomach.

STANDARDS OF LIVING

Food

Dietary habits appear to be basically the same throughout the country, whether among Khmer, Chinese, or Vietnamese, in villages or in provincial capitals. Rice and fish are basic. Because rice is not as thoroughly milled as in many other rice countries (even less in the rural areas than in the cities), it retains many vitamins. Average rice consumption per person is almost one pound a day. *Tuk-trey* (a fermented fish sauce) is a diet staple for people at all social levels. *Prahoc*, a paste of Khmer origin made of salted, dried fish and allowed to ferment in jars, is also an important part of the diet. At its best, food is characterized by its mixture of delicate flavors and spices, combining the sweet and sour and the bland and bitter in distinctively national recipes.

Tea is drunk generally between meals by the prosperous. It is the first offering to a visitor, and refusal would be considered a rude and unfriendly act by older people. Water is drunk after meals, generally from a large water jug and a common bowl. Supplements to the basic diet, depending on season, status, and wealth, are vegetables, meat (beef and pork), poultry, eggs, and fruits—particularly bananas.

The typical meal of a farmer consists of rice, a few small dried fish, and a bit of *prahoc*. The diet in the cities, particularly in Phnom Penh, has been affected by such Western items as soft drinks and ice cream; the elite favor French cooking, and there are French, Chinese, Indian, and Khmer restaurants plus small food stands with Khmer food. Rice, dried fish, and *prahoc*, however, are still staples.

Malnutrition is manifested in the caloric underfeeding of children and in vitamin B complex deficiencies, such as beriberi. In rural areas such dietary deficiencies result from faulty food customs and a lack of public information about the proper composition of a balanced diet.

Meals are rituals that must not be interrupted even by talking. Serving dishes, with straw or cloth covers, are placed on matting on the floor. The members of the family sit around and serve themselves, the older members of the family eating before the younger. If the older generation is late coming to eat, food is set aside for them before the younger members eat.

Clothing

The traditional lower garment is the *sampot* (a national costume) of which there are many different kinds. The wearing of Western clothes is customary for men in the cities, except at home and on very ceremonial occasions. The ceremonial *sampot*, worn by both men and women, is a length of cotton or silk up to ten feet long and one yard in width worn wrapped around the waist, fastened in front, and falling to mid-calf. The top of the remaining material is then twisted, passed between the legs, and tucked into the waistband in back. The effect is to give the appearance, from the front and back, of loose trousers. Women in the cities ordinarily wear a *sampot* that is a modified sarong with waistband, hooks, snaps, and lining. With the *sampot* women wear a blouse and sometimes a shawl, whereas for formal ceremonial occasions men wear a high-necked tunic, ceremonial *sampot*, and (in the case of high-ranking officials only) long socks.

Around the house, members of both sexes wear sarongs. In the country men wear shorts or sarongs, and women wear a sarong or old *sampot* for everyday life. An alternate costume for men includes a tailored vest and short trousers or a long-sleeved collarless tunic. In the country, both sexes may drape a coarse cloth into a loose turban for protection against the sun, and men usually wear the sarong or shorts without a top and go barefoot. In remote rural areas women may also work in the fields without a blouse but with their breasts bound by a coarse cloth.

In most of the rural areas and the cities children wear a more Western form of dress to school. Boys dress in shirts and shorts, and girls usually wear blouses and skirts or simple dresses. Until they reach puberty, girls wear a skirt made of sarong material fastened by a drawstring at the waist and a blouse.

Although most people in the country have a few garments that are worn only on ceremonial or other special occasions (a sashlike dress scarf draped from one shoulder to the waist by Khmer women is an example), most clothing is simple and often made from cloth produced on the household loom. The possession of clothes purchased in stores has become a prestige symbol.

Housing

The traditional village home is inexpensively built with the help of relatives and neighbors. The typical house is rectangular in shape, ranging from twelve by twenty to twenty by thirty feet in size. Its wooden floor perches on wood piles as much as ten feet high, the height sometimes depending on the likelihood of flooding during the rainy season but more frequently reflecting the degree of prosperity of the owner. There is a sharply gabled thatch roof with overhanging eaves to protect the interior from monsoon rains. The matted thatched material may be palm frond or savanna grass, used widely in rural housing throughout Southeast Asia. Walls are constructed of overlapping panels or woven bamboo strung horizontally between posts supporting the roof.

Customarily, there are apertures in the walls over which bamboo mats are lowered during heavy winds or rains. In houses that do not have windows, a space is left between the wall panels and the overhanging eaves to permit ventilation. There may be as many as three rooms, separated by partitions of dried palm fronds or other material, but many houses often have only a single room. The kitchen is usually a separate room or an adjacent shed, sometimes joined to the house by a ramp, but in some instances cooking is done underneath the house. Crowding is general, and privacy is minimal by Western standards.

Although most houses are constructed entirely of thatch and bamboo except for the wooden floors, some of the better dwellings are of masonry or wood with tile roofs. In the 1960s considerable housing construction in the urban areas had been accomplished by the government or with its assistance. Furnishings may consist of several mats, cushions, and chests containing one or two garments for each member of the family. Most families have their own statue of the Buddha (see ch. 7). Festive platters, pedestals, and fruit dishes, which may be wood encrusted with mother-of-pearl or of copper and silver, are standard equipment for entertaining. Bowls of copper and silver and pruning shears are necessary for serving betel nuts, which figure prominently in most ceremonies.

The kitchen customarily is equipped with a portable oven made of baked clay, pots, a jug, bowls, and a rice ladle. Under the house between the pilings, the family loom, cart, dugout canoes, and livestock are kept. Outside, large water storage jars collect rain from the roof gutters. The ladder or wooden staircase leads to the raised entrance, traditionally facing towards the east.

In marked contrast are the well-constructed new public buildings of frame or masonry that are springing up about the countryside. These are the new administrative buildings, schools, hospitals, and health centers, although many have been damaged or destroyed in the fighting that began in March 1970. The thatch homes contrast also with solidly built residences of wood or masonry in Phnom Penh, Kampong Saom, and a few of the main provincial towns. Press reports in April 1972 stated that new buildings were rising in several areas of Phnom Penh for the first time since March 1970.

Consumption Patterns

Before the outbreak of large-scale hostilities in March 1970, the life of the average villager in government-controlled areas was not one of extreme hardship. His money income was low, but rising. This gain was offset by a strong inflationary trend after March 1970, but in mid-1972 the rate of increase in consumer prices in Phnom Penh seemed to be slowing down somewhat.

The countryman's diet of rice and fish in mid-1972 was apparently adequate, although not as abundant and easy to obtain as before March 1970. It was supplemented by vegetables from a kitchen garden, by gathering of roots, wild fruits, and berries, by sugar made from sugar palms, and by the occasional capture of edible wild game (see ch. 2; ch. 12). His housing was simple and inexpensive to build, and his meager supply of clothing was adequate for his needs in a tropical climate.

The rural dweller, growing his own food and often looming his own cloth, was largely self-sustaining. For the urban resident the heaviest expense item was food, which accounted for well over half of his essential expenditures. Rice was the most important food cost item, followed by fresh and dried fish. Cabbages and bananas were the most important fruit and vegetable items.

Government statisticians calculated that members of the urban working class spent 60 percent of their income for food, 20 percent for housing, 8 percent for clothing, and 12 percent for miscellaneous expenses. The urban middle class spent 53 percent of its income for food, 15 percent for housing, 9 percent for clothing, 8 percent for amusements, and 15 percent for miscellaneous items. The upper class expenditure included 45 percent for food, 11 percent for housing, 11 percent for clothing, 14 percent for amusements, and 19 percent for miscellaneous items.

The villager finds entertainment through his local temple. If he wishes to travel some distance for festivals, the local moneylender can make it possible; but moneylenders are a major source of social tension. Although an increasing number of Khmer had become moneylenders in the 1960s, most moneylenders are Chinese rice millers and brokers, and the charging of exorbitant interest rates has been attributed to them.

The rural dweller traditionally has been deeply religious, and Buddhist principles have pervaded his system of values. His religion has encouraged him to value generosity rather than the accumulation of wealth. After satisfying his immediate needs for food and clothing, he was likely to spend any remaining funds on gifts to monks or the temple or on domestic festivities (see ch. 4). In the 1960s, however, these traditional consumption patterns began to change. The increase in literacy, schooling, and the availability of consumer goods was creating new desires. The change was much more easily perceptible in urban areas than in the countryside, but people in general were taking an increasingly modern attitude toward the importance of money and the degree of satisfaction derived in spending it.

WELFARE PROGRAMS

In 1972 welfare programs varied for different sections of the population, such as civil servants, military forces and police, workers of state-owned industrial and commercial establishments, mixed-ownership establishments in which the state was the majority stockholder, and workers for private enterprise. A retirement and disability pension system was provided for the civil servants, military, and police only. This gave coverage to widows and minor orphans; widows received half of the pension. The system was funded by a 6-percent deduction from each employee's salary, plus an annual government contribution equal to 14 percent of the total amount of government salaries in the national budget; this sum was to be paid into the Civil Pension Fund. Pensions were paid from the fund on retirement for reason of age or disability. Special survivor benefits were paid to families of civil or military personnel killed in hostile action. Two months' salary was paid if death occurred while on leave; and one year's if it occurred while on an official mission.

Other social legislation concerned working hours, wages, family allowances, and workmen's compensation. A schedule of paid sick leave applied only to civil servants, but temporary disability allowances resulting from on-the-job accidents and service-related illnesses applied to all workers.

Compensations for disability varied according to the category of employment. Medical expenses usually were reimbursed directly to the head of the family at the rate of 100 percent for workers, 50 percent for their wives and children, and 40 percent for their parents. All employers were required to grant pay advances under specified conditions.

For the working force, accident compensation was generally granted regardless of fault. This payment took various forms, including medical care and compensation at government expense for civil servants and lesser benefits for other workers. Items covered under various circumstances included return to the place of employment and funeral expenses.

Benefits usually commenced after four days of absence from work for on-the-job injuries or professionally related ailments. One-halt of the daily wages were payable from the fifth day; the indemnity included regular and supplementary payments as well as family benefits. These benefits were payable to the worker until the healing of the wound or recovery from the work-incurred ailment but were dependent upon the percentage of disability and were not to exceed one year's salary.

Most of the private welfare organizations were organized after independence was achieved. The Women's Mutual Health Association was established in 1953 as a result of the efforts of a group of women, mostly American, to demonstrate the use of powdered milk. It developed into an influential organization associated with the Preah Ket Mealea Hospital in Phnom Penh, where it has concerned itself with prenatal and postnatal care and general child care. Also of importance is the Cambodian Red Cross Society, which was organized in 1951; it depended for its operation on domestic and foreign contributions and on an annual fund raising drive.

PATTERNS OF LEISURE

A traditional pattern of living evolved from agricultural life was followed in the rural areas under the government's control in mid-1972. This pattern was no longer fully applicable to urban society.

Use of Calendars

Two calendars—Western and traditional—are in use. The Western calendar is used by the more sophisticated, by the government in its official translations, and by the educational and business institutions. The traditional calendar, of Indian origin, is basically lunar with corrections made at certain times to bring it into accord with the solar yearly cycle. These corrections consist of the insertion of intercalary days and, at intervals, of intercalary months or the suppression of days or months. Buddhist religious observances are based on the lunar calendar, which begins in the Western month of November or December. The country's New Year's Day, however, is celebrated in April, being determined by solar calculations (see ch. 7). The Buddhist day, month, or year is often indicated beside the Western date in official government Khmer-language communications.

The traditional calendar has twelve months alternately of twenty-nine and thirty days. The first is known as female, and the second, as male. Marriages may conventionally be celebrated only during the female months. These months are divided into halves of fifteen days each in the male months and fifteen or fourteen days in the female months. The days in each are numbered from one to fifteen in the male months and from one to fourteen in the female months. During the first half, in which the moon is waxing, the word *kaoet* (to be born) is added to the number; during the second half, the word *roc* (to diminish) indicates that the day is in the time of the waning moon.

Use is also made, in connection with the traditional calendar, of a twelve-year-cycle of Chinese origin, in which each year is designated by the name of an animal. The Sanskrit numerals one through ten are combined cyclically with each name. It takes sixty years to complete the cycle of all possible number and animal combinations.

Certain days of the week are considered to have special significance. For example, some villagers refuse to lend money on a Monday but gladly make purchases then. Saturday is considered a bad day throughout most of the country because it is liked by demons and spirits; it is, however, a good day to appeal to those inhabitants of the spirit world.

Holidays

The rhythm of life is strongly influenced by the alternation of wet and dry seasons determining times of sowing, transplanting, and harvesting the rice crop. Certain days during these periods are occasions for festivals and holidays, many of which are associated with the Buddhist religion.

Among the most important during the 1960s were the Plowing of the Holy Furrow, which occurred in May at the beginning of the rainy season, and the Water Festival, which celebrated the reversal of the current in the Tonle Sab River (see ch. 2). The Water Festival usually occurred in late October or early November and was specifically fixed by the full moon in the month of Kadoek, within a few days of the actual reversal of the water. Both of these festivals were of traditional importance, but neither was an official holiday, and both were eliminated after 1969 (see ch. 7). Official holidays are numerous; those based on the lunar calendar varied somewhat in terms of the Western calendar from year to year. The Ministry of Labor and Social Action publishes lists of holidays applicable to workers in commerce, industry, and agriculture; the Council of Ministers publishes lists of holidays applicable to government personnel. These official holidays were granted with full pay to civil servants and employees of state and mixed industries; in practice, they also were granted to most employees of private companies.

The most widely observed of the official holidays is New Year's, which occurs on or about April 13 and lasts three days. It is a time of cleansing. On the last day of the old year houses are cleaned. On New Year's day itself, Cho Chhnam, the people go to the temple to bathe the images with water and to pray for good fortune during the coming year. On the last day of this period, in and around the temples they make sand hills and insert in them colored paper flags as pleas for prosperity. Sporting events and all-night dances are regularly featured.

There are three official Buddhist holidays. Two are of two days' duration but involve only a half-day's release from work each day. The first in this series, occurring in January or February, is Miakh Bouchia, which commemorates the last sermon of the Budda. The second is Pisakh Bouchia, in April or May; it is a triple anniversary of Buddha's birth, enlightenment, and entry into nirvana upon dying (see ch. 7).

The remaining official Buddhist ceremony, in September or October, is Prachum, which lasts for three days. During this time offerings are made to the monks for the benefit of the dead. In addition to these formally designated national religious holidays, there is the October and November season of the Kathen. During this time each monastery enjoys its own Kathen day on which villagers join in a procession, bearing gifts to the monks (see ch. 7).

Secular holidays are determined by the Gregorian calendar and are full holidays for both nationals and foreigners. These holidays in 1972 included Labor Day on May 1, National Day on October 9, United Nations Day on October 24, Independence Day on November 9, and Western New Year's Day on January 1.

Days of special occasion, such as the arrival of a foreign delegation of particular importance, are frequently designated official holidays. Altogether, it has been estimated that fifty or sixty days a year, exclusive of Saturdays and Sundays, are ordinarily taken as official or unofficial holidays.

Diversions

Holidays of all sorts are treasured. People have an acute sense of the dramatic, and their celebrations abound with costumes, lights, floats, and parades. Singing is very popular, music and dancing are enjoyed, and fireworks are a feature of every festival. Festive occasions are closely related to the Buddhist religion, since most are Buddhist days of observance and since the *wat* (see Glossary) itself is often the scene of feasts and theatrical performances.

The pleasures of the people are simple ones. Motion pictures are well attended in urban areas but are not available to villagers. In general, enjoyment of leisure time is associated with festivals, but there are enough of these to provide diversion. There are no important distinctively national games; however, kiteflying, featuring elaborately painted kites shaped like dragons or birds, is enjoyed by adults and children. Races in huge pirogues propelled by forty rowers were featured during the Water Festival in the 1960s.

REFUGEES

In 1972 two distinct groups of refugees had emerged from the situation in the Khmer Republic. The first group involved the ethnic Vietnamese minority. The second group of refugees produced by the situation are ethnic Khmer.

Before the mass exodus of ethnic Vietnamese to the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) in 1970 and 1971, the ethnic Vietnamese minority in Cambodia numbered approximately 400,000 persons out of a total population estimated in mid-1970 at about 6.8 million. Most of these people had lived in Cambodia all their lives, and a substantial number claimed Cambodian citizenship (see ch. 2; ch. 4; ch. 6).

Beginning in late March 1970, those ethnic Vietnamese who were able to leave the country did so by using existing commercial air routes between Phnom Penh and Saigon or by crossing the border into South Vietnam, mainly into Chau Doc and Tay Ninh provinces of that country. This early movement, which later included refugees generated by the United States military incursion in April-June 1970, numbered nearly 50,000 persons. The repatriation to South Vietnam of some 150,000 additional ethnic Vietnamese interned in schools and other compounds in Phnom Penh was arranged in late April and early May 1970 through negotiations between South Vietnamese and Cambodian officials. This relatively orderly movement—by boats down the Mekong River—began in mid-May 1970 and was completed in August 1970.

Staff members of the United States Senate visited Cambodia in the summer of 1970. The staff report, issued in late September 1970, stated that at that time about 200,000 ethnic Vietnamese apparently remained in Cambodia, nearly all of them outside Phnom Penh. Government officials and others reported that heavy concentrations of ethnic Vietnamese were being interned in provincial capitals and elsewhere. An undetermined number were also present in areas held by the North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese communist forces, mainly in the rubber-producing provinces southeast of Phnom Penh and east of the Mekong River, according to government officials.

The committee staff found little official concern about the future of the ethnic Vietnamese, except for their effect on the country's internal security. There were no plans in early August 1970 for the evacuation and repatriation to South Vietnam of those still in government-held territory. On August 14, 1970, however, the League of Red Cross Societies and the International Committee of the Red Cross submitted a joint progress report stating that approximately 18,000 Vietnamese were still awaiting repatriation. On February 15, 1971, the South Vietnamese Government Committee on Repatriates from Cambodia published a report indicating that 155,100 ethnic Vietnamese refugees had been assisted in resettling themselves and that another 155,601 were being assisted through a group resettlement plan. In March 1971 the joint Cambodian-South Vietnamese operation on repatriation was concluded, the last flotilla leaving for South Vietnam on March 13, 1971.

A United States government official estimated that in April 1971 there were some 3,000 to 10,000 ethnic Vietnamese remaining in Phnom Penh; of these, fewer than 1,000 were in a resettlement camp and might still return to Vietnam. Another 8,000 or so Vietnamese were still living in western Cambodia and along the Tonle Sap (see ch. 2). Some of these, he said, might wish to return to South Vietnam, but no facilities for their doing so had been available up to that time. Still other Vietnamese remained in villages along the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border, where in some cases they might represent a source of supplies and recruits for the North Vietnamese and the South Vietnamese communist forces. An unknown, but probably large, number of Cambodians were wholly or partly Vietnamese; they had adopted Cambodian manners and customs, in many cases intermarried with Cambodians, and were thought of as nationals (see ch. 2; ch. 4; ch. 6).

A report on war victims, issued by the Commissioner General for War Victims in May 1971, said that 102,130 Vietnamese had been repatriated to South Vietnam up to that point. The government, through the Ministry of Labor and Social Action, told a visiting group of officials of the United States General Accounting Office in September 1971 that the ministry assisted in the repatriation of over 200,000 Vietnamese nationals from Cambodia to South Vietnam from April 1970 through June 1971. Whether this listing supplemented or included the 150,000 Vietnamese evacuated via the Mekong River from May through August 1970 was not clear from the data available in mid-1972.

This same group of official visitors inspected the Cao Dai Pagoda Camp, near the center of Phnom Penh, in which 616 refugees of Vietnamese origin were quartered. This camp was guarded by the Cambodian military forces. The visitors were told that this camp was supported primarily by the Roman Catholic Church of Cambodia and that some assistance had been provided by the government of South Vietnam.

The group also inspected three refugee camps located in and near the city of Batdambang. The camps housed a total of 4,054 refugees of Vietnamese origin from the provinces of Siemreab and Batdambang. These camps were basically internment camps because the movements of their internees were restricted; also, the camps were guarded by Cambodian military forces.

The second group of refugees were ethnic Khmer. A United States government official stated in April 1971 that one of the last significant United States-South Vietnamese operations before June 30, 1970, involved the extrication from the northeasternmost province of Rotanokiri of some 5,000 Khmer troops, their dependents, and civilians. These troops were subsequently trained in South Vietnam, and both they and the civilians had returned to Phnom Penh. The official also stated that the dependents of the troops and the civilians evacuated from Rotanokiri Province constituted a major part of the refugees housed in and around Phnom Penh.

Largely in response to the problems created by the encamped refugees, on July 28, 1970, the government created the office of the Commissioner General for War Victims to coordinate and administer the relief work, which was carried out largely by the Cambodian Red Cross and several foreign voluntary agencies. At that time the government believed the situation was well under control in Phnom Penh, except for the encamped refugees whose resettlement in the Phnom Penh area was expected to be carried out within a very short time, if funds from outside sources to pay for shelters were available. The government was assessing the number of refugees in and around provincial capitals by having the Commissioner General for War Victims visit those areas. The government did not anticipate any massive refugee relief problems and therefore was not engaging in any contingency planning. It was not appealing to friendly governments for assistance to help meet relief problems among refugees but was relying solely on contributions from private voluntary agencies; friendly national Red Cross societies, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the League of Red Cross Societies, and such international bodies as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

According to official reports in the summer of 1970, most refugees after being displaced from their homes settled temporarily with relatives or friends in urban areas. A large number of Khmer refugees had also taken over houses vacated by the Vietnamese. Provincial capitals throughout the country were crowded with new arrivals from the countryside, and additional numbers of ethnic Khmer refugees were moving across the borders into Laos, Thailand, and South Vietnam (see ch. 2).

A joint progress report of the League of Red Cross Societies and the International Committee of the Red Cross estimated on August 14, 1970, that the outbreak of large-scale hostilities in March 1970 and related events had generated approximately 100,000 ethnic Khmer refugees, in addition to displacing the bulk of the ethnic Vietnamese. In August 1970 about 10,000 Khmer refugees were being housed in eight camps, mainly school buildings and other compounds, in Phnom Penh. They apparently included some dependents of paramilitary Khmer forces which, under United States tutelage, had been operating for many years along the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border.

The flow of refugees from areas threatened by the North Vietnamese and by the South Vietnamese Provisional Revolutionary Government forces had continued through April 1971, according to a statement of a United States government official in that month. He cited the consensus of Khmer and United States government officials and press reports regarding the reasons that motivated these people to leave their homes and seek safety in government-controlled areas: first, people were afraid of the North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese Provisional Revolutionary Government forces and indigenous Khmer guerrillas; second, there was strong resentment against the invaders, not simply as Communists but as Vietnamese; third, living conditions had quickly deteriorated in the areas that had fallen under enemy control; and fourth, there was strong distaste for the controls and regulations that the enemy forces had sought to impose.

Other refugees had left areas of heavy fighting between the Khmer government forces and the North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese Provisonal Revolutionary Government forces. Typically, individuals and families moved into the towns from insecure areas or areas of combat and moved out again as soon as they could safely recover their plots of land. The villagers tended to follow Khmer government armed forces and, where government control was reestablished, tried very quickly to resume their normal lives, rebuild their houses, and cultivate their fields. During the period they were in the towns or cities, these refugees lived with relatives or friends.

In April 1971 some 50,000 families, or about 250,000 persons, were believed to be taking refuge in Phnom Penh. Of these, no more than 5,000 were located in the five refugee camps in and around the capital. About 6,500 were dependents of military personnel whom they were unable to accompany and were being cared for by government aid. Outside Phnom Penh the available information in April 1971 indicated that some 12,000 families, or about 60,000 persons, were refugees in provincial towns.

Much of the burden of assistance to those refugees who were in need of aid had been borne by Cambodian private organizations, with help from abroad. The Cambodian Red Cross had played a leading role in distributing food and relief supplies and in providing medical care. It was also the principal channel for contributions from abroad, which up to April 1971 had totaled the equivalent of US$2.5 million from at least seventeen countries. The Association of Khmer Women and relief agencies of the Roman Catholic and Protestant churches in Cambodia had also been active in the relief efforts.

CHAPTER 6

LANGUAGE, EDUCATION, AND THE ARTS

The cultural homogeneity of the Khmer Republic (Cambodia), as compared to the cultural diversity found in neighboring countries, has contributed to the great strides made in literacy and education in the two decades since independence. Nearly all Cambodians speak the national language, Khmer, and a high proportion of them speak it as their mother tongue. This has made possible a remarkably rapid conquest of illiteracy and made easier the expansion of public education; by the late 1960s a high proportion of the school-age population was receiving some schooling. Credit belongs also to the vigorous activities of the government and the substantial contributions of time, labor, material, and money by the people for having brought the country from a relatively backward position in literacy and education in the early 1950s to a position of leadership among new states by the late 1960s. These gains were being endangered by the hostilities taking place in the country in the early 1970s, which had by 1971 reduced enrollment and the number of schools to less than half that at the end of the 1960s.

Culturally, the chief activities of the nation have been devoted to studying, preserving, and restoring the ancient monuments and arts that are the nation's heritage from 1,000 years earlier. Progress in this effort was great in the 1960s. Art treasures, both in and out of museums, were restored and studied. The great literature of the nation's past, derived from Indic sources, was translated into Khmer and disseminated to a wider domestic audience than ever before. Progress in the arts and archaeology, however, was adversely affected by the outbreak of armed conflict in 1970, and in 1972 many of the country's most treasured monuments appeared to be in danger of severe damage or destruction.

LANGUAGE AND LITERACY

Khmer (also known as Cambodian) is the official language of Cambodia and is the mother tongue of the ethnic Khmer, approximately 85 percent of the country's population. Ethnic Khmer living in Thailand, Vietnam, and Laos speak dialects of the Khmer language that are intelligible to Cambodians (see ch. 4).

Khmer is the major language of the Mon-Khmer language family, which includes the Mon language (spoken primarily in lower Burma) and hundreds of hill tribe languages and dialects spoken by peoples scattered over mainland Southeast Asia. The Khmer language is nontonal—unlike the national languages of its neighbors, Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam—and has a fair number of words of two syllables. Because of the extensive historical ties of the Khmer to the culture of India, the language has many loanwords and modified words and expressions from Sanskrit relating to administrative, political, military, and literary subjects, among others.

Since the popularization of the Theravada school of Buddhism beginning in the thirteenth century, Pali, the sacred language of the Theravadins, has been used extensively for coining neologisms (see ch. 7). The Pali and Sanskrit linguistic heritage is shared with the Thai and Lao, and this has contributed to the substantial fund of words used in common by all three languages.

More recent borrowings from French (the language of Cambodia's colonial rulers for ninety years) have become part of the colloquial language of urban people. There are also a few Vietnamese and Chinese loanwords in colloquial Khmer urban speech.

It is not clear whether Khmer was the language used by the people of Fu-nan, Southeast Asia's most ancient known indianized kingdom, which included the area occupied by present-day Cambodia. The earliest inscription in the Khmer language was found at Angkor Borei in Takev Province and is dated A.D. 611, shortly after the collapse of Fu-nan (see ch. 3). Since Angkor Borei had been within the borders of the Fu-nan kingdom, some scholars therefore felt it safe to assume the Fu-nan kingdom was Khmer speaking. There is more substantial evidence to support the claim that the kingdom of Chen-la, which eventually superseded the kingdom of Fu-nan, used Khmer as its language. In any event, Khmer is considered the oldest major language in continuous use in the Indochinese peninsula.

Khmer script has an older documented history than the language, based on the Vo-canh inscription, found near Nha Trang in Khang Hoa Province, Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). Although composed in Sanskrit, it is transcribed in Khmer letters and dates to the second or third century A.D. It was the oldest vernacular inscription found in Southeast Asia as of the early 1970s. Khmer script is derived from Indic sources, and epigraphers have found evidence of great similarity between ancient Khmer script and that of the Pallava kingdom of southern India.

Two styles of writing are used in modern Khmer. *Chrieng* is an angular script used for most purposes, and *mul*, a more rounded script formerly restricted to transcription of Pali texts, is now used also for special purposes, such as capital letters on a title page or inscriptions on public buildings. Khmer script has both superscripts and subscripts and thus takes up a fair amount of page to transcribe.

The basic symbols of the writing system correspond to syllables; other elements correspond to single sounds. There is little ambiguity at the common vocabulary level. In many cases, however, there is more than one way to spell the same sound, and the result, until recently, has been a lack of standardization in spelling. Great progress in this area has come about in the mid-twentieth century, primarily as the result of the publication by the Buddhist Institute of a highly regarded two-volume official Khmer dictionary. In 1967 the fifth edition of volume one and in 1968 the fifth edition of volume two were issued.

There has been no consistency or uniformity in the transliteration of Khmer words into other alphabets. No official system of romanization of Khmer has been adopted, and spelling variation in official Cambodian French-language publications often occurs within the same paragraph.

In addition to Khmer, there are other languages in use in the country. French is the language of the educated classes, of much literature and technical writing, and of communication with the outside world. Introduced by the French colonial regime in the nineteenth century, French was the sole language of secular education until 1953 and until September 1967 was the only language of secondary education or above. Its use has been restricted primarily to educated ethnic Khmer (chiefly urban residents), urban Vietnamese and to a lesser extent, urban Chinese. Efforts were beginning in the early 1970s to promote the teaching of English and to place it on the same level as French, because of its usefulness as a world language and especially as a language of communication with other Asian nations.

The role of French was to be reduced. According to the schedule proposed by the Ministry of National Education and Culture in a report on Cambodian education of September 1971, all public education, through university level, was to be conducted in Khmer by September 1974. The effect of hostilities on this program could not be determined.

The approximately 425,000 Chinese, who constitute the largest single minority ethnic group, speak a number of southeastern Chinese dialects, but an estimated three-fourths speak Teochiu. Mandarin, the Chinese national language, is sometimes used between Chinese of different dialect groups. Other dialects, in order of importance, are Cantonese, Hainanese, Hakka, and Hokkien. Most can speak some Khmer, and some speak French also.

Vietnamese is the mother tongue of the Vietnamese minority. This group consisted in early 1970 of approximately 300,000 to 400,000 persons. Repatriation of the Vietnamese to South Vietnam began in mid-1970 and had resulted in the departure of the bulk of the Vietnamese civilian population by the end of 1971. Urban Vietnamese tended to speak their own language at home and French outside it, but rural Vietnamese generally had learned to communicate with non-Vietnamese in Khmer.

The third largest minority group was the Cham-Malay, a Muslim group. Members of this group, descendants of the ancient kingdom of Champa who left Vietnam for Cambodia 500 years ago, numbered an estimated 80,000 in 1971. Their language belongs to the Malayo-Polynesian language family. Like Khmer, Cham is nontonal and uses a writing system of ancient south Indian derivation; however, very few Cham are literate in their own language. They employ Arabic and Malay (in Arabic script) for their religious literature, and most Cham who live among the Khmer also speak Khmer.

The Khmer Loeu (indigenous upland people), who in 1971 numbered as many as 70,000, were distributed among thirteen distinct ethnic groups, of which the five most numerous were probably the Stieng, Rhade, Jarai, Khoy (Kui) and Pear. The Stieng, who live primarily in eastern Kracheh Province, speak a language of the Mon-Khmer group, as do the Khoy and Pear. The Rhade and Jarai, in eastern Stoeng Treng and Rotanokiri provinces (and in larger numbers in South Vietnam), speak Malayo-Polynesian languages related to Cham.

Government policy has been to encourage the spread of Khmer among all segments of the population and to discourage the use of Chinese and Vietnamese. The spread of Khmer as the national language has been aided by the importation of transistor radios; it was estimated by the government officials that by 1967 virtually every home had at least one radio. Also effective in promoting the use of Khmer by all Cambodians have been a highly successful literacy campaign and a great expansion of public education, quantitatively and qualitatively. These programs have virtually conquered illiteracy within less than a decade and have vastly increased the numbers of persons who have received at least primary schooling, or a portion thereof, conducted in Khmer.

Official acts to discourage the use of minority languages included the banning in Phnom Penh in June 1971 of the use of signboards in any language but Khmer. Business letters and documents were not to be written in Chinese or Vietnamese. In addition, restaurant, hotel, and store personnel were to be required to speak Khmer. The decree promulgating these steps was announced by the mayor of Phnom Penh and, according to him, stemmed from a decision made at a meeting attended by members of the Central Youth Commission, high school principals, representatives of the Association of College and University Students of the Khmer Republic, and departmental chiefs of the municipal government. The impetus for this decree was attributed to demands by the Association of College and University Students.

In early 1972 conflicting information existed concerning whether some or all Chinese schools were still operating or had been temporarily suspended. According to one source, some Chinese schools were closed in April 1970 and resumed within a few weeks. According to another source of May 1971, all Chinese-language schools were closed as of that date. Before the schools closed, a majority of the Chinese were thought to be attending private Chinese-language schools. A number also attended English-language private schools, and others attended French-language private schools. Attendance at these institutions has tended to defer true fluency in Khmer among the educated Chinese, although Khmer was a required subject at Chinese-language schools.

The relatively low official figure for private school students as of the academic year 1960/70 of under 54,000 primary students and under 8,700 secondary students (including Khmer-, French-, Chinese-, and English-language schools) suggests that Khmer may have become the language of education for most Chinese schoolchildren.

It was estimated that in 1962 about 41 percent of the population fifteen years of age and older was considered to be functionally literate. This figure had grown by the beginning of the 1970s to over 60 percent. In October 1964 the Cambodian government embarked on a mass literacy campaign that involved the services of civil servants, who taught large numbers of persons in evening classes to read and write. In 1969, in recognition of the great success of the program, Cambodia was given the Gold Medal of Reza Pahlevi for Literacy, an award created by the Shah of Iran and conferred under the patronage of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

The minister of national education and culture was chairman of the Permanent Literacy Committee, which was composed of representatives of serveral entities of the central government. Under it, the Technical Literacy Committee directed survey committees at national and local levels. These committees supervised six-month literacy courses leading to the issuance of a certificate of literacy. To receive this document an applicant must be able to read, without too much hesitation and with reasonable comprehension, a six- or seven-line paragraph in Khmer concerning everyday life; he must be able to write six or seven lines under dictation without making too many errors; and he must also be able to solve simple problems of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division.

EDUCATION

Achievements of the government in the field of public education have been almost as impressive as achievements in combating illiteracy. As early as the thirteenth century there had been schools run by the Buddhist monks where boys were taught to read and write Khmer and were instructed in the rudiments of Buddhism (as presented in Pali texts) and in simple manual arts. By the time of the French Protectorate (1864) temple schools existed in most villages. They served solely male students and provided virtually the only type of education available to Cambodians.

Modern education in French was introduced gradually and was resisted by the rural population. State schools, designated as Franco-Cambodian schools, began to be established, but few attended them.

In 1924 an experimental school was opened in Kampot Province with a view to reforming the temple schools by instructing monks in modern European teaching methods. By 1930 a few monk-teachers had been trained and sent to teach at certain local *wat* (Buddhist temple complexes); these schools became known as modernized temple schools. The curriculm offered in such schools was basically the same as that of the state primary schools, except that no French was taught. The standard of teaching, though regarded as satisfactory, was at a lower level than at the state schools.

The experiment was an immediate success. As an extension of the traditional system, the modernized temple school won the approval of many parents and students who had been reluctant to accept the state schools. The French authorities were also pleased to have modern education gain a foothold in the country. The temple school modernization program spread rapidly; about 100 of these schools were established every year. The drawbacks of the system—that girls were excluded and that many teachers trained while part of the *sangha* (see Glossary) left the order after having received their teacher training—were such that the French authorities envisioned the eventual transformation of all modernized temple schools into secular state schools. These plans were interrupted by World War II.

The nationalist movement, which developed during World War II and led to independence in 1953, was accompanied by an ever-increasing popular interest in education. It became evident that indigenous trained personnel would be needed to carry on the functions formerly performed by the French and by French-speaking Vietnamese brought in by the French to fill many civil service positions. Throngs of children flooded the schools in the early postwar period. The French government continued to expand the French school system, though it could not keep up with the demand, and between 1947 and 1951 about 100 modernized temple schools were converted to state schools.

The growth in education from 1953 to 1970 was phenomenal and reflected the amount of public money spent in this field. The 12.2 percent of the national budget allocated to schools in 1954 rose to over 20 percent in 1967, 1968, and 1969. Only national defense has received consistently higher allocations.

The expansion in the educational system was accompanied by various shifts in emphasis. During the first years after independence the stress was on expanding primary education. It was later shifted to general secondary schooling and, during the 1960s, toward higher education and technical studies at both secondary schools and universities. These shifts were expensive since the cost per student is much greater in schools at higher levels than in primary schools: technical and vocational education, receiving the greatest emphasis in the early 1970s, is the most expensive per pupil.

Both in the past and at present the educational system had functioned as an instrument of inducing desired social behavior and attitudes. Traditionally, Buddhist monks regarded their *wat* schools primarily as places for teaching the importance of gaining merit and of following the Buddhist precepts and only secondarily as educational institutions. In the early 1970s the government saw the schools as appropriate places for indoctrinating young people in the awareness of their civic duties. Lectures, literature, and an intensive school sports program were designed to instill national pride in Khmer students. In the 1960s there were units of the Royal Khmer Socialist Youth (Jeunesse Socialiste Royale Khmère—JSRK) in many schools. The JSRK was a uniformed organization for boys and girls devoted to furthering Khmer socialist goals under the leadership of Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

Since the inception of the republican regime, there has been established an organization called Salvation Youth, or Youth for the Emergency (Jeunesse de Sauvetage), which performs similar functions. The Ministry of National Education and Culture has used its General Commission for Youth (Commissariat Général à la Jeunesse) to mobilize students for political, national defense, educational, cultural, and social action purposes and campaigns. In the academic year 1970/71 the commission organized poster campaigns, drafted public informational material on the invasion, sent youth and cultural delegations to world conferences, recruited volunteers for service in the Khmer National Armed Forces (Forces Armées Nationales Khmères—FANK) and the military police, and worked to aid refugees and on other charitable projects.

Public School System in Areas Controlled by the Republican Government

Public education in 1972 was free in government areas at all levels to any student who could pass the state examinations qualifying him for the next level and could find a place therein. Public schools at the end of the 1960s were providing primary schooling for roughly 70 percent of children ages six through twelve, according to estimates of the Ministry of National Education and Culture. This was in contrast to the fewer than 80,000 students who attended schools of all types and at all levels at the end of World War II. Whereas at that time there were only a few hundred male students attending classes above the sixth grade, by academic year 1969/70 there were nearly 936,000 students of both sexes in public primary schools, nearly 120,000 in general secondary schools (beginning with the seventh grade and including a maximum of seven years of instruction), nearly 5,800 students in technical and vocational schools (including lower level teacher training schools), and over 9,100 students at nine universities located in various parts of the country (see table 1), All nine institutions of higher learning had been founded since 1956.

Popular education for women began in 1955 with the passage of a women's rights law and with the gradual weaning of primary education from the control of the *sangha*. Female students, barred by Buddhist practice from close association with monks and thereby from *wat* schools, were for the first time in the 1950s able to attend primary school in significant numbers. At the primary level in the academic year 1969/70 the female student body was 70 percent that of the male. Female enrollment has been subject to a comparatively high dropout rate; in 1969/70 the sixth year of primary school had four times as many boys as girls.

Education in the Khmer Republic suffered a great setback beginning in late March 1970, when North Vietnamese forces and those of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam invaded the country in substantial numbers. The effects of the conflict were even more deleterious in the academic year 1970/71. Many schools were ransacked or destroyed by the invading forces, and classes had to be moved into temporary quarters, or room had to be found for them on the grounds of the village *wat*.

The government has had to cope with an influx of schoolchildren into Phnom Penh from insecure areas in the provinces. Out of a total of 80,939 primary school pupils attending public schools in Phnom Penh in 1970/71, there were 30,557 refugees. Double and triple shifts were established; this necessitated a reduction in the number of school hours per child from thirty to twenty-one per week. In addition to inconveniencing pupils, many of whom have had to attend school at awkward hours, the change to two and three shifts and the shortening of the schoolday has obliged the school system to eliminate parts of the curriculum, including sewing, penmanship, and household arts. Kindergartens were obliged to cease functioning. Some 2,600 teachers came to Phnom Penh from in-

Table 1. Khmer Republic (Cambodia), School Enrollment, Academic Year 1969/70

	Student Enrollment		
Educational Institution	Public	Private	Total
Primary Education (six-year course)			
Schools	5,275[1]	424	5,699
Teachers and staff	22,607	1,404	24,011
Students	935,938[2]	53,526	989,464
General Secondary Education (seven-year course)			
Collèges and *lycées*	148	24	172
Teachers and staff	5,035	257	5,292
Students	111,309[3]	8,679[4]	119,988
Vocational and Technical Education (three-year course)			
Schools	43	64	107
Teachers and staff	n.a.	n.a.	676
Students	3,006	2,792	5,798
Higher Education (four-year course)			
Faculties and institutes	47	0	47
Teachers and staff	2,000	0	2,000[5]
Students	9,162	0	9,162

n.a.—not available.

[1] Including 1,334 Buddhist schools.

[2] Including 532,667 males in secular schools; 27,489 males in Buddhist schools; and 375,782 females in secular schools. The entering class contained 179,650 boys and 139,484 girls. The sixth grade contained 42,651 boys and 17,747 girls.

[3] Including 85,194 males of whom 1,328 were student monks at the Buddhist *lycee*, and 26,115 females; 25,608 were in seventh grade, but only 3,686 were in the last year of secondary school.

[4] 1,872 were in seventh grade; 142 were in the last year.

[5] Includes 1,205 teachers—895 Khmer and 310 foreign.

Source: Adapted from *Annuaire Statistique, 1969*, Phnom Penh, Institut National de la Statistique et des Recherches Economiques, 1969, pp. 97–105.

secure areas and were being used in 1970/71 in the capital's schools. That year 1,763 teachers were living in areas under enemy control.

A comparison of the number of public primary schools, teachers, and pupils at the start of the academic year 1969/70 with that of the following academic year gives an indication of the amount of impact the armed conflict has had on Cambodian education. At the start of the school year 1969/70, Cambodia had 5,275 public primary schools with 22,607 teachers and staff and 935,938 pupils, whereas at the start of the academic year 1970/71 the government area had only 1,064 primary schools, 18,866 primary teaching personnel, and 322,933 primary school pupils. Before March 1970 there had been 21,036 classes in the public primary schools, but by the following September there were only 7,736 classes.

Claims were made by the antigovernment forces that elementary and secondary education was being carried out in areas under its control. A spokesman of the National United Front of Cambodia (Front Uni National de Kampuchéa—FUNK) in early 1972 asserted that education in areas under its control was entirely free and was in the Khmer language, that literacy classes were functioning, and that the curriculm of schools included political economy and military and medical science. It was claimed that instruction in the arts and cultural subjects was also being carried out.

Administration

In the republican government the Ministry of National Education and Culture was, in 1972, in charge of public education from primary classes through university. Some technical and professional education came under the jurisdiction of appropriate ministries or departments, such as agriculture and public health. Within the Ministry of National Education and Culture there were directorates for higher, secondary, and primary education, school sanitation, arts, and cultural relations. There was also the General Commission on National Educational Reform and Planning. Under it was the office of National Educational Planning and the Directorate of Pedagogical Services. In 1971 the latter was publishing a monthly journal, *Revue de l'Instituteur Khmer* (14,000 copies per month), and it also published school texts and did research in French and other foreign teaching methods. It provided some inservice training to teachers and presented and recorded songs, lessons, stories, and interviews for use over the radio and educational television.

A system of inspection was maintained by the ministry covering secondary, primary, private, and technical education and social affairs. In 1971 a new directorate of higher education was created, charged with coordinating those activities at universities that had not previously come under the ministry's direct supervision. At the secondary school level there were inspectors for Khmer, French, history, geography, mathematics, physical science, and natural science. At the primary level the ministry employed both ordinary inspectors and special activity inspectors and in 1971 planned to have inspectors as soon as possible for specialized fields in technical education.

The academic year, divided into trimesters, begins in mid-September and ends in mid-July. It is punctuated by a holiday period from December 24 to January 2 at the end of the first trimester and a two-week holiday in mid-April at the end of the second trimester.

Primary Schools

In the government zone primary education was divided into two cycles of three years each. The first cycle—twelfth, eleventh, and tenth classes—was the elementary cycle and concluded with a state examination for the certificate of primary studies, elementary (*certificat d'études primaires élémentaires*). There was a great drop in student enrollment between the twelfth and ninth classes—the ninth class was the first year of the second, or complementary, cycle. The 1969/70 figures showed 179,650 boys and 139,484 girls in the twelfth class and only 62,663 boys and 40,886 girls in the ninth class. Upon completion of primary school, the pupil takes an examination qualifying successful candidates for the certificate of primary students, complementary (*certificat d'études primaires complémentaires*).

The primary educational program in effect in 1971 was established in 1959; the ministry recognized its inadequacy to the current needs of the society and the nation. In particular, the lack of sufficient instruction in civics, patriotism, and economic matters was noted in a ministerial report on Cambodian education for the year 1970/71 that was presented to the International Conference on Education held in Geneva, Switzerland, in September 1971. There was also mention in this report of the need to revise the teaching of history to conform with the needs of a republican form of government. The curriculum up to March 1970 included ethics, civics, history, arithmetic, geography, science and hygiene, Khmer language, manual training, penmanship, and physical training. The last three subjects were suspended with the disruption of schooling that began in March 1970.

Since 1953 primary education has been in the Khmer language, but French has been taught as a subject, beginning in the third year (tenth class). The teaching of French was necessary because all public secular education at the secondary level or higher was until 1967 conducted in the French language. By July 1971 the first four years of public secondary school (classes six through three) had been converted to Khmer, and Khmer was being extended as the language of instruction throughout the public school system at the rate of one grade a year. The changeover had resulted, according to a 1971 observer's report, in the removal of French from at least some primary school curricula.

The great expansion in primary school education was the result of the combined efforts of the government and the people. In many areas school physical plants were built or expanded by voluntary effort and donations by the local community. The extensive use that had been made during the 1950s and 1960s of such volunteered labor, material, and money for construction of primary and secondary schools was not expected to continue in the 1970s. Government officials of the republican regime have publicly announced the abolition of the practice by the previous regime of demanding voluntary contributions for school construction. This practice had been deplored as placing an unfair burden, which should rightfully have been carried by the national government, onto the local communities. In the academic year 1970/71 a ministry report noted that the proportion of the educational budget spent on equipping schools was still "insignificant." Even before the disruptions that began in March 1970, there were serious insufficiencies in school buildings and facilities, as well as in the quantity and quality of teaching staff and texts. The situation has worsened considerably since then.

General Secondary Schools

The effect on state secondary education of the armed conflict and insecurity in the countryside was profound. In the academic year 1970/71 there were eighty-three government general secondary schools open in contrast to 148 the previous year. Their enrollment was only 52,216 boys and 23,403 girls, as against 85,194 boys and 26,115 girls in school the year before. The greater drop in male enrollment was almost certainly caused by the high level of participation by Cambodian youths in the armed forces beginning in mid-1970. In 1970/71 schools in the capital had 17,118 secondary students who had fled the countryside.

The teaching staff in secondary schools in 1970/71 included 113 teachers fully qualified to teach senior secondary school (second, first, and terminal classes), 2,154 teachers qualified to teach the first four years of secondary school (classes six through three), and 2,263 teachers in secondary schools who possessed only elementary school qualifications.

The dropout rate between primary and secondary school is high. In the latter 1960s only about 45 to 50 percent of students entering the final primary grade went on to secondary school. For instance, 56,781 students entered the last year of public primary school in 1968/69, but only 25,608 were attending the first year of public secondary school in 1969/70.

General secondary education was offered as a seven-year course divided into two main cycles of four and three years. A few schools offered the entire seven years, but usually education in a *collège* (an institution offering the four-year cycle) was followed by education in a *lycée* (a three-year secondary school). At the end of the *collège* cycle, students were required to take a state examination. Successful candidates were awarded the secondary diploma, first cycle (*diplôme d'enseignement secondaire du premier cycle*). In 1971, of the 17,776 candidates who took the examination, 4,638, or 26 percent, passed. For the first time the examination included a section of questions entirely in Khmer, as well as a section with some questions in French and others in Khmer.

The *lycée* cycle was also divided into two parts, the first part consisting of two years and the second of one year. Each part terminated with a required state examination offered twice each year. Those who pass the examination following the terminal class are awarded the second *baccalauréat* (diploma). The first *baccalauréat* is generally regarded as being the approximate equivalent of a high school diploma in the United States, and the second *baccalauréat* is regarded by some educational authorities as being the equivalent of one or two years of United States college education. In 1971 the results for the first *baccalauréat* showed that, out of 11,745 candidates, 2,366, or 20 percent, passed.

From September 1967 the top three years of secondary school (second, first, and terminal classes) were split up according to major subjects into three sections: letters; mathematics and technology; and agriculture and biology. It had been planned that such diversification would be extended to classes five and four, leaving the first two secondary school years (sixth and fifth classes) to unspecialized secondary education. This modification in the third and fourth year of secondary school has been deferred because of the disruption of the schools since March 1970.

The examination for the second *baccalauréat*, which follows the final year of secondary school, differed for candidates of the three separate sections; however, the percentage that passed each was approximately the same—12 percent of the candidates.

The scientific and mathematical fields have recently attained greater popularity as the result of government policies designed to ensure that technical education expanded, at the expense, if necessary, of liberal arts. Successful candidates in the second *baccalauréat* in early 1971 included only eleven in the fields of letters, whereas there were 206 in the agriculture and biology section and 689 in the mathematics and technology section. The availability of secondary and higher level education in technical and scientific fields has been greatly increased. In order to improve the quality of technical education, the ministry in 1971 had plans to reorganize this branch, placing under one central directorate the various institutions that had formerly been under separate control of the various national universities and technical institutes.

Vocational Schools

Whereas in 1955 vocational training was offered by five specialized schools to a student body of less than 400, in 1969/70 there were forty-three public vocational and technical schools and sixty-four private ones serving nearly 5,800 students, of whom over 3,000 were in public schools. In general, the standard for entry into these specialized technical schools was the completion of the first cycle of secondary school (ten years of schooling). A series of small technical training centers had been established to give three years of specialized study in skilled trades. Some of these had been built with foreign aid—for example, the Center for Formation of Technicians in Batdambang, a school for training students to become electricians, automobile mechanics, general mechanics, bricklayers, and carpenters. The center was built with funds donated by the government of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and was opened in 1966, at which time its staff included six German instructors, whose salaries were also paid by West Germany.

Upper secondary level technical training is also furnished by several universities. Some students enroll in the technical universities for three years of further secondary studies after completing the first cycle of the regular secondary school. This work is offered within the university faculties under the same administrative and teaching systems as for the regular university body.

Higher Education

In academic year 1969/70 there were nine universities operating in different parts of the country (see table 2). The University of Phnom Penh was by far the largest of the higher educational institutions in the Khmer Republic, with 4,567 male and 736 female students at the start of the 1969/70 academic year. At that time it had eight departments: letters and humanities; science and technology; law and economics; medicine; pharmacy; commercial science; teacher training; and higher level teacher training. In 1969/70, before the disruption of the schools by the armed conflict, the student body at all nine universities was engaged primarily (about 60 percent) in scientific and technical studies, with 12.4 percent in letters, 3.8 percent in education, 2.9 percent in fine arts, and 19.4 percent in social sciences. Within the scientific and technical fields, 29 percent of the students were engaged in natural and exact sciences, 10.4 percent in engineering, 16.9 percent in medical science, and 5.2 percent in agriculture.

In 1970/71 the University of Phnom Penh, the Technical University, the University of Agricultural Sciences, the University of Fine Arts, and the Buddhist University, all in Phnom Penh, remained open. After the invasion by North Vietnamese troops and those of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, the universities at Kampong Cham, Takev-Kampot, and Batdambang were shut down. Some faculties were transferred to Phnom Penh. The faculty of the Popular University at Phnom Penh (in actuality a vocational school for young people and adults) was transferred to the Technical University.

Table 2. Khmer Republic (Cambodia), University Enrollment, Academic Year 1969/70

University	Student Enrollment		
	Male	Female	Total
University of Phnom Penh	4,567	736	5,303
University of Agricultural Sciences	114	2	116
University of Kampong Cham	533	66	599
Technical University	1,391	75	1,466
University of Fine Arts	562	163	725
Buddhist University	176	0	176
University of Takev-Kampot	183	2	185
University of Batdambang	297	25	322
Popular University	132	138	270
Total	7,955	1,207	9,162

Source: Adapted from *Annuaire Statistique, 1969*, Phnom Penh, Institut National de la Statistique et des Recherches Economiques, 1969, pp. 97-105

The bulk of the course work in universities has been given in French up to 1972 except at the Buddhist University, in which the language of instruction was Khmer and use was also made of Pali and Sanskrit texts. The changeover to all-Khmer language instruction planned for the early 1970s has not eliminated, in the ministry's view, the need for improved French instruction, the quality of which the ministry believed had fallen dangerously low in recent years because of the lack of competent teachers and adequate methods. A language institute was created at the beginning of the 1970s for promoting the use of audio-visual methods of language study, and a program was begun to place English on the same level as French, as a second language for use in advanced education in various fields and in communication with the outside world.

In 1970/71 there were 155 Cambodian students on scholarships at educational institutions abroad, including thirty-one in France, twenty-three in Singapore, sixteen in Australia, ten in the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), eleven in Great Britain, and seven in Canada. In addition there were twenty civil servants who had been sent abroad to study, ten of whom went to Japan, six to Singapore, and four to other countries.

Before the United States aid program was terminated in 1963, there were nearly 200 Cambodian students pursuing higher education in the United States. Most of them continued their schooling with funds obligated before the termination of the program. In 1972 there were twenty-two Cambodian university students in the United States sponsored by the educational and cultural affairs program of the Department of State. Other students also go abroad on their own or under other sponsorship.

Buddhist Education

In addition to the modernized Buddhist primary schools (which are subsidized by the government as part of the public school system), there has developed a substantial secondary school system within the Buddhist religious system. In the mid-1960s it was reported that many monasteries had what were sometimes called Pali schools, which gave three years of elementary education, after which students could compete for places in the Buddhist *lycées,* which offered a four-year course. Graduates of the Buddhist *lycées* could sit for the entrance examination to the Buddhist University in Phnom Penh.

The purpose of instituting this religiously oriented school system, run by and for the *sangha,* was to improve the scholarship and intellectual level within the community of monks so that their role in the cultural life of the modern country would not lag behind. Education in the Buddhist system was open only to males, as only males were eligible to be novices or monks or to have close contact with *sangha* members.

Opportunities for higher education within this system were limited. In 1969/70 there were more than 27,000 pupils in Buddhist religious elementary schools but only 1,328 at the Buddhist *lycées*, and the Buddhist University had only 176 students. As of the mid-1960s a certificate from a Buddhist *lycée* was not recognized by the government as equivalent to a state *lycée* certificate for purposes of determining eligibility for employment and pay.

Some holders of the certificate were expecting new legislation to provide for the equal status of Buddhist degrees so that they would be on a par with secular degrees. Information as to whether this had been effectuated was not available in mid-1972.

Private Education

Some private schools have been operated by minority ethnic groups—Chinese, Vietnamese, Eurasians, and Europeans—in order to make it possible for children to study in their own language and culture. Others have provided schooling to indigenous children who were not able to gain admission to a public school or who had failed a state examination for the second time. All private institutions were licensed by the Ministry of National Education and Culture.

The private educational system included Chinese-language schools, belonging to the Chinese community; Christian schools, most of them operated by French and Vietnamese Catholic clergy; French-language schools; English-language schools; and Khmer schools. Enrollment in private primary schools in the first half of the 1960s was about 32,000. It increased to over 42,000 in the mid-1960s and reached some 53,500 in 1969/70. At the same time enrollment in private secondary schools dropped from about 19,000 to under 8,700. A breakdown by language of instruction was unavailable for private primary schools; however, in 1969/70 private secondary school students were all listed as attending Khmer-language schools. As a result of the great decline in numbers of the resident Vietnamese minority group beginning in mid-1970, as well as government regulations closing or restricting the activities of Chinese- and Vietnamese-language schools, the number of private schools and their enrollments had presumably been reduced substantially by early 1972.

A government decree in April 1970 closed some Chinese schools and all Vietnamese schools in Phnom Penh. A large proportion of the total private school population had been Chinese but, according to one unsubstantiated report in 1971, all Chinese-language schools had been closed. Conflicting information existed as to whether any of these schools had reopened since that date. All or almost all Vietnamese schools had presumably shut down as a consequence of the repatriation to South Vietnam of the Vietnamese resident minority during 1970 and 1971 (see ch. 2).

The French schools were reported in the 1960s to be well run and well attended, chiefly by Khmer and other children of the wealthier classes. English-language schools at the same time were reported to be popular among westernized Chinese. Khmer-language schools were the largest element in the private school system, absorbing students who could not be accommodated in state schools. They were believed to have educational standards inferior to those of the public schools and had lower prestige.

ARTISTIC AND INTELLECTUAL EXPRESSION

Intellectual activity in various fields, especially scholarship and research, has been stimulated by the vast improvements in literacy and in the general level of education that took place during the 1960s. There was, by the early 1970s, a far larger audience for literary, artistic, and scholarly works than there had ever been in the past. The proliferation of higher educational institutions during the 1960s was likely to prove fruitful in the fields of scholarship and research. Although in 1972 there remained a severe shortage of texts, either in Khmer or in French, a lack of scientific or technical materials and equipment in urban schools, and a virtual absence of such materials in rural schools, there had begun to develop an indigenous corps of technicians and persons able to perform professional, scientific, and scholarly functions.

Plans were being made to improve the quality especially of technical and scientific studies. An example was the new program for the study of medicine put into effect in the faculty of medicine of the University of Phnom Penh in the academic year 1970/71; in addition, graduates of the medical school were being sent abroad for further study, and the Ministry of National Education and Culture planned to bring indigenous professional medical standards gradually up to international levels.

The period from the ninth to the thirteenth centuries—when the Khmer kings ruled a great empire from a series of capitals in the Angkor area of Siemreab Province—is generally acknowledged to be the high point of Khmer artistic and intellectual development and is widely regarded as having been one of the greatest periods for the arts in the history of Southeast Asia. The modern Khmer Republic treasures its heritage and was engaged in 1972 in an effort to protect it from damage during the war, as well as in long-term restoration and other efforts aimed at preserving and illuminating the Cambodian heritage for posterity. As part of this effort, and also to promote advances in all artistic and intellectual fields, the government founded the

Mon Khmer Institute in 1969 as an institution to do research in Cambodian prehistory, history, anthropology, art, geography, ethnology, language, and literature.

Architecture and Sculpture

The Khmer people take great pride in the architectural and sculptural remains of the ancient Cambodian kingdoms. The most prominent of these date from the ninth to thirteenth centuries and are located in the Angkor area near the modern town of Siemreab. These world-renowned structures—which have been the subject of a seventy-year restoration project, carried out originally by French experts under the direction of the Far East French School (Ecole Française d' Extrême-Orient) and more recently by French, Cambodian, and other experts under the aegis of the Ministry of National Education and Culture—were in grave danger in 1972 as a result of armed conflict in the Siemreab region involving North Vietnamese forces, forces of the communist Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (Viet Cong), and Cambodians.

The Cambodian government is a signatory of the 1954 Hague convention for the protection of cultural heritage in times of armed conflict, which forbids its members the use of such monuments for military purposes and holds occupying forces responsible for protecting such structures from pilferage, vandalism, or destruction. It has appealed to its fellow signatories, to the United Nations General Assembly, and to UNESCO to bring public pressure to bear for the protection of the Angkor area and to provide help in preserving the ruins. UNESCO was providing specialist help in 1972 and had donated some equipment for storing valuable statuary. Until the war began in 1970, the chief danger to the great monuments of Angkor and elsewhere in Cambodia had been from looters, who smuggled statuary out of the country for its eventual sale, at extremely high prices, to foreign buyers.

The Cambodian government has forbidden the use of any arms or ammunition by its own forces in or near historic sites except in cases of severe military necessity. The National Committee for the Protection of Cultural Heritage in Time of Armed Conflict was formed to coordinate the work of government agencies to protect historic sites and art works. Dividing the country into three administrative units, the committee has tried to remove by air or truck all portable art treasures located in endangered sites or in the local museums in insecure areas. These objects have been stored in moisture-proof containers in the basement of the National Museum in Phnom Penh.

Those items too large or too heavy to be moved have been left behind and, where possible, buried to protect against damage and pilferage. All temples and other culturally significant sites have been marked with the international blue and white shield of neutrality in the hopes that the enemy would respect these national treasures. Some have been damaged, however. In January 1972 it was reported in a Japanese newspaper that the monument restoration project in the Angkor area under the direction of French expert Bernard Groslier and a 1,000-man work force had been halted by order of communist forces in the area.

A few weeks earlier, the tacit truce that had begun after North Vietnamese forces seized the Angkor area in June 1970 had collapsed, reportedly as a result of fighting within the communist ranks over control of the temples. The Khmers Rouges (indigenous communist insurgents) were alleged to have fought their North Vietnamese allies after accusing them of pillaging the monuments of their statuary.

The country's heavy rains, the tropical heat, and the snake-like roots of the fast-growing bombax trees had destroyed or damaged many of the great monuments of Angkor during the more than four centuries between the abandonment of the Angkor area by the Khmer (after their second major defeat, in 1431, by the Thai) and the start of the rehabilitation of these monuments under the French colonial regime (see ch. 3).

In seventy years of restoration efforts in this area, much has been accomplished. Among the great monuments that have been reassembled and restored to nearly their original state are: the great royal funerary monument of Suryavarman II (reigned 1113–50); the Angkor Wat complex; and the magnificent royal capital, Angkor Thom—with its central feature, the Bayon, a mountain-like structure honoring the great king Jayavarman VII (reigned 1181–ca.1215) in the form of Avalokitesvara, the *bodhisattva* (see Glossary) of compassion.

From the evidence of these monuments—their inscriptions, their structure, and the freestanding and bas-relief sculptures that ornament virtually every surface—scholars have determined that the purposes of these buildings were not primarily aesthetic. Instead, they served the needs of the state by providing a means of expressing and bringing about, in a magical way, the proper alignment of the microcosm—the kingdom—with the macrocosm—the universe.

As understood by the hinduized Khmer rulers on the basis of Brahmanic literature, the universe was envisioned as having a central continent pierced at its center by the central axis of the universe, which took the form of Meru, the cosmic mountain. At the summit of this mountain was the abode of the gods. The continent, the abode of men, was encircled by six rings of land alternating with seven oceans. Beyond the seventh ocean was a surrounding rock wall. (The Mahayana Buddhist cosmological concept, also well known to the Khmer kings, differed from this only in detail.) The Khmer kings sought to bring their kingdom into harmony with the universe by following this cosmic pattern in construction of their capitals. Thus, at Angkor Wat, for example, these elements are all present: at the center a five-peaked structure symbolizing Meru, the cosmic mountain; the enclosing rock wall; and a wide moat, symbolizing the ocean.

At the time when these monuments were built, the kingdom had as its royal religion the cult of the *devaraja* (god-king). This cult centered on the belief that the king was spiritually related to, or an *avatar* (incarnation) of, one of the Hindu gods, usually Shiva or Vishnu. The *devaraja* cult provided the chief motivation for creating the great royal monuments of the Angkor area. Each king who could afford it commissioned the building of a magico-religious structure in stone symbolizing Meru, the central cosmic mountain. This central mountain-temple was the place where the magical union of the *devaraja* and the spirit of the universe, Shiva or Vishnu, could be brought about through special rituals carried out by court Brahmans. Within the central mountain structure, a stone phallus (the symbol of Shiva) or an anthropomorphic statue of the god was placed. This statue served as the locus of the meeting of the god and the king, as the king's portrait statue or symbol of his spiritual essence, and as the funerary statue of the king upon his death.

The ideas behind the building of the great Khmer temples and palaces were the result of a combination of Hindu and, later, Buddhist thought with the animistic beliefs and practices of the Khmer people. This union of imported and indigenous systems of belief is best expressed in the myth relating to the origin of the royal line of the early Fu-nan kingdom, which claimed to have sprung from the union of an Indian Brahman with the daughter of a *naga* king, the *naga* (multiheaded serpent) being the symbol of the spirit of the local soil (see ch. 3). In its stylistic features also, Khmer art is a combination of Indian and indigenous motifs and idioms. For example, the idea of a temple being in the form of a mountain and its magico-religious purposes came from India, but the five-peaked towers of the Angkor temples are uniquely Khmer in their shape.

In sculpture there is greater emphasis on the frontal aspect and greater reserve, serenity, and refinement in the Khmer figures, as compared to a more sinuous, exuberant, vigorous, and extreme sensuality in much Indian work of the same period dealing with similar subject matter, such as Hindu and Buddhist religious images and scenes from the *Ramayana,* the *Mahabharata,* and Puranic literature. The faces of Khmer sculptures are the most expressive features. Although the planes are simplified and the forms idealized, there is careful observance of such details as the breadth of face, horizontality of eyebrows, smallness of chin, and fullness of lips (in later pieces almost always fixed in a contemplative smile). These indicate that an indigenous Khmer face was the subject, not the facial ideal of Indian Sanskrit art manuals.

Information is generally lacking concerning the arts of architecture and sculpture after the thirteenth century because at that point the use of stone was largely abandoned for such purposes. The few stone pieces that have been found dating from later periods are not of the same quality as those of the early thirteenth century and before. The sacking of Angkor by the Thai in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and the subsequent removal to the Thai capital of large numbers of palace artists and artisans resulted in the impoverishment of the arts in the Khmer homeland. Also, with the spread of Theravada Buddhism among the Khmer beginning in the thirteenth century, the motive for building great temple-mountains was absent. There was no room for a *devaraja* cult in the humbler and more popular Theravadin dogma (see ch. 7).

Buildings of the royal palace at Phnom Penh and Buddhist temple structures have been the chief objects of architectural effort in post-Angkor times. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries wooden structures with lavishly painted pediments and upward-turned eaves were built for the use of the Buddhist monkhood and royalty. More recently concrete has been used, and the carved and gilded wooden structures are gradually being replaced by these more permanent, but aesthetically less interesting, buildings.

Present-day sculpture in so-called Cambodian marble, a type of soapstone found in shades of blue with pink or brown veins, is pursued as a localized art, the center of which is the town of Pouthisat (Pursat). The chief subjects are the Buddha, *naga* heads, *apsaras* (celestial dancers), and other motifs deriving from the art of ancient Cambodia. There is also some carving in wood.

Performing Arts

The thousands of *apsaras* in the bas-reliefs of the Angkor monuments provide testimony to the delight that the Khmer kings took in the dancing female form. The lovely court dancers of Angkor, however, were among the trophies carried off to Siam by the invading Thai; there they provided the inspiration for the Thai classical dance that has continued to the present day.

In the nineteenth century Thai dancers brought back the Khmer heritage to its homeland and, under the patronage of King Ang Duong (1796–1859), who came to the throne in 1841, the Khmer court dance began to be restored to its position of importance as a partly aesthetic, partly religious, appendage of Cambodian royalty. The Khmer classical court dance has retained many of its Thai-acquired elements, including the use of more elaborate and heavy costumes than had been traditional among the Khmer.

There was at one time within the royal dance troupe (since 1970 called the Khmer Classical Ballet) a contingent of male dancers who performed the *lkhaon khaol* (nonclassical play), but the classical dance troupe of the early 1970s was composed almost entirely of female dancers. Its repertoire consisted partly of traditional court dances, such as the ballet *Makara,* and partly of dance dramas, some of which are the product of modern choreography—albeit using exclusively traditional movements—such as the *Tep Monorom,* a ballet in Khmer style dramatizing a popular *jataka* (see Glossary).

In the past the court ballet danced only for the royal family, their guests, and occasionally tourists assembled at Angkor Wat or elsewhere. The troupe was also sent overseas on tour from time to time and has performed on certain ceremonial occasions, both Buddhist and royal. As recently as 1967 it was reported to have danced at the palace in response to a request by farmers who sought this means of inducing the spirits to provide rain for their dry provinces. In 1971 the Khmer Classical Ballet came to the United States on tour, where it was very well received. It was then under the sponsorship of the Ministry of National Education and Culture and administered by the University of Fine Arts.

The orchestra accompanying the classical dance is made up of the following instruments: the *sralay* (double reed oboe); the *kong thom* (set of tuned bronze bowls arranged on a semicircular frame); the *roniat* (wooden xylophone); the *chhing* (small bell cymbals); the *skor thom* (large tripod drum struck with a padded stick); and the *sampho* (horizontal drum tapped at both ends with the fingers). The ensemble is doubled when a greater sound is desired, but this does not change the character of the music. There is some singing and chanting in the classical ballet, an actor on stage alternating verses with an offstage male and female chorus.

The classical court dance performances were not viewed by the public at large, but other dance traditions grew up popularly. An estimate made in the mid-1960s was that there were at least twenty-five professional dance troupes in Cambodia at that time. These troupes performed dance dramas that drew upon the Hindu myths, Buddhist *jataka* tales, indigenous legends, and modern romances and satires for their story lines. The dance gestures, the costumes, and the music show elements of Hindu, Buddhist, Thai, Lao, Vietnamese, Chinese, and Western elements in addition to classical Khmer features. The *lkhaon bassak* (a dance-drama form), named after the area in South Vietnam from which its ethnic Khmer dancers originated, appears to borrow about equally from Indic and Sinitic sources.

The influence of court classical dance on popular dance has been strengthened in recent years by the practice of hiring former leading ladies of the classical troupe to instruct popular troupes in the rudiments of the classical dance style. In one village south of Phnom Penh, such a teacher was hired by the local *wat* committee in the early 1950s to train local girls in singing, dancing, and acting so that the village could have a dance drama twice yearly in connection with festivities at their Buddhist temple. The teacher was still there in the late 1960s, and the dance dramas continued to be performed.

A number of folk dances are performed in rural areas, some of them possibly dating back to pre-Hindu times, such as the *trot* (deerhunting dance), in which masked dancers represent a hunter, a demon, a bull, girls, and deer. The story is danced to the accompaniment of chanting and beating of drums. It may originally have preceded the hunt and invoked the blessings of spirits on that particular venture. In the 1960s it was being danced to propitiate the spirits of the monsoon rain, when this was late in arriving.

The *lamthong*, or *rom vung*, is a popular dance for mixed couples or groups. Dancers posture gracefully with their hands while stepping flirtatiously near their partners but never touching each other. Unlike other dance forms, the *lamthong* is not primarily the province of trained or professional performers.

The University of Fine Arts has become a center for the study of the dance as well as other performing arts. Under the direction of a Russian ballet teacher, Cambodian students at the university have learned the rudiments of Western ballet. In the late 1960s Western-style ballets were performed occasionally by Cambodian dancers in the capital for a westernized elite audience. University plans, as of 1971, included the construction of a hall for Western ballet and the obtaining of equipment and costumes for such ballet.

The most important traditional Khmer dramatic form other than the dance drama was the shadow play. This form still survived in the early 1970s in a troupe from Siemreab but was no longer widespread. Shadow pictures, made by holding a series of large perforated leather panels between a light and a white screen (each panel held by a different person), depict scenes from the drama being recited behind the screen. The designs of these silhouette panels are elaborate and traditional.

Modern French drama became the model for the French-educated elite of twentieth-century Cambodia. The former chief of state, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, wrote, directed, and produced a number of plays and also several films. In one film of the late 1960s the prince and his wife, Princess Monique, also starred. Motion pictures are popular, and there were in the latter 1960s some fifty motion picture theaters in the country, located in Phnom Penh and the five largest provincial towns.

Television was introduced in Cambodia in the 1960s and, although limited, telecasting has been a means of transmitting artistic performances to a wider audience (see ch. 8).

The University of Fine Arts has frequently presented programs of music, dancing, and other cultural content on television as well as on radio. Dissemination of the performing arts to the rural areas has increased since the March 1970 invasion. A troupe from the university visits various provinces to perform before audiences of soldiers, settled villagers, and villagers in areas that have newly returned to government control after a period of enemy occupation.

Crafts

In the nineteenth century and earlier, many artisans were employed to provide artistic luxuries for the numerous members of royalty and others who had achieved wealth. At that time silverwork and goldwork were of high quality, especially in making jewelry and the little boxes that held the ingredients for betel nut chewing, then an important social ritual among all classes. In the twentieth century the making of both jewelry and betel boxes had decreased, for the wealthy had both abandoned the chewing of betel nut and turned to luxury manufactures of European origin. Early in the twentieth century craftsmanship was dying rapidly, and some special crafts, such as the making of niello ware, were already forgotten, as many craftsmen had turned to farming to make a livelihood. A survey made in 1917 showed that there were only 132 artisans left, and most of them were no longer practicing their crafts.

The French governor general attempted a revival of crafts with the approval of the king. Craftsmen were assembled at Phnom

Penh in a school of fine arts operated in conjunction with a museum. They were employed as masters to train young craftsmen under the traditional apprenticeship system. The French did not interfere, hoping to exclude European influence and to prevent the frustration of native initiative.

A new generation of craftsmen was trained, but the results were generally uninspiring: ancient themes were meticulously repeated for appeal to the tourist trade. Cambodians who could afford the products showed only polite interest and provided little patronage. Although some of the craftsmen added small individual touches to their designs, more often standardized designs originated by others were used. The craftsmen enjoyed little prestige; it was considered degrading for a member of an educated or a prosperous family to engage in such work.

The principal crafts now practiced are the working of silver and gold, the making of jewelry, and the sculpture of ebony, colored hardwood, and stone. Leather punching or carving is a specialty of artisans in Siemreab Province. The silverwork and goldwork consist largely of cigarette boxes, sugar and cream sets, and similar tourist-trade items; designs are based on the figures and floral patterns seen on the stone carvings of Angkor. The wood sculpture, similarly based on ancient models, consists of heads and images of the Buddha. The best jewelry is probably made by Chinese craftsmen, but a few Khmer are also skilled in this craft.

Stone sculpture and ivory carvings are local household industries in some parts of the country, catering to local demands for Buddha images. There is also some tortoiseshell work, made chiefly by Vietnamese.

Household implements are practical but unadorned; in urban areas they are usually either of Chinese manufacture or copied from Chinese objects. Pottery making, a local industry in several areas, shows little artistic effort, even though the bowls and pots are attractive in shape. When a nicer dish is desired for use at the table, a decorated Chinese bowl is usually purchased. If wall decorations are desired in the more prosperous homes, Vietnamese lacquered pictures or European prints are used. Miniature shadow-puppet silhouettes are popular wall decorations.

Some common objects are decorated—among them the oxcart, the pirogue, and the rice-harvesting sickle. These objects reflect pride in workmanship, but the amount of actual carving and decoration is usually scanty. Here too, as in nearly all forms of Cambodian art, designs are traditional; heads of dragons and *nagas* are the most common themes, and some floral patterns are used.

One of the few folk arts in which all Cambodians take special pride is the making of the cloth used in the *sampot* (the national costume); *sampot* weaving is a widely scattered local industry (see ch. 5). Each *sampot* is woven separately by hand. Frequently, native vegetable dyes, available only in certain months, are specially mixed for each *sampot*, so that no two garments are the same. The simplest are made in linear or plaid patterns. One popular variety uses heavy silk threads of one color for the woof and another color for the warp to produce a shimmering effect in solid colors. The most complicated and original is made by *houl*, a weaving process in which the design is produced essentially by a tie-dying process in which the threads are predyed with different colors along their length. More lavish *sampot* are woven with gold or silver threads, and royal *sampot* and those of the ballet dancers have silver throughout the woof.

Literature and Scholarship

Khmer literary roots are traceable further back in time than are those of any other Southeast Asian country. The Vo-canh inscription of the second or third century A.D. is the oldest in any Southeast Asian vernacular script, and the Angkor Borei inscription of the early seventh century A.D. is the oldest in a Southeast Asian language (see Language and Literacy, this ch.). Unfortunately, except for inscriptions carved on stone monuments, which are plentiful in number but limited in subject matter and time span, most Khmer literature was presumably written on materials that were highly vulnerable to the climate, insects, and conquering armies.

The literature of Cambodia owes much to Indic sources, as does the script itself. The single most important achievement in Khmer literature in modern times was the completion in 1969 of the translation from Pali of the entire *Tipitaka* (in Sanskrit, *Tripitaka*—Three Baskets of the Law), the basic document of Theravada Buddhism, sometimes called the Pali canon. The *Tipitaka* had never before been translated in its entirety from the original Pali into another language. This achievement, the result of forty years of work by the Buddhist Institute, was performed under the leadership and largely as a result of the efforts of the late patriarch Chuon Nath Chottanheano, of the Mohanikay order of Cambodian monks (see ch. 7). He died in 1969 having achieved, in addition to the *Tipitaka* translation, the completion of a two-volume Khmer dictionary and a Pali dictionary as well as other scholarly projects. In celebration of its completion the *Tipitaka* translation (110 volumes, each 400 to 900 pages long) was carried in procession through Phnom Penh ahead of 2,000 monks and many thousand lay Buddhist marchers.

The Buddhist Institute has also been responsible for the publication of a Cambodian version of the *Ramayana,* one of the great epics of Hindu literature, known in Cambodia as the *Reamker.* Except for the version of the institute, all other Cambodian texts of the *Reamker* have been written on highly perishable materials; however, some of these can still be found treasured in rural and provincial *wat,* especially in Batdambang and Siemreab provinces. There is a belief in the magico-religious character of ancient writing, and the monks are often unwilling to let the texts be handled, studied, or removed from their control.

The differences between spoken and written Cambodian prose are substantial; the literary form is full of archaic words and loanwords from Sanskrit and Pali. A sizable proportion of prose literature consists of canonical texts or other religious tracts. Technical works on divination, astronomy, and traditional medicine are also found.

Poetic forms make use of meter, assonance, rhyme (including internal rhyme), and profuse alliteration. Poetic form was used for many types of subject matter including technical material in ancient times. The use of archaic and foreign terms is even more frequent in Khmer poetry than in Khmer prose.

Western literature, chiefly French, formed an important part of the secondary school syllabus at the schools attended by most of the Cambodian leadership of the 1960s and 1970s. One foreign observer has attributed the willingness of the government to abandon the monarchical form, with its roots reaching deeply into the Khmer past, to the influence on the country's modern political elite of ninety years of French literature. Rousseau, Voltaire, and Hugo—all required reading at the French-language *lycée*—presented to educated Cambodians the egalitarian republican concepts to which the Khmer Republic at its inception claimed adherence.

Modern novels in Khmer and French reflect foreign influences but deal chiefly with ancient indigenous legends, Khmer historical events, love stories, or current domestic social problems. A few magazines publish short stories and poems in Khmer and French, but special literary magazines were lacking, as far as was known from information available in early 1972. Modern Cambodian writers often have their works published by private booksellers.

CHAPTER 7

RELIGION

Theravada Buddhism, one of the two major forms of Buddhism, is the official faith of the Khmer Republic. Nearly all Khmer, who comprise roughly 85 percent of the population, adhere to Theravada Buddhism, as do the dominant ethnic groups of neighboring Thailand and Laos and also those of Ceylon and Burma. The Khmer not only accept Buddhist ideas as part of their system of belief but also actively engage in the rituals sanctioned by Buddhist doctrine and support the *sangha* (brotherhood of Buddhist monks—see Glossary) and the *wat* (Buddhist temple complex) in their communities. Before independence nearly all Khmer education was in the hands of the *sangha* and a substantial, although decreasing, portion of it remained so in the early 1970s (see ch. 6).

Theravada Buddhism has been an important source of national integration, providing the primary value system for the overwhelming majority of the population (see ch. 4). Reported attacks on Buddhist monks, institutions, and values by dissident and communist forces in Cambodia have been given wide publicity by the government, which has declared that the present armed conflict was, in effect, a war between Buddhists and the enemies of Buddhism. The Communists have apparently tried to avoid public attacks on Buddhism and have denied any conflict between their goals and those of pious Buddhists.

Theravada Buddhism has been the predominant popular belief in Cambodia since the thirteenth century A.D. At that time, however, the royal religion was a Brahmanic cult, including the worship of the *devaraja* (god-king), that had as its central tenet the belief in the union of the supreme deity (usually envisioned as a Hindu god—Shiva or Vishnu) with the reigning king or his dynastic ancestor (see ch. 3; ch. 6). This Brahmanic cult, although promoted at court, did not have much effect on popular worship outside the capital, where animistic and ancestral cults predominated before the spread of Buddhism. Such spirit cults have survived among the Buddhist Khmer, where they have become intermixed with Buddhist and Brahmanical practices. Buddhism, the remnants of Brahmanism, and the worship of spirits do not compete or conflict, however; together they constitute for the Khmer the total system of belief and practice. Spirit cults also continue among the Khmer Loeu, the non-Buddhist indigenous tribal peoples living in the uplands.

Buddhism stresses the ultimate goal of nirvana, a state in which all desire and individual consciousness are extinguished, and thus suffering, the inevitable result of desire and of self-awareness, is absent. In Theravada Buddhism the ordinary layman, in contrast to the monk, is thought to be quite remote from this and can only hope for a rebirth (reincarnation) that will improve his earthly status and will bring him closer to the possibility of nirvana in a later incarnation. He takes satisfaction in having already risen so far within the great hierarchy of living things as to have reached the human state.

In order to deal with the difficulties and desires of daily life, however, the Khmer Buddhist placates the appropriate local or ancestral spirits when he thinks them vengeful or when he seeks their endorsement for a new venture. He looks to the spirits to reap a good harvest and performs the necessary propitiatory rituals to assure it. Illness or misfortune is usually blamed on the anger of spirits. Spirit worship, then, is meant to deal with the problems of this world; Buddhism is oriented to finding one's way out of it. Brahmanical lore and symbolism survive in popular worship, in fortunetelling, in the choosing of auspicious dates for various activities, and in many life-cycle ceremonies.

Among the non-Khmer, religion is not a major source of ethnic integration except in the case of the lowland Cham, who are all Muslims and who regard their identity as Cham to be inextricably linked to adherence to Islam (see ch. 4). The Chinese and Vietnamese adhere to Mahayana Buddhist, Christian, and various national and regional religions, such as worship of historical folk heroes, the Cao Dai sect, and others. The category Khmer Loeu includes more than a dozen tribal groups, each with its own religious beliefs and practices. Whereas the small numbers of Thai, Lao, and Burmese residing in the Khmer Republic are easily assimilated into Khmer society because of shared adherence to Theravadin belief, the social distance between Khmer Buddhists and Mahayana (that is, Chinese and Vietnamese) Buddhists is fully as great as that between Khmer Buddhists and Christians or Muslims.

BUDDHISM

Buddhism emerged initially as an effort by a North Indian prince, Lord Siddharta Gautama (563–483 B.C.), to revive religious consciousness in India at a time when Brahmanism (ancient Hinduism) had become an elaborate sacerdotal and sacrificial religious system. Gautama (in later life dubbed the Buddha—the Enlightened One) rejected his high status and the rights and wealth his status conferred on him, to become a wandering ascetic. According to Buddhist beliefs, after years spent in meditation and the search for salvation, he finally attained enlightenment while seated under a fig tree.

After the Buddha's death—which is celebrated by Theravada Buddhists on one day together with his birth and enlightenment—the faith that he inspired was institutionalized in the monastic body of the *sangha* founded by his disciples, and his teachings were then transmitted orally by the monks. Patronized by the great North Indian emperor Asoka (269–232 B.C.), Buddhism spread over India and, in 246 B.C., reached Ceylon. In the second or first century B.C. a Buddhist conference was held in Ceylon, and at that time the *Tipitaka* (Three Baskets of the Law), the sacred scripture of Theravada Buddhism, was committed to writing. It was written in Pali, a now archaic Indian language derived from Sanskrit. The *Tipitaka* (in Sanskrit, *Tripitaka*) is often referred to as the Pali canon. The basic religious text for all of Southeast Asia's Buddhists (except the Vietnamese), the Pali canon has been translated in its entirety into Khmer. The translation, completed in 1969, was the first complete one in any other language (see ch. 6).

By the time of the conference in Ceylon, a major schism had developed among Buddhists. The Mahanaya (Greater Vehicle) faction created a broader ethic than had obtained in the original version—by reinterpreting what the Buddha had taught about laymen, incorporating into Buddhist doctrines many aspects of other philosophical schools, deifying the Buddha himself, and superimposing upon the entire doctrine a pervasive optimism. Buddhism as interpreted in the Mahayana tracts (written in Sanskrit, a North Indian language now archaic) offered nirvana to everyone, although ascetics could expect to achieve it more readily. Mahayana Buddhism swept India, Central Asia, China, Korea, Japan, and the court cities of Southeast Asia, including Angkor, along with some Brahmanic Hindu beliefs and practices.

In Ceylon, however, the original doctrine was preserved and perpetuated as Theravada (School of the Elders) Buddhism; it is referred to by Mahayanists as Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) Buddhism. Maintaining its position in Ceylon, Theravada Buddhism eventually came to replace Mahayana and Brahmanical beliefs in the court cities of Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos while also becoming a popular belief in the rural areas of those countries.

In the thirteenth century it became the prevalent belief of the Khmer, although the *devaraja* cult remained the official religion of Angkor, the capital, until the fifteenth century (see ch. 3).

Basic Beliefs

Buddhism began as a reform of ancient Hindu doctrines, and some of the primary assumptions of Hinduism are vital to Buddhist theory. Initially, the Buddhist, as well as the Hindu, sees the universe and all forms of life as parts of a process of eternal flux. The character of this flow is cyclical and recurrent. For the individual this means that the present life is merely a phase in an endless progression of events that neither ceases with death nor continues indefinitely in some heavenly afterlife. Life and death are merely alternate aspects of individual existence, marked by the transition points of birth and deanimation. The individual who follows this course is essentially one who is continually reborn in new guises, not all of them necessarily human. It is possible that his next existence will be that of a god or an animal. This endless cycle of rebirth in which all creatures are involved is known as *samsara* (the wheel of life).

Theravada Buddhism is not prescriptive, authoritative, or exclusive in its attitude toward its followers and is tolerant of other religions. It merely presents a way for those who will follow it. It does not require belief in a god, but it does demand that each individual take full responsibility for his own actions and omissions.

Buddhism (whether Theravada or Mahayana) is based on three concepts: *dharma*, the doctrine of the Buddha, a guide to right action and belief; *karma*, the belief that one's life now and hereafter is dependent one one's own deeds and misdeeds and that each person is responsible for, and rewarded on the basis of, the sum total of his acts and omissions in all his incarnations past and present; and *sangha*, the ascetic community within which a man can improve his *karma*.

None of these concepts was original to the Buddha, but the Buddha added to the Brahmanic conception of *samsara*, with its fatalistic vision of an endless round of pain and sorrow in life after life, the hope of escape. This was not a promise of heaven or of a happy life after death. Instead, the Buddhist way offered the hope of salvation in the form of nirvana, a final extinction of one's core of individual being and thereby a complete release from *samsara* and its inevitable suffering. Nirvana, the state in which the illusions of existence are conquered, comes about when, having achieved a good *karma* through earning much merit and avoiding misdeeds, one gains enlightenment.

The essence of Buddhism is contained in the Four Noble Truths *taught by the Buddha; suffering exists; suffering has a cause* and that cause is the thirst or craving for existence; such a craving can be stopped; and, fourthly, there is an Eightfold Path by which a permanent state of peace can be attained. This Eightfold Path, simply stated, consists of right understanding, right purpose, right speech, right conduct, right vocation, right effort, right thinking, and right meditation.

The Four Noble Truths illustrate the extent to which Buddhist doctrine, as it was first developed, relies upon logic rather than revelation or divine inspiration. The element of divinity was not introduced until the Mahayana doctrine was devised and has not figured to any significant extent in Theravadin belief.

The average layman cannot hope for nirvana after the end of this life but he can, by complying to his best ability with the doctrine's basic rules of moral conduct, hope to improve his *karma* and thereby better his condition in the next incarnation, following his death.

The doctrine of *karma* holds that, by the working of a just, automatic, and impersonal cosmic law, one's actions in this life and in all previous incarnations determine which position along the hierarchy of living things one will occupy in the next incarnation. An individual's *karma* can be favorably affected by certain acts and omissions. The omissions are summarized in five precepts, which all Buddhists try to follow, although laxity in the case of the fifth is regarded as less serious than in the case of the first four. These are: do not kill; do not steal; do not indulge in forbidden sexual pleasures; do not tell lies; and do not take intoxicants or stupefying drugs or liquors.

The most effective way to work actively to improve one's *karma* is to earn merit. Although any act of benevolence or generosity can be said to be a source of merit, the Khmer tend to regard opportunities for earning merit as primarily connected with interaction with the *sangha* and support of it with money, goods, and participation in its activities.

Among the favorite ways for a male to earn merit are: to enter the *sangha* as a monk (after the age of twenty) or as a novice, or to live in the *wat* as a temple boy; and, in the case of women (usually the elderly), to become a nun. Provided one has the funds, one can: sponsor the ordination of a monk or novice; contribute to a permanent feature of a *wat*, for example, pay for all or part of the construction of a *wat* building or donate or pay for some appurtenance for the use of the *sangha*; feed members of the *sangha* at a public meal; or provide food for either of the two daily meals of the *sangha*. The more expensive donations gain more merit than the less expensive ones, but joining the *sangha,* which is generally possible for men from all but the poorest and most short-handed families, earns great amounts of merit.

Because of the primacy of the concern of the donor with improving his own *karma* by such good deeds, the Khmer Buddhist layman always thanks the *sangha* member when presenting his gift for having provided the layman with the opportunity to earn merit. The monk or novice, for his part, laboring under the monastic obligation to learn detachment from worldly concerns, merely accepts the offering without thanks, avoiding any appearance of interest in the quality or quantity of the gift.

The Sangha and the Wat

The Buddhist hierarchy in Cambodia is independently organized in accordance with regulations formulated in 1943 and modified in 1948. As of 1969 the chief of state was the head of the Buddhist clergy, and he appointed the heads of the two monastic orders as well as the monks who had been nominated to the highest ranks of the hierarchy. Information as to who performed this function in mid-1972 was not available.

There are two separate and independent monastic orders in Cambodia (as in Thailand and Laos): the Mohanikay (Great Congregation) order, and the Thommayut (Those Who Are Attached to the Doctrine) order. The Mohanikay is by far the older and is much the larger, in terms of numbers of monks and *wat.* Over 90 percent of the members of the *sangha* belong to the Mohanikay order. The Thommayut order, initially patronized by the Thai royal house in the nineteenth century, was introduced into Cambodia in 1864 by a monk who had studied in Thailand. Despite its small number of adherents and its insignificance in rural areas, the Thommayut order has considerable prestige because it was adopted by most of the royalty and aristocracy as well as by some other Khmer of greater than average wealth or status.

There appear to be no real doctrinal differences between Thommayut and Mohanikay groups, but they disagree on certain details of behavior and of adherence to rules for the *sangha.* The Thommayut monks, for example, are more meticulous than are the Mohanikay monks about never handling money, traveling alone, or accepting alms directly from the hands of women. In a survey in one rural community of central Cambodia in the early 1960s that had one *wat* of each order, many villagers said that they attended ceremonies equally often at both *wat.*

It is difficult to estimate the total number of monks in Cambodia at any one time because of the easy, and continual, entry and egress of men into and out of the monasteries. The Theravada Buddhist rule that requires each male to spend some part of his life as a member of the *sangha* still has significance for the Khmer, although its observance is reportedly somewhat less frequent than formerly.

The Buddhist retreat period, Vuhsa—the three months of heightened monastic religious activity and asceticism during which monks do not leave the *wat* except for reasons of necessity —is the most popular time for Khmer males to enter the *sangha*. This is because the merit earned by being in the *sangha* for that period is reckoned as equivalent to the merit earned by a year's membership.

Both entrance into and separation from the *sangha* are at the choice of the individual, provided entry is not barred because one has killed or stolen and provided one has permission of one's wife if married. The individual decides whether to become a *phikhok* (fully ordained monk) or a novice (*sameney* or *neyn*), although one cannot be ordained a *phikhok* until the age of twenty. The distinction between monk and novice consists chiefly of the greater number of rules that fully ordained monks must obey. There are, in all, 227 rules of monastic discipline that must be obeyed by a *phikhok*, but a novice need only obey a list of seventy-five monastic rules.

There are ten basic precepts that must be followed when entering the *sangha*—the five Buddhist precepts for all persons (but with the requirement of total celibacy, not merely chastity) and five other precepts that deal with requirements of monastic asceticism. These include the forbiddance of eating after midday; participating in any activity that excites the senses, such as dancing, singing, or making music; using any personal adornment; reclining on a raised or luxurious bed; and handling money (literally gold and silver).

Members of the *sangha* have been outside the scope of civil legal action and exempt from all public duties. Under the constitution in effect in early 1972 they were also ineligible to vote or to hold official office "by reason of Buddhist dogma." They have been able neither to witness a legal document nor give legal testimony, nor could they be tried in an ordinary court of law without first being defrocked. The suspension or expulsion of a monk can be decided by the abbot of the local *wat* but only with the endorsement of the superior of the order. (Whether this situation still held in areas of the country occupied, or controlled, by communist North and South Vietnamese forces was not known in mid-1972.)

Estimates of the numbers of monks and *wat* throughout the country vary considerably. Probably the most reliable recent estimate is one reported to have been made in June 1968 by the director of the Buddhist Institute in Phnom Penh, in which *phikhok* were said to number about 53,400 and novices about 40,000. They were reportedly residing in 2,800 *wat*.

The status of the senior-most novice is below that of the junior-most monk. There also exist within the monk category various grades of monkhood based on qualifications in priestly learning, chiefly the study of the sacred Pali texts. Novices are instructed in the Pali texts by the monks. Also attached to the *sangha* are temple boys, usually between the ages of seven and twelve, who perform various personal services for members of the *sangha*, assist at ceremonies, and help with the housekeeping in exchange for being tutored in reading and writing Khmer and the memorization of parts of the Pali litanies. Until the great expansion of secular education in the 1960s, schooling given the temple boys and novices was virtually the only formal education available to most Khmer children.

Women may not be ordained, nor may they have any physical contact with a monk or novice. A son's ordainment into the *sangha*, however, brings great merit to his mother as well as to his father. It is usually the women who give the daily alms to the *sangha* and who make offerings in the temple. There are usually also some old women living within the *wat*, although not in the section reserved for the *sangha*. They act as nuns, decorate altars, and do some housekeeping chores. They shave their heads and eyebrows and lead an ascetic life of detachment.

In both orders of the *sangha* there are two main high ranks in the clergy, *riachiakenak* and *thananukrom*. Promotion to the higher of the two, *riachiakenak*, is made by the head of state on the recommendation of the superiors of each order and the minister of state in charge of the interior, security, religious affairs, veterans, and tourism. Within this rank there are four subranks. A monk must serve twenty years in the priesthood to receive nomination to the lowest of these ranks. Elevation to *thananukrom*, a rank below all four subranks of *riachiakenak*, is made by the superior of the order in agreement with the ministry in charge of religious affairs. Many monks holding the lower offices in each of the orders have achieved this rank.

Each province forms a *kun* (diocese), which is divided into districts. The capital city of Phnom Penh constitutes a *kun* for both orders. The religious head of each *kun* is of the *thananukrom* rank and is directly responsible to his superior and to the ministry in charge of religious affairs. The religious head of each district is of *thananukrom* rank and supervises the temples in his district.

Religious councils are of three types: the highest council, assisting the superior of each order; an executive assembly, assisting the head of each *kun*; and the lowest council, assisting the work of each district head.

Each temple is headed by a *chau-athikaa* (abbot or chief monk). He is assisted in managing the temple and conducting the services by two other monks, the *kruu sout* of the right and left. The *achaa* (also spelled *achar*—lay assistant) serves as a temporal intermediary between the monks and laymen. He represents the monks in dealings with the government and leads the prayers and chants at ceremonies. The *chau-athikaa* supervises the monks and novices and the students at the temple school, making certain that all conform to lay, as well as religious, standards. The *achaa* and the *chau-athikaa* are responsible for all temple grounds and buildings. It is also the duty of the *chau-athikaa* to take the initiative in encouraging the intellectual and moral development of his subordinates.

In one village studied in the mid-1960s, an anthropologist noted that seven *phumi* (villages) supported one *wat* and each of these *phumi* elected its own *achaa*; the seven *achaa* then chose among themselves a chairman or "big" *achaa*. The "big" *achaa* selected was a man who was respected, who knew the Pali formulas and ceremonies so that he could function as leader of the lay congregation in *wat* rituals, and who could be trusted with money, since donations to the *sangha* were entrusted to him.

The typical *wat* consists of a cluster of buildings located inside a walled enclosure. The entrance is usually from the east and often is guarded by grotesque figures in animal or human form. The compound contains the *vihia* (temple proper or sanctuary), one or two *salaa* (open halls), dormitories for the *sangha,* some tombs, and a few shrines to animistic spirits. The *wat* is patronized chiefly by the households living near it; these households feel a sense of community through this joint support. The *wat* is also, however, dependent for big donations upon wealthy urban patrons who seek the chance to earn merit by contributing to the needs of rural *wat* and *sangha.*

Life in the *sangha* is dominated by restrictions and prohibitions. A monk or novice must obey the five basic precepts of Buddhist morality more scrupulously than need the layman. Thus, whereas the lay Buddhist is merely enjoined not to kill, the monk is under stronger proscription. For instance, he carries a strainer at all times in order that, when he drinks water, he avoids accidentally killing an insect by swallowing it. The layman must not steal, but the monk or novice is forbidden to take anything that has not been expressly given to him, even food. A lay Buddhist may not indulge in forbidden sexual pleasures, but members of the *sangha* must avoid all physical contact with females. The rules of honesty and sobriety are likewise more exacting for the *sangha* than for laymen.

The monk or novice also has other proscriptions to follow as well as certain duties to perform. A partial list of regulations governing the *sangha* indicates their stringency and broad scope. The *sangha* member may not, for instance, seek pleasure in looking at women or giving them gifts of flowers. He may not till the soil. His head, eyebrows, and beard must be shaved every two weeks. He may participate in political affairs only as they concern religion. He must offer advice to the laity on spiritual matters only when requested but, when requested, he may not refuse.

A *sangha* member's day is generally full and well ordered. He is up by five o'clock each morning, and by six o'clock—after his toilet and prayers unless he is an older or senior monk—he sets off, usually with a temple boy, to beg the daily food of the *sangha*. After begging he returns to the *wat* where all eat a simple breakfast. Then each turns to his duties for the day: some monks study; others teach; some perform necessary chores in the *wat*; and others perform various ceremonies in the village and in the *wat*. Shortly before noon they take their last meal of the day, which is followed by a period of rest and contemplation. At the end of the afternoon they return to other allotted tasks.

A study in a village in central Cambodia in the early 1960s noted that there had been in recent years a downturn in interest on the part of adolescent boys and young men in entering the *sangha* in favor of pursuing a secular education and nonagricultural secular careers. By the mid-1960s, however, improvement in religious education—with the possibility also of receiving secondary and higher level Buddhist education leading to nationally recognized certificates in Pali studies—had apparently helped bring a reversal of this trend (see ch. 6). In one hamlet an anthropologist found that the number of novices at the local *wat* had increased markedly from 1962 to 1965, as a result of the influx of novices from outside the community who had come to this *wat* because it had a Pali school. The effect that the hostilities, which began in 1970, were having generally on this situation was not known in mid-1972.

Role of Buddhism in Cambodian Life

The monks perform a number of functions in the life of the village. They officiate at all formal village festivals and ceremonies. Their presence is indispensable at marriages and funerals, and they are often called in for other household occasions, such as naming ceremonies for infants—some specialize in the astrological lore essential to propitious naming. Monks and former monks, especially *achaa*, often engage in curing by means of religious rites and folk medicine as well as by modern scientific techniques.

The monk has traditionally occupied a unique position in the transmission of Khmer culture and values. By his way of life he provides a living model of the most meritorious behavior a Buddhist can follow, and by his dependence upon the laity for his food, clothing, shelter—all his needs in fact—he provides the lay community with opportunities to earn merit by giving alms to him. For centuries the only literate persons residing in rural communities were the monks, and they acted as teachers to the temple boys, novices, and newly ordained monks. Until the marked expansion of secular education and literacy training in the 1960s—which had led to a great reduction of illiteracy by the end of the decade—the bulk of the literate male Khmer population gained whatever degree of literacy it possessed solely through the efforts of the *sangha* (see ch. 6).

The most important events of the year in Khmer communities were Buddhist holidays and the festivities connected with them. During these ceremonies the entire community—and often outsiders as well—is brought together, cooperating and pooling resources in planning for and participating in rituals and festivities that are taking place in the *wat*.

The traditional Cambodian New Year (Choul Chhnam), in mid-April, is an important religious ceremony (see ch. 5). Another important one is Phisak Bauchia, the festival celebrating the birth, enlightenment, and final extinction upon death of the Buddha; it usually takes place in May. Next, at the beginning of the rainy season and of the retreat of the *sangha*, is the holiday Choul Vuhsa, which is preceded by the ordination of monks and novices.

Ordination ceremonies are colorful and elaborate. The young men who are to enter the *sangha* are dressed in their best clothes and, at one point in the ceremony, are led in procession three times around the ordination hall, accompanied by chanting monks, musicians, relatives, and friends, all dressed in their finery. This symbolizes the world of earthly luxury that the postulant, like Lord Gautama before him, voluntarily renounces to enter the life of ascetic purity and detachment from worldly concerns. The ceremony concludes with the postulants' entering the ordination hall, changing into the saffron-colored garments of the order, and being accepted into the *sangha* by the abbot.

Prachum, a festival honoring the dead, usually falls in September. For two weeks people go to the *wat* to offer the morning meal to the *sangha* and, in the evening, return to hear the monks' sermons. Every day *ben* (balls of rice) are offered to the spirits of the departed. On the last day of the fortnight, called Prachum Ben, even persons from outside the village come to the *wat* if the ashes of their ancestors are kept there or in the community it serves.

At the festival of Chenh Vuhsa, monks come out of retreat; this usually occurs in October. At that time, or soon thereafter, each *wat* celebrates the Kathen festival, during which clothing and other objects of permanent use are presented to the *sangha*. Such a ceremony is commonly sponsored by another village or by a wealthy individual, government office, or business firm residing outside the community, often in the nearest urban center. Much merit is thought to be earned by sponsoring a Kathen festival. The local community also contributes, in the form of cooked food and service as waiters and helpers to the patrons of the festival and the other guests. The anniversary of the Buddha's last sermon, Miakh Bouchia, is usually during the month of February.

In addition to these regular yearly festivals that involve the entire community (and to some degree outsiders) at the *wat*, there are also four holy days each month. These occur on the eighth and fourteenth (or fifteenth) days of the waxing moon and on the corresponding days of the waning moon. On these days sermons are delivered and scriptures recited by the monks to the laity at the *wat*. The more pious, generally the elderly, attend these holy day rites, but the majority of villagers do not. It is common for the elderly men to spend the entire holy day in the *wat*, abiding by the ten precepts for the course of the day. Sometimes, rather than go to the *wat*, a pious person may stay at home, fasting in the afternoon and remaining indoors in order to avoid anger or upset and the possibility of inadvertently killing a living creature, such as an insect. No beef or alcohol is sold on holy days, but in other respects most villagers behave the same as on other days.

The relationship of Theravada Buddhism to the state is often likened by Cambodians to that of the two wheels supporting a chariot: only if both turn at the same speed can the chariot advance. Since Theravada Buddhism is not only the state religion but also the faith of at least 85 percent of the population, there is a popular tendency among the Khmer to regard adherence to that belief as basic to participation in Cambodian life.

President Lon Nol has called the war underway in Cambodia in 1972 a religious crusade that must be supported by all good Buddhists. Republican government statements have emphasized that Communists (including the communist Red Khmers, North Vietnamese, and Viet Cong) do not believe in the religion and therefore do not believe in the Buddha. The government has charged that communist forces in Cambodia have killed and intimidated monks and novices, have used *wat* buildings for purposes of war, have forbidden the giving or taking of daily alms to the *sangha* in areas under their control, and have required monks to work for their food in direct violation of the ancient, sacred laws governing the *sangha*. The government has found reported communist activities against the *sangha* to be an important propaganda asset.

The Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia (Gouvernement Royal d'Union Nationale de Kampuchéa) of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, in Peking, and the National United Front of Cambodia (Front Uni National de Kampuchéa—FUNK) have, likewise, called upon all monks to support them (see ch. 9). Communist elements of the FUNK have, for their part, never opposed the *sangha* or Buddhism in their public statements. Known Khmer Communists have issued statements pointing out the joint concern of themselves and the *sangha* with honesty, social justice, and other matters. Both the non-Communists and Communists in the FUNK have also stressed the necessity of joint cooperation of all, including the *sangha*, in a united front against the "fascist" republican government and have stated their policy to be one in which "national traditions are fully respected and developed" and in which "Buddhism is the state religion." They have, moreover, accused the republican government of mistreating monks and have claimed that monks had been killed by United States bombing.

Efforts apparently have been made by the Communists, however, to indoctrinate members of the *sangha* in their views so that the monks, in turn, would indoctrinate the laity. According to republican government reports, these efforts have met with resistance. The *sangha* is expressly barred by both Theravadin monastic and secular Cambodian law from participating in politics. Only rarely in modern times have members of the Cambodian *sangha* been involved in political demonstrations or activities; for example, in the early 1940s monks demonstrated against continued rule by the French. Such participation has been reported on various occasions since the deposition of Sihanouk, however. In March 1970 monks were reported to have joined students, soldiers, and others in the sacking of the chanceries of the North Vietnamese and the mission of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam in Phnom Penh. Demonstrations occurred in Phnom Penh in 1971, reportedly both in favor of Marshal Lon Nol's assuming the provisional presidency of the country and in opposition to government policy. Another event occurred in Takev in March 1972, when several thousand monks reportedly took part in a progovernment demonstration. The FUNK, also, has reported active participation by monks in mass meetings of a political nature.

KHMER SPIRIT WORSHIP AND SORCERY

In Cambodia, as in other Theravada Buddhist countries, security in daily affairs is sought through the propitiation of spirits, the practice of astrology and fortunetelling, and the use of magical charms and spells. The Khmer seek the help of spirit practitioners for the problems of daily life while they adhere to Buddhist beliefs and practices as related to their spiritual existence in the next life. No contradiction between Buddhism and spirit worship is felt to exist by the Khmer. Shrines to local spirits are found in the *wat* as well as in the forests, fields, and household compounds. Life-cycle rites usually require the presence and participation of both Buddhist monks and lay spirit specialists.

Spirits fall into several categories: the *neak taa* (spirits of trees, stones, forests, and villages); *chniang ptheh* (house guardian spirits); *praet* (demons); *khmaoc loong* (ghosts); *meba* (ancestral spirits); and *mring kongvial* (elves guarding certain animals). Of these only the *chniang ptheh* are entirely benevolent; others can do good or ill, and many are said to possess an instinct for mischief and vengeance and may act mercilessly against those who fail to show proper respect. Illness is explained as having been caused by the anger of spirits (see ch. 5). To secure the spirits' favor and forebearance, the individual, household, or community must perform the correct rituals and place offerings before the appropriate spirits' shrines.

To influence the supernatural on one's behalf, one seeks the aid of a *kruu* (spirit practitioner). The *kruu* is believed to have a number of talents, often including curing, finding lost objects, brewing love potions, and making protective amulets. The *kruu* is also believed to be able to inject supernatural power into an amulet by means of secret magic formulas. Once the amulet is imbued with the desired magical properties and ownership is ritually established, the owner takes exclusive possession of it, guarding and cherishing this link with the supernatural. A 1970 report stated that the use of amulets to provide invulnerability in battle was then widespread among soldiers in the Khmer republican forces. Such amulets were commonly carried in a pouch strung around the neck and put into the mouth upon entering into battle.

In addition to *kruu*, there are other specialists recognized as having the ability to intervene with the spirits. The term *achaa* (different in meaning from that also used for the lay intermediary at the *wat*) is used to denote a specialist in conducting spirit worship rites connected with life-cycle ceremonies. Such an *achaa* may also do curing. Sometimes the *wat achaa* undertakes this kind of activity, but often the practitioner is a former *wat achaa* who no longer serves as intermediary with the *sangha*.

Other specialists include the *tmup*, a *kruu* who is believed to be able to cause illness or perform murder through sorcery; and the *ruup areak* (spirit medium), usually female. Villagers may call upon the *ruup areak* to perform ceremonies at various times throughout the year and to communicate with the spirit world when she is possessed by spirits while in trance.

Examples abound of the continued popular belief in spirits, supernatural events and agencies, and myths. Various foreign observers have noted the tendency even among the most Westernized Khmers to hold such beliefs.

Until the deposition of Prince Sihanouk in March 1970 there had been celebrated at the royal palace in Phnom Penh and elsewhere a number of rites that were survivals or revivals of elements of the ancient *devaraja* (god-king) cult. Among these were a number of rituals concerning homage to dynastic ancestors carried out by a handful of *bakou* (Brahman court priests) using Sanskrit liturgies. In mid-1970 the palace ceased to be a royal residence and, under the republican regime, royal titles and functions have been abolished. Information available indicated that the *bakou* were not performing religious functions on behalf of the state after March 1970.

Also connected with the *devaraja* cult was an ancient rite, revived by Prince Sihanouk, in which a royal personage plows a symbolic first furrow of the year, thus sanctifying the start of the country's planting season. By mid-1972 this rite had not been performed in nearly three years, nor had the water festival, formerly held in Phnom Penh usually in the month of November. During the three-day water festival, which had involved boat races and fireworks, a royal personage would ritually command the waters of the Tonle Sab River to reverse their flow—as they do naturally every year at that time (see ch. 2; ch. 5).

KHMER LOEU BELIEFS AND PRACTICES

Although there have been some converts to Theravada Buddhism among the Khmer Loeu, partly as a result of government-endorsed missionary work among them, most Khmer Loeu adhere to tribal religions involving worship of local and ancestral spirits. In some instances Buddhist, Brahmanic, and Confucian notions have influenced these religions.

Details of belief and practice vary considerably among the hill peoples. Animals, often water buffalo, are sacrificed by some Khmer Loeu at the time of founding of a new settlement; at funerals of village notables; or when, as during an epidemic, it is thought desirable to placate the anger of spirits.

OTHER MINORITY RELIGIONS

Islam is the religion of the Cham minority; the Cham are also known as Cham-Malays and Khmer Islam. The Cham, largely rural inhabitants, are descendants of a group of fifteenth-century refugees from the great kingdom of the Chams, then located in what is present-day Vietnam. Only in religious belief and practice, however, are the Cham conspicuously different from their Khmer Buddhist neighbors. Intermarriage is rare because of the religious difference, but the Khmer Buddhist majority tends to regard the Cham as essentially an indigenous group. In 1971 there were unofficially estimated to be 85,000 Muslims in Cambodia, almost all Cham; the remainder were from the Indian subcontinent and were urban residents. The Muslims comprised an estimated 1.4 percent of the population. Eighty pilgrims went to Mecca in 1969; and another eighty, in 1970.

The Cham pray in mosques, keep the fast in the Muslim month of Ramadan, and also in other ways appear to be orthodox Muslims. Most live in villages north and east of Phnom Penh and are engaged in fishing and water buffalo herding; however, some engage in trade and industry. The butchering of cattle in Cambodia for food is often done by Cham since Buddhists are forbidden to kill. The Cham religion forbids their handling pork, however.

The Christian minority in 1972 probably totaled fewer than 20,000 persons, primarily Roman Catholic. The number of Christians in the country was reduced considerably in 1970 and 1971 as a result of the large repatriation of the resident Vietnamese population to the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) (see ch. 2; ch. 5). Roman Catholic authorities estimated that there were about 62,000 adherents to their faith in 1970. Cambodian Roman Catholic authorities estimated in April 1970 that about 50,000 were Vietnamese. The repatriation began soon after that date, and it was reported by a foreign observer in early 1972 that most of the Vietnamese in republican areas, including the Catholics (most of whom had lived in Phnom Penh, its immediate environs, and the larger provincial cities), were no longer in the country.

A sizable portion of the Roman Catholic community remaining in Cambodia in 1972 consisted of Europeans—chiefly French. There were also a few Chinese Catholics. There were approximately 2,000 Protestants counted in the 1962 census; later figures were not available.

The bulk of the Chinese population supported a variety of Mahayana Buddhist, Taoist, Confucianist, and ancestral shrines as well as shrines dedicated to regional and folk deities or to combinations of beliefs. The Chinese Mahayana Buddhists consisted, in the mid-1960s, of not more than 10,000 persons, almost all living in Phnom Penh. The few monks were all born in China. These Buddhists showed no interest in Khmer Buddhist rites or festivals and celebrated different holidays and performed different life-cycle rites. For example, they buried their dead rather than cremating them, as do the Khmer.

The Mahayana Buddhists at the beginning of the 1970s also included some Vietnamese, but joint participation in ritual observances with Chinese Mahayana Buddhists appears to have been limited. In addition, there were various kinds of Vietnamese spirit, ancestor, and folk hero shrines, and the Vietnamese community had some adherents to the Cao Dai religion, a faith that originated in Vietnam. The mass repatriation of Vietnamese in 1970 and 1971 presumably also reduced the number of supporters of these beliefs, although details were lacking in mid-1972.

A small but undetermined number of Hindus from the Indian subcontinent were resident in Phnom Penh and a few other urban centers in the 1960s. How many resided in Cambodia in 1972 was unknown.

SECTION II. POLITICAL

CHAPTER 8

THE GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM

Almost 2,000 years of uninterrupted monarchial government came officially to an end in Cambodia with the proclamation of the Khmer Republic on October 9, 1970. A new constitution was promulgated on May 10, 1972, after its acceptance in a national referendum held on April 30. The new constitution established "an independent, democratic, and social republic" in which all powers derived from the people. The political system provided by this constitution attempted to ensure a balance between the powers of the executive and legislative branches of government and also ensure the independence of the judiciary.

The new charter provided for a modified executive system with a strong president as head of state—although with lesser powers than in a purely executive system—assisted by a cabinet, which was headed by a prime minister. Parliament was bicameral, consisting of a popularly elected National Assembly and a Senate selected by a more restricted electorate. The lower house of Parliament, the National Assembly, had the power to effect the impeachment of the president; it could also, by withdrawing its confidence, dismiss individual members of the cabinet or an entire cabinet.

The new constitution incorporates the traditional Western democratic rights and privileges but includes restrictions that make certain rights subject to regulation by law and conditional on the maintenance of morality, law, and order. At the same time it reflects an increased social consciousness over the earlier constitution, taking cognizance of the citizen's right and need for social welfare and the state's obligation in such areas as employment and education.

Although there has been a growing awareness of the mechanism of government and the administration has been fostering an increased national consciousness, in 1972 the majority of the population was probably only marginally aware of the concept of the state and the meaning of constitutional guarantees. For the most part, government and politics remained primarily the concern of the country's educated elite.

The constitution recognized Buddhism as the state religion. Administratively, the country was divided into provinces, districts, autonomous municipalities, communes, and villages. Provincial governors and chiefs of districts and municipalities were appointed officials, but chiefs of communes and village headmen were elected by their communities.

In May 1970, after his ouster, Prince Norodom Sihanouk announced the formation in Peking of the Royal Government of National Union (Gouvernement Royal d'Union Nationale de Kampuchéa—GRUNK), under the leadership of the National United Front of Cambodia (Front Uni National de Kampuchéa—FUNK). Prince Sihanouk was designated head of state of the new government, which he averred was not a government-in-exile but one that had its roots inside Cambodia.

The executive branch of GRUNK appeared generally to follow the organizational lines of the earlier Cambodian governmental system before the republic. It had a prime minister, a deputy prime minister, and a fourteen-member cabinet. There was scant information, however, on any existing or proposed governmental structure for such areas of Cambodia that were, or might come, under GRUNK control (see ch. 9).

During the Sihanouk era national mass communication facilities were used largely for propaganda purposes to present government views and mold public opinion. After the deposition of Prince Sihanouk the republican government continued to exercise control over the various media through licensing. The extent to which national radio and television services were used to present government views, however, was not known in mid-1972.

Word-of-mouth communication remained an important medium, but radio was the primary means of disseminating news and information. The relatively small size of the country facilitated fairly thorough coverage from central transmitting facilities in Phnom Penh, and widespread distribution of radio receivers, many imported with the encouragement of the government during the Sihanouk era, has brought outlying communities into contact with the capital city.

Most mass media have been concentrated in the capital, which has served as the focal point for the nation's small press, publishing, film, radio, and television facilities. After the outbreak of active hostilities in 1970, the antirepublic FUNK under Prince Sihanouk also began radio broadcasts to the general population from stations that it claimed were under its control on Cambodian territory. These broadcasts were continuing on a regular basis in mid-1972.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Throughout its history until the establishment of the French Protectorate in 1864, Cambodia was essentially an absolute monarchy. The early kings were considered divine, and there were no formal restrictions on their authority. Advisers and astrologers some times influenced the monarch's thinking, but fundamentally all executive and lawmaking power was in the hands of the king. Although by the nineteenth century the concept of the king's divine status had been modified and tempered somewhat by modern thought, there were still few curbs on royal authority.

The French Protectorate placed the first real restraints on the king's absolute powers and in time virtually reduced the monarch to a figurehead. Through the Franco-Cambodian Treaty of 1863 and the subsequent Convention of 1884, the French governor general (*résident supérieur*) assumed most of the lawmaking and administrative prerogatives of the king. The king's powers were, in effect, limited to his spiritual role as head of Buddhist religious activities and the traditional right of granting pardons, although this was restricted to those committing offenses solely against Cambodian law.

The country's introduction to the legislative process began in 1913, when a consultative assembly was formed by King Sisowath under pressure from the French. Although this was purely an advisory body designed to assist the king in economic and domestic affairs, it was elected by restricted suffrage and was a first step in the direction of representative government.

After World War II the government, given a measure of autonomy by the French, sought to consolidate it by basing it on a popularly elected government. In 1946 King Sihanouk promulgated an electoral law providing for the convening of a constituent assembly to consider a constitution prepared by him and his advisers. The assembly was elected in September 1946 by direct vote of all citizens, with no opposition by the French and without major incident. After some months of debate, the constitution was ratified and was promulgated by the king on May 6, 1947. It was the country's first constitution and was to remain in effect until supplanted by the republican Constitution of 1972.

The Constitution of 1947, although introducing constitutional government, specified that the country was a monarchy and that this provision could not be amended. It established that all powers emanated from the king and prohibited any amendment that would, in effect, restrict the rather broad rights reserved to the king by the constitution. The king, however, was required to swear before the National Assembly to observe the constitution and the laws of the kingdom. In 1960 a constitutional amendment allowed the legislature to entrust the powers of the king to a chief of state—in this case Prince Sihanouk (king until 1955).

A bicameral legislature was introduced that was composed of the National Assembly, which was elected, and the Council of the Kingdom. The Council of the Kingdom was in part appointed and in part elected indirectly by territorial regions and by various groups, including members of the professions, the National Assembly, and officials of the government. In the case of National Assembly elections suffrage was extended to all citizens twenty years of age or over. Military personnel and members of the *sangha* (see Glossary) were not permitted to vote.

In 1955 members of Prince Sihanouk's political organization, the People's Socialist Community (Sangkum Reastr Niyum, commonly called the Sangkum), were elected to the National Assembly on a platform of granting the people greater participation in government (see ch. 9). Subsequently, the National Assembly passed an amendment to the constitution that provided for elected popular assemblies in each province and the city of Phnom Penh, which were to vote on provincial, municipal, and commune budgets, approve administrative accounts, set tax rates, and be consulted on the national budget. These assemblies functioned until 1959, when they were dissolved because of what the national government and Prince Sihanouk considered to be unwarranted interference in provincial and local government affairs. The constitutional provision for their existence, however, was never revoked.

In a 1958 amendment a new organ, the National Congress—which had been created in 1955 as the forum for the Sangkum—was made a constitutional body. It was to provide people with a direct voice in government affairs through recommendations to the National Assembly. The congress met twice a year until Prince Sihanouk's ouster as chief of state in 1970.

According to the Lon Nol government, the deposition of Prince Sihanouk on March 18, 1970, was carried out in conformity with provisions of the Constitution of 1947. In October 1970, just before the proclamation of the republic, a law continued the constitution in effect, with the exception of certain provisions incompatible with republican concepts. This situation continued until promulgation of the new constitution in May 1972.

THE CONSTITUTION OF 1972

The Constitution of 1972 went through several drafting stages before emerging in final form. In April 1971 the National Assembly by law authorized the government to set up the Expanded Joint Commission (Commission Mixte Elargie) to draw up a new republican charter. The commission began its work on June 16, but in

October Prime Minister Lon Nol, apparently in disagreement with the draft constitution's provisions, dismissed the commission. The prime minister took over the lawmaking powers of the National Assembly and decreed that this body, instead, would serve as a constituent assembly to draft the new constitution. As a basis for its work, the constituent assembly took the draft already prepared by the commission.

In early 1972 Lon Nol again indicated dissatisfaction with the direction the drafting was taking. Apparently concerned with the developing political situation, he declared himself president on March 10, 1972, and dissolved the constituent assembly. On March 24 a new committee was created by presidential order to consider the drafts prepared by the earlier commission and the assembly. A constitution, proposed on April 5, 1972, was submitted to a national referendum on April 30 and was approved by 97.5 percent of the 1.56 million votes cast. The new constitution went into effect on May 12, 1972.

The Constitution of 1972, comprising a preamble and eleven chapters, sets forth basic principles. Its language is couched in general terms, and it leaves a number of areas for future resolution. Thus some aspects of the governmental structure are outlined in specific terms, whereas others are left to be defined by the subsequent legislation of pertinent organic laws.

Rights and Duties of Citizens

The rights accorded the citizen in the 1972 Constitution do not differ radically from those in the 1947 charter. These include freedom of speech and assembly, freedom of the press and religion, the equality of all before the law, and the inviolability of all forms of communication. All citizens eighteen years of age were given the right to vote. A notable difference in the two documents is the inclusion in 1972 of a series of obligations on the state to "seek to improve the condition of the less favored social and occupational groups in order to ensure a standard of living compatible with human dignity." Among other responsibilities acknowledged by the government are the obligation to seek to create employment for all citizens, to provide social insurance and other benefits, and to grant welfare assistance when a citizen is deprived of his means of subsistence. The state further ensures all citizens the right to an education.

The rights granted the citizen, however, are not absolute, for the constitution also provides for suspension of certain freedoms in a state of emergency or martial law or if the nation is proclaimed to be in danger or is at war. This applies to freedom of speech, press, and assembly as well as to the inviolability of correspondence and of the home. The period of suspension, however, may not exceed six months but can be renewed for a second similar period under the same conditions. In addition to the blanket suspension provided for in times of emergency, a number of freedoms, moreover, are subject to certain conditions or to supplementary legislation. For example, freedom of the press is to be regulated by law. Capital punishment is abolished by the constitution; it may be reinstituted when the nation is proclaimed to be in danger.

The duties of the citizen, as set forth, are brief and succinct: every citizen must respect the law, defend the fatherland, and come to the aid of the state. Moreover, every citizen must perform compulsory military service as prescribed by law.

Constitutional Amendments or Revisions

Either the executive or half of the members of either of the two legislative bodies can initiate action to revise or amend the constitution. Adoption requires passage of the proposed law by a three-fourths majority in each house; the vote must be a roll-call vote. Any revision that would modify the republican form of government is specifically forbidden.

THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

Although the governmental system envisaged by the new constitution was a radical departure from the monarchical form in its philosophic concept, it was not too different in basic structure. Nomenclature was changed to adhere to republican terminology; although the president replaced the king, the office of chief executive remained strong, and other government agencies were altered in form and composition but not in function. In mid-1972 the new republican government was still unfamiliar and not fully tested—it would probably take some time for the nation to adapt to the mechanics of its new democratic principles.

The Executive Branch

The executive power of the government is exercised by the president of the republic, who is elected by universal suffrage. If the president is incapacitated temporarily, his duties are taken over (with certain restrictions on appointments, the signing of treaties, and other matters) by the vice president, who is elected on the same slate as the president. If the office of the president becomes permanently vacant or if the president is declared permanently incapacitated by the Constitutional Court, the vice president then assumes full power; if the vice president cannot serve, the office of president devolves upon the president of the Senate.

The president and vice president are elected for a period of five years, and the president can succeed himself only once. Candidates must be elected by an absolute majority; otherwise, a second election must be held one week after the first. In such case, the candidates from the two political tickets that received the greatest number of votes in the first election compete for the office.

Any citizen of either sex may be a candidate provided he or she meets the required conditions: he must be a Khmer national by birth or have been born of parents who are Khmer nationals; he must be at least forty years of age by the date of the election; and, if he is married, his spouse must be a Khmer national by birth. The functions of the president and vice president are considered incompatible with the exercise of any industrial or commercial occupation or holding any ministerial or public office; other restrictions may be stipulated by law.

The president is supported by a cabinet and an executive staff and has at his disposal a security council whose organization and functions are determined by law. The powers given the president are extensive. He appoints the prime minister and, upon the latter's recommendation, the other members of the cabinet; the prime minister and the cabinet are responsible solely to the president. He also appoints ambassadors, provincial governors, directors of central government agencies, and university rectors. The president, moreover, as commander in chief of the armed forces, appoints military general officers and members of the Armed Forces Council.

Although responsible to the president, members of the cabinet may be required to report on the handling of their offices to the National Assembly when requested by a vote of one-fifth of the assembly members. The assembly does not vote to confirm the appointment of cabinet members, but it may express its lack of confidence in one or more members of the cabinet or in the entire body. The president may reject the assembly action, but this decision can be overridden by a two-thirds vote, in which case automatic dismissal of the cabinet member (or the entire cabinet) occurs. If two cabinets are dismissed within an eighteen-month period, either by the president as a result of a vote of no-confidence by the assembly or by the assembly's overriding of a presidential refusal, the president is empowered to dissolve the National Assembly after consultation with the president of the Senate.

In mid-1972 the cabinet comprised sixteen ministries. Five were headed by ministers of state: justice; assisting the presidency; national defense; planning, foreign aid, and development; and interior, security, religious affairs, veterans, and tourism. The remaining eleven, under the direction of a minister, were: foreign affairs; labor and social action; industry, mineral resources, and maritime fishing; public health, welfare, and pharmaceutical development; trade; general mobilization; agriculture, community development, and rural engineering; housing, public works, posts, and telecommunications; finance; national education and culture; and government of Phnom Penh city.

The Legislative Branch

The legislative power of the government rests with Parliament, a bicameral body composed of the National Assembly and the Senate. In principle, certain major executive actions are also within the purview of Parliament, since it must approve treaties, international agreements, and government loans and confirm a state of national emergency or of war proclaimed by the president.

Parliament is required to meet regularly in ordinary session twice a year, each session lasting at least three months. Extraordinary sessions may be convoked by the president upon request of the prime minister or a majority of either legislative body. Members of Parliament may not occupy any other public office in a position of active employment and may not be a member of any other institution of the republic except the High Court of Justice. No member may be prosecuted, arrested, or detained for a crime or offense except with the authorization of the chamber to which he belongs.

Although Parliament makes the laws, the right to initiate legislation is accorded equally to the executive and to Parliament and, in certain cases, to the judiciary. Bills may be introduced in either chamber except for finance bills, which must be introduced in the National Assembly. All proposed legislation must be considered successively in the two chambers; if disagreement occurs, it must be resolved in joint session by majority vote. To function, both bodies—separately and in joint session—require the presence of two-thirds of their members.

The National Assembly

The National Assembly is the principal legislative body. It consists of at least eighty members, individually elected every four years by universal, direct, and secret ballot, unless unusual circumstances of war or grave national danger make this impossible. A president and other officers of the assembly are elected by its members every two years. Candidates for the assembly are required to be at least twenty-five years of age at the time of the election. Deputies are eligible for reelection.

The Senate

The Senate represents the territorial and administrative regions of the country and also certain major government agencies. It consists of twenty-eight to forty members, three-fifths of whom are elected by the various regions, one-fifth by the civil service, and one-fifth by the Armed Forces Council. They are elected individually for a term of six years (half of the total members are elected every three years) by universal, indirect, and secret suffrage. Candidates must be at least forty years old on the election date. Senators are eligible for reelection.

The Senate is a new institution initiated with the formation of the republic. In the governmental structure it replaces the former Council of the Kingdom and is designed as an upper house, or chamber, having somewhat more restricted powers than the National Assembly (see Historical Background, this ch.). The Senate was envisioned as a moderating force and as a more neutral body, since it does not have the power to check on or take sanctions against the cabinet, which is the prerogative of the National Assembly. Moreover, the Senate has greater independence since it cannot be dissolved by the president, as can the assembly.

The Judicial Branch

The constitution provides for an independent judicial branch whose authority is vested in the Supreme Court and lower tribunals. The organization and functions of this branch were established by law, as were the procedures for administering justice. Judges exercise their jurisdictional functions under the control of the Supreme Court, and public prosecutors are responsible to the minister of justice. Judiciary personnel may be dismissed only for a criminal conviction, and any disciplinary measures taken by the minister of justice against a public prosecutor may be appealed to the cabinet.

The Supreme Court is a new institution. It not only has national jurisdiction in judicial affairs but may also initiate legislation on matters concerning the judicial branch. Moreover, by a two-thirds majority vote of its members, it may dissolve any political party it judges to be harmful to the republican form of government. The court consists of a chief justice and eight associate justices. They are elected for a term of four years by a joint session of Parliament from a list of twenty judges selected by their colleagues. A justice must have at least twelve years' experience on the bench.

Also established by the constitution is the Supreme Judicial Council. This body, which rules on promotions of judges and sanctions against them, is designed to ensure the independence of the judiciary from the executive branch. It is composed of five regular, and two substitute, members, elected from the bench in the same manner as the justices of the Supreme Court. It is presided over by the president of the republic, except in cases of disciplinary measures against a member of the magistracy, over which the chief justice takes control. The council supersedes an analogous but less independent supervisory body under the monarchy, the High Council of the Magistracy. The Supreme Judicial Council also is empowered to advise on all proposed legislation concerning the organization and functioning of the court system.

Other Government Agencies

Eight agencies are further provided under the constitution to assist the three main branches of government. One body is the Constitutional Court, which has the primary function of ruling on the constitutionality of legislation, on the regularity of presidential elections, and on contested parliamentary elections. It is composed of six members appointed to six-year terms—two by the president, two by the National Assembly, and two by the Senate. All laws must be transmitted to the court by the president and, if declared unconstitutional, may not be promulgated or enforced.

The High Court of Justice is a disciplinary court empowered to judge the president and vice president and members of the cabinet, the Parliament, the Supreme Court, and the Constitutional Court for offenses committed in the performance of their duties. It is composed of twelve members—four each named by the president and the National Assembly and two each named by the Senate and the Supreme Court. Cases are referred to it by joint session of Parliament.

The Council of State serves as an administrative court of last resort. It also audits the government's accounts, ensures the propriety and legality of government expenditures, and aids the administration in the preparation of laws. The exact composition of the council was to be determined by susequent legislation.

The National Council on Education and Culture was established to provide a permanent council to assist the president, at his request, on matters concerned with the development of education and culture. Members are appointed for four-year terms; one-third of the members are named by the executive, and two-thirds, by the country's recognized cultural and educational organizations.

The Armed Forces Council is designed to assist the commander in chief of the armed forces with the major problems of national defense and to improve justice for members of the armed forces. It is concerned with matters relating to promotions, transfers and discipline.

Another government agency provided by the constitution is the Economic and Social Council, which advises the president on economic and social matters. Its intent is to ensure continuity of policy and further national growth and development. The Government

Controllers Office, a type of watchdog committee aimed at preventing government corruption and malfeasance, is specifically charged with examining and investigating personnel of public and private organizations implicated in cases of extortion, bribery, abuse of power, and illegal acts concerned with the economy. The General Mobilization Office assists in and coordinates the proper mobilization of national resources. Its definite makeup and functions were to be determined by subsequent legislation.

ELECTORAL PROCEDURES

Few details on electoral procedures were available in mid-1972. Article 119 of the Constitution of 1972 required an election for the presidency to be held on June 4, 1972; this was to be universal, direct, and secret suffrage, according to procedures laid down in an electoral ordinance. This article also authorized the new president to designate his vice president after consultation with the presidents of the two chambers of Parliament.

Candidacy certificates had to be submitted by May 16; the interior ministry then decided provisionally on the list of approved candidates. Disapproved candidates were allowed to appeal the decision before a provisional constituent court not later than May 20, and on May 21 the final list of candidates was announced.

Eligible voters were required to register in advance of the election, and every effort was made by the government to facilitate the process. The government, by the use of posters, press, and frequent broadcasts, urged all citizens to register, and registration points were kept open until 6:00 P.M. on the evening before the election. Provincial and municipal governors were directed to cooperate fully and execute the electoral implementing ordinance without fail.

The new constitution further required that elections for the first National Assembly and the first Senate be held within three months after election of the president. The electoral ordinance for these elections had not been promulgated by July 1, 1972.

COURT STRUCTURE

The republican court structure in mid-1972 continued to be fundamentally a carryover of the French system of the colonial era, modified after independence in 1953 in order to adapt it to national needs and character. The most significant innovation since the period of the monarchy was the establishment of an independent Supreme Court as the nation's highest tribunal (see The Constitution of 1972, this ch.).

At the time the Constitution of 1972 became effective (May 1972), the lowest level tribunal was the local court, which was summary in nature and was presided over by a single conciliatory justice, somewhat comparable to a United States justice of the peace. The court was limited to trying misdemeanors, and it could impose small fines or brief confinement sentences. A justice might have jurisdiction over a group of villages, a municipality or, in some cases, a district. Findings could be appealed to the next higher judicial authority.

At the next higher level was the provincial court of first instance. It had jurisdiction over all criminal and civil cases and was presided over by three magistrates appointed by the national government. Beginning in 1962 these courts used a six-man jury system.

Serious crimes were remanded to one of the criminal courts located in various parts of the country, which handled all cases involving felonies. These were three-magistrate courts and utilized a six-man jury in reaching their findings. Appeals from their decisions were made to the Court of Review, which was the court of last resort within the system, both for criminal and civil cases; under the new constitution, the function of this court has been taken over by the Supreme Court.

A variety of other courts with specialized limited functions in civil and commercial litigation also existed. Special military tribunals were convened at times to try military personnel or civilians involved in certain offenses. These tribunals became more significant after declaration of martial law on June 1, 1970 (see ch. 14).

TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION

The Constitution of 1972 specified three types of territorial administrative divisions: provinces (*khet*), communes (*khum,* also called *sangkat*), and municipalities. These were to be administered in accordance with an organic law to be adopted later. (There was no information in mid-1972 whether such a law had as yet been enacted.) Other divisions, however, also existed in mid-1972. Some provinces were known to be divided further into subprovinces (*anukhet*); all provinces were subdivided into districts (*srok*); and communes consisted usually of a number of villages (*phumi*) (see ch. 2).

In mid-1972 there were twenty-one provinces (two of which Odongk Meanchey and Vihear Suor, were created during that year) and five autonomous municipalities, which included the capital city of Phnom Penh, Keb, Kirirom, Bok Kou, and Kampong Saom. The number of communes was unknown.

That part of the country under the control of the republican government in 1972 was centrally administered through the Ministry of Interior, Security, Religious Affairs, Veterans, and Tourism (known as the Ministry of Interior). This ministry controlled the internal governmental structure through the provincial governors, who were appointees of the national administration. Below the governor was the district chief, who was appointed by the governor; the commune chief, a civil official who generally was elected locally by universal suffrage; and the village headman, who was selected by residents of the village.

Provincial governors were responsible for the economy of their jurisdictions as well as for law and order. Their staffs were composed of members of the national civil service; these civil servants were usually transferred to different localities every few years on a rotational basis. Various ministries and important national agencies had representatives at the provincial level who oversaw the execution of pertinent government orders issued from the capital.

About half the country was controlled in mid-1972 by the dissident National United Front of Cambodia (see ch. 9; ch. 14). Little information was available on the internal administration of this area or whether the earlier existing administrative units had been retained. The administrative arm of the front, the Royal Government of National Union headed by Prince Sihanouk and located in Peking, claimed that a number of its cabinet vice ministers were functioning in front-held territory. Dissident broadcasts have referred not only to provinces but also to districts, communes, and villages.

MASS COMMUNICATION MEDIA OF THE REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT

Mass communication media of the Khmer Republic in mid-1972 either were agencies of the government or were controlled by it through licensing, as had been the case also during Prince Sihanouk's regime (see ch. 3; ch. 9). Responsibility for government information organs and for policing the information media was entrusted to the Ministry of Interior.

Radio and Television

Most Cambodians of all classes in both rural and urban areas have access to daily radio broadcasts; as a result, the radio exerts a pronounced effect on interpreting news and influencing public opinion. As early as 1967 government officials claimed that virtually every home had a radio. The most recent estimate

(1968) placed the number of receivers of all types at 1 million, or approximately 153 sets for every 1,000 persons—a considerably higher ratio than for Thailand (seventy-six sets per 1,000) and South Vietnam (fifty-seven per 1,000) in the same year.

In addition to listening over privately owned receivers, mostly inexpensive transistor sets imported from Japan, many people listen to broadcasts over public address systems installed by municipal governments in such areas as markets. Most Buddhist temples also have receivers, and the monks, who are usually confirmed listeners, interpret the news to the villagers.

The republican government's radio service, Khmer National Radio (Radiodiffusion Nationale Khmère—RNK), was operated by the Ministry of Interior. As of mid-1972 the network consisted of eleven transmitters—nine located in Phnom Penh and one each in Batdambang and Keb. Seven transmitters were shortwave facilities; of four mediumwave transmitters, two were provincial stations. There was no frequency modulation (FM) service. The stations ranged from fifteen to 120 kilowatts in power; the higher output stations were located in the capital. There was a fifty-kilowatt facility in Batdambang.

RNK broadcast services utilized two distinct networks. The National Network (Chaine Nationale) was for Khmer-speaking audiences, and the International Network (Chaine Internationale) was apparently designed both for foreign-language elements within the country and for listeners in other parts of mainland Southeast Asia. Domestic programs were broadcast on one mediumwave and two shortwave bands and were readily heard throughout most parts of the country. They were on the air from sixteen to eighteen hours daily and featured news, music, political commentary, and occasional official announcements. The international programs, broadcast on shortwave, featured news, primarily in fifteen- to thirty-minute periods at intervals throughout the day and evening. The International Network usually broadcast at least once daily in French, English, Thai, Vietnamese, Lao, and major Chinese dialects such as Teochiu and Cantonese.

Most of the radio equipment still in use was old, and much of it was obsolescent. Nearly all the facilities had been furnished by the People's Republic of China (PRC). The PRC had installed the first transmitter in 1957, replacing an outdated installation that had been provided by the French in 1946. The republican government had plans to procure new equipment, and in early 1972 the United States, through the Commodity Import Program, had committed itself to furnishing some new transmitters for the RNK; these were to be purchased by the Cambodian government. The United States Information Agency (USIA) was to provide short-term technical advice on installation—which would take approximately eighteen months to complete—and operation of the equipment. There were also reports that Australia had agreed to provide financial and technical aid toward modernizing and upgrading the radio broadcasting system in Phnom Penh, but no details were available on the type of assistance offered.

Television was in an early stage of development. The first television station was set up with Japanese assistance in 1961. In 1972 there were two transmitter stations—a main channel at Phnom Penh and one channel at Bok Kou in southern Kampot Province. The Bok Kou channel was used primarily as a relay station, but it had the capability for originating programs. There was wide divergence in the estimate of receivers in the country, ranging from 20,000 to 50,000; government sources indicated there might me as many as 40,000 sets.

Television was broadcast from ten to fourteen hours a week, and telecasts were usually made from 6:00 P.M. to 8:00 P.M. There were no live broadcasts, and programs consisted mainly of newsreels and documentary films donated by the French and other diplomatic missions. Programs of the United States Armed Forces television station in South Vietnam, whose signal easily reached Phnom Penh, were popular, despite lack of Khmer- or French-language translations. The government recognized the generally inferior quality of most programs but had not been very energetic in attempting to improve them. The television audience was limited largely to the urban upper class in Phnom Penh and in the larger communities in the Bok Kou areas.

Press and Periodicals

With the increase in literacy after independence, especially in the 1960s, newspapers became an increasingly significant information medium, although circulation in 1972 was still small and confined largely to the members of the urban middle and upper classes (see ch. 6). The country's newspapers have had an erratic course, however, and few have achieved an existence of any notable longevity. A sizable portion of the press had usually been either owned or subsidized by the government, which continued to operate the sole domestic news agency, the Khmer Press Agency (Agence Khmère de Presse—AKP).

During the Sihanouk era, government outlets served as official publicity organs for the Sangkum movement (see ch. 9). Most privately operated newspapers existed to voice partisan political views, to appeal to the public taste for sensation, or to cater to special social and economic interests, as in the case of Chinese and Sino-Khmer publications. Privately owned newspapers were subject to government control, which was exercised under legislation giving the government wide discretionary powers. Freedom of the press guaranteed by the constitution and by law was observed arbitrarily as the government saw fit, and the life span of the average private newspaper—because of governmental restraints or, sometimes, financial difficulties—was often short.

Upon coming to power, the Lon Nol government in 1970 imposed official censorship on all printed media (both foreign and domestic), but this censorship was lifted in August 1970. Government control continued, however, through an official requirement that all publications must be licensed by the Ministry of Information. As late as June 1972 the government closed down four dailies, purportedly for such offenses as "disseminating false news, disrupting public order, damaging the unity of the Khmer people, and insulting the government." One of the newspapers was published by the presidential runner-up in the June 1972 elections, and another, by a prominent jurist.

The government promulgated a new press law on June 27, 1972. It appeared to be concerned essentially with the domestic press. Certain aspects of the law remained unclear in mid-1972, however, and awaited interpretation and actual implementation.

Latest available data indicate that in mid-1972 there were perhaps twenty to thirty daily newspapers in the country. All of them were published in Phnom Penh, and they appeared in French, English, and Chinese as well as in Khmer. There had been a considerable turnover in the list of existing publications. A number had ceased publication—some because of government pressures and others for no apparent reason. Several new ones were launched during the same period, and few newspapers had been in existence for more than two years.

The AKP, the Cambodian national news service, published a sizable daily bulletin that, in effect, served as a daily newspaper. Issued in Khmer and in French, it incorporated timely local items from the *Journal Officiel,* the official organ that reports government activities. The AKP was generally considered the most authoritative news source in the country. Its primary source of foreign news was the French Press Agency (Agence France-Presse), but it also subscribed to Reuters and received free service from the PRC's New China News Agency and from the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (Telegrafnoye Agentsvo Sovietskovo Soyuza—TASS) and the news agencies of several other European communist countries.

There were a few newspapers that had been published for more than two years—these had bridged the gap from kingdom to republic. Among the more prominent dailies in Khmer were: *Nokor Thom, Prayoch Khmer, Sathearanak Rath, Koh Santipheap,* and *Reastr Khmer*. Two leading French dailies were *Le Républicain* and *Le Courrier Phnompenhois,* and there were two Chinese dailies, *Sroch Srang Cheat* and *Ching-chi Jih-pao*. There was one English-language newspaper, the *Republican News*.

The average Cambodian newspaper had four pages. Page one had international, national, and local news items and sometimes included signed editorials. When necessary, front-page articles were usually continued on page four. The masthead used elaborate decorative printing; different colors of ink and varied type were used on holidays and special occasions. Pages two and three contained serialized fiction and other feature items, such as horoscopes, poetry, and articles on such subjects as art, science, and health. Advertising appeared on all but the front page.

Circulation of newspapers was small; estimates in 1970 placed the countrywide total at 55,000 to 60,000, with over half in Phnom Penh. The leading journals probably had circulations well under 10,000. In the latter 1960s Chinese-language newspapers had the widest distribution, often being the only ones received by the Chinese village shopkeeper in rural areas; this situation presumably still was true in mid-1972 in those areas controlled by the republican government. In 1970 the AKP bulletin was being distributed to some 2,000 subscribers, mainly members of the civil service and foreign diplomatic personnel. The foreign-language publications catered mostly to their respective national elements, but they did have some circulation among university students and the educated elite. Civil servants constituted a large percentage of the readership of the Khmer-language press.

There was no reliable information available on the sources of financial support for the Cambodian press. It is known that the government subsidized most French-language newspapers through extensive paid advertising. Whereas the Chinese-language journals prospered through liberal advertising by the Chinese business community, the Khmer-language newspapers lacked adequate backing and were often dependent solely on the resources of their publishers. This could be a heavy drain, as few newspapers were self-sustaining.

The publication of periodicals in 1972 was difficult to assess. Most popular magazines were published for foreign consumption and appeared in French or in English. There were also a few revues in French aimed at specialized interests. The leading magazine in late 1971 was the French-language *Réalités Cambodgiennes,* which had been in existence for over five years. Following somewhat the format of the American magazine *Time*, it was an illustrated weekly news magazine; it also contained editorial comment and feature articles of national interest. Another monthly publication, *New Cambodge*, appeared in both English- and French-language editions. Begun in May 1970, it was profusely illustrated, with some pages in color. It contained extensive news coverage but also emphasized cultural and artistic events, sports, and youth activities.

Among the specialized publications appearing with some regularity were: *Bulletin Mensuel de la Banque Nationale*, a monthly bank publication in French; *Revue Economique*, a semiweekly in French; and *Revue de l'Armée*, a monthly armed forces revue in French and in Khmer. These, along with the two magazines, were the only periodicals to have survived the 1970 change of government. Further information as to their continued appearance in 1972 was not available.

Book Publishing

There was little information available on the country's book publishing effort since the establishment of the republic. It was, however, an extremely small enterprise, limited to a considerable extent by the relatively high cost of books, which were beyond the means of most Cambodians. Moreover, books were generally available only in the major urban areas because of limited distribution facilities.

During the Sihanouk era there were two government-operated printing establishments in the capital and ten private printing firms. The government printers handled the more voluminous official documents and distributed them throughout the nation, whereas the private firms relied on bookstore outlets that were found in Phnom Penh and various provincial capitals. There appeared to have been little change in the situation in the early 1970s, although it was probable that some turnover had taken place among the private printers.

The number of titles published was comparatively small; according to the latest statistics, the numbers were 358 in 1967 and 185 in 1968. Fiction and books on religion and the social sciences make up most of the output of the publishing houses. Editions were generally small, typically totaling 500 copies; 3,000 copies sold was considered a bestseller. Foreign works translated into Khmer have been published locally, but their number is small. Until it suspended its activities during the Sihanouk period in 1963, the United States Information Service (USIS) mission (the overseas operations unit of USIA) in Phnom Penh conducted an extensive book translation program. The Buddhist Institute in the early 1970s had a program to translate various Cambodian literary works, folk tales, and other writings into French and English. In addition, there had been some importation of books and pamphlets, particularly from France.

Motion Pictures

Filmgoing was an increasingly popular pastime, although it was largely limited to the capital. In 1972 there were reported to be fifty-three motion picture theaters, almost all in Phnom Penh. Annual attendance was estimated at over 10 million in 1971; this compared with an estimated 7 million in 1967. In the late 1960s some 800 feature films were imported annually under strict government censorship; they were mostly from India, the United States, France, and the PRC. The government additionally imported over 700 newsreels and documentaries. Details of film imports in 1972 were not known.

The Cambodian film industry was small, but it thrived during the Sihanouk era, producing as many as seventy-five feature films a year as well as a number of short subjects and documentaries. Prince Sihanouk was the industry's moving spirit, and he took a personal interest in production, at times writing, directing, and participating in the films. These ranged from entertainment vehicles of the love story and thriller type to travelogues and scenic films portraying the beauties of Cambodia. Some of the scenic films received high critical praise at international screenings. Since the establishment of the republic there has been a marked paucity of news released on the industry.

Foreign Media Activities

France has maintained the only sizable foreign-sponsored information program. During the latter part of the Sihanouk era only publications from France were legally permitted to enter the country (principally because of foreign exchange restrictions). Many other foreign publications, however, circulated illegally. These included newspapers, books, magazines, and pamphlets, a number of which came from North Vietnam and other communist countries.

Until 1963, when it was terminated by the Sihanouk regime, the USIS conducted an extensive program in Cambodia, including the distribution of printed USIS material. In March 1970, after the ouster of Prince Sihanouk, the USIS resumed limited activity in Cambodia, but there were no immediate plans for resumption of a full information program. In mid-1972 only three Americans were assigned to the Phnom Penh office, which was headed by a public information officer rather than the customary public affairs officer.

Foreign publications, on occasion, had been officially banned by the Sihanouk government for articles considered offensive to the country or distasteful to the prince. The Lon Nol government has been somewhat more liberal in the matter of foreign publications, and a number of periodicals banned by the Sihanouk regime have been permitted to reenter the country.

Regular radio broadcasts emanating from neighboring countries can be received in Cambodia. In addition to these, both South Vietnam and Thailand had special Khmer-language broadcasts aimed at Cambodia, and South Vietnamese stations also broadcast to Southeast Asia in Chinese dialects found in Cambodia. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and the Voice of America (VOA) had extensive programs covering the Indochina Peninsula. Although programs were principally in English, the BBC also beamed programs in Chinese, and the VOA carried a three-hour program in Khmer daily.

North Vietnam's Radio Hanoi broadcast programs in Khmer, in French, and in Cantonese (the second largest Chinese group in Cambodia in 1972) (see ch. 4). The communist Liberation Radio, which purported to be located in South Vietnam, also directed a Khmer-language program regularly at the Cambodian audience. Both Radio Hanoi and Liberation Radio increased their Cambodian schedules in April 1970, after Prince Sihanouk's deposition. The PRC also was giving considerable attention to Southeast Asia, broadcasting in Khmer, several Chinese dialects (including those of speakers making up the majority of Cambodia's Chinese minority), French, and English. The Soviet Union's broadcasts to the area included a daily one-hour program in Khmer.

Communist broadcasts to Cambodia from Asia varied in virulence and subversive content over the years. During the Sihanouk era listening to such broadcasts was periodically banned. Since imposing martial law in June 1970 (still in effect in mid-1972), the Lon Nol government has prescribed heavy penalties for listening to communist broadcasts. There has been no indication, however, as to how strenuously the proscription has been enforced.

MASS COMMUNICATION MEDIA OF THE FUNK

The principal antigovernment broadcasting activity in mid-1972 was the Voice of the National United Front of Cambodia (Front Uni National de Kampuchéa—FUNK), commonly called FUNK Radio. The FUNK was the clandestine arm of Prince Sihanouk's Peking-based Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia (Gouvernement Royal d'Union Nationale de Kampuchéa—GRUNK). FUNK Radio, established by the GRUNK Ministry of

Information and Propaganda, began operations on August 1, 1970.

In a broadcast message inaugurating the station, Prince Sihanouk indicated that it was located in a "liberated" area of Cambodia. Technical monitoring observations since that time, however, have indicated that all broadcasts of FUNK Radio emanate from transmitters in North Vietnam. In 1972 the programs were being broadcast on a maximum of five shortwave transmitters, three of which were announced as FUNK outlets and two as Hanoi "Voice of Vietnam" relay transmitters.

FUNK programs stressed "Cambodian liberation" and the "legitimacy of the GRUNK" and vehemently attacked the Lon Nol government and the United States. They generally included reports on the war, news commentaries, editorials, and entertainment. They were also used on occasion for dissemination of official statements by the FUNK and GRUNK. The station's sixty-minute broadcasts were presented five times daily on a schedule that was spread over the morning and evening hours; programs were usually repeated at least once during the broadcast day. The daily program from 8:00 P.M. to 9:00 P.M. was generally news broadcast at dictation speed.

In August 1970 Radio Hanoi reported that Prince Sihanouk had announced the formal establishment of the Cambodian Information Agency (Agence Kampuchéa d'Information—AKI). This agency replaced the Information Bureau of the FUNK as the formal spokesman for Prince Sihanouk's government-in-exile. There was evidence that AKI was also releasing items in French for Hanoi broadcasts as well as its Cambodian releases for FUNK Radio.

Several small clandestine stations have come on the air purporting to represent Prince Sihanouk's government-in-exile. For the most part they have been weak in power and erratic in their schedules. There is no indication that they have any official status, and some have left the air after a few broadcasts. Their location, mostly in the northeastern parts of the country, suggests that they could be isolated, dissident groups attempting to identify with a larger movement to reinstate the former head of state.

CHAPTER 9

POLITICAL DYNAMICS

The politics of the Khmer Republic (Cambodia) continued, in 1972, to revolve around President Lon Nol, who had emerged as the nation's preeminent leader after the deposition of Prince Norodom Sihanouk in March 1970. In a national election held in June 1972 Marshal Lon Nol was confirmed in power as the republic's first popularly chosen president.

The Lon Nol government's two immediate political objectives were to expel North Vietnamese and Viet Cong intruders from Cambodian territory and to institutionalize a new republican political system—as distinguished from the Sihanouk-dominated system before March 1970 (see ch. 8). The achievement of these objectives depended on a number of factors, both internal and external, which under the set of circumstances confronting the republican government in mid-1972 presented considerable difficulties for President Lon Nol.

The government's domestic resources were scarcely adequate to generate any effective counterpressure to the presence of the Vietnamese Communists on Cambodian soil, as Prince Sihanouk had found out painfully during the 1960s. As a consequence, his government was unable to keep the Vietnam war at a distance, more so especially after Prince Sihanouk challenged the legitimacy of the Lon Nol leadership through the Peking-based politico-propaganda organization called the National United Front of Cambodia (Front Uni National de Kampuchéa—FUNK).

Although the prince himself was not a member of the FUNK's directorate, he had emerged as the nominal chairman of the front and as FUNK's best known international spokesman. In a bid to secure international recognition from as many countries as possible, the FUNK had also set up a government-in-exile in Peking—the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia (Gouvernement Royal d'Union Nationale de Kampuchéa—GRUNK).

During the first half of 1972, the FUNK and its military arm—the Cambodian People's National Liberation Armed Forces—began to assert themselves, heavily supported by North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces, as a credible threat to the survival of the Lon Nol government.

There was evidence of FUNK's growing military and political strength at the expense of the Lon Nol government. According to most Western estimates, the combined FUNK and Vietnamese communist forces had varying degrees of influence over at least 50 percent of Cambodian territory inhabited by perhaps one-third of the total population. In the liberated areas—the areas that FUNK considered secure—the insurgents had established their own political infrastructures. Invariably the real source of power in these areas appeared to be not the prince's own noncommunist following but a Cambodian communist group popularly known as Red Khmers (Khmers Rouges) and Communists recruited from the ethnic minorities.

Between March 1970 and mid-1972 the persistence of wartime conditions had its effects on the Lon Nol government's efforts to improve the performance of various political institutions. During much of this period the country was ruled by decree, and it was not until mid-1972 that the government could in earnest initiate measures designed to stimulate open, organized political party-based competition. These measures, however, were still barely off the ground; political parties were in an embryonic stage, and partisan competition revolved around personalities. The extent of popular participation in the government's scheme of politics was also still limited as a result of insecurity prevailing throughout the country. The real source of power on the side of the republican government remained rooted in the armed forces, of which Marshal Lon Nol was the supreme commander.

The Khmers are united by a common language, religion, and heritage. They have a relatively homogeneous social and political tradition, a factor that could significantly facilitate official efforts to communicate with a cross section of the population. Such homogeneity provides a more or less uniform way of looking at the realities of life (see ch. 4).

Thus both among the politically articulate and those of more limited intellectual horizons, very few tended to question the validity of Buddhism, nationalism, and the glory of the country's ancient Angkor civilization as sources of political values and national pride. While Prince Sihanouk was in power, the monarchy was believed by many to be another major determinant of value and attitudinal orientations.

After March 1970 the Lon Nol government undertook extensive efforts to inculcate in the people a new set of political values. Its purpose was to implant the idea that political power should be exercised by the people on their own behalf, not by the king or an equivalent thereof as during the Sihanouk era. Thus the Constitution of 1972 specifically declared that all powers were derived from the people, whereas the previous constitution had designated the king as the source of all powers. The new constitution also spelled out liberty, equality, fraternity, progress, and happiness as specifics of a new value system to be internalized under republican rule. It was still too early to determine to what extent these value attributes had been accepted as articles of faith by the common people.

THE SIHANOUK ERA

Until deposed in March 1970, Prince Sihanouk was, for nearly two decades, a towering figure in Cambodian politics and government. He was popular with, and accessible to, the bulk of the population, although his popularity seemed to diminish somewhat beginning in the late 1960s. His leadership was only rarely questioned at home, except by small numbers of dissidents and by an equally limited number of intellectuals and students in the cities. The anti-Sihanouk activities of these elements were spasmodic. Externally, despite Cambodia's limitations in economic and military capabilities, Prince Sihanouk was able to keep the country out of the Vietnam war—through diplomatic juggling based on an ostensible policy of nonalignment (see ch. 10). Dominant as he was, however, the prince was not without problems. Foremost among these was the mounting pressure of the Vietnam war, which from the mid-1960s commanded the attention and energies of the Sihanouk regime (see ch. 14).

Prince Sihanouk derived his popularity from his status as the former king, a position to which great prestige and reverence accrued, especially in the countryside. An additional source of his strength was his popular hero image as the father of national independence. These two factors alone were sufficient to assure him an unparalleled national stature. Yet the prince was not content to rest on this popularity. He wanted to exert himself more actively on the political scene. The first step in this effort was his abdication of the throne in 1955. This was necessary because by custom the monarch had to remain above politics, and the Constitution of 1947 had been so framed as to restrict the king's role to that of a nonpartisan sovereign.

The People's Socialist Community

After his abdication freed him to engage in partisan politics, Prince Sihanouk in April 1955 created a political instrument called the People's Socialist Community (Sangkum Reastr Niyum, commonly called the Sangkum). The Sangkum's declared purpose was to establish "a true socialist and egalitarian democracy" in a nonpartisan way, and all persons wishing to participate in political life were urged to join the organization, led by Sihanouk himself as chairman. Among the objectives of the movement were to unify the country; to instill patriotism and loyalty to the Khmer tradition; to inspire opposition toward injustice, bribery, and corruption; to develop a regard for the little people; and to maintain loyalty to the monarchy or to Buddhism—both considered essential for the achievement of the party's goals.

For all intents and purposes, however, the Sangkum was conceived of as Prince Sihanouk's personal political vehicle, to be responsive to his wishes alone. Its name in time became practically synonymous with that of Sihanouk, making opposition to the movement equivalent to opposition to him and, by extension, to the nation. With full resources of the state at its disposal, the Sangkum helped the chief of state monopolize all important levers of power, absorbing in the process other political organizations as well (see ch. 3). In the 1955–56 period it swept four National Assembly elections, winning all the seats in the assembly. To become a member of the Sangkum an individual could not belong to another political party and must not have been deprived of any of his civic rights. During the height of its popularity in 1967, the Sangkum claimed over 2 million persons as its members; in addition, its youth group—the Royal Khmer Socialist Youth (Jeunesse Socialiste Royale Khmère)—had a membership of nearly 1 million.

Prince Sihanouk could also count on the National Congress, created by him after the 1955 elections as a Sangkum institution. Open to all citizens, the National Congress met twice a year on the palace grounds, with the prince presiding. It was through the National Congress that the prince often communicated directly with the masses, exhorting them to involve themselves in the Sangkum-centered political activities. Attended by government leaders, Sangkum delegates, and thousands of peasants, the congress debated current domestic and foreign policy issues, usually according to an agenda prearranged by the Sangkum. In 1957 the National Congress was confirmed by an amendment to the Constitution of 1947 as the principal governmental institution responsible for giving the people "the opportunity to become directly acquainted with affairs of national interests." That constitution authorized the congress to "pass recommendations for the attention of the Government and resolutions for the attention of the National Assembly."

With his almost exclusive, personal control of the political scene through the Sangkum and the National Congress, the prince ruled the nation without serious internal challenge during the decade ending in 1965. The decade was relatively stable, despite Sihanouk's increasingly autocratic tendencies in his rule and mounting pressures from the Vietnam war.

Domestic and External Tensions

Beginning in the mid-1960s tensions stemming from both domestic and external sources became manifest in the growing divisive tendencies within the Sangkum leadership. On one side of the Sangkum hierarchy was a leftist group led by Chau Seng, Hou Yuon, Hu Nim, and Khieu Samphan (whose names were to figure prominently after 1970 in the North Vietnamese-sponsored Cambodian insurgency led nominally by Prince Sihanouk himself); in the early 1960s this group had supported the introduction of a socialist economy and opposed any move, actual or fancied, that would bring Cambodian alignment with the West.

The leftist group was opposed by a group of conservative rightist leaders, including among others Douc Rasy, Chau Ban, Sim Var, and Son Sann. This group favored a greater role for private initiative in the national economy, a more resolute stand against intruders from North Vietnam, and closer cooperation with the West within the country's neutralist framework of foreign policy.

In the latter half of the 1960s the factional rivalry within the Sangkum intensified steadily, and a growing number of politically aware citizens began to demand more performance from the government and less of Prince Sihanouk's rhetoric. The first significant sign of changing political mood in the country was reflected in the outcome of the National Assembly elections held in September 1966. For this election Prince Sihanouk, smarting from charges of one-man rule leveled against him, permitted more than one candidate to run for each seat. The returns showed a surprising upsurge of conservatives at the expense of leftist elements, who until then had served as an effective counterweight to their adversaries in successive cabinet formations. The postelection cabinet formed by General Lon Nol reflected the rightwing political tendencies.

Out of concern that the rightwing might cause an irreparable split within the Sangkum hierarchy and also to reassert his preeminence, Prince Sihanouk almost immediately set up a shadow government packed with his personal followers and leading leftist figures. His apparent intention was for this shadow cabinet to exert a restraining influence on the Lon Nol cabinet and thereby help preserve a political balance between the two contending groups. The counter-cabinet proved no match for the rightist government. The result was the weakening of not only Prince Sihanouk's hitherto unchallenged authority but also the leftist faction, which in November 1966 had begun to undermine the Lon Nol government.

In April 1967 the Cambodian Communists (or Red Khmers), capitalizing on local discontent, started an armed uprising in the province of Batdambang. Whether the leftist faction and the Red Khmers were in effect synonymous remains still unclear—the two never publicly identified as belonging to the same group, although it was widely suspected at the time that some leftist deputies and activists might be leading the rebellion. Prince Sihanouk accused the communist rebels of seeking to turn Cambodia into another Vietnam in collusion with foreign communist forces; he was especially critical of Communist China. The rebellion was quickly suppressed, and Khieu Samphan, Hu Nim, and Hou Yuon—three of the more prominent leftist deputies in the National Assembly—disappeared in late April after being denounced by the prince for their allegedly leading role. (At the time, these deputies were believed to have been arrested and executed by Cambodian authorities, with Prince Sihanouk's personal approval. Whether they were dead or were still alive remained controversial in 1972; the FUNK and Prince Sihanouk himself asserted that these deputies were alive and were in fact leading the armed struggle in the interior parts of Cambodia. On the other hand, the Lon Nol government maintained that they had been killed in 1967.)

In January 1968 the Red Khmers opened new attacks on government security forces in Batdambang, quickly extending their insurgency to other provinces in the ensuing months. By then Prince Sihanouk had concluded that the communist subversion was no longer a localized, sporadic problem and that it was being instigated by both the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) and the People's Republic of China (PRC). The prince in January 1968 for the first time openly indicated that South Vietnamese Communists were infiltrating into parts of Cambodian border provinces. His acknowledgment of the Viet Cong presence on Cambodian territory became more explicit later in 1968 and the spring of 1969.

During 1968 Prince Sihanouk also issued warnings, although oblique, to North Vietnam and the PRC that foreign-instigated subversion would likely affect Cambodia's neutralist foreign policy—almost certainly redounding to the disadvantage of these communist nations. He also voiced the hope that the United States would continue to maintain its military presence in Asia as a counterforce to the growing threat of communist expansionist moves (see ch. 10).

Prelude to Deposition

During 1969 the domestic Cambodian situation deteriorated steadily. The Red Khmer insurgency became more widespread;

corruption within governing circles was more prominent; and the economy stagnated. The country became increasingly subjected to the vagaries of the Vietnam war. (By late 1969 the number of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops entrenched in eastern Cambodian provinces was reported to have reached 35,000 to 40,000 men.) Prince Sihanouk's efforts to secure pledges from North Vietnam and the Viet Cong for prompt evacuation of their troops from Cambodia were unfruitful. In May 1969, to underline his demands for removal of Vietnamese communist forces and to reassure Cambodian rightist commercial circles, he decided to restore diplomatic relations with the United States, after the latter had recognized Cambodian neutrality and territorial integrity. The following month, in keeping with his professed policy of neutrality, the prince raised the level of diplomatic representation of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (see Glossary) to ambassadorial status. These diplomatic gestures notwithstanding, Cambodia found itself helplessly drifting toward the edge of the war in Vietnam.

In August 1969 Prince Sihanouk asked General Lon Nol (who had resigned as prime minister in April 1967) to form a new cabinet and find a way to improve the domestic situation and the economy in particular. The new salvation government, as General Lon Nol called his cabinet, was different from most of its predecessors. It began to initiate measures sometimes independently of Prince Sihanouk and to take measures designed to exclude him from decisionmaking processes. The general, for example, picked as his deputy prime minister Prince Sisowath Sirik Matak—a longtime antagonist of Prince Sihanouk.

Toward the end of 1969 the prince himself publicly threatened to break off diplomatic relations with North Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam if they continued to ignore his pleas to evacuate Cambodia's eastern border provinces. In late February 1970 the government announced two measures designed to apply a degree of counterpressure against the Vietnamese communists. These called for a 25-percent increase in the size of the Cambodian army and for a currency change; the latter move was intended especially to deprive the Vietnamese communist forces, who were believed to have in their possession a considerable sum of 500 riel (for value of riel—see Glossary) notes smuggled in through Communist Chinese channels, of the means to buy Cambodian rice and other supplies (see ch. 11; ch. 14).

During 1969 it became increasingly apparent that Prince Sihanouk's ascribed omnipotence was not going to be taken for granted any longer. While Lon Nol was out of the country seeking medical treatment (September 1969 to mid-February 1970), Deputy Prime Minister Sirik Matak, emerging as a competent and powerful leader, attempted to divest Sihanouk of his more or less exclusive power to conduct the affairs of state and place it in his own hands. The prince's declining authority was further dramatized in part by another episode in late December 1969, when the increasingly assertive rightist faction in the National Assembly voted down certain aspects of his economic polices (see ch. 11).

It was against this background of an emerging crisis of confidence in leadership that in early January 1970 Prince Sihanouk left abruptly for medical treatment in France. In his absence, steadily mounting Cambodian emotions against Vietnamese communist intrusions finally erupted into more or less spontaneous popular demonstrations against both the Communists and resident Vietnamese. The first of these occurred in Svay Rieng Province on March 8 and 11, 1970. Three days later Phnom Penh witnessed massive anti-Vietnamese popular demonstrations staged by thousands of soldiers, students, workers, civil servants, and Buddhist monks. The aroused demonstrators, on March 11, sacked the embassies of North Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam as well as the office of North Vietnam's Vietnam News Agency. Despite General Lon Nol's appeal for calm, these incidents were quickly followed by indiscriminate attacks on Vietnamese houses, churches, and shops in the capital and elsewhere. Speculations abounded at that time that the demonstrations had been staged with the advance knowledge and consent of Prince Sihanouk himself, but according to subsequent developments these appeared to have been groundless.

In a telegram sent to Queen Mother Kossamak from Paris, Prince Sihnaouk roundly criticized the demonstrators' excesses, while at the same time expressing his sympathy for "the motives which roused the anger of our compatriots." He then announced his plans, as previously arranged, to visit Moscow and Peking so as to secure Soviet and Communist Chinese help in pressing his objection to the presence of Vietnamese communist troops on Cambodian territory.

CAMBODIA UNDER GENERAL LON NOL

On March 18, 1970, the National Assembly and the Council of the Kingdom met in a special joint session. After several deputies accused Prince Sihanouk of dictatorship, nepotism, corruption, and supplying arms to the Viet Cong forces, the two houses jointly passed a motion that called for withdrawing confidence from the chief of state. Then a proclamation was issued to the effect that, under Article 122 of the 1947 Constitution, Prince Sihanouk would cease to be the head of state after March 18, 1970, and that the functions of head of state would be performed by Cheng Heng, president of the National Assembly and acting head of state in Prince Sihanouk's absence, until the election of a new head of state. The withdrawal of the mandate from the former chief of state was officially described as being in accord with the constitution. Despite this change, General Lon Nol and Sirik Matak remained prime minister and deputy prime minister, respectively.

On the following day the National Assembly also proclaimed a state of emergency; suspended constitutional guarantees relating to fundamental rights for a renewable period of six months; granted Prime Minister Lon Nol full emergency powers; and announced a decree barring the return of Prince Sihanouk to Cambodia. On March 20 a government spokesman took pains to stress that the prince was removed not by a coup d'etat, as alleged by some sources, but by constitutional means. He also announced that the Lon Nol government would continue to follow its previous domestic and foreign policies and that the government, therefore, should not be called new.

Prince Sihanouk's deposal was warmly received in Phnom Penh, which remained calm, and it quickly became apparent that anti-Sihanouk sentiments had been much stronger than had been suspected, especially in the urban areas. On March 28 a "committee of intellectuals" consisting of youth, students, teachers, engineers, artists, writers, and doctors expressed its support for the Lon Nol leadership and openly demanded the abolition of the monarchy and the establishment of a republican system of government. In parts of the countryside, however, Prince Sihanouk still retained some popularity, as evidenced in part by peasant demonstrations staged in several eastern provinces on his behalf. Some observers described these demonstrations as spontaneous, whereas the government sources claimed that they had been instigated by Viet Cong elements.

Lon Nol's salvation government, as it was still called after Prince Sihanouk's ouster, moved to cope with the problem of Vietnamese communist infiltration. At the end of March 1970 it requested the United Nations Security Council to send a team of observers to verify the presence of Vietnamese communist troops on Cambodian soil. It also expressed its desire for the return of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Cambodia (forced to withdraw by Prince Sihanouk in 1969) plus its intention to seek arms aid from any country willing to help defend Cambodia's neutrality and territorial integrity (see ch. 10).

The anti-Vietnamese Communist campaign was paralleled by an accelerated attempt to extol the need for domestic unity. The government thus reversed Prince Sihanouk's policy of condemning both leftist and rightist dissidents as traitors. In late March it appealed to all Cambodians who had been exiled abroad during the Sihanouk years to return home and to unite behind the Lon Nol leadership. In early April about 490 political prisoners were released; according to the government, most of these detainees had been condemned by the prince as "Red Khmers, or as Maoists."

In mid-May Son Ngoc Thanh's Khmer Serei movement announced its dissolution, explaining that its major political objective—the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk—had been achieved on March 18, 1970. At the same time, Son Ngoc Thanh, who had returned from Thailand after more than a decade of exile, announced his support of the salvation government.

Cambodia moved also to strengthen its wartime posture. On June 1 martial law was proclaimed for an indefinite period; a general mobilization decree was issued on June 25; and, in an effort to improve bureaucratic efficiency, the cabinet was reorganized in early July (see ch. 8; ch. 14). Of special significance was the creation of a ministry of community development, the purpose of which was to effectuate closer relations between government and villagers. In August, Son Ngoc Thanh was appointed as a senior adviser to General Lon Nol.

On October 9, 1970, Cambodia was proclaimed "a united and indivisible republic having as its official title the Khmer Republic"; the monarchy was formally terminated, and the 1,168-year old Cambodian kingdom came to an end (see ch. 3). Cheng Heng remained in his function as head of state, pending the election of a president.

The strains of a nation at war became steadily obvious in many ways. In February 1971 General Lon Nol suffered a stroke and left for medical attention in Honolulu. The list of war casualties lengthened as days passed; the number of refugees multiplied; war profiteering became extensive; economic dislocations, fueled by inflation, worsened as more territories passed into the hands of the Vietnamese communist troops. The initially enthusiastic support given the Lon Nol government cooled perceptibly by early 1971.

To complicate the already strained situation, several key national leaders found themselves unable to continue a harmonious, cooperative relationship, thereby contributing to a cabinet crisis in April and May 1971. In late April 1971, shortly after his return from convalescence in Honolulu, Marshal Lon Nol (promoted to this rank on April 21. 1971) announced his resignation as prime minister, minister of national defense, and chief of the general staff of the armed forces. Because no one else was able to form a new cabinet, however, he was persuaded—under compromise—to serve as nominal head of the government: actual charge of the government was delegated to Deputy Prime Minister Sirik Matak. Marshal Lon Nol had no alternative since Sirik Matak, Chuop Hell (adviser to Lon Nol and former chairman of the National Assembly), and In Tam (then chairman of the National Assembly) had all declined offers to head a new cabinet. It was widely believed that political infighting was largely responsible for the cabinet crisis in Phnom Penh.

Tensions within the inner circle of power persisted throughout the remainder of 1971. In September, Marshal Lon Nol dismissed In Tam from his cabinet post and also removed him as an army general. Although the official reason for this removal was "inefficiency," many observers have suggested that this action was attributable to In Tam's personal popularity and his criticism of Marshal Lon Nol's policies.

In the face of schism within the government and other signs of tensions arising from various sources, Marshal Lon Nol's strategy was to centralize power in his own hands and use this power to promote as much unity as circumstances permitted. Thus on October 18, 1971, he took over by decree the lawmaking power of the National Assembly, declaring that this assembly would henceforth serve only as a constituent assembly to draw up a new constitution (see ch. 8). Members of the assembly vented their frustrations by electing In Tam as chairman instead of Marshal Lon Nol's nominee, Op Kim Ang.

The marshal's grip on power became firmer still after March 10, 1972, when he declared himself the republic's first president and prime minister and dissolved the constituent assembly. The latter move was taken evidently because of what he suspected as the assembly's efforts to weaken presidential powers in the new constitution it was then drafting. Lon Nol at the time publicly accused the assembly of having distorted the meaning of the draft constitution by changing several of its fundamental clauses (see ch. 8). From this statement, it was reasonably clear that some serious internal dissension persisted over the structure and functioning of a new republican political system. The extent of dissension was expressed in part in Marshal Lon Nol's March 10, 1972, speech in which he asserted that certain groups — meaning his critics within the constituent assembly — had strayed from the common path and unconsciously aided the enemy subversion against the nation.

As the result of the presidential elections held on June 4, 1972, Marshal Lon Nol for the first time won popular endorsement of what had in effect been rule by fiat. He defeated two other contenders, In Tam and Keo An, the little-known law school dean. Lon Nol received nearly 55 percent of the votes cast, as compared to In Tam's 24 percent and Keo An's 21 percent. Keo An's performance surprised most observers since he had been expected to garner less than 5 percent of the total votes. During the election campaign Marshal Lon Nol stressed the need for developing Cambodia's economy as far as possible while continuing the war against the Vietnamese Communists. His position was not seriously challenged by his opponents. Both Lon Nol and In Tam also suggested the possibility of a reconciliation with the Red Khmers as a means of peacefully ending hostilities in the country. Keo An went a step further by advocating that Prince Sihanouk be allowed to return to Cambodia, though as a private citizen, so as to facilitate the restoration of peace.

POLITICAL COMPETITION AND ORGANIZATION

Cambodian politics in 1972 remained unsettled and unpredictable, as much because of prevailing wartime conditions as because President Lon Nol's republican political system was, for all practical purposes, still in an experimental stage. During the first two years there was little official encouragement for the resumption of open, organized political party activities. The Sangkum, which had been the all-pervasive political organization during the Sihanouk years, was allowed to exist even after March 1970 under the new leadership of In Tam and Trinh Hoanh. Its new leadership stressed that the Sangkum should be rededicated to its original purpose of fighting injustice, corruption, oppression, and treason and that this organization should never again be prostituted as an instrument of despotic rule. In February 1971, however, the Sangkum was dissolved, apparently because of the Lon Nol government's desire to make a clean break with the Sihanouk past.

In the absence of any single viable political party, political competition was limited to the inner circle of power—to the few clique leaders and to those holding key positions in the cabinet and the army. Competition was muted at first because of the need for unity during the first post-Sihanouk year. It surfaced gradually as Cambodia's assorted problems grew more complex and as there was a growing popular realization of the republic's inability to solve all of the nation's problems.

Although information was sketchy, it appeared that the partisan contest for power during the first half of 1972 centered on the question of whether Cambodia should have a strong, centralized presidential system of government, as argued for by Marshal Lon Nol, or whether power should be shared by Parliament, as advocated by In Tam. This question was resolved in Lon Nol's favor in April 1972 when the draft of a new republican constitution was approved in a national referendum, and the document was officially promulgated in the following month (see ch. 8).

From March 1970 through mid-1972 political power had its source in the bureaucracy, particularly the army. It was self-perpetuating, but the bureaucratic character of this power was modified somewhat in theory, if not in fact, by the presidential election of June 1972. Although he was outvoted heavily in Phnom Penh and a considerable number of eligible voters declined to participate in that election (even in areas considered to be secure by the government), Marshal Lon Nol won the contest and thus the popular mandate.

The June 1972 election was significant in another respect. For the first time since the 1958 national elections, political party labels were introduced, Marshal Lon Nol competing under the flag of his newly formed Social Republican Party, and In Tam, under the newly reorganized Democratic Party. Information was not available concerning the platform, organization, and membership of these parties. It was also unclear, in mid-1972, whether the party labels had any appreciable effect on the outcome of the presidential elections. Some observers suggested that Marshal Lon Nol's campaign benefited from the fact that he had more resources available for electioneering, including the use of troops to aid his campaign. The defeated candidate In Tam complained of voting irregularities.

The republican Constitution of 1972 guaranteed that political parties could be freely organized, but at the same time it directed the state to ensure the establishment of a two-party system. This provision was intended apparently to forestall the emergence of a political system dictated by a single organization—as it had been under Sihanouk's Sangkum before March 1970; to preclude proliferation of splinter parties; and to stimulate a greater degree of popular involvement in the political processes.

It remained to be seen, however, whether party politics would evolve according to the intent of the constitution. Part of the uncertainty was derived from President Lon Nol's position on the future of organized political activities, which he revealed on June 21, 1972. In a message to the nation, the president appealed to all Cambodians, regardless of whatever political party they belonged to, to join a new movement called the National Organization of Nationalist Union (Rassemblement National de L'Union Nationaliste). He had not by the end of June explained what the position of this movement would be in relation to his own Social Republican Party or other competing parties.

According to the president, the new movement was to have a central committee with him as chairman and with subordinate committees at the provincial, district, commune, and village levels. Its political program called upon its members to dedicate themselves to the three principles of nationalism, democracy, and people's welfare.

Initial popular reaction was a mixture of disbelief and skepticism. For one thing, the movement bore a striking similarity to Sihanouk's Sangkum, which by the late 1950s had effectively absorbed almost all political parties and had emasculated political opposition. For another, the new movement's announced purposes were all too vague to be intelligible.

SOURCES OF POLITICAL INFLUENCE

Whatever the direction of political competition and party politics, indications in 1972, just as in the past, were that the army, intellectuals, and Buddhist monks would likely exert varying degrees of positive influence upon the political scene. Of these sources of political influence, the army's role was perhaps the most important, more so than it had ever been under Prince Sihanouk's rule.

The armed forces, of which Marshal and President Lon Nol was still supreme commander, was the only national organization capable of holding the nation together in times of grave internal crises. It was also the only cohesive collectivity that could lend political muscle to President Lon Nol. The centrality of the military establishment to whatever scheme of politics the president had was underscored on June 21, 1972, when he singled out the army as the organization that had asked him to run for the presidency of the republic. At that time, the president appealed to the army to continue to "support the implementation of the nation's political program . . . by rendering proper cooperation with me." Before March 1970 the army's political role had been much less conspicuous and its leaders had been tightly controlled under Prince Sihanouk's authority.

If the republican constitution could be taken as an indication, military involvement in national politics appeared likely to expand, but the manner in which this would take place was still unclear in mid-1972. Unlike the previous constitution, the new one did not contain a restrictive provision barring members of the armed forces from voting or from running for elective office. Marshal Lon Nol, for example, was not required to retire from active service before he started campaigning for the presidency.

Although they were small in number and unorganized, intellectuals (university students, degree holders, teachers, and professionals) were politically relevant. More than any segments of the population, they were faultfinding and their political orientations were responsible, before and after March 1970, for the variability of the national political mood. It could be said that they not only set the tone of political climate but also functioned as an indicator of political dynamics, although sometimes erratic, in the capital city of Phnom Penh.

Of this intellectual group, students and degree holders tended to be more vocal and protest-oriented than others. Many university graduates, based in Phnom Penh, were unemployed and yet indisposed to accept employment outside the capital. At the same time, there were only limited openings in the preferred, prestigious government services, causing anxiety also to those students who would soon be out of school. The continuing, predominantly agrarian nature of the economy did not help to absorb the increasing number of educated and qualified jobseekers.

In March 1970 young intellectuals were the first to rally to Lon Nol's leadership; on the eve of Sihanouk's deposition, they presented a petition to In Tam, then acting chairman of the National Assembly, calling for the removal of the former chief of state. They themselves, however, did not take any direct action to press their demand. They heartily supported the new regime in the expectation that the economy and living conditions would at last improve; corruption, profiteering, and nepotism would end or at least would be reduced; the bureaucracy would be energized; and more effective actions would be taken against the presence of Vietnamese communist intrusions.

The student euphoria diminished considerably during 1971. In their view, many of the old ways they had rejected were still just as pervasive as they had been in the Sihanouk years. There was also a new problem confronting the nation. The dragging on of the war, coupled with rampant war profiteering and the soaring human and material costs of the conflict, contributed heavily to their growing disillusionment. Morever, circumstances surrounding the removal of In Tam from the cabinet in September 1971 appeared to have disturbed the students. In Tam had been popular with many young citizens, perhaps more than any other politician in the country.

Growing student unrest came to a head in early 1972. The immediate target of their grievance was Deputy Prime Minister Sirik Matak, who was regarded by the student group as the symbol of the old order and who, along with Marshal Lon Nol, was regarded as being somewhat responsible for In Tam's ouster. Then came the so-called Keo An incident in early March 1972. Keo An, a law school dean and professor, was fired from Phnom Penh University for his criticism of the Lon Nol government in general and Sirik Matak in particular. In an apparent move to placate the agitated students, Marshal Lon Nol in mid-March dropped his deputy prime minister from the cabinet but, when the government refused to reinstate Keo An, the students went on strike. In late April the government temporarily closed three colleges in Phnom Penh and issued an order barring students under eighteen years of age from engaging in political activities. On July 1, 1972, the National Youth Association was inaugurated, presumably under official encouragement. The purpose of the organization apparently was to rally young citizens to the republican government.

The Buddhist monks as a whole were not organized for political action, nor did they seek to intervene in the business of government. Yet they were politically important, if only passively, not only because of the traditional role of Buddhism in Cambodian society but also because of the general popularity of the monks in the countryside (see ch. 4; ch. 7). Rulers, past and present, invariably attempted to project their image as defenders of the faith by articulating their concern with Buddhist affairs and by publicizing their policies as being in accord with the teaching of the Buddha.

Shortly after Prince Sihanouk's overthrow in March 1970, General Lon Nol sought Buddhist endorsement of his leadership. Meanwhile, Prince Sihanouk and his Peking-based antirepublican organization started a propaganda campaign designed to discredit the Lon Nol government as antireligious and anti-Buddhist. In fact both sides, claiming the undivided support of Cambodia's two Buddhist sects—the Mohanikay and the Thommayut—began accusing the other of having committed crimes against religion. These crimes allegedly included the forced induction of young monks into military service, the conversion of monasteries into military posts, the destruction of temples, and assorted instances of mistreating the monks.

In 1972, as in the past, political expressions of senior monks carried considerable weight in influencing the political orientations of the people, especially in the countryside. The words and advice of monks were generally respected at all levels of society. Nevertheless, the monks remained for the most part apolitical, except for a small number of activists who made political speeches sometimes in support, and at times critical, of policies announced by both the republican government and the insurgent front. During the Sihanouk years the Thommayut order, the smaller of the two Buddhist sects, aligned itself closely with Prince Sihanouk's leadership. This practice was not followed by the Mohanikay order, which counseled its adherents to remain detached from partisan political affairs.

INSURGENCY AS A MAJOR INTERNAL POLITICAL ISSUE

The single most critical issue confronting the republican government in 1972 was the question of survival against both internal and external threats. The Lon Nol government's efforts to arouse and unite the people on its behalf became progressively important amid indications of diminishing popular confidence in the republican government's ability to defeat the Vietnamese communist forces and to restore peace. These efforts stressed on the one hand the importance of such motivating factors as nationalism, patriotism, Buddhism, the historic greatness of Angkor civilization, and Vietnamese communist aggression as a direct threat to Cambodia's existence and, on the other, unity against the insurgent forces acting in the name of Prince Sihanouk, who was now condemned as a turncoat—a master collaborator with the Vietnamese Communists as well as with the Red Khmers who had once borne the brunt of his internal suppression campaign (see ch. 14).

By late 1971 it had become increasingly clear that what at first had been an externally dependent Cambodian insurgency might well be able to generate a viable, self-sustaining momentum; it could no longer be dismissed by the government as "a figment of someone's imagination." The Lon Nol government had to reckon with the growing certainty that this internal challenge would not fizzle out, even after its principal source of foreign support—the Vietnamese communist military forces—was removed from Cambodian territory. As the fighting capacity of the National United Front of Cambodia became increasingly credible, the disquieting specter of a protracted internal civil war began to loom large.

According to the most Western estimates, the Red Khmers grew from a pre-1970 strength of 3,000 men to about 15,000 men by the end of 1971. By mid-1972 the force had doubled to an estimated 30,000 (see ch. 14). The expansion of this insurgent force was reflected in the changing ratio of territories contested by the insurgent and republican government forces. At the end of 1971 the insurgents were believed to have controlled roughly one-third of Cambodian territory with about 20 percent of the population. According to conservative Western estimates, their share had risen by mid-1972 to about 50 percent of the territory containing as much as one-third of the total population. On the other hand, the insurgent media claimed that over 80 percent of Cambodia's territory and 5 million out of the country's 7 million population had been liberated.

It was against this background that in December 1971 Deputy Prime Minister Sirik Matak publicly hinted at the possibility of a reconciliation with Red Khmer insurgents. He was also reported to have expressed the readiness of his government to seek a negotiated peace with North Vietnam if the latter were prepared to withdraw its troops and its Viet Cong auxiliaries from Cambodia unconditionally. In a similar vein both Marshal Lon Nol and In Tam, in their presidential campaign speeches in May 1972, indicated their wish to open talks with the Red Khmers, although neither offered any details. During the first half of 1972 rumors were rife in Phnom Penh that the Lon Nol government might have established contacts with some Red Khmer units in hopes of exploring peaceful alternatives to the current hostilities—these rumors probably stemmed from the government's decision to permit the reestablishment of the defunct Cambodian communist organization known as the People's Party (Pracheachon).

Publicly the republican government insisted that there could never be a civil war in Cambodia because Khmers should not fight Khmers and because there could always be mutual understanding between domestic adversaries. Such insistence was designed to strengthen internal unity against external threat and to drive a wedge between domestic insurgents and Vietnamese communist forces. The extent to which these tactics had any desired effects remained unclear, although there were persistent reports of friction and clashes between Cambodian rebels and the Vietnamese Communists.

In any event, it appeared that the republican government's expressed willingness to bring the Red Khmers into its own political processes after the Cambodian hostilities ended did not envisage any role for Prince Sihanouk. The prince was to be permanently banned from Cambodia. Conversely, Prince Sihanouk maintained an equally adamant position on rejecting any compromise with the Lon Nol leadership. In mid-1972 the intriguing question was whether the Red Khmers would in the future consent to any political settlement that did not have a role for the prince, who still retained a considerable symbolic importance for the insurgent forces, especially for purposes of domestic and international propaganda (see ch. 8).

NATIONAL UNITED FRONT OF CAMBODIA

Before and after March 1970 the Red Khmers formed the nucleus of Cambodian insurgency. After Prince Sihanouk's ouster they were joined by Cambodians of assorted backgrounds, some voluntarily out of loyalty to the former chief of state and some involuntarily by force of circumstances over which they had no control. On March 20, 1970, one day after his arrival in Peking from Moscow where he had learned of his ouster, Prince Sihanouk denounced his deposition as absolutely illegal, declaring that the 1947 Constitution did not allow the National Assembly to replace the head of state who was implicitly appointed for life. He proposed that a national referendum, which he said was the only way to unseat him, be held under the auspices of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Cambodia. On March 23 he shelved the referendum scheme by declaring his intention to dissolve the Lon Nol government, to organize a national liberation army, and to form the National United Front of Cambodia (Front Uni National de Kampuchéa—FUNK). According to him, this front would embrace "all Khmers both inside and outside the country—including the faithful, religious people, military men, civilians, and men and women who cherish the ideals of independence, democracy, neutrality, progressism, socialism, Buddhism, nationalism, territorial integrity, and anti-imperialism."

The formation of the FUNK and its political program was announced in Peking on May 5, 1970. The announcement identified Prince Sihanouk as "head of state of Cambodia" and chairman of the FUNK.

Also revealed at that time was the establishment under the FUNK of the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia (Government Royal d'Union Nationale de Kampuchéa—GRUNK), with Penn Nouth as prime minister and Khieu Samphan as deupty prime minister and minister of national defense. Prince Sihanouk stated that the GRUNK was not a government-in-exile because its roots were inside Cambodia. He called upon foreign governments to recognize his GRUNK, urging them to withdraw their diplomatic and consular missions from Phnom Penh (see ch. 10).

The FUNK's political program had the following objectives: to unite all Khmers and mobilize them to oppose "the United States imperialist schemes and agression"; to overthrow "the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak regime"; and to create a national liberation army. The program also pledged to democratize Cambodian society so that political power would be vested "in the hands of the progressive, industrious and genuine working people"; to develop a national economy that would be free from "profiteering, smuggling, blackmarketing and inhuman exploitation"; to nationalize banks and foreign trade; to develop "the good traditions of the Angkor civilization handed down to us until now"; and the pursuit of a nonalignment and neutralist foreign policy according to the principles of peaceful coexistence.

The FUNK, in mid-1972, remained under the thirteen-member (eleven regulars and two alternates) Political Bureau headed by Penn Nouth, the GRUNK's prime minister (see fig. 4). It reportedly had a central committee of undetermined size to which the bureau was theoretically accountable. The FUNK and GRUNK leaders were evidently interlocked and interchangeable because all thirteen Political Bureau members also held positions in the fourteen-member GRUNK cabinet.

The FUNK-GRUNK operations had two geographically separated bases; Prince Sihanouk's entourage in Peking, or the so-called external branch, that was concerned mainly with diplomatic and propaganda activities for international consumption; and the internal branch that was engaged in actual fighting inside Cambodia. The FUNK-GRUNK sources asserted that the interior branch was led by Khieu Samphan, Hu Nim, Hou Yuon, and more than a dozen GRUNK cabinet vice ministers. (Regular ministers were resident in Peking.) This assertion was disputed by the Lon Nol government, which maintained that Khieu Samphan, Hu Nim, and Hou Yuon had been executed in 1967 at Prince Sihanouk's order.

During 1972 there were reports of divisions between the leaders of the external and internal branches over unascertainable issues. Internal differences apparently stemmed from the fractionated alignments of contending forces within the FUNK, which included communist as well as noncommunist Cambodians professing pro-Communist Chinese, pro-Soviet, pro-North Vietnamese, pro-Sihanouk, or simply pro-Cambodian sympathies. Tensions among these cliques were reported to be considerable, as for example between pro-Sihanouk elements and Red Khmers, who were still nursing bitter memories of persecution sustained during Prince Sihanouk's rule. Despite their internal wranglings, the Cambodian insurgents at times joined forces against Vietnamese Communists, who were resented for their domineering attitudes and policies toward the Cambodians.

In the liberated areas state organs were established at the village, commune, district, and provincial levels, in order for FUNK's propaganda to be accepted. These organs had three to seven elected members, charged with responsibility for political, military, internal security, economic, cultural, and social undertakings. They also had varying numbers of cadres assisting these elected members. The domestic and external propaganda activities were handled in part through an ostensibly independent news service called the Cambodian Information Agency (Agence Kampuchéa d'Infor-


North Vietnamese Military Forces in Cambodia
Vietnam Workers Party (in Hanoi)
People's Revolutionary Party and (or) Red Khmers
Viet Cong Forces in Cambodia
National United Front of Cambodia (based in Peking)
Central Committee
Political Bureau
Cambodian Information Agency
Voice of the National United Front of Cambodia
Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia (based in Peking)
Cabinet
Cambodian People's National Liberation Armed Forces
Regulars
Regional Forces
Guerrillas
Inside Cambodia
Provincial Committees
District Committees
Commune Committees
Village Committees
Vietnamese support organizations
Control
Forces within Cambodia

Figure 4. Khmer Republic (Cambodia), National United Front of Cambodia, June 1972

mation—AKI) and the clandestine radio called Voice of the National United Front of Cambodia. FUNK news was disseminated also through propaganda agencies of the People's Republic of China and North Vietnam (see ch. 8).

The insurgents' military front was called the Cambodian People's National Liberation Armed Forces. With Khieu Samphan as commander in chief, the military organ asserted that it undertook all the fighting in Cambodia and claimed victories over the armed forces of both the republican government and South Vietnam. As of early 1971 indications were that North Vietnamese and Viet Cong soldiers made up as much as 70 percent of these forces, the remainder being Cambodians of assorted categories—Red Khmers, Prince Sihanouk's personal followers, opportunists, bandits, and peasants forcibly inducted. The seventy-to-thirty ratio changed somewhat during the first six months of 1972 in the direction of more Cambodian representation.

According to Ieng Sary, who was usually referred to as "a special representative of Cambodian resistance from the interior," the FUNK's military and political success was attributed to a number of factors. In an interview with a journalist from the French newspaper *Le Monde* in January 1972, he asserted that firm bases had been established both in the rural areas and in the cities and that the Buddhist monks were playing an active role in the mobilization of the people against the republican government forces. The participation of the great majority of the intellectuals in FUNK's national liberation war was cited as another reason. Other reasons were the cooperation of the "majority of our cadres" (an apparent reference to civil servants currently in the service of the Lon Nol government) and the firm alliance of all national patriotic forces within the FUNK.

In 1972 most observers agreed that the FUNK insurgency was essentially communist-inspired, despite the latter-day addition of Prince Sihanouk as its titular leader. The origin of this movement could be traced back to at least 1951, when the People's Revolutionary Party was founded under Vietnamese sponsorship. Because of its near unanimous rejection by Khmers as a Vietnamese puppet, the party created in 1955 a front called the People's Party (Pracheachon) in an obvious effort to project its image as a popular Cambodian organization. The People's Party was allowed to exist as a legal party until 1962, when many of its leaders were arrested and it was forced underground. The party was dealt a further blow in early 1967, after the outbreak of the Red Khmer rebellion, when remaining communist leaders as well as some leftist leaders were arrested or went into exile.

In 1972 there were a number of unanswered questions concerning interrelationships among Red Khmers, the People's Revolutionary Party, the People's Party, and the FUNK. The Red Khmers were never publicly identified with either of these parties. It was also unknown whether the People's Party was still the People's Revolutionary Party's front or whether the two still maintained separate identities. The tendency among Western observers was to assume that the People's Revolutionary Party was the principal directing force behind the FUNK. Whether this party and the Red Khmers were one and the same was difficult to ascertain, but an assumption could be made that both were leading forces in the Cambodian insurgency.

POLITICAL VALUES AND ATTITUDES

Traditionally, the people's way of viewing themselves and life in general and of relating themselves to governmental authorities revolved around Buddhism, the monarchy, and the seasonal cycle of planting and harvesting (see ch. 4). After the 1940s a new set of political idioms—nationalism and national independence—gained wide currency as a means of asserting Cambodian identity both against French colonial rule and against the Vietnamese and Thais. In 1970 the government of President Lon Nol officially undertook to popularize the concept of republicanism as a substitute for centuries-old monarchism, which for thirty years until March 1970 had been identified almost exclusively with Prince Sihanouk.

Buddhism and Nationalism

In both official and popular literature political beliefs and concepts as held by the Khmers in general have been associated with nationalism, the monarchy, and republicanism. In 1972 the first two of these appeared to be especially influential, more so than the other two, in affecting the political orientations of almost all Khmers—whether they were inhabitants in the republican government-controlled areas or in the territories under FUNK administration. Buddhist and nationalist aspirations were popularly regarded as above partisan disagreement, whereas monarchism and republicanism were identified with mutually exclusive political alignments—the FUNK and the republican government.

Buddhism as practiced in Cambodia has considerable impact on the political perceptions of the people. It does not offer any specific political precepts for its adherents to follow, but the concept of good government derives from Buddhist teaching on compassion, benevolence, justice, happiness, and nonviolence. According to the Buddhist philosophy, those with authority must develop the sentiments of goodness and compassion, respecting those over whom they rule, thereby gaining merit and also removing the potential cause of popular revolt. Thus a ruler or any person in position of public trust must above all be recognized as a meritorious Buddhist. An individual who is regarded as an unfaithful follower will find it difficult to be elected or appointed to local office. It is only natural, therefore, that governmental leaders are deferential toward the Buddhist hierarchy and seek its favor by asking its senior monks to officiate at state ceremonies, participate in the dedication of new buildings in the provinces, and interest themselves in education and community welfare projects.

Most Cambodians tend to see their state as the repository of Buddhist values that must be protected and preserved in their pristine purity. Thus they find acceptance of Buddhism to be consistent with the profession of allegiance to the state. To them Buddhism and the state are interdependent.

Before his deposition in 1970, Prince Sihanouk sought to rationalize his nation-building processes in the name of so-called Buddhist Socialism. As defined by the prince, Buddhist Socialism meant the abolition of suffering through hard work, intelligence, and farsightedness; it included the virtues of compassion and respect for others. He believed that the government could improve the lot of the "little people" in a compassionate manner if his brand of socialism was correctly understood and implemented. He took pains to stress that Buddhist Socialism was not compatible with Marxism. He asserted that Marxist regimes were too harsh, would destroy the joy of life, and would be inconsistent with the good Buddhist tradition of his country. After his deposition, almost nothing was heard of this Buddhist Socialism.

In terms of ethnocentrism, nationalism is a powerful political motivating force in Cambodia. Nationalist awareness is relatively high for an essentially agrarian society in which more than 80 percent of the population reside in the countryside. This situation results from a tradition of rivalry with Vietnam and Thailand, both of which are widely distrusted as being bent on destroying Cambodia one way or another. After independence in 1953 Prince Sihanouk constantly reminded his people that the Khmer civilization and the nation could best be preserved if the people were imbued with nationalism and remained vigilant against their neighbors to the east and to the west.

The official policy of exalting Cambodian nationalism was continued under the Lon Nol leadership, perhaps with even greater fervor. President Lon Nol's messages to the nation were replete with exhortations aimed at arousing and mobilizing the people against the Vietnamese communist forces operating in Cambodia.

In his speech to a youth organization on July 1, 1972, for example, the president declared that he would lead the nation mainly on the basis of nationalism and Khmer traditional values. Also stressed at that time was the theme that the survival of Cambodia depended on whether or not the people were sufficiently motivated by a high degree of national distinctiveness and pride in their past.

Monarchism and Republicanism

In the Sihanouk years the monarchy was widely accepted as the personification of Khmer civilization and the major source of political legitimacy and stability as well. For the people it was the protector of Buddhism and the symbol of national continuity. The masses of the people accepted the paternal authoritarianism of Prince Sihanouk and went through the motion of supporting his program and policies. For them there appeared to be no alternative political symbol that could evoke as much feeling.

Circumstances surrounding the ouster of the prince in March 1970 tend to support the view that the supposed sanctity of the monarchy and its unifying importance for the nation have been somewhat exaggerated. Intellectuals, who were known to have been unimpressed with the monarchy as early as the 1940s, rallied to the Lon Nol leadership, supported the Prince's deposition, and almost immediately called for the establishment of a republican political system. The much publicized peasant loyalty to the prince proved to be something less than convincing. The sudden removal of monarchial symbols from the political scene did not precipitate any major internal crisis of legitimacy. There were no massive peasant uprisings in support of the prince, although in a few scattered instances the peasants took to the streets to demonstrate their loyalty to the deposed chief of state. After Prince Sihanouk announced the establishment of the National United Front of Cambodia, an unknown number of peasants appear to have joined his insurgent forces, but it became apparent in 1972 that the majority of the rural population remained unruffled, going about their daily pursuits as if nothing had happened.

Cambodia is no stranger to republican ideas. As early as the 1940s a number of Cambodian returnees from French universities attempted to advocate political beliefs focused especially on the concept of a popular mandate or popular sovereignty. It was not until after Prince Sihanouk's ouster in March 1970, however, that they could freely assert and publicize their political philosophy. Until then, overt expression or advocacy of republicanism had been tantamount to high treason.

As formally incorporated into the Constitution of 1972, the republican ideas consist of liberty, equality, fraternity, progress, and happiness. They are also described as "the five principles of the Khmer Republic," in President Lon Nol's own words.

In his message to the nation on the occasion of the proclamation of the Khmer Republic on October 9, 1970, President Lon Nol stated that these principles in effect constituted the highest ideals or values of the new political order. Liberty, he declared, meant freedom: to drive out the North Vietnamese-Viet Cong invaders from Cambodian territory; to choose national leaders popularly in such a way that they should not remain in power for more than two successive mandates; and to eliminate bribery, corruption, and the clan spirit. According to the president's concept, equality referred to the enjoyment of equal rights according to an individual's capacity and his work. Friendship and trust among Cambodians, avoidance of a self-seeking attitude, and conformity with the spirit of Buddhism and the Khmer tradition were identified as attributes of fraternity.

According to the president, liberty, equality, and fraternity, plus the spirit of mutual help, were bound to bring about progress. He declared that the republic should introduce modern procedures and technical and scientific means and develop the spirit of cooperation between government and people as an essential condition for achieving national progress. He specifically mentioned Japan and Israel as his national models in this regard. Happiness was generally described as the end product of the other four republican ideals.

In an effort to dramatize the newness of his republican political values and system, the Lon Nol government adopted a new national flag, national anthem, and national emblem. All symbols having to do with the monarchy were removed, and the only symbolic element retained by the new regime concerned Angkor Wat. A stylized representation of the *wat* (see Glossary) was kept in the upper left corner of the national flag and the center of the national seal in order to indicate the continuity of Khmer civilization.

Political Attitudes

In 1972 popular political attitudes appeared to be in a state of unprecedented fluidity. Contributing factors were the prevailing uncertainty about the direction of the war against the Vietnamese communist intruders; insecurity engendered by the alternating cycle of advance and retreat between the opposing forces of the republican government and the insurgent FUNK; and the increasingly credible show of strength demonstrated by the insurgent forces. These factors were responsible to a degree for popular disinclination to become identified openly with either of the country's two principal political forces—the republican government and Prince Sihanouk's government-in-exile.

To the extent that it was apparent, popular support for either of the adversaries seemed to have been motivated more by self-preservation than any issue- or ideology-oriented political convictions. The bulk of the population was passive and acquiescent, as it had been under Sihanouk's rule. Most of the people, especially in the countryside, preferred to remain inconspicuous and, publicly at least, unattached. Many observers suggested after the presidential election of June 4, 1972, for example, that many voters chose to stay home rather than participate in the election, possibly because insurgent guerrillas in many localities threatened harm to those going to the polls. In that election, only about 30 percent of the electorate voted.

CHAPTER 10

FOREIGN RELATIONS

The single most important objective of Cambodian foreign relations in 1972 was to maintain neutrality, as it had been since 1954. The need for neutrality or nonalignment has stemmed from three basic factors: the presence of historically antagonistic entities, Thailand and Vietnam, on Cambodia's borders; Cambodia's military weakness in relation to these neighbors; and the Cambodian conviction that the People's Republic of China (PRC) would sooner or later become the dominant power in Southeast Asia.

Since the policy of neutrality was first adopted in 1954, the efforts of Cambodian diplomacy have been directed consistently toward obtaining international legal guarantees of this policy. During this time the government also sought, through the exercise of a degree of freedom, to sustain this policy by flexibly adjusting its relations with other countries according to situational needs. It demonstrated this freedom by seeking economic and military assistance from any country that was willing to respect and help defend Cambodia's neutrality.

The number of border skirmishes with Thailand and the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) rapidly increased in the early 1960s, and Cambodia has come to insist on the inseparability of neutrality from the importance of safeguarding its territorial integrity. Thus the two intertwined policy objectives became the focal point of Cambodia's diplomatic efforts throughout the remainder of the 1960s and in the early 1970s. Friends and foes have been determined by the criterion of whether or not a country supported Cambodia's stand on neutrality and border security.

The deposition of Prince Norodom Sihanouk as head of state in March 1970 did not affect the country's commitment to nonalignment and its continuous concern over the security of its border. His ouster, nevertheless, introduced a new dimension of disharmony into the foreign relations of Cambodia (proclaimed in October 1970 as the Khmer Republic by the premier, General Lon Nol). Prince Sihanouk, who was abroad at the time of his deposition, established a countergovernment called the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia (Gouvernement Royal d'Union Nationale de Kampuchéa—GRUNK).

With headquarters in Peking, this government-in-exile has issued foreign policy statements that also affirm the importance of Cambodian neutrality and territorial integrity. The GRUNK's policy statements are heavily colored by the standard communist rhetoric of anti-imperialist and anti-United States struggles; in fact, they are much like the anti-Western policy statements emanating from the capitals of communist countries. As of mid-1972 the GRUNK was recognized by at least twenty-five countries (including the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, the political arm of communist insurgents in South Vietnam—until June 1969 known as the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam). The government of the Khmer Republic, on the other hand, was a member of the United Nations and was recognized by forty-nine countries.

The most important nations directly affecting the Khmer Republic's foreign relations in recent years have been the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), South Vietnam, Thailand, the PRC, and the United States. France and the Soviet Union played roles of lesser significance. Although Laos shares a common border with the Khmer Republic, its role in the Cambodian scheme of foreign relations has not been prominent. Cambodian-Laotian relations have not been affected by any serious disputes. Cambodia's primary objective with respect to Laos, before and since March 1970, has been to preserve it as a neutral buffer state.

Cambodia was admitted to the United Nations in December 1955 and has since become a member of many intergovernmental organizations related to the United Nations. Cambodia has also participated in the activities of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, the Asian Development Bank, the Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia, the Mekong River Development Project, and the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization. Cambodia's neutrality has precluded the country's membership in the regional defense system, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). It has also refused to participate in the Asian and Pacific Council and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, both of which have been criticized by communist countries as pro-Western.

CAMBODIAN NEUTRALITY

The Cambodians are generally modest in their conception of the role they expect their country to play in the community of nations. They regard their country as being small and weak and vulnerable to pressures by their neighbors—Thailand and Vietnam in particular—which are popularly regarded as traditional antagonists (see ch. 3). The Cambodian sense of insecurity has been aggravated especially by North Vietnamese incursions starting in 1946. Compounding this insecurity has been Cambodian apprehension over the possibility of Communist Chinese expansion into Southeast Asia in general and Cambodia in particular.

Cambodia's primary foreign policy concern since independence, therefore, has been to secure its territorial integrity from border incursions by its neighbors. This concern prompted the country in 1953 and in early 1954 to seek, unsuccessfully, guarantees from France and the United States that they would come to its defense in case of external aggression.

At the Geneva Conference dealing with Indochina, held in May-July 1954, Cambodia insisted on its right to participate in any military alliance and on the right to permit the establishment on its soil of foreign military bases, as warranted, for defense against aggression; it strenuously opposed the North Vietnamese scheme —proposed at the conference—to demilitarize and neutralize Cambodia (see ch. 3). During this conference it also sounded out the possibility of becoming a member of the Southeast Asia regional defense system, which was then in its preparatory stage under the aegis of the United States. The United States, however, concerned over the effect that Cambodian membership would have on the course of the Geneva negotiations, was reluctant to accept the country as a charter member.

What came out of the Geneva Conference amounted to a compromise, as evidenced by Article 7 of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Cambodia, which was signed on July 21, 1954. The article reads:

> The Royal Government of Cambodia will not join in any agreement with other States, if this agreement carries for Cambodia the obligation to enter into a military alliance not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, or, as long as its security is not threatened, the obligation to establish bases on Cambodian territory for the military forces of foreign powers.

Article 7 also provided that Cambodia would not "solicit foreign aid in war material, personnel or instructors except for the purpose of the effective defence of the territory."

Cambodia's anxieties were lessened somewhat in September 1954, when a protocol to the treaty establishing SEATO included Cambodia, along with Laos and the State of Vietnam (predecessor of South Vietnam) within its area of protection. SEATO members agreed that they would come to Cambodia's defense in case of communist aggression against it. In deference to the country's sovereignty and independence, however, this protection was to be extended only with the consent of the Cambodian government.

Not satisfied with the SEATO arrangement and feeling still insecure, Prince Sihanouk looked to other means to augment his nation's security. He was particularly attracted to a policy of neutrality, which was consistent with Article 7 of the Geneva agreement on Cambodia and which was at the time advocated by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. In December 1954, therefore, the government of Cambodia formally enunciated this policy as the basis for its foreign policy.

The policy of neutrality was given a significant boost after the Bandung Conference of April 1955. At this conference Prince Sihanouk publicly expressed his fear of PRC and North Vietnamese expansion, but in a private meeting that followed, PRC Premier Chou En-lai and North Vietnam's foreign minister, Pham Van Dong, told the prince of their intention to pursue a neighborly policy of peace and friendship and to respect Cambodia's independence and territorial integrity if Cambodia remained committed to neutrality. These assurances led to Cambodia's adherence to the five principles of peaceful coexistence that had been agreed upon the year before between India and the PRC: mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; nonaggression; noninterference in each other's internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence.

Adoption of the policy of neutrality was based on pragmatic considerations. Foremost among these was the desire to avert an East-West confrontation on Cambodian soil; an alliance with either bloc was thus ruled out in order that the country would not run the risk of provoking hostile actions by the opposing bloc. Cambodia's geographical vulnerability to North Vietnamese incursions appeared to have further underscored the wisdom of this policy. Equally important, Prince Sihanouk wanted to maintain his freedom of action, limited as it was, in international affairs. This freedom was thought to be essential to winning the friendship of all countries and to maintaining a degree of initiative in dealing with countries of various ideological persuasions.

Thus, in May 1955 Cambodia signed an agreement with the United States under which the latter pledged to provide military aid to help Cambodia cope with both internal subversion and external aggression. The Cambodian government was assured by the United States, however, that the aid would not compromise Cambodia's neutrality. Then, in an apparent effort to demonstrate that his country was not allied with or subordinate to any bloc, Prince Sihanouk visited Peking in February 1956, where he reaffirmed Cambodian neutrality and his disinclination to accept any SEATO protection (a position that he had first enunciated to the Communist Chinese and North Vietnamese at Bandung).

Cambodia's policy of neutrality acquired the force of law in November 1957 when the country's National Assembly passed a bill that proclaimed Cambodia's neutrality and its intention not to commit any aggression against any country. The law required the country to abstain from any military or ideological alliance with foreign countries. At the same time, the law reserved for Cambodia the right to appeal to a friendly power in the event of foreign aggression as well as the right to carry out its own legitimate defense by all means.

Prince Sihanouk's effort to obtain international sanction for his country's neutrality and territorial integrity was intensified in the late 1950s. This was partly because of continued frontier frictions with Thailand and South Vietnam and partly because of the deteriorating internal security situation in Laos. In late 1960, therefore, he proposed at the United Nations General Assembly that Cambodia and Laos be neutralized and that their security be internationally guaranteed. At about the same time and for the same reason, he also solicited international support for the convening of a new Geneva conference on Laos. The resultant fourteen-nation Geneva Conference met intermittently beginning in May 1961 and finally agreed, in June 1962, on measures designed to ensure the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity, and territorial integrity of Laos.

Despite the Geneva agreement, Prince Sihanouk considered Cambodia still insecure, and in late 1962 he proposed that another Geneva conference be held, this time to consider the question of Cambodia. Nothing came of this proposal because the United States and British governments took the position that Cambodia might obtain better results if it negotiated directly with its neighbors. Nevertheless, the prince did not give up his efforts. In November 1963 he called on the Soviet Union and Great Britain, as cochairmen of the 1954 Geneva Conference, to summon a fourteen-nation conference on Cambodia similar to the Geneva Conference on Laos held in 1961 and 1962. When this effort failed, he proposed to the United States in 1964 that the Cambodian question be discussed by four nations—Cambodia, the United States, Thailand, and South Vietnam. This suggestion came to naught because of differences concerning the terms under which the conference would take place.

Sihanouk's quest for international recognition of Cambodia's position nevertheless continued. A communiqué issued by the Indo-Chinese Peoples' Conference, which was held in Phnom Penh from March 1 to March 9, 1965, under Cambodian sponsorship, appealed for a new Geneva conference to be convened "as soon as possible in order to give to the Kingdom of Cambodia legitimate guarantees concerning its neutrality and territorial integrity." The Phnom Penh conference was attended by delegations representing for the most part communist and leftist movements and associations from the three Indochinese countries of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam (both North and South); there was, however, no delegate from the South Vietnamese government. A few days after that communiqué, the Cambodian government also requested the Soviet Union to reconvene the Geneva Conference. Initially this request was favorably received not only by the Soviet Union but also by the United States, Great Britain, the PRC, and North Vietnam. The intensification of the Vietnam war in mid-1965 and the new insistence by the PRC and North Vietnam that South Vietnam be represented by the insurgent National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam blocked hopes for such a conference, however.

In 1966 and 1967, because of Prince Sihanouk's persistence, a growing number of foreign countries declared their respect for or recognition of Cambodia's territorial integrity. In September 1966 France became the first to announce its respect for Cambodia "within the limits of its present borders." During 1967 Bulgaria, Burma, Cuba, the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), Guinea, Indonesia, Mauritania, North Vietnam, the PRC, Senegal, Singapore, the Soviet Union, and the United Arab Republic, as well as the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, expressed their support of the Cambodian cause.

In September 1967 Prince Sihanouk declared that recognition of his country's present borders was a useful indicator as to whether other countries wished to pursue friendly relations with Cambodia. He declared that he would "freeze" diplomatic relations with any nation that had not recognized Cambodia's borders by mid-January 1968. During 1968 Great Britain was the first to issue a border declaration on Cambodia; it was followed by Australia, Ceylon, India, Japan, Laos, and the United States. By the end of 1968 a total of forty-five countries had given their support to Cambodia's position. Among those countries that continued to withhold recognition were the Republic of Korea (South Korea), South Vietnam, and Thailand.

The deposition of Prince Sihanouk in March 1970 did not alter the Cambodian government policy of neutrality. The new government of Premier (later President) Lon Nol announced on March 19 that its policy of independence, sovereignty, peace, strict neutrality, and territorial integrity would remain unchanged and that it would respect all its previous international agreements.

In view of North Vietnam's continued armed violation of Cambodian neutrality, the Lon Nol government announced on April 16, 1970, that it was prepared to accept foreign military aid from any source whatever and on April 20 formally appealed to the United States for such assistance in its efforts to repel Vietnamese communist invaders. Two days later Cambodia's chief delegate to the United Nations also appealed to "all countries which love peace and justice" for military aid.

In May 1970 Cambodia was invited to participate as an observer in a conference of Asian and Pacific countries held in Djakarta at the initiative of Indonesia to discuss necessary measures both to ensure Cambodia's neutrality and to seek a negotiated rather than a military settlement of the Cambodian problem. At the conference Cambodia asked for military, diplomatic, and economic assistance in its struggle against communist invaders. The communiqué issued on May 17 jointly by Australia, Cambodia, Japan, South Korea, Laos, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and South Vietnam called for the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Cambodia; reaffirmed the inviolability of that country's neutrality and the principle of noninterference in that country's internal affairs; and called on the 1954 Geneva Conference participants to convene an international conference to help resolve the Cambodian problem. The United States almost immediately announced its endorsement of these demands. The Djakarta conference was boycotted by Burma, the PRC, India, North Korea, Pakistan, and North Vietnam; Afghanistan and Nepal did not respond to Indonesia's invitation.

Meanwhile, after March 1970, deposed Prince Sihanouk was obliged to seek the support of communist nations, including North Vietnam, in his bid to regain his lost power. He also sought diplomatic recognition of his government-in-exile from a number of countries.

RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES

North Vietnam

In early 1972 Cambodia was, for all practical purposes, at war with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), which along with the South Vietnamese communist forces (Viet Cong) it supported, controlled at least one-third of Cambodian territory containing roughly 20 percent of the Cambodian population. This situation was only the latest manifestation of the historically strained relations between the Cambodian and Vietnamese peoples.

In 1946 Viet Minh (see Glossary) agents began to infiltrate Cambodia, and in 1950 and 1951 they established a resistance government in southern Cambodia. Under growing communist influence, the Viet Minh intensified its activities in Cambodia, and Viet Minh units actually invaded the northeastern province of Stoeng Treng in the spring of 1954. After the Geneva Conference of 1954 the invading force was withdrawn, and the resistance government was disbanded. During the remainder of the 1950s Cambodian relations with North Vietnam were relatively uneventful, although the government of Cambodia continued to suspect Viet Minh incursions and other attempts to interfere with its internal affairs (see ch. 3).

Relations between the two countries gradually warmed beginning in 1963 after repeated South Vietnamese border incursions into Cambodia in pursuit of Viet Cong guerrillas. In March 1964 Prince Sihanouk, who had severed diplomatic ties with South Vietnam in August 1963, announced plans to establish diplomatic relations with North Vietnam and to negotiate a border settlement directly with the communist regime rather than with the South Vietnamese government. These plans were not quickly implemented, however, as North Vietnam told Prince Sihanouk that any problem concerning the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border would have to be negotiated directly with the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam; Cambodia finally opened the border talks with the front in mid-1966, and the latter recognized the inviolability of Cambodia's "present borders" in mid-1967. North Vietnam quickly followed suit.

These assurances on territorial integrity notwithstanding, Cambodia became increasingly concerned about the presence of Viet Cong troops in its border provinces adjoining South Vietnam. It concern was heightened because the Viet Cong presence was the cause of repeated air and ground attacks by allied forces fighting in South Vietnam. In frustration, Prince Sihanouk remarked in March 1967: "The Vietnamese war is increasingly becoming the Cambodian war."

In January 1968 Prince Sihanouk felt constrained to admit publicly for the first time that Cambodia's eastern provinces were being used by Vietnamese communist forces both as a sanctuary and as a source of supplies. Thus he reversed his previous policy of denying the alleged presence of Viet Cong troops in these areas. Beginning in February 1969, he also publicly expressed his concern at the use of Cambodian territory by North Vietnamese forces as well. According to Cambodian government estimates issued in October 1969, the number of foreign troops, that is, North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces, operating inside Cambodia was, as of the end of September 1969, from 35,000 to 40,000 men (see ch. 14).

Cambodian relations with North Vietnam took a decided turn for the worse on March 11, 1970, when about 10,000 Cambodians demonstrated in Phnom Penh in protest against the presence of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese troops in their country (see ch. 9). In the course of this demonstration, they sacked and burned the embassies of North Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam; they also turned on Vietnamese houses, shops, and churches. At the time of this disturbance the prince was in Paris, en route to the Soviet Union and the PRC to solicit their assistance in ridding Cambodia of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops. In a cable sent to Queen Mother Kossamak, Prince Sihanouk said: "I fully understand the motives which have aroused our compatriots' anger, but knowing them as I do, I cannot possibly believe that they would have gone to such lengths." He then criticized rightwing elements for their attempts to "change Cambodia's political and ideological orientation" and reaffirmed his intention not to become "either an American or a Chinese satellite."

On March 12, although expressing its "regret" for the anti-Vietnamese incidents, the National Assembly of Cambodia adopted a resolution demanding the evacuation of all Vietnamese troops from Cambodia by March 15. On March 16 representatives of the Cambodian government, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, and North Vietnam met in an attempt to settle the dispute. A week later the new government of General Lon Nol proposed to the other sides that the talks be resumed, but his government was informed two days later by both North Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government that they were withdrawing their diplomatic personnel from Phnom Penh. On the same day Prince Sihanouk announced in Peking his plan to establish a government-in-exile. On May 6, 1970, North Vietnam formally broke off diplomatic relations with Cambodia and recognized Prince Sihanouk's GRUNK, which had been formally proclaimed the previous day in Peking. The Provisional Revolutionary Government also extended its diplomatic recognition to the government-in-exile on May 6.

South Vietnam

Despite the passage of time, historical Cambodian antagonism toward the Vietnamese was still apparent in 1972 and affected official relations with the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) as well as with North Vietnam. After Prince Sihanouk was deposed in March 1970, mutual recriminations—these had led to the severance of diplomatic relations in August 1963—leveled off considerably, but disputes over a number of issues remained unsettled. These disputes included, among other things, Cambodian rights of navigation on the Mekong River, conflicting claims to offshore islands in the Gulf of Thailand (the largest of which is Dao Phu Quoc—in South Vietnamese hands in early 1972), the status of Vietnamese in Cambodia and of Khmer in South Vietnam, and the question of Cambodian-South Vietnamese boundaries. Another dispute, apparent after 1969, concerned overlapping claims of Cambodia, South Vietnam, and Thailand to the continental shelf in the Gulf of Thailand, which has been reported to contain large oil deposits (see ch. 2). More than half of the Cambodian oil exploration area is claimed by South Vietnam.

Before March 1970 the government of Cambodia had been especially disturbed about South Vietnam's negative attitude toward its policy of neutrality. South Vietnam had insisted that Cambodia's neutrality was at best slanted toward the communist side and had repeatedly accused Prince Sihanouk of aiding Viet Cong and North Vietnamese troops by allowing them to use Cambodian territory as a sanctuary from which to attack South Vietnam.

Formal relations were affected adversely also by the question of minority rights. Cambodia and South Vietnam frequently exchanged accusations concerning the mistreatment of each other's citizens in the other country. Moreover, Cambodia charged that South Vietnam, along with Thailand, had been aiding and abetting an anti-Sihanouk, rightwing movement known as the Free Khmer (Khmer Serei). For its part, South Vietnam countered that Cambodia had given asylum to dissident South Vietnamese political leaders and refuge to Viet Cong insurgents.

Shortly after the downfall of President Ngo Dinh Diem's regime in November 1963, Prince Sihanouk proposed restoration of diplomatic relations with South Vietnam if the latter agreed to recognize Cambodian sovereignty over disputed islands, respect Cambodian neutrality, stop supporting the Free Khmer movement, and protect the rights of Khmer in South Vietnam. He also suggested the creation of a neutral confederation including Cambodia and South Vietnam. The government of South Vietnam responded by sending an exploratory mission to Phnom Penh, and the two sides initiated bilateral talks on the settlement of border disputes. In March 1964, however, Cambodia called off the border talks as a result of a South Vietnamese attack on a Cambodian village, despite South Vietnam's formal apology for the incident and promise to compensate for damages.

In May 1964 Cambodian charges of aggression were brought before an emergency session of the United Nations Security Council. It was suggested by South Vietnam that further border incidents might be averted if the two countries would agree to the initiation of effective measures designed to deny the Viet Cong the use of Cambodian territory as bases for attack on South Vietnam. Frontier incidents continued throughout the summer of 1964, and in August 1964 Prince Sihanouk publicly declared that he might sign border agreements with North Vietnam, with the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, and with the Laotian communist Lao Patriotic Front (Neo Lao Hak Sat). He also hinted at the possibility of negotiating a military aid agreement with the PRC.

Relations between Cambodia and South Vietnam continued to worsen during the remainder of the 1960s, especially after June 1967, when Cambodia permitted the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam to establish a permanent mission in its capital. In May 1969 the status of this mission was raised to that of an embassy, and in June 1969, when the front was dissolved and the so-called Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam was established, Cambodia was among the first to extend diplomatic recognition to the insurgent government.

The frigid relations between the two countries began to thaw after the deposition of Prince Sihanouk in March 1970. This was possible because of more positive measures taken by the new Cambodian government of General Lon Nol to force the withdrawal of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops from its territory. During March clashes between Cambodian government troops and the combined Vietnamese communist forces became more frequent, and at the end of the month the Cambodian government felt it necessary to inform the United Nations Security Council of the increasing communist infiltration into its territory. In early April the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops, already well entrenched in the eastern frontier provinces, began to extend their activities to southern Cambodia, reaching to the port of Kampong Saom (formerly Sihanoukville) and the coastline. In mid-April Cambodia issued a general appeal for any unconditional external aid of whatever origin to help defend its independence and territorial integrity.

On April 29, 1970, the government of South Vietnam announced that its troops had entered a Cambodian border area about fifty miles northwest of Saigon, the United States providing advisers and tactical and logistic support. The purpose of the intervention was described as the destruction of "an extensive complex of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong bases and depots in Cambodian territory." The following day South Vietnam began joint military operations with United States troops in another Cambodian border area (see ch. 14).

General Lon Nol's initial reaction to the intervention was that the United States should have given arms to his government so that Cambodians might themselves drive the Communists from their country. Nonetheless, he expressed his satisfaction with the president's assurances that the United States troops would withdraw by the end of June and that Cambodia's neutrality and territorial integrity would be scrupulously respected.

On May 5, 1970, Cambodia and South Vietnam reached a tentative agreement that a South Vietnamese mission be set up in Phnom Penh, pending the resumption of diplomatic relations. Diplomatic ties were formally restored on May 27, 1970, the two countries agreeing to respect each other's present territorial limits, to normalize economic relations, and to settle all outstanding issues as early as practicable. At the same time, South Vietnam pledged to withdraw its troops from Cambodia when their mission was completed, thereby modifying the statement of South Vietnam's President Nguyen Van Thieu of May 8, 1970, that his government's troops would remain in Cambodia indefinitely as long as the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces in that country posed a threat to the security of South Vietnam. For its part, the government of Cambodia promised to guarantee the security of Vietnamese lives and property in Cambodia and to extend every facility to Vietnamese wishing to return to Cambodia. (By late May 1970 a large number of Vietnamese nationals had been repatriated from Cambodia, many of them against their will) (see ch. 2). South Vietnam, in turn, made a similar assurance that the status of the Khmer under its jurisdiction would be considered "with a sincere spirit of cooperation."

On June 27, 1970, South Vietnamese President Thieu, emphasizing that the presence of his government troops in Cambodian border areas was temporary, announced that the two countries had agreed to coordinate their military operations in communist-infested areas. He also reaffirmed that Cambodia's neutrality and territorial integrity would be respected by his government.

Despite this indication of government-to-government cordiality, Cambodian popular resentment against the presence of South Vietnamese forces manifested itself occasionally, and relations between the Cambodian and South Vietnamese troops were sometimes strained. Amid reports that South Vietnamese soldiers had mistreated Cambodian nationals, a Cambodian official told a press conference on May 21, 1970, that "the Cambodians would rather die than remain under Vietnamese domination," adding that he meant all Vietnamese, communist or otherwise. Despite assurances by South Vietnam that these incidents of misbehavior by "indisciplined and isolated elements" would not go unpunished, friction between the troops of the two countries continued intermittently in 1972.

Thailand

Cambodia and Thailand resumed diplomatic relations in May 1970, and four months later Thailand's first ambassador to Cambodia in more than nine years assumed his post in Phnom Penh. Diplomatic relations had been broken by the Sihanouk government in 1961. Relations between the two countries had been generally strained since Cambodian independence, as much because of frequent border clashes as because of mutual suspicion of each other's position in relation to the East-West conflict. Underlying these sources of tension was the traditional antagonism between the Khmer and Thai peoples dating back at least to the thirteenth century (see ch. 3).

Their modern differences stemmed initially from a dispute over possession of the ancient Buddhist temple of Preah Vihear in northern Cambodia. The issue was whether the ruined temple, which had been occupied by Thai border police since 1953, was in the Cambodian province of Kampong Thum or in the Thai province of Sisaket. (The northern part, Kampong Thum, was subsequently made into Preah Vihear Province.) Bilateral efforts to settle the dispute through negotiations became complicated in August 1958 when Cambodia's recognition of the PRC antagonized Thailand. Mutual recriminations led to Cambodia's suspension of diplomatic relations three months later but, through the good offices of the United Nations, formal relations were restored in February 1959.

The situation deteriorated again after October 1959 when Cambodia unilaterally referred the temple dispute to the International Court of Justice at The Hague, which, in June 1962, passed judgment in Cambodia's favor. Cambodia-Thai relations became increasingly tense because of frequent border clashes between Cambodian and Thai forces and because of the anti-Sihanouk activities of the Free Khmer who, Cambodia charged, were also based in Thailand and were aided and abetted by the Thai government. Relations were further strained because of Thailand's frequent disparaging references to Cambodia as a procommunist neutral country. In October 1961 Cambodia broke off diplomatic relations as a result of a Thai government allegation that Cambodia became a springboard for Chinese Communist aggression against Thailand and South Vietnam. This allegation was made in reaction to an earlier public statement by Prince Sihanouk that he would rather fight Thailand than Communists.

Border skirmishes became more frequent with the escalation of the war in Vietnam and with the growing evidence of North Vietnamese participation in the communist insurgency in South Vietnam. In view of the intensification of communist-supported armed insurgency in its own territory in late 1965, Thailand came to suspect that Cambodians and Vietnamese Communists were colluding against it. In February 1966 the Thai government charged Cambodia, before the United Nations, with permitting its territory to be used as sanctuary for the Viet Cong insurgents and with allowing them to pass through its territory into Thailand. The government of Cambodia denied this allegation.

In mid-1966 a special envoy of the United Nations visited both Cambodia and Thailand to help restore diplomatic relations between them. This mission failed, partly because of Cambodian insistence that Thailand renounce its territorial claims and partly because of Thai refusal to recognize Cambodia's frontiers and its neutrality. In June 1967 Prince Sihanouk stated that he would discuss the border question instead with the Thailand Patriotic Front, the communist-directed insurgent organization in that country. Charges and countercharges concerning border violations continued. In August 1968 Cambodia was accused of sending armed infiltrators and of fortifying border outposts. For its part, Cambodia, in May 1969, formally notified the United Nations Security Council of an alleged Thai plot to establish an anti-Cambodian rebel government inside Cambodia.

Cambodian-Thai relations improved substantially after the ouster of Prince Sihanouk in March 1970. With the resumption of diplomatic ties in May 1970, Thailand announced its decision to supply Cambodia with Thai-made gunboats, uniforms, shoes, and medical supplies. In late July 1970 Premier Lon Nol paid an official visit to Bangkok—the first by a Cambodian head of government in twenty years. While in Bangkok the premier declared, "We want Thailand to realize that the danger to Cambodia is also a danger to Thailand." The leaders of the two countries discussed, among other things, a Cambodian request for aid, including communications equipment, arms and ammunition, and also Thai troops.

In August it was announced by the Thai government that Cambodia had given permission for Thailand to deploy its troops into Cambodian territories at any time it felt its own security was threatened by military actions of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops. Thailand decided not to comply with the request for troops; its position was that the Cambodian situation should be stabilized through diplomatic and political means as long as its own security was not directly affected. This position was also consonant with a Cambodian view, stated in September 1970, that the presence of Thai troops might provoke hostile reactions from the communist countries, thereby enlarging the Cambodian conflict.

In nonmilitary matters, trade relations were reopened in April 1970; a new civil aviation agreement was signed; and the border, closed since 1961, was reopened in the following month. Also in May, Thai citizens were permitted to visit the temple of Preah Vihear for the first time since 1963. In October 1970 a gift of five locomotives and twenty-four freight cars was presented by Thailand to Cambodia, and the following month railroad communications between the two countries, also cut in 1961, were restored.

People's Republic of China

The Khmer Republic, which the People's Republic of China (PRC) denounced as illegal, antidemocratic, and antinational, maintained no diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1972, since the PRC recognized the countergovernment headed by Prince Sihanouk. When the prince proclaimed in May 1970 the establishment of the GRUNK in Peking, the PRC withdrew its diplomatic personnel from Phnom Penh and recognized his government-in-exile, pledging full support of his efforts to regain full control of Cambodian affairs.

Before Prince Sihanouk was deposed in March 1970, Cambodian relations with the PRC had been generally cordial except for a brief period during 1967. These relations were characterized, however, by the prince's apprehensions about PRC intentions, as well as by his expectation that the PRC might exert a degree of restraining influence on Vietnamese and Thai expansionist ambitions in Cambodia.

Between 1953 and 1954 Cambodia, seeking military support from the West, made no attempt to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC. In February 1956 Prince Sihanouk visited Peking, where he publicly renounced SEATO's protection of Cambodia. He returned with praise for the PRC's achievements, but he had no illusions about the incompatibility of communism with the Buddhism of his country. He stated in no uncertain terms that Cambodia would not benefit from adopting the Communist Chinese model.

Premier Chou En-lai paid a return visit to Phnom Penh in

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November 1956. A joint communiqué issued by the two countries at the end of this visit affirmed the observance of the principle of peaceful coexistence and requested all Overseas Chinese in Cambodia to respect their host country, abide by its laws, and refrain from political activity. In July 1958 Cambodia recognized the PRC, and ambassadors were exchanged. In December 1960 the two nations signed a treaty of friendship and nonaggression, and friendly exchange of visits and aid by the PRC continued into the early 1960s, although the amount of aid given gradually decreased because of the PRC's own economic problems. In 1964, after Cambodia had cut off United States aid in 1963, more PRC aid was received, and in October 1964 it was announced that the PRC would build two factories in Cambodia and an international airport at Siemreab, near the Angkor Wat temple complex tourist attraction.

Various agreements for economic, cultural, scientific, and military cooperation were signed in 1965 and 1966 but relations cooled for several months beginning in early 1967, when Chinese students in Cambodia, inspired by the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution then underway in the PRC, displayed Maoist badges and publicly shouted Maoist slogans. Prince Sihanouk was particularly upset by a statement of support sent by the Sino-Cambodian Friendship Association in Peking to its counterpart in Phnom Penh, which had been ordered disbanded by him on charges of carrying on anti-Cambodian subversive activities. The prince denounced the Communist Chinese statement of support, which called on the Cambodian association to continue to struggle side by side with its Chinese compatriots against the Cambodian government, as "the first official attack by China" on Cambodia and "an extraordinary act of interference in our internal affairs." He threatened to resign and turn his government over to the army, which, he said, would turn to the West for help. He also threatened to recall his diplomatic mission from Peking on the grounds that foreign personnel were not safe in the PRC capital. Premier Chou En-lai sent a conciliatory note to the prince—the first such note sent to a foreign state since the start of the cultural revolution in 1966—assuring him that the events would not reoccur and reiterating his country's pledge to abide by the principle of peaceful coexistence. Nevertheless, Cambodia ordered the closing of the PRC's official news agency (New China News Agency) and kept a close watch on PRC diplomats in Phnom Penh.

In 1968 relations improved again, despite Prince Sihanouk's growing suspicion that the Khmers Rouges (indigenous communist insurgents) were supported by the PRC. The PRC gave more military, medical, and educational aid and equipment to Cambodia. In October 1969 Prince Sihanouk headed a delegation to Peking to attend the PRC's twentieth anniversary celebrations.

After March 1970 Prince Sihanouk perforce turned to the PRC for help. In Peking, he announced the establishment of various organizations under the overall direction of the National United Front of Cambodia (Front Uni National de Kampuchéa—FUNK), which, as it turned out, was controlled by the Khmers Rouges (Red Khmers) (see ch. 9). Despite the PRC backing, however, he stated in Peking in May 1970 that Cambodia did not want to be "anyone's satellite." He also declared, "I am an admirer of communism but I am not a communist. I am a nationalist, a Cambodian like my ancestors." What influence Prince Sihanouk actually wielded within the FUNK, as well as the GRUNK, was a matter of speculation in 1972.

THE UNITED STATES

Cambodian relations with the United States, tense during the 1963–69 period, have improved considerably since the resumption in June 1969 of diplomatic relations, broken off by Prince Sihanouk in May 1965. During the first decade of Cambodia's independence, these relations were based on Prince Sihanouk's assumption that friendship with and support from the United States were essential to maintaining his country's neutrality and independence. The United States was looked upon as the only effective outside power able to counterbalance the rising communist influence in neighboring countries.

Thus, in May 1955, after his return from the Bandung Conference, where he had assured Communist Chinese and North Vietnamese leaders that he would not seek SEATO's military protection, Prince Sihanouk found it expedient to sign a military aid agreement with the United States (see ch. 14). The Soviet Union and the PRC alleged that Cambodia had entered into a "military alliance with the United States." The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Cambodia, consisting of India, Canada, and Poland, reviewed the terms of this agreement and ruled that they did not violate the 1954 Geneva Agreement on Cambodia.

Cambodian-United States cordiality began to cool in 1959. There were at least three reasons for this: Prince Sihanouk's suspicion that the United States was involved, if only indirectly, in a plot to depose him; the increasing United States commitments to South Vietnam and Thailand, the principal Cambodian antagonists; and the United States disinclination during 1962 and 1963 to support Cambodia's demand for recognition of its border integrity.

Relations with the United States deteriorated rapidly in late 1963. In November 1963 Prince Sihanouk charged that the United States had actively supported the anti-Cambodian subversive activities of the Free Khmer operating from across South Vietnamese and Thai borders. He ordered the immediate termination of all United States aid to Cambodia. (The United States Department of State categorically denied Prince Sihanouk's allegation.) In March 1964 the United States embassy in Phnom Penh was sacked by mobs. Nevertheless, diplomatic relations continued until May 1965 when, amid increasing indications of border violations by South Vietnamese and United States planes in the course of their attacks on Viet Cong insurgents, Prince Sihanouk broke off formal relations. Another major factor contributing toward the diplomatic breakoff was what Prince Sihanouk called a slanderous article in the American publication *Newsweek*, which he claimed contained offensive references to his mother, Queen Mother Kossamak.

Cambodia's worsening relations with the United States did not mean that Prince Sihanouk was prepared to join the bloc of communist countries. Although in public he denied the presence of Viet Cong or North Vietnamese troops on Cambodian territory, he was not unaware of internal communist threats to his regime. In April 1967, when a Khmers Rouges rebellion broke out in the northwestern province of Batdambang, he suspected links between internal and foreign Communists. In the following month he reaffirmed his determination to defend his country's neutrality and territorial integrity against "any enemy whether it be the Viet Minh or the United States." He also commented that, although Cambodia supported North Vietnam, North Korea, and the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam "politically and diplomatically without reservations," his country would not support "certain of them in their attempt to turn Cambodia into a colony or a satellite by using the 'Red Khmers' as their Trojan Horse."

In late 1967 the United States presented Prince Sihanouk with evidence of communist sanctuaries inside Cambodia—a contentious issue between the United States and Cambodia since 1965—and proposed a bilateral discussion on ways to cope with the situation. Despite the prince's initial reluctance, this proposal eventually led to the visit of Chester Bowles to Phnom Penh in January 1968 and to the United States assurance that it would not attack these sanctuaries across the border. This assurance, coupled with the resumption of the Khmers Rouges rebellion at the end of 1967 and its intensification in early 1968, was instrumental in Prince Sihanouk's stiffened attitude toward the Communists and his growing appreciation of the United States role in Southeast Asia. Thus, in January 1968 he issued a warning to the communist rebels that, if he were forced to resign because of communist-provoked chaos, the alternative would be a takeover by the Cambodian army and the establishment of "a pro-American government." In such an eventuality, he warned, Cambodia would become a United States military base (and thus could no longer provide havens for Viet Cong troops). Then in November 1968 he publicly stressed the need for the United States presence in Asia as a counterweight to the power of Asian communism, adding that he might ask for United States military aid if Cambodia were threatened by North Vietnam.

Cambodian-United States relations warmed in April 1969 when the president sent a note to Prince Sihanouk stating that the "United States recognizes and respects the sovereignty, neutrality, and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Cambodia with its present frontiers." After the receipt of this communication, Prince Sihanouk expressed his willingness to reestablish diplomatic relations with the United States, which were then formally restored in June 1969. Relations between the two countries were not without friction, however. In July 1969 Cambodia signed a "trade agreement" with the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, which in effect regularized the Viet Cong smuggling of rice and pharmaceuticals into Cambodia. The government of Cambodia continued to protest the United States and South Vietnamese crossing of its border in "hot pursuit" of the Viet Cong forces during 1969 and in early 1970. Its protest was, however, also directed against the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam for its use of Cambodian border areas as sanctuaries and supply depots; in late December 1969 Prince Sihanouk in fact threatened to sever diplomatic relations with the Provisional Revolutionary Government if its violations of Cambodian territory were not stopped.

After the change in Cambodian government leadership in March 1970, the United States continued to maintain its policy of respecting Cambodian neutrality. At the request of the Cambodian government, however, it began to provide the government of General Lon Nol with small arms shipments. The scope of this military assistance was widened at the end of April when President Richard M. Nixon announced the undertaking of joint United States-South Vietnamese military operations inside Cambodia in order to "clean out major enemy sanctuaries on the Cambodian-Vietnamese border" and to prevent that country from becoming "a vast enemy staging area and a springboard for attacks on South Vietnam along 600 miles of frontier—a refuge where enemy troops could return from combat without fear of retaliation." The president took pains to stress that this joint operation was "not an invasion of Cambodia" and that, once the enemy forces were driven out of these sanctuaries and their military supplies were destroyed, the United States forces would withdraw. In a May 8 news conference the president further stated that all United States military personnel, including advisers, would be out of Cambodia by June 30.

On June 30, 1970, in a report to the American people concerning the Cambodian situation, the president laid down an explicit framework for future United States policy toward Cambodia. This framework, consisting of a seven-point guideline, was:

1. There will be no U.S. ground personnel in Cambodia except for the regular staff of our Embassy in Phnom Penh.
2. There will be no U.S. advisers with Cambodian units.
3. We will conduct—with the approval of the Cambodian Government—air interdiction missions against the enemy efforts to move supplies through Cambodia toward South Vietnam and to re-establish base areas relevant to the war in Vietnam. We do this to protect our forces in South Vietnam.
4. We will turn over material captured in the base areas in Cambodia to the Cambodian Government to help it defend its neutrality and independence.
5. We will provide military assistance to the Cambodian Government in the form of small arms and relatively unsophisticated equipment in types and quanties suitable for their army. To date we have supplied about $5 million of these items principally in the form of small arms, mortars, trucks, aircraft parts, communications equipment and medical supplies.
6. We will encourage other countries of the region to give diplomatic support to the independence and neutrality of Cambodia. We welcome the efforts of the Djakarta group of countries [11 Asian nations that met May 16-17, 1970 at Djakarta—Australia, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, South Vietnam, and Thailand] to mobilize world opinion and encourage Asian cooperation to this end.
7. We will encourage and support the efforts of third countries who wish to furnish Cambodia with troops or matériel. We applaud the efforts of Asian nations to help Cambodia preserve its neutrality and independence.

In 1972 this set of guidelines remained the basis for Cambodian-United States relations as well as for United States programs of economic and military assistance to the Khmer Republic.

FRANCE

Cambodia maintains cordial relations with France. French education, long the key to social and political advancement, remains important; French culture is admired; and France has materially assisted Cambodia in a variety of fields. Cambodia's relations with

France have become increasingly cordial since late 1963. France helped fill the gap left by the discontinuance of United States economic aid in late 1963 and in January 1964 offered Cambodia military and educational assistance (see ch. 14). Prince Sihanouk frequently visited France for medical treatment; he was there for treatment shortly before he was deposed in March 1970.

In July 1964, while visiting Paris, Prince Sihanouk told French President Charles de Gaulle that Cambodia regarded France "as the only possible bridge between East and West." About the same time, in an interview he gave to *Le Monde*, the prince was quoted as having said: "Without France and her intelligent policy, our disappointment with the Americans and even the British . . . would have turned us against the West. . . . It is thanks to France that Cambodia has not swung into the socialist camp and can still call herself neutral." While in France in July 1964, Prince Sihanouk also received additional offers of French credits to cover the cost of a number of economic projects.

In September 1966, much to Prince Sihanouk's gratification, France became the first foreign state to extend support of Cambodia's stand on neutrality and its territorial integrity. French military assistance continued throughout the latter 1960s and was maintained after the change of government in March 1970.

After March 1970 French policy with respect to the Khmer Republic and Prince Sihanouk's GRUNK appeared to be one of maintaining friendly relations with the two rival governments. In late April 1970 France supported Prince Sihanouk's policy of peace and neutrality as "wise." As of mid-1972, however, France had not extended recognition to Sihanouk's government-in-exile in Peking but continued to recognize the government of the Khmer Republic in Phnom Penh.

THE SOVIET UNION

Cambodia established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1956, and its relations with the Soviet government steadily improved, especially after the termination of United States aid in late 1963. The Soviet Union began to assist Cambodia economically in 1961 and militarily in August 1963 when it offered limited arms aid to Cambodia (see ch. 14). The initial military aid was delivered in February 1964, and a further delivery was made in November 1964. During the Cambodian-PRC-dispute of 1967 Prince Sihanouk suggested that, if the PRC's aid were cut off, he would have to turn to the Soviet Union and France for more help. In February 1968 a new military aid agreement was signed between Cambodia and the Soviet Union.

Prince Sihanouk was in Moscow when he heard the news of his deposition in March 1970. In May 1970, from Peking, the prince made "an official request for official recognition" to Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin; this request was made in the name of the FUNK (see ch. 9). In reply, the Soviet leader welcomed the formation of the FUNK but made no specific reference to recognition. In June 1970 the Soviet Union agreed to grant the GRUNK representative in Moscow the status of an ambassador, but as of mid-1972 the Soviet Union continued to withhold formal recognition of Prince Sihanouk's government-in-exile, maintaining diplomatic relations instead with the government of the Khmer Republic in Phnom Penh. The Soviet refusal to recognize the GRUNK was a source of growing dissatisfaction on the part of Sihanouk.

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE NATIONAL UNITED FRONT OF CAMBODIA

Despite the change in his political circumstances, Prince Sihanouk's foreign policy remained, as of mid-1972, essentially the same as it had been before his deposition. The political program of the FUNK announced on May 5, 1970, affirmed his previous policy of defending Cambodian neutrality and "the territorial integrity within the present frontiers." The FUNK also pledged that Cambodia would not enter into any military alliances or allow any foreign country to establish bases or station troops on its territory for the purpose of aggression against other countries.

In a press conference in early May 1970, Prince Sihanouk appealed to foreign countries to recognize the FUNK and its affiliate, the GRUNK. He said, "It is the duty of foreign governments to withdraw their embassies and consulates from Phnom Penh. After victory the Cambodian people will take each government's attitude into account. It is during this period that we shall find out who are Cambodia's friends and enemies." By mid-1972 a total of twenty-five countries (including the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam) had given recognition to the GRUNK; almost without exception, all of these countries followed foreign policies of anti-Western orientation.

The governments of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland had yet—as of mid-1972—to give formal recognition to the GRUNK. Neither, for that matter, had they extended recognition to the new government of the Khmer Republic; however, they continued to maintain diplomatic relations with it, although at chargé d'affaires level. Their ambivalence was evident in their recognition of Prince Sihanouk as the legal head of state of Cambodia without expressly referring to his government-in-exile.

In foreign policy tactics, the only notable departure by Prince Sihanouk from his pre-March 1970 line was the increasing emphasis he placed on "the common anti-imperialist front" of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam as a counterbalancing force against what he called the Phnom Penh-Saigon-Vientiane axis. The first major step toward establishment of this front was the Summit Conference of Indochinese Peoples held on April 24 and 25, 1970, somewhere along the border area of the PRC, with North Vietnam and Laos. This conference—reportedly held on the initiative of Prince Sihanouk—was attended, in addition to Sihanouk, by North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong, Prince Souphanouvong of the communist-controlled Lao Patriotic Front (the counteradministration to the neutralist Royal Lao Government in Vientiane), and Nguyen Huu Tho, chairman of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam. At a banquet for the delegates, PRC Premier Chou En-lai stated that the Chinese people would struggle "shoulder to shoulder" with the Indochinese peoples. The joint declaration issued by the conference affirmed the Indochinese peoples' determination to defend "the fundamental principles of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva agreements, to make Indochina a truly independent and peaceful area." The declaration also pledged that relations among Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam would be governed by the five principles of peaceful coexistence (see Cambodian Neutrality, this ch.).

As of mid-1972 it was unclear whether Prince Sihanouk was getting any military aid from the Soviet Union for his supporters in Cambodia. When told of his deposition in Moscow in March 1970, the prince had sent a telegram to Queen Mother Kossamak, assuring her that "the Russians have offered me aid of many kinds to restore order and neutrality in Cambodia." Fragmentary indications were, however, that Prince Sihanouk had found it impractical to count on assistance from both the Soviet Union and the PRC as long as his government-in-exile was seated in Peking and the Sino-Soviet dispute remained unsettled.

In May 1970 Prince Sihanouk publicly admitted that Cambodians were "comrades in arms with Vietnam, China and Korea," that they were receiving aid from these friends, and that their guerrillas were "sometimes trained in camps which [were] not always in Cambodia." He also said that Cambodia counted on the PRC in particular for necessary equipment. At the same time, however, he stressed that Cambodia did not wish to become anyone's satellite. On more than one occasion thereafter, the prince declared that he was not and would not become a Communist, since he disavowed none of his religious beliefs nor his nationalism. He even hinted at the likelihood of his going back to France should Cambodia become a member of the communist camp.

SECTION III. ECONOMIC

CHAPTER 11

CHARACTER AND STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY

The Khmer Republic (Cambodia) has an agrarian economy based largely on rice cultivation. Farming is the principal occupation of the people, and rice and rubber have been the usual exports. Industry, consisting mostly of food-processing plants and factories producing consumer goods, is still small and is hampered by the destruction caused by war. Commercially exploitable natural resources are limited.

The economy is far from self-supporting and is heavily dependent on foreign aid. The United States is the foremost donor and has financed the development of the defense establishment.

Most of the country's 7.1 million people are farmers living in villages that are largely concentrated in the Cambodian Basin, the most fertile area of the country.

Before the outbreak of war in 1970, only 70 percent of the unforested area of the country was actually cultivated, reflecting a relatively light pressure of population upon the land. For the most part, food crops were grown on small landholdings tended by independent farmers whose tenure was virtually absolute; and the main outlet for the harvests was the subsistence of the rural household rather than the market.

Until 1963 the majority of industrial undertakings were privately operated. A number of state-owned enterprises were founded in the mid-1960s with foreign assistance. "Mixed-economy" enterprises, melding private capital with public, also grew considerably. By the late 1960s, however, dissatisfaction with most state participation in production was widespread. The coming of war in 1970 forced a postponement of the debate on industrial policy. In mid-1972, with the overriding necessity for maintaining production at a minimal level for economic survival, the government's major concern regarding industrial firms—whether private, public, or mixed—was the caliber of their management and not their legal ownership.

Commerce and industry, including handicrafts, employed about 235,000 persons, or about 10 percent of the economically active population in 1962, the latest year for which census statistics are available. Most of these enterprises are located in or near Phnom Penh, which is the focal point for all commercial and financial activity.

The internal transportation network, which centers in Phnom Penh, is inadequate, and freight charges are high—the result of numerous disruptions caused by widespread communist sabotage operations concentrated on the destruction of bridges and uprooting of rail trackage (see ch. 13).

Through 1969 foreign trade consisted of rice and rubber exports and imports of manufactured goods. After the outbreak of war in March 1970, however, rice exports dwindled, then were prohibited as a result of shortages, and finally ceased in 1971. Rubber exports ended in 1970. Imports of manufactured goods, on the other hand, have been maintained at a moderate level, averaging US $50 million per year through the commodity import program financed by United States aid. The United States has replaced France as the major supplier.

Government revenues are derived largely from customs duties and other associated indirect taxes. At no time in the 1960s did revenues finance more than 85 percent of government expenditures. In the 1970s budgets have been consistently unbalanced.

In 1970, with the outbreak of war, Cambodia's budgetary expenditure rose to a level over 50 percent more than in 1969. In 1971 as efforts to repel communist forces increased, budgetary expenditures again climbed. The deficits in 1969 and 1970 were met by advances from the central bank, and the deficit in 1971 was met by advances from the central bank and by counterpart receipts from United States economic aid.

The increasing magnitude of the military effort was also accompanied by a steady rise in prices and wages. As both shortages and demand increased, a serious inflation developed, aggravated eventually by hoarding and speculation. The increase in money supply resulting from budget deficits and the contraction in the supply of goods caused a price inflation of about 140 percent between March 1970 and December 1971.

To counteract these inflationary price pressures, the government, on the advice of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), undertook a far-reaching economic stabilization program in October 1971. Since March 1970, through successive devaluation, the riel has been depreciated from 55 to 186 to the United States dollar. Also on the advice of the IMF, the government has succeeded in establishing a multilateral Exchange Support Fund (ESF), earlier known as the Exchange Stabilization Fund, to help finance those foreign exchange requirements that cannot be financed under bilateral aid programs.

A second five-year plan, launched in 1968, has been abandoned. In 1972 economic development was necessarily linked to the country's defense of its terrritory against foreign occupation. A serious deficiency hampering improvement of all sectors of the economy has been the shortage of trained technical, professional, managerial, and administrative personnel (see ch. 12).

The data in the first half of 1972 on the economic structure of the area of the Khmer Republic under enemy control were fragmentary. A fundamental revamping of the economic life of persons under communist control was in motion, but how far it had gone was difficult to evaluate. Available reports indicated that the communist administrators intended ultimately to construct a state on the Asian communist model but had been forced by the geographic and socioeconomic environment in their areas to move with comparative moderation.

ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND TRENDS

From Independence Until March 1970

During the 1952–69 period the gross national product (GNP) grew by an average of 5 percent in real terms but at a faster growth rate in the 1950s than in the 1960s. From 1956 to 1963 the rate of growth of the GNP was about 7 percent a year. Rice production increased considerably faster than the population grew, and industrial production increased about 7 percent a year. Government expenditures in this period increased at about 20 percent a year, to reach 21 percent of the GNP in 1963. Total investment in 1963 was about 17 percent of the GNP.

After this period of progress, agriculture began to stagnate. The nationalization of foreign trade, banking, and insurance caused a setback to the service components of the GNP, and construction sharply declined. As a result, the GNP increased at only about 4 percent a year in real terms from 1963 to 1969.

Exports have temporarily increased in years of favorable rice crops, but over the 1963–68 period they stagnated at the level of the approximate equivalent of US$90 million, and in percentage of the GNP exports declined from about 12 percent to 8 percent. Imports had remained stationary at the equivalent of about US$97 million, with a temporary increase in intermediate years. The trend of rice exports had been to decline in the late 1960s.

After the requested termination of United States assistance in 1963 and because of a slower expansion of the tax base throughout the 1964–69 period, the government faced a serious financial constraint (see ch. 3). Despite economies in outlays on defense (which fell from 8 percent of the GNP in 1962 to 5 percent of the GNP by 1968), the national budget was persistently in deficit. Public sector investment outlays as a proportion of the GNP declined from over 7 percent in 1963 to about 5 percent in 1968.

Until 1967 concentration on such sectors as health and education had been placed above economic growth as a national objective. By contrast, priorities established by the second five-year plan (1968–72) placed prime emphasis on the development of the productive sectors of the economy (see Economic Policy, this ch.). First priority was agriculture, followed by industry, tourism, transport, and social services.

The government, however, found it difficult to adhere to these priorities because of the shortage of funds and of sufficiently prepared projects, particularly in the agriculture sector. Social expenditures, after the adoption of the second five-year plan, continued to grow faster than in any other field. In the national budget (through 1968) total current expenditures increased at 6 percent annually, but education expenditures grew at 12 percent a year, and health expenditures rose by 8 percent a year.

In 1969, for an estimated population of about 7 million, the country's economy provided an income level of about 6,000 riels (for value of riel—see Glossary) per person per year, which at the exchange rate then in effect was equivalent to about US$110. The economy was dominated by a relatively stagnant agricultural sector, which had lower yields of foodcrops than most countries in the region (see ch. 12). The agricultural sector (including fisheries and forestry) accounted for roughly two-fifths of the GNP, but the proportion of the country's population living on the land was about 80 percent. Agriculture also provided virtually all of the country's exports in the form of rice, rubber, and various other products (see ch. 13).

There had been some structural changes in the country's economy after independence was achieved in 1953. Agriculture, as a proportion of the GNP, had fallen from 56 percent in 1952 to 38 percent in 1969, having grown at an average rate of only 2.7 percent a year. Construction had grown from 2 percent in 1952 to 6 percent in 1969, and the government proportion had risen from 6 percent in 1952 to 16 percent in 1969. Other sectors had remained stable. Assuming that the population had grown in the 1952–69 period at about 2.5 percent a year, the GNP in real terms had expanded about twice as fast, notwithstanding a substantial slowdown to an average growth rate of about 4 percent in the 1963–69 period.

In agriculture a third of the sector's contribution to the GNP originated from rice production. Rice yields (in terms of tons per

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acre) had not changed during the 1952–69 period; the increase in total production from 1952 to 1969 was the result of a growing population bringing additional land under cultivation.

Manufacturing represented 10 percent of the GNP in 1952, but this proportion reflected a relatively high level of handicraft activity rather than organized manufacturing of more modern type. During the period of French rule the country was mainly an agricultural hinterland, and manufacturing was not encouraged or promoted, with the exception of a few branches such as rubber processing for export (see ch. 3).

Beginning in 1952 manufacturing grew at a rate of 6 percent a year, and its proportion of the GNP had increased to 12 percent in 1969 after the installation of a number of new factories producing textiles, glass, cement, sugar, and tires, as well as cigarettes, processed foods, and matches (see ch. 12). In the 1955–60 period the combination of a rapid growth of government expenditures (by 25 percent a year) and an 8-percent annual increase in agricultural production had stimulated manufacturing, which during that phase had advanced at the pace of over 9 percent a year, largely as a result of increased utilization of existing capacity. In the following years, when agriculture tended to stagnate, industrial growth also decelerated—to 8 percent per year during the 1960–65 period.

The relatively small size of the manufacturing sector prevented it in the 1960s from imparting greater momentum to the economy. After the 1963 economic policy steps, however, manufacturing was the only sector (other than government) that showed considerable strength, when a number of newly established plants began operation in the public sector.

Effects of the War on the Economy

After the outbreak of the war in March 1970, its pervasive influence on the country's economy in general, and on the export sector of the economy in particular, was highlighted by the sharp drop in production and export shipments in virtually all commodity sectors (see ch. 14). In the course of the war some areas of the country from which exports were usually drawn had been outside the effective administration of the authorities. Large losses in supplies had been reported, and segments of the farming population had been displaced (see ch. 2; ch. 5; ch. 12). Higher retention of food supplies by producers was another consequence of the situation.

The principal routes for movement of export commodities had been interrupted, and the security situation throughout the country had inhibited the transportation of the smaller surplus in the producing areas of the countryside to the main marketing centers. Beginning in Mid-November 1971 the government in practice suspended export licensing for a variety of essential items, including such major export commodities as rice, corn, and cattle, for the purpose of assuring domestic supplies (see ch. 13).

The country produced a large surplus of rice for export until 1970. Rice exports in 1970, however, were minimal because of severe economic dislocations caused by hostilities (see ch. 13). In 1971 they shrank still further. Large losses of rice stocks were reported, and intermittent shortages occurred in the principal cities, where large numbers of the displaced population took refuge (see ch. 2; ch. 5).

Production of rice was estimated at 2.4 million tons for the 1971/72 crop year. In mid-1972 the authorities were contemplating having to import rice in 1972. The temporary suspension of rice exports imposed in mid-November 1971 appeared likely to be maintained throughout 1972.

Exports of natural rubber, the second leading export commodity, ceased shortly after the commencement of hostilities and was the main factor in the decline in exports in 1970 (see ch. 13). The part of the country in which production of natural rubber was concentrated had been the scene of extensive hostilities, and considerable damage to rubber-processing facilities had been reported (see ch. 12; ch. 14).

Earnings from the remaining export commodities, which comprised a variety of other agricultural and forestry products, cattle, and fish products, had remained relatively stable in the 1967–69 prewar years. By 1971 these exports fell to about a third of the 1967–69 average. The temporary restriction on exports of essential commodities imposed in November 1971 affected several items in the group.

Production in the manufacturing sector had also declined. The oil refinery at Kampong Saom had been destroyed, the principal papermill in the country was situated in enemy-controlled territory; and supplies to and from several other important industrial units had been impeded. In Phnom Penh, where most of the industries were located, there had been shortages of raw materials and spare parts and, in some instances, of key personnel who had joined the armed forces. The government estimated that those industrial plants that were still functioning in mid-1972 were operating at between 40 and 50 percent of capacity and that total industrial production was perhaps one-third of the prewar total.

The functioning of public utilities and other services had been impaired. Internal water transport had been disrupted. The railroad was inoperative, and the airport at Phnom Penh had been subject to sporadic attacks. Road transport had been pressed into service by the armed forces. Electricity shortages had initially been induced by shortages of fuel, although this situation had improved in late 1971 after increased deliveries of oil. The tourist industry, which previously had been a substantial earner of foreign exchange, had declined sharply.

Initially, after the outbreak of the war in March 1970, prices of domestically produced commodities tended to rise more sharply than those of imported commodities. From May 1971 growing shortages of imported goods had led to sharp rises in their prices; at the same time prices of domestic commodities also rose rapidly.

As an inflationary psychology developed, there was a considerable amount of hoarding for speculative and other purposes, and the supply position deteriorated. The prices of certain key domestic commodities, such as rice, sugar, salt, charcoal, and gasoline, were subject to official controls, but it had proved impossible to enforce those official prices. The government maintained strategic stocks of essential commodities in Phnom Penh and in provincial centers, but the amounts so held were small in relation to total demand. The authorities had therefore accorded high priority to improving the overall supply situation and maintaining public confidence in the continued availability of essential consumer items.

Balance of Payments

The country's balance-of-payments position is largely determined by trade in merchandise. Other items in the current-account portion of the balance of payments are relatively small (see table 3). Total payments for services have usually been about one-sixth of the value of imports of merchandise. Large changes in the balance of trade were directly translated into changes in the foreign exchange reserves.

The country's exports, almost entirely agricultural, had been growing from 1952 through 1969 at a rate of 3.5 percent per year. Within the components of the GNP, however, the services and industry sectors, which have a higher dependency on imports than does the agriculture sector, grew at 7.2 percent a year, compared with a 2.7 percent yearly rate of growth for agriculture. These findings had suggested to some Western economic analysts that the country's balance of payments had been in disequilibrium in the 1952–69 period, resulting in constant pressure on the exchange rate.

The country's total imports had grown between 1952 and 1969 at about 5 percent a year. The rate of growth before 1963 had been higher than this average; the difference was caused by the

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Table 3. Khmer Republic (Cambodia), Balance of Payments, 1966–70
(in million U.S. dollars)

	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970
Current Account					
Balance on goods and services	– 52	– 4	–15	–34	–30
Exports (free on board)	66	81	81	66	41
Imports (free on board)	–112	–83	–90	–99	–69
Trade balance	– 46	– 2	– 9	–33	–28
Total services	– 6	– 2	– 6	– 1	– 2
Transfers					
Private	6	4	3	8	8
Central government	15	4	12	2	22
Total transfers	21	8	15	10	30
Capital Account					
Capital flows	29	–10	– 7	15	– 3
Nonmonetgry sector					
Central government	17	– 2	– 3	1	– 7
Loan receipts (net)	(17)	(– 2)	(– 3)	(2)	(– 4)
Assets	(..)	(..)	(..)	(– 1)	(– 3)
Other	..	1	..	..	– 1
Total nonmonetary sector	17	– 1	– 3	1	– 8
Monetary sector					
Commercial banks	3	– 7	3	5	– 1
National Bank	9	– 2	– 7	9	6
Total monetary sector	12	– 9	– 4	14	5
Allocation of special drawing rights	..	..	..	..	4
Official reserves					
Liabilities	..	..	..	..	..
Assets (increase —)					
Monetary gold	..	– 1	..	13	..
Special drawing rights	..	..	..	..	– 2
Reserve position in IMF	..	..	..	– 5	– 1
Foreign exchange	– 2	8	11	..	7
Total assets	– 2	7	11	8	4
Net errors and omissions	4	7	– 4	1	– 3

.. zero or less than US$500,000.

Source: Adapted from *Balance of Payments Yearbook, 1970,* XXIII, Washington, International Monetary Fund, June 1972.

inflow of foreign capital and the comparatively more rapid growth of the economy during the 1952–63 period.

Imports increased substantially in 1968 and 1969 but declined by almost 50 percent in 1970, reflecting the decision of the authorities to protect international reserves in the face of sharply declining foreign exchange earnings by drawing down the relatively ample stock of imported commodities available at the outbreak of hostilities. In addition, because of insecurity along transportation routes, importers hesitated to risk their capital in the financing of import trade.

The balance of payments had shown a deficit on the services account in each of the four years 1967 through 1970, and preliminary data available in mid-1972 indicated that the position had worsened in 1971 because of sharp declines in revenue from tourism, as well as in government and various other receipts; there were sharp rises in freight on merchandise and in government expenditures abroad. Only an agreement by the United States—signed on March 2, 1971, to reimburse the government for foreign exchange costs incurred in purchasing a limited number of urgently needed commodities up to a maximum of US$20 million—and a United States cash grant of US$10 million on October 27, 1971, prevented an even more drastic fall in foreign exchange reserves in 1971 than in fact occurred (see table 4).

Net receipts from transfers had remained positive during the 1967–70 period, whereas the capital account and other items had fluctuated rather sharply from one year to the next. On the whole, however, in each year since 1967 there had been a steady decline in official foreign exchange reserves. As of February 10, 1972, gross official foreign exchange reserves, including gold and special drawing rights but excluding the equivalent of US$7.8 million in blocked French francs, amounted to US$26.8 million. Current liabilities stood at US$1.6 million, leaving a net balance of US$25.2 million. To this net amount, US$3.1 million in sales of foreign exchange reimbursable under the United States economic aid program could be added, bringing total net official reserves to US$28.3 million.

In early 1971 the government of the Khmer Republic was faced with declining foreign exchange reserves and the virtual elimination of foreign exchange earnings. It had also become apparent to the government that bilateral economic aid programs, such as that voted by the United States Congress for the country in early January 1971, or bilateral aid available from other donor nations could not finance all the country's essential foreign exchange transactions. In these circumstances the government sought an alternative source of international financial support. The IMF in March 1971 formulated a concept of an exchange support fund designed to alleviate the country's balance-of-payments position.

Efforts to gain multinational support for the fund were conducted in the latter half of 1971 and resulted in a formal meeting

Table 4. Khmer Republic (Cambodia), Foreign Exchange Transactions, 1971[1]
(in million U.S. dollars)

Sector	Amount
Balance (January 1, 1971)	60.2[2]
Revenues from exports and other transactions	12.8
United States cash grant	10.0
United States reimbursement for imports	9.3[3]
Total	92.3
Commodity expenditures	41.5
Noncommodity expenditures	16.8[4]
Total	58.3
Balance (December 31, 1971)	34.0

[1] Calendar year 1971.
[2] Balance on January 1, 1971, includes equivalent of US$7.8 million in blocked French francs.
[3] United States grant agreement of March 2, 1971, provides for US$20 million reimbursement to Cambodia toward its imports upon submission of satisfactory documentation.
[4] Noncommodity expenditures include US$8 million in payments on foreign debts, US$3 million in costs of Cambodian embassies, and in excess of US$1 million in transfer of profits.

Source: Adapted from United States Congress, 92d, 2d Session, House, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government Information, *U.S. Economic Assistance for the Khmer Republic (Cambodia): Thirteenth Report by the Committee on Government Operations* (House Report No. 92-1146, June 18, 1972), Washington, 1972.

held in Phnom Penh on January 14, 1972. A staff report of a United States Senate committee on the outcome of the talks stated that:

> At the suggestion of the IMF an Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF) will begin operations on March 1, 1972, with an initial capitalization of $35 million. The Cambodian government is contributing $15 million, the United States will eventually contribute $12.5 million (out of FY 1973 aid funds), and the Japanese government $5 million. Of the remaining $2.5 million, Australia has pledged $1 million, Thailand $250,000, New Zealand $119,000 and Malaysia $100,000. Indonesia, the Philippines, Korea, Italy, the U.K. and Singapore have refused to contribute at all, and the contributions of Japan, Australia and New Zealand were lower than the amounts these nations were requested to contribute.

Other information cited the New Zealand contribution at US$120,000 and stated that, subsequent to the Phnom Penh meeting in January 1972, the United Kingdom had pledged US$520,000. There were indications that the amount given by the United Kingdom was part of a contribution of a little more than US$1 million that was to be given over a two-year period.

On February 29, 1972, the government of the Khmer Republic established the Exchange Support Fund within the National Bank of Cambodia. Its purpose was stated to be assistance in the financing of foreign exchange costs of imports and related services and of certain other services and commodities that would be required for the civilian economy of the country at realistic rates of exchange. These were further defined to encompass all imports for the civilian economy and related services (except imports and services reserved for exclusive financing under the commodity import program of the United States or any other aid-providing country) and services or commodities required in connection with technical assistance or capital projects in public or private sectors for the civilian economy of the Khmer Republic (with the proviso that such services or commodities should be provided only by the countries contributing to the ESF).

The duration of the fund was to be from March 1 to December 31, 1972. The fund was to be administered by the Working Group, composed of a representative from the National Bank and from each of the contributing governments. The Working Group was, among other things, to receive reports from the representative of the National Bank of Cambodia on the progress of the country's economic stabilization program.

The Khmer Republic made an initial contribution to the fund of the equivalent of US$8.75 million. It promised in addition to provide the proceeds of a request for special drawing rights equivalent to US$6.25 million that the Khmer government expected to make on the IMF. (The Khmer Republic submitted this request to the IMF on March 1, 1972.)

Local currency proceeds (counterpart) of sales of foreign exchange by the fund were to be used for budgetary support or, if this were not agreeable to a contributing government, they could be sterilized—that is, held by the fund for its duration. An agreed percentage of such sterilized counterpart might be desterilized to finance local costs of specific projects for economic, social welfare, and development purposes, preference being given to those projects endorsed by an international financial institution.

The Khmer Republic had envisaged the conclusion of bilateral agreements with each of the governments contributing to the fund. The bilateral agreement with the United States, concluded on May 13, 1972, pledged the United States (subject to the appropriation of funds by the United States Congress) to contribute US$12.5 million in two installments; it also included certain understandings to govern the bilateral agreement. That portion of the counterpart attributable to the contribution of the United States was to be kept in a special account at the National Bank and was to be used under future project agreements between the two governments.

According to the bilateral agreement, reports by the representative of the National Bank to the Working Group would include information on the demand for foreign exchange and the relationship of the exchange rate system to factors affecting such demand. Also included was information on other subjects of common interest to members of the Working Group, such as matters pertaining to trade. On the United States side, this interpretation was reportedly related to the hope of the United States, expressed publicly in March 1971, "to establish a consultative group involving other donor countries as well as appropriate international organizations such as the IMF, which could coordinate the policy framework and implementation of all external aid to Cambodia."

ECONOMIC POLICY

Official objectives and targets for economic development have generally been modest. The projections of growth in the GNP in the second five-year plan (1968–72), published in 1967, were generally a projection of past trends and did not imply the initiation of ambitious programs. More than a simple awareness of economic constraints, including a limited endowment of natural resources, this modesty also reflected an appreciation of certain sets of values inherent in Khmer society (see ch. 4). Social development has generally taken precedence over material production. Buddhism supports a quietist attitude toward exterior circumstances in life. Awareness of poverty and dissatisfaction with the absence of modern technology are not widespread. Until the outbreak of war in March 1970, there was no urban proletariat worthy of mention; the subsequent movement of population to the urban centers may have changed this situation, but to what extent could not be definitely determined in mid-1972. The Khmer farmer was widely known for his remarkable self-sufficiency and apparent contentment, although the extent of well-being in areas not under the republican government's control was uncertain.

Single-minded pursuit of growth of the GNP, regardless of the distribution of income and social relations, was an idea foreign to nearly all Khmer. Large differences in wealth existed in addition to ethnic differences, the Chinese minority commanding disproportionate economic power. There was a school of thought, espoused by Prince Norodom Sihanouk when he was head of state and to some extent shared by other national leaders, in which agricultural pursuits ranked highest in esteem because land, or the soil, was assumed to be the source of all wealth, whereas commercial and other service activities were looked upon as more or less sterile or parasitic.

Long-Range Objectives

Agricultural development continued in mid-1972 to command top priority in the thoughts of the government regarding postwar economic policy, although for the moment the necessity for economic survival was an overriding preoccupation. One reason for the government's giving highest long-term priority to agricultural development was that the Khmers, who represented over 80 percent of the population, had not yet taken to nonfarming activities on a scale that would alter the country's national complexion as a farming society.

At the time that agricultural development was the government's major economic goal, up to the outbreak of war in March 1970, the government had traditionally placed prime emphasis on social advancement. Social expenditures—for education and health—during the 1954–68 period had increased 2½ times as fast as total revenues in the national budget, of which they absorbed 35 percent in 1968. Although the bulk of this effort was absorbed by education, part was directed at improving government services in the villages to raise living conditions. The objective had been to stop migration from the country into the towns, and this was to be accomplished by providing in the villages all the amenities that had made the people move to city agglomerations. This goal had not been achieved; the difference in urban and rural living standards had continued to grow in the 1954–68 period (see ch. 5).

The objective of agricultural development as such had been approached with a degree of paternalism up to March 1970. Prince Sihanouk, when head of state, had donated farm equipment to various villages while traveling through the country, and the government had attempted to lift farm prices by subsidizing government procurement operations for rice and other crops. Price control in general had been rather widespread, and prices for most goods and services needed to achieve agricultural production, as well as those for manufactured goods for general consumption, had been kept at a low level. In the case of imports this had been achieved until the devaluation of August 1969 by permitting essential goods to be imported at the official foreign exchange rate, which was about half the free rate (see Mechanisms of Control, this ch.).

There had been some examples, such as jute, where price incentives had been a successful means of stimulating agricultural production (see ch. 12). On the whole, however, and particularly as regards rice and corn, this approach had failed to produce results, and from the early 1960s agricultural production had shown signs of stagnation. Rice production increased from an average level of 1.5 million tons in 1955 to 2.4 million tons in 1960—at which level it had remained throughout the 1960s.

As of 1969 the government's approach was to rely much more than in the past on irrigation, and consequently its plans included some large-scale projects. There was significant potential in developing water management in Cambodia to achieve higher crop production, provided it was combined with better seeds and fertilizer. A systematic approach to introducing the Khmer farmer to modern agricultural techniques and, in particular, to making the best use of future availabilities of water for irrigation had not been found, however, before March 1970.

Because of the very uneven distribution of the country's population and the presumed availability of agricultural land in virtually unpopulated provinces (particularly those east of the Mekong River), colonization had been quite an important objective and continued to be so in mid-1972, especially once the problems of military insecurity were overcome (see ch. 14). Since voluntary migrants for colonization of new land were not forthcoming in great numbers, part of the effort (until the outbreak of war in March 1970) had been carried out by the military forces; and, on occasion, surrendering groups of rebel elements, after obtaining pardon from the head of state, had been implanted into settlement areas (see ch. 2; ch. 14).

Industry was given priority after agriculture in the second five-year plan (1968–72). Until 1970 foreign bilateral capital assistance had been obtained to build a nucleus of manufacturing industries in the country (see ch. 10; ch. 12). The country's general lack of resources was a basic hindrance to industrial development (see ch. 12). The government recognized that the limited size of the domestic market and the scarcity of industrial skills restricted the scope for realistically sized domestic industries producing domestic goods as a substitute for imports in certain fields. The government also knew that a large effort for export industries would not be a realistic goal for an agriculture-based economy such as Cambodia's. The processing of agricultural products for export could, however, well be envisaged. The development of industry was a politically sensitive issue because most industrial workers were non-Khmer and promising Khmer private entrepreneurs were far outnumbered by Chinese (see ch. 4; ch. 9; ch. 12). Moreover, industries introduced into a small market as "infant" industries were expected to be in need both of protection against foreign competition and of acquiring monopoly power; both ideas were unattractive.

There was in 1969, and continued to be through mid-1972, a great need to improve the quality of information on the whole economy. Statistical material was comparatively scarce and, of that available, very little was processed and published. Various parts of the government or of a ministry were not aware of facts known to individual officials in other parts. There was generally no systematic channeling of economic information to a central agency on which to draw, although such an agency existed.

Planning

Despite the continuing general absence of reliable economic information, economic planning had been given a role to play in Cambodia at a relatively early stage. The first such plan, the Two-Year Plan (1956–57), consisted mainly of a list of projects for the public sector and served as an experiment to gain experience. Two five-year plans had subsequently been prepared; the first covered the 1960–64 period, and the second included the years from 1968 to 1972.

A general feature of economic planning was the relative remoteness of the planners from the field of action. The experts who prepared plan documents did not participate in the ultimate decisionmaking process.

Execution of the second five-year plan was in 1969 still limited, by and large, to the sanctioning and coordination of investment projects in the public sector. The second plan was explicit on overall priorities, but these were translated into allocations of resources to economic sectors only in the form of lists of projects to be undertaken during the plan period, without converting these into five-year expenditure targets. The description of constraints on financial resources, and possible remedies, was not part of the second plan. As a result, the annual budgeting of development expenditures had been carried on generally without reference to the second five-year plan.

The preparation of projects was a special weakness in the development effort. Foreign assistance, for example, from France or the People's Republic of China (PRC) had been sought—and received—for projects for which there was neither an economic feasibility study nor a government agency equipped to judge these projects on their merits within an overall pattern of resources and investments. The planning council sanctioned all projects beyond a minimum size, both public and private, but all important decisions were referred to the head of state, who also took action unilaterally.

The first five-year plan (1960–64) proposed an economic growth rate of 5 percent per year, which was modest if compared with the 9 percent per year achieved in the preceding five years. A growth rate of only 3.4 percent per year, however, was realized in the first plan period. The target for investments, which was put at 12 billion riels for the five years, was exceeded by more than half but, whereas the first plan had foreseen 8 billion riels of investment in the public sector, only about 5.5 billion riels was achieved. Foreign resources, which had been projected at 2.4 billion riels, were disbursed in the amount of 1.5 billion riels. Private investment went beyond 13 billion riels, or 55 percent of the total, and three times as much as projected. Private investment went very largely into construction, not anticipated on that scale in the first plan, and a quarter was for production investment. In the public sector less than two-thirds of the amount proposed was invested in the productive sectors. In the social sectors, on the other hand, investment fell short by only 10 percent.

At the outset of the first plan, it had been decided by the government that all investment, including foreign assistance, would be centrally administered by the Ministry of Planning. This decision was not observed, and the national budget had its own investment funds allocated together with plan outlays. Substantial portions of plan funds, furthermore, were utilized for current expenditures. About 30 percent of the 1.5 billion riels of foreign aid were also made available for current expenditures.

For the second five-year plan, starting in 1968, the same 5-percent annual growth target was adopted. Of the proposed total investments of 32 billion riels, a quarter each was proposed to go into agriculture and industry. Fourteen billion riels, or 44 percent of aggregate investment, was proposed to be in the public sector, compared to 29 percent during the first five-year plan.

One clear economic policy implication of the second plan was a continuation, if not further tightening, of measures favoring state enterprises and discrimination against the private sector. The financial target of private investments of about 3.6 billion riels during the 1968–72 period compared on the average with actual private investments of 3.3 billion riels per year during the three years preceding the plan. The proposal that private investments should grow so slowly (or decline) could be understood in the context of very unfavorable policy assumptions vis-à-vis private enterprises. These included the policy pursued through 1969 of denying adequate bank credit to the private sector and thus effecting a transfer of private savings through the banking system into the public sector.

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The total cost of public sector projects inscribed in the second plan was 11.7 billion riels. The implied investment strategy was to concentrate on the productive sectors. In agriculture the aim was to increase production and productivity through irrigation and flood control systems, mechanization, colonization of sparsely populated regions, and other methods; to promote cattle raising; to promote production of industrial raw materials; and to reduce the difference in the standard of living between urban and rural areas. In the industrial sector the plan proposed the establishment of new industries processing domestic raw materials and producing goods needed for agricultural output, such as fertilizer, pesticides, and agricultural implements (as a substitute for imports). The major part of the investment envisaged for power would be absorbed by the Prek Tnaot (Prek Thnot) multipurpose project, on which construction began in 1969 (see ch. 12). The proposed investment in social services was designed according to the second plan to create poles of attraction in sparsely populated regions with a high potential for economic development. This was to be accomplished by providing public health, education, community centers, and other amenities to keep population on the land and prevent a migration to the towns.

Prewar Developments

In 1968 the country began a slow shift away from its earlier economic policy of orientation toward state enterprises. The shift was demonstrated in a number of actions—enactments, decrees, and adherence to international organizations—none of which was highly significant in itself. Each action was one part, however, of a persistent movement away from not only the Sihanouk version of socialism of the middle and late 1960s but also the lack of interest in the 1950s in Western economic concepts and from de facto nonparticipation in those international organizations where those concepts were dominant. Each action made clear, furthermore, the continuing determination of the country's governors to open their country to new Western investment (although under tight controls) and to seek the advice and assistance of the major international financial organizations. During 1969, for the first time, the country allowed experts from such organizations to examine the economy at firsthand.

In 1968 the country's shift in economic policy consisted, in the first instance, of a revival of attention to, and strengthened emphasis on, two laws and a decree; they had been formally in effect for some time but had languished for lack of vigorous interest.

Law No. 221 of September 13, 1957, still in effect in mid-1972, granted certain guarantees and fiscal advantages to potential foreign investors, varying with the importance of the investment for the national economy. Foreign private investment was guaranteed against nationalization for a period of from ten to thirty years. In the event of nationalization or expropriation as a public utility, a "just and equitable" indemnity would be accorded. Repatriation of up to 20 percent per year of the invested capital, as well as transfer of annual profits up to 20 percent of the invested capital, was allowed.

Law No. 242 of May 18, 1965, accorded certain fiscal advantages to those enterprises approved by the Ministry of Finance "during the first years of exploitation" and with a minimum investment of 1 million riels for industrial enterprises and 300,000 riels for agricultural enterprises. The law provided for an exemption from registration fees and stamp duties, for import duties on equipment and other materials necessary for the operation of the enterprise, for land taxes on rural property and cultivated land, for company profits and dividends, and for accelerated depreciation.

A decree dated March 28, 1967, authorized these fiscal advantages for industrial enterprises engaged in the manufacture of fruit juice, fishmeal, canned vegetables, vegetable oils using local agricultural products, chemical fertilizers, milk, caustic soda, and iron rods and in oil refining. A subsequent decree dated July 22, 1967, added the international-class hotel industry to the listing.

The movement in economic policy was also shown by the promulgation on March 12, 1968, of Law No. 357, known as the Law on the Distribution of Economic Activities, which enumerated the activities that in principle were reserved to the public sector. These were: extraction of precious stones, minerals, and sea salt; the production and distribution of alcohol and alcoholic beverages, arms and ammunition, and pharmaceutical products; the production, refining, and distribution of petroleum products; the production of chemical products other than fertilizers; and the exploitation of major dams and irrigation systems. Also reserved to the public sector were banking and insurance, foreign trade, wholesale trade in imported products, rail and air transport, and post and telecommunications. Notwithstanding the state monopoly in these activities, permission might be granted to private investors to undertake such activities for a period not to exceed twenty years. All other industries were open to private investors, but if the public interest so dictated (for example, in case of lack or inadequate response on the part of private initiative in a particular field, for reasons of public order, or for unjustifiable price increases), the state might intervene and undertake an activity otherwise open to private enterprise in competition with private firms on "equal terms." Private sector enterprises in fields not reserved for the public sector would be granted exemption from nationalization for twenty years.

The response to this law by the private sector was to look at the "stepping-in" rather than the "opening-up" clause and to regard the "equal terms" provision for public enterprises as of doubtful value. Only two projects came forth in the private sector after the law was passed and before March 1970. One was the Angkor Hotel in Siemreab, and the other a Khmer-owned but Danish-managed milk plant sponsored by a group of trading and industrial firms headquartered in Phnom Penh.

A decree dated August 5, 1968, established the National Investment Committee, headed by the minister of planning and composed of representatives from the principal interested ministries and from the National Bank. The committee was assigned the tasks of collecting the texts of all laws and regulations concerning investments to make them available to investors; facilitating new investments, reinvestments, and self-financing; and assuring the existence of an office where an investor can come in case of need. Its major assigned function was that of coordinating the activities of the various branches of the government in order to expedite decisions on proposed new investment projects.

In September 1968 a shift in policy toward greater involvement with international and regional sources of financial aid was initiated. In the next few months Cambodia sought membership in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, commonly known as the World Bank) and the IMF and confirmation of its membership in the Asian Development Bank (ADB).

Also in September, at a meeting in Phnom Penh, a group of countries—Australia, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), India, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the Philippines, and the United Kingdom (Great Britain)—plus the United Nations Development Program pledged to contribute, in loans and grants, the equivalent in foreign exchange of US$19.3 million to the first phase of the long-pending Prek Tnaot combined hydroelectric-irrigation project (see ch. 12). On November 13, 1968, Cambodia joined with the other pledging nations to sign, in New York, a multilateral agreement in which Cambodia promised to meet all the project's local costs, consisting of the balance of estimated total cost of the equivalent of US$28 million for its first phase.

On December 29, 1968, the head of state delivered a major speech before the opening session of the National Assembly in which he proclaimed a "new economic policy" and indicated that the country would join major multilateral aid-giving organizations. "Cambodia does not intend to cooperate with any country in particular, but with all countries throughout the world," said Prince Norodom Sihanouk. "That means cooperation with conditions dictated by us and in the frame of our national law." Prince Sihanouk also welcomed private foreign investment.

On August 12, 1969, a government of "national salvation" under Lon Nol was approved by the National Assembly and installed in office; the new government was so named in recognition of its mandate to save the country from economic disaster (see ch. 9). The head of state had announced that the government was operating at a budget deficit of over 1 million riels per month and had a balance-of-trade deficit in 1969, up to that month, of about US$20 million. The new government focused at once upon economic problems. Its ambition was to reverse the foreign trade imbalance that had afflicted the country after the peak year of 1965, when exports were slightly higher than imports (see ch. 13). In attempting to reverse this pattern the new government hoped both to encourage local production and to discourage the import of unnecessary luxury goods, or excessive amounts of nonluxury imports, such as petroleum and automobiles (see ch. 13). The government acted to achieve the former goal by devaluing the riel on August 18, 1969, from 35 riels to US$1 to approximately 55 riels to US$1 (see Mechanisms of Control, this ch.).

On September 25, 1969, the government concluded a trade agreement with the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam under which the country would sell rice legally to the South Vietnamese Communists and earn money lost to the government by smuggling (see ch. 13). At the same time, there was increased pressure for denationalization of companies that many persons had become convinced were accumulating profits mainly for a small group of associates and relatives of the head of state. The deputy prime minister in the new government, Prince Sisowath Sirik Matak, had recommended the reversion to the private sector of at least sixty companies owned by the government. The corruption of the state enterprises, which had become a matter of increasingly caustic public comment in the capital, accounted in part in 1969 for that year's excessive imports, which increased as officials in charge of the state enterprises encouraged more purchases from abroad than were necessary, reportedly so that they or their superiors could earn greater profits.

From December 27 through 29, 1969, the twenty-eighth National Congress was held in Phnom Penh (see ch. 9). A major topic of debate was the proposal (one of the new government's promised economic reforms) to allow foreign banks, including United States banks, to open branches in Phnom Penh. This idea was bitterly opposed by Prince Sihanouk, but the finance minister argued that "banks with foreign investments" would "help Cambodia to acquire more funds for its national construction projects and protect its interests in commercial operations as well." This dispute was at the core of the issue of whether to reverse the pattern of state socialism that had formed the keystone of Prince Sihanouk's domestic policies. When the National Congress adjourned, it was clear that a large majority of members of the National Assembly—whose members had attended all sessions of the much larger National Congress—and of ministers favored the economic programs of the new government more than Prince Sihanouk's policies (see ch. 9).

After Prince Sihanouk's departure for France on January 7, 1970, the government carried out a number of economic policy measures and initiated legislation, adopted by the National Assembly on February 12, 1970, designed to permit greater private participation in the economy. One enactment allowed the resumption of private banking to a limited extent (see Mechanisms of Control, this ch.). Another permitted private, rather than government, organizations to import and export limited quantities of secondary products. The National Export-Import Corporation (Société Nationale d'Exportation et d'Importation—SONEXIM) still retained an exclusive state monopoly over the export of rice and rubber, the largest sources of foreign exchange, as well as over the export of maize (corn) and semiprecious stones, which ranked next in export earnings. SONEXIM also retained control over a wide range of imports, including alcoholic beverages, air conditioners and refrigerators, cloth of most types, fertilizers and insecticides, medicines and pharmaceutical products, motors and generators, tractors, and raw materials for industry and construction.

The government still hoped gradually to return most foreign trade to the private sector. Once the law on liberalization of foreign trade was in effect, government officials anticipated that they could then add certain key products to the limited lists of those that the law allowed to be imported or exported by private companies. It was believed that ultimately even rice and rubber might be removed from control of SONEXIM. Officials also envisioned improving or selling national industries that continued to operate at financial losses.

On February 24, 1970, the government announced an exchange of new 500-riel banknotes for all the old 500-riel notes, valued at

40 billion riels. The exchange was to be carried out until March 7. For a citizen or organization to exchange more than 10,000 riels in old 500-riel notes, it would be necessary to place the excess in a government-controlled bank account. The equivalent sum in new notes could not be withdrawn until government officials had checked to discover the real source of the notes and to determine if they were forgeries.

This step was taken because counterfeit notes in this denomination had been appearing for some time. Although no formal accusations had been made, the domestic press had clearly indicated that communist countries were suspected of producing the false notes to help finance the efforts of the communist forces of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) and of the Provisionary Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam to purchase their rice and to ship war matériel, rice, and other necessities to their sanctuaries near the South Vietnam border. The total sums that the North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese Communists had accumulated for this purpose was reported to be possibly the equivalent of US$50 million.

Postwar Events

After the outbreak of war in March 1970, governmental officials temporarily postponed plans for further liberalization of the economy while expanding the army and appealing for foreign aid (see ch. 10; ch. 14). A decree issued on June 25, 1970, ordered general mobilization, which, in the economic area, directed the relinquishment to the state in time of danger of economic resources in accordance with requisition regulations. In August 1970 a staff mission of the IMF conducted a thorough study of the economy; an economic consulting firm under contract to the United States government and representatives of that government also made special visits in 1970 to assess the country's need for foreign assistance.

In late 1970 the government, despite the exigencies of the war, remained eager to continue the process of liberalization of the economy begun before Prince Sihanouk's deposition. On November 30, 1970, the government promulgated a law restricting SONEXIM to a monopoly in the export only of rubber and precious and semiprecious stones. Rice and corn, which previously had to be exported through SONEXIM, could now be sold directly overseas by private companies. SONEXIM simultaneously remained responsible for the import of all goods financed by foreign exchange, such as essential machinery and pharmaceuticals. The government promulgated a complicated set of regulations where-by private companies could import certain products with foreign exchange earned from exports.

Despite the mobilization of men and resources after the outbreak of hostilities in March 1970, the economic situation was better during the first few months of 1971, especially with respect to inflation, than had been expected in the autumn of 1970. This was because of the availability of large stocks of rice and imported goods, the sizable accumulation of private cash balances, and some lag in budget expenditures. Price developments after April 1971, however, showed a marked change. Prices rose sharply as shortages of various essential domestic goods, such as rice, sugar, and salt, as well as some imported products, appeared in Phnom Penh.

On July 6, 1971, Marshal Lon Nol, in a radio address to the nation, stated that military victory could be achieved only by firmly waging economic war. He called for support of general mobilization so that the national economy would be able to meet the nation's necessary wartime requirements (see ch. 14). Referring to "substantial aid from friendly countries," he asserted that the people must show the country's friends that they would not hesitate in making great sacrifices so that the country could remain independent.

Marshal Lon Nol, in a series of decrees issued in late August and September 1971, established a number of subcommittees to function under what was titled "the enlarged interministerial committee for general mobilization." The subcommittees were given various duties covering a wide range of economic and social activities pertinent to the pursuit of the war effort and to the continued development of the economy and society. In mid-1972 the fragmentary data available did not permit an informed assessment of what role, if any, "the enlarged interministerial committee for general mobilization" and its various subcommittees, if they existed, were playing.

On October 29, 1971, the government announced a comprehensive program of reforms aimed at stabilizing the economy. The program included: increased import taxes on all nonessential commodities; a new system for review of budget expenditures on a quarterly basis to eliminate low-priority items; increased interest rates on bank deposits and commercial loans; establishment of minimum reserve requirements for commercial banks; limitations on the purposes for which bank credit would be made available; elimination of credit to state enterprises and public utilities; increases in the prices of products and services of state enterprises and public utilities to eliminate subsidies; introduction of a flexible exchange rate system; and simplification of the import system to facilitate the movement of goods. The main emphasis of the program was on the restoration of monetary stability.

MECHANISMS OF CONTROL

In mid-1972 the concept of control of the economy by means of fiscal and monetary policy was a relatively recent development in the Khmer Republic. In the 1953–69 period Prince Sihanouk, by using the governmental system within ill-defined constitutional rules, was able to monitor all activities of the government of any consequence and to bend the decisionmaking process to his own will (see ch. 9). In the process of nationbuilding political aims had prevailed over strictly economic objectives. For the government in power in 1969, before the outbreak of war in March 1970, the primary domestic objective had been political stability supported by an effort at promoting social progress.

For these and other reasons, limited success had been achieved until 1970 in gearing the governmental administration to the promotion of economic development. After March 1970 the objective of political, military, and economic survival was uppermost; having considerable formal and informal counseling from international financial organizations and friendly developed countries, the economic machinery of the government was focused upon this goal.

The National Budget

The most important entity in Cambodia's public finance is the national budget, where about two-thirds of total government revenue and over 80 percent of taxes are inscribed. The budget is voted each year by the National Assembly, and it includes both current and capital transactions. Only a part of capital expenditures is listed separately, however. Each chapter (corresponding to a ministry) is divided into expenditures for salaries and for goods and services without specifying function. Expenditures from foreign grants and loans are not inscribed in the budget, nor are their accounts kept in the Ministry of Finance. The monetary value of military supplies received as aid from abroad is not included in the budget estimates. No data of actual expenditures for previous years are shown in the budget documents. Detailed data on expenditures as they are authorized by the treasury are recorded in the Ministry of Finance, but in 1970 actual outlays had not been registered for many years.

The public finance sector included, in addition to the national budget, six principal agencies (or groups of agencies) with independent budgets but interlinked with numerous lines of financial transfers. Of these, the two most important were the local entities (communes, provinces, and municipalities) and the special accounts of the treasury.

Government expenditures have been consistently higher than government revenues since 1958. In the 1960s the annual budgetary deficits had been on the average one-seventh of total expenditures. The budget deficits had been covered by nontax sources, such as current foreign aid (grants and borrowing) and National Bank of Cambodia financing.

In 1970, reflecting the effect of the outbreak of war on expenditures for military personnel and on receipts from taxes on external trade, the budget deficit rose to 7 billion riels on a budget of 11.9 billion riels. Advances from the National Bank financed the deficit.

By mid-1972 at least three versions of the 1971 national budget had been made public. The original budget estimates, enacted by the National Assembly on July 27, 1971, calculated total expenditures at 18.7 billion riels, total revenues of 6.2 billion riels, and a deficit of 12.5 billion riels to be financed almost equally by advances from the National Bank and anticipated proceeds from sale in Cambodia of commodities imported under United States economic aid. The proceeds included both the counterpart in local currency from the sale of the commodities and receipts from a special wartime 50-percent tax on such imports. The 50-percent tax, imposed on the 55.54 riels per US$1 exchange rate in effect at the time the budget was enacted, made the effective exchange rate for such imports 83.25 riels to US$1. The budget law enacted several other increases in import taxes and granted authority for the issuance of up to 1 billion riels in treasury bonds.

On August 28, 1971, the National Assembly approved a revised budget estimate for 1971. The assembly predicted total expenditures of 18.7 billion riels, reducing total revenues to 4.8 billion riels. The deficit was to be financed by National Bank advances of 10.1 billion riels and 3.7 billion riels from receipts from sales of commodities imported under United States economic aid, including the special wartime 50-percent tax on such imports. The budgetary enactment of August 28, 1971, also raised the authority for issuance of treasury bonds from 1 billion to 3 billion riels.

The government announced important new measures in fiscal policy as part of the economic stabilization program introduced in late October 1971 (see Economic Policy, this ch.). The main fiscal objective was to reduce the budget deficit. The fiscal authorities adopted procedures for quarterly budget programming as a means of strengthening control over budget operations. To raise revenues, excise taxes on imported alcohol and imported and domestic beer were increased. A new tax "for support of the war effort" was introduced on durable consumer goods and other goods, ranging from 130 percent ad valorem on passenger cars and parts to 20 percent ad volorem on radios, electrical appliances, and parts; all other import items outside this group were taxed at 3 percent.

The perequation tax (import surcharge) system (including the 50-percent wartime tax on imports under United States economic aid) was abolished at the same time. All imports were made subject to the basic (so-called minimum) import tariff, whereas previously imports from countries with which the Khmer Republic had not negotiated trade agreements were subject to the so-called general tariff, whose duty rates were three times those of the basic tariff. To increase budget revenues from less essential items, a surcharge was imposed on all basic import duty rates above 35 percent.

A plan for the issuance of treasury bonds was simultaneously announced at interest rates of 5.5, 6.5, and 10 percent for three, six, and twelve months, respectively. In the last two months of 1971 the government relied heavily on the sale of treasury bonds to cover the budget deficit, and the rate of government borrowing from the National Bank declined considerably compared with the rate in the earlier months of 1971. Another factor in decreasing the anticipated budget deficit for 1971 and consequent borrowing from the National Bank was a new procedure introduced in September 1971 to finance military expenditures that seemed to bring such expenditure under greater control. Before September 1971 the Ministry of Finance advanced money to the military authorities with the justifying documents to be submitted subsequently. After September the Ministry of Finance released funds to the military authorities only against the justifying documents.

The third, and presumably final, national budget for 1971, as reported by the United States embassy in Phnom Penh in May 1972, showed actual budget expenditures for 1971 at 17.3 billion riels and total revenue of 4.7 billion riels, leaving a deficit of 12.6 billion riels that was financed by National Bank advances of 10.9 billion riels and counterpart receipts from United States economic aid of 1.7 billion riels. The embassy also reported the 1972 national budget estimated total expenditures at 23.9 billion riels, revenues at 6.7 billion riels, and a deficit of 17.2 billion riels financed by National Bank advances of 10 billion riels and United States counterpart receipts of 7.2 billion riels.

Expenditures

Total expenditures through the national budget increased very rapidly from 1956 to 1962 at a rate of over 20 percent a year. From 1962 to 1968 the rate of increase fell to 3.6 percent a year. This change in pace reflected the fact that in the early period the government started from a position where the existing tax system produced more funds than the newly independent government was able effectively to use. As soon as this situation ended, however, surpluses disappeared, and by 1959 substantial deficits were produced that were covered with foreign assistance, largely from the United States. The greatest expansion took place in defense expenditures, which increased fivefold from 1956 to 1963; outlays on education increased about three times, as did general administration and economic services (agriculture, public works, and industry).

When in 1963 the government decided to renounce assistance from the United States and simultaneously maintain monetary stability, an austerity program was announced. Expenditures for education and for health programs were conspicuous exceptions, however, and defense and public investment absorbed the brunt of the overall restraint.

From 1962 to 1968 total salary payments of the government increased at 8.2 percent a year. All of this increase was for expansion of the number of civil servants, particularly teachers. The level of salaries had not changed since 1953, and only in 1969 was an adjustment of about 10 percent voted by the government to lessen the effects of the devaluation of August 1969 on the cost of living.

In 1969 budget expenditures were 8.1 billion riels, or 20 percent above the 1968 level of 7 billion riels (see table 5). Most of the increase reflected higher civilian expenditures, which rose 24 percent compared to the 1968 level and accounted for 78 percent of total expenditures in 1969. Military expenditures rose by 6 percent and constituted 22 percent of budget expenditures, reflecting mainly higher personnel costs.

The outbreak of war in March 1970 brought major changes in government expenditures. Military expenditures rose by 300 percent, and total expenditures increased by over 50 percent. Civilian expenditures, however, fell only slightly.

The increases in total and military expenditures continued in the national budget for 1971, although at a somewhat slower rate. Total expenditures increased by about 45 percent. Military expenditures increased by over 100 percent, reflecting mainly personnel costs (see ch. 14). Civilian expenditures fell a little more slowly.

Revenues

Although a large number of agencies formed part of the public finance sector, the collection of taxes was very centralized. For example, in 1966, of a total tax revenue of 4.9 billion riels, the national fiscal channels collected 86 percent; the special accounts of the treasury, 7 percent; and the local entities, the remaining 7 percent.

Table 5. Khmer Republic (Cambodia), National Budget, 1969–71
(in million riels)*

	1969	1970	1971
Expenditures			
Civil			
Personnel	3,170	3,726	3,836
Materiél	3,398	2,768	2,481
Total	6,568	6,494	6,317
Military			
Personnel	1,144	3,952	9,982
Materiél	379	1,410	983
Total	1,523	5,362	10,965
Total	8,091	11,856	17,282
Revenues			
Domestic taxes	2,381	n.a.	n.a.
Taxes on external trade	2,350	n.a.	n.a.
Other receipts	2,339	n.a.	n.a.
Total	7,070	4,811	4,657
Accounting Deficit			
Foreign loans and grants	700	..	..
Domestic borrowing	..	..	..
Treasury operations	115	..	..
National Bank advances	206	7,045	10,879
United States aid counterpart	..	..	1,746
Total	1,021	7,045	12,625

n.a.—not available.
. zero or less than 500,000 riels.
* For value of riel—see Glossary.

The structure of taxation was not simple. Of the tax revenue included in the national budget in the 1960s, however, 75 percent was derived from the four most important taxes—that is, the excise tax, turnover tax, import duties, and income tax. In 1969 the shares of domestic taxes, taxes on external trade, and nontax receipts in total budget revenues were 34 percent, 33 percent, and 33 percent, respectively.

Only very minor changes in the field of taxation were made during the 1956–68 period; no attempt was made either to simplify the system or to introduce new taxes, with the exception of the import surcharge in 1963. To meet the increasing financial demands of the public sector, the policy until 1970 appeared to have been to rely on new extrabudgetary resources more than on taxation.

Budget receipts increased by 17 percent in 1969, to 7.1 billion riels, the largest increase being recorded in nontax receipts. The war seriously affected budget receipts in 1970, especially by causing a sharp decline in exports. Budget receipts declined by over 30 percent to 4.8 billion riels. Continued effects of the war caused a further decline in 1971, to 4.7 billion riels.

Currency, Credit, and Money Supply

The country's currency is the riel, which is subdivided into 100 sen. Banknotes are issued by the National Bank of Cambodia, and coins are issued by the treasury. Through 1954 the issue function was handled by the Joint Currency Board for Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, but after the Paris Accords of December 24, 1954, the currency board was dissolved. On January 1, 1955, the National Bank of Cambodia assumed responsibility for the issue of banknotes and the currency unit was changed from the piaster to the riel. In March 1956 a formal currency law was enacted, and the parity of the riel was fixed at 25.4 milligrams of gold.

From January 1955 through August 1969, the basic exchange rate for the riel was 35 riels to US$1. On August 18, 1969, the riel was devalued by 37 percent to a rate of 55.54 riels to US$1, and the gold parity of the riel was changed from 25.4 milligrams to 16 milligrams. This devaluation was induced to some extent by the French devaluation of August 10, 1969.

Beginning in 1955, because of exchange anomalies with the French franc, the effective rate was 49 riels to US$1, a figure above the legal rate of 35 riels to US$1 but well below the Hong Kong free market rate for the riel at the time.

A complex system of foreign currency controls failed to prevent a black market from flourishing on the basis of these anomalies. A special rate of 60 riels per US$1 for tourists introduced in 1962 increased the purchasing power of tourists but also further encouraged clandestine trading in foreign exchange.

The 37-percent devaluation of the riel in August 1969 had the effect of realigning the rates for the dollar, pound, and franc. The special exchange rate for the conversion of foreign exchange by foreign tourists was also abolished on August 18, 1969. These were some of the first actions of the government of "national salvation" installed on August 12, 1969 (see ch. 9).

The country maintained a multiple-exchange rate system from 1955 until October 1971 (see Economic Policy, this ch.). The use of a multiple-exchange rate system, plus the level of quotations for the riel in free markets, indicated that the riel had generally been overvalued since the 35 riels per US$1 rate was introduced in 1955. Although the August 1969 devaluation of the riel eliminated a substantial part of this overvaluation, the riel remained seriously overvalued.

As part of the economic stabilization program introduced on October 29, 1971, the foreign exchange and foreign trade system was reformed. The main feature of the reform was the establishment of a unified exchange market with a unitary exchange rate and elimination of most import restrictions. The policy of the Khmer authorities was that the National Bank of Cambodia would adjust the exchange rate whenever the demand for foreign exchange exceeds a sustainable level. On October 29, 1971, when the reform was introduced, the initial rate was set at 140 riels per US$1.

The rate moved from 140 riels to the dollar on October 29, 1971, to 120 riels to the dollar on January 17, 1972, then gradually up to 150 riels to the dollar in March 1972. (On January 17, 1972, the government introduced a 25-percent preferential exchange rate for commercial aid imports procured in the donor country; in other words, whatever the exchange rate might be, the rate for such imports was 25 percent less.) By late June 1972 the rate had moved to 186 riels to the dollar.

Bank credits extended to business enterprises originated from two sources—the state commercial banks and the National Bank. The largest part of commercial bank credit represented overdrafts. From 1963 to 1968 such credits were almost stable, at about 2.8 billion riels. In 1969 they increased by 20 percent; in 1970, by a further 29 percent; and in 1971 bank credits extended to business enterprises rose to 5.7 billion riels. The continued expansion of bank credit reflected a lack of available funds in the business community to support a large volume of imports.

Despite small increases and one decrease (in 1969), the money supply (currency in circulation plus demand deposits) had remained nearly stable in the years before the outbreak of the war in March 1970. The pattern of monetary development underwent a marked change during 1970, reflecting the impact of war. The money supply rose by 70 percent in 1970 to 13.5 billion riels. The increase represented a sharp change in currency in circulation, which rose by 98 percent to 11.5 billion riels, whereas demand deposits declined slightly. Net foreign assets decreased by only 86 million riels despite a sharp decline in export proceeds because the government curtailed official imports to preserve exchange reserves.

The rate of expansion of the money supply slowed somewhat—to 50 percent—in 1971. The data available in mid-1972 indicated that in 1971 there had been some change in the relative composition of the money supply; demand deposits had increased at a rate higher than the rate of growth of currency in circulation. Western observers speculated that this tendency might indicate a disinclination to hold large amounts of currency during a time of physical insecurity.

Banking

In mid-1972 the banking system comprised the National Bank of Cambodia (the central bank), two government commercial banks (the Khmer Bank of Commerce and the Inadana Jati [National Credit] Bank), and the Cambodian Development Bank. The Agricultural Credit Bank, established in November 1969, had assumed the credit activities previously carried out by the Royal Office of Cooperation and advanced credit mainly to agricultural cooperatives (see ch. 12). Outside the banking system, the most important financial institutions were the National Insurance Company, which had had the insurance monopoly after nationalization in 1963, and the Government Pension Fund.

In February 1970, as part of a general move to open more sectors of the economy to private enterprise, the government revised the basic law regulating the banking profession to permit the private sector to undertake banking activities, but private banks were not allowed to extend credits with a maturity of less than one year; accept deposits with a maturity of less than one year; or engage in export-import operations. A further amendment to the banking law effective March 2, 1971, removed these restrictions and therefore allowed the practice of banking in Cambodia by any entity, public or private, domestic or foreign, in all fields. As of mid-1972, however, no domestic private banks had been established, and the only foreign banking facilities were representative offices of two French private banks and one British private bank.

As a part of the economic stabilization program introduced on October 29, 1971, several changes were made in monetary practices. To encourage domestic savings, interest rates on time deposits with the commercial banks were increased to 5.5, 6.5, and 10 percent per year for deposits of six, three, and twelve months. This represented an increase of three percentage points on the rates formerly applied. The minimum deposit required for the opening of a time deposit account was reduced from 100,000 to 50,000 riels.

General policy guidelines were established to channel bank credit to priority areas. Priority was given to bank credit for financing production, exports, imports of essential goods, and distribution. In principle, the use of bank credit for financing any operational losses of state enterprises and public utility companies, medium-term investment, and general imports was not to be allowed. Bank lending rates of 10 and 12 percent per year were established for priority and nonpriority credits, respectively.

To strengthen their control over the operations of the banking system, the monetary authorities introduced a minimum reserve requirement of 30 percent on total deposits of the state commercial banks. Of these reserves, one-third was to be held in the

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form of deposits with the National Bank and up to one-third in the form of treasury bonds.

National Bank of Cambodia

The National Bank of Cambodia was established on January 1, 1955, and began operations on January 10, 1955. By law, 75 percent of its capital was to be subscribed by the government, and the remaining 25 percent was to be subscribed by the nonalien private sector. There were, in fact, no private shareholders. In July 1964 the bank was converted into a completely public institution, all of its capital being held by the government. The move transformed the National Bank from a private institution performing purely central banking functions into a public institution with broader responsibilities in the field of industrial and commercial credit.

In mid-1972 the National Bank's functions included the exclusive authority to issue banknotes, the responsibility to regulate the volume of credit by means of general or selective controls, the ability to provide credit to the banking system, and the duty to maintain the accounts of government entities. The National Bank served as a depository for the funds of both the government and various financial institutions. Other functions of the bank included controlling all foreign exchange operations and movements of capital into or out of the country and serving as a clearinghouse for the banking system.

Both the 1954 and the 1964 laws on the National Bank of Cambodia subjected it to certain statutory restraints. The National Bank's advances to the treasury were not to exceed 25 percent of the government's revenues during the preceding fiscal year, and the bank was required to maintain reserves in gold or foreign exchange equal to, or at least 33 percent of, the money in circulation. Early in 1971 the minimum ratio of reserves to money in circulation was changed to 25 percent but, as a result of the continued large increase in currency in circulation arising from the budget deficit, it was no longer being observed in 1971 and 1972. The restriction on National Bank advances to the treasury had also apparently been suspended, beginning in 1970, but the legal mechanism by which this was done could not be determined in mid-1972.

The 1954 statutory directive to the National Bank to vary the volume of its credit to the agricultural, industrial, and commercial sectors in response to their needs was continued by the 1964 enactment. Additionally, the bank was instructed to prevent or modify inflationary or deflationary tendencies harmful to the economic growth of the nation. If the volume of monetary circulation increased or decreased in an "abnormal" manner, the bank's governor was required to present to the chief of state a detailed report on the causes and possible consequences of the change on production and employment levels, prices and general economic activity. The report was to include recommendations for measures to restore monetary and economic equilibrium. No information was available in mid-1972 as to whether one or more such reports had been presented by the bank's governor and, if so, what disposition of the reports had been made.

State Commercial Banks

From the late 1950s until mid-1964 there were generally eight private commercial banks operating in the country. Three were indigenous banks, and five were foreign banks. In mid-November 1963 the government announced that effective July 1, 1964, all banks in the country would be nationalized and the private banks would have to cease their operations.

A law of January 1964 provided for the conversion on July 1, 1964, of the Cambodian privately owned Khmer Bank (of which Prince Sihanouk had been a founder and was a major shareholder) into a new state-owned commercial bank, to be known as the Khmer Bank of Commerce. Before this step the Khmer Bank had reportedly functioned as the commercial arm of the National Bank. The Khmer Bank of Commerce has continued to concentrate on financing domestic commercial activity and international trade transactions.

In June 1964 the government established another state-owned commercial bank, which was named the National Credit Bank. This was advertised and subsequently became known as the Inadana Jati Bank; the bank's title was derived from the Khmer words for its name in English. Although originally announced as concerned with industrial development, in practice the bulk of the bank's credits have been extended to finance commercial activities.

Other Financial Institutions

The Cambodian Development Bank was a government organization, which extended mostly medium-term and long-term development credits to the public and private sectors. It superseded in 1969 the National Investment Fund, established in 1956. Most of the fund's credits had been extended to government or quasi-government enterprises and, to a lesser extent, to the industrial and agricultural sectors of the economy. The basic objective of the Cambodian Development Bank was to assist financially and technically all projects promoting the development of the economy.

First priority was to be given to expansion of the rural economy; and second priority, to the expansion of the industrial sector.

The Agricultural Credit Bank was established on November 22, 1969, as a national joint-stock company. The basic objective of the bank is to provide agricultural credits to those farmers who have had to pay usurious interest rates on borrowed funds. During the first years of the bank's operations, it was expected to extend credit mainly to those small farmers who were the poorest and the most in need of assistance. The bank planned to use part or all of the network of rural-credit cooperatives previously operating under the supervision of the Royal Office of Cooperation, in extending credits to farmers (see ch. 12). In early 1970 the bank announced the availability of credits and their assignment to the different provinces, subprovinces, and districts. No information was available in mid-1972 regarding the effect of the war on the bank's operations.

The National Insurance Company began operations in 1964, following nationalization of a mixed government-private company. It insured against all risks except life; the profits were remitted to the government. The Government Pension Fund derived its resources from a 6-percent deduction from the salaries of civil servants and a 6-percent contribution to the government. The total accumulated funds were deposited with the government.

The Public Debt

The extent of the country's external debt was uncertain. One tabulation, computed by the government on the basis of estimated repayment schedules of debts outstanding at the end of 1969, showed a total of the equivalent of slightly over US$49 million. About US$16 million of this total consisted of suppliers' credits extended by French public or private sources to finance exports. The other major category of external debt, loans from governments, totaled around US$33 million; this amount comprised slightly over US$4 million in loans from East European governments and about US$29 million in loans from Western governments, of which about US$9 million were in loans from France.

This same compilation, using the known repayment terms of the debt, calculated that in 1970 a total of over US$6.8 million would be required for payment on the external debt, in 1971 a total of US$7.5 million, and so forth, until by the beginning of 1990 the external debt would be reduced to US$2.3 million (provided no additional debt had been incurred after 1969). Of the approximate US$6.8 million due in 1970, repayment of suppliers' credits from France would take US$4 million, the balance to be paid on loans from governments. The subsequent annual payments followed about the same distribution, except that repayments of suppliers' credits from France were scheduled to finish in 1974.

Another compilation, also prepared by the government, gave somewhat different figures. This showed that the country had contracted external debt that totaled the equivalent of US$86.9 million at the end of 1969. The largest creditor was France, which extended the equivalent of US$34.7 million for various transport and industrial projects. In the second half of 1969 loans were concluded with three countries: the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), for US$12 million; Belgium, US$7 million; and Denmark, US$4 million. The East German loan would be used for the construction of a cement plant; the Belgian loan, for the establishment of a sugar factory; and the Danish loan, to finance agricultural, power, transport, and tourism projects. In January 1970 an agreement was reached with France for new loans equivalent to about US$22.5 million, of which about US$1 million was designated for the Prek Tnaot project (see ch. 10; ch. 12). Of the remaining balance under the agreement, half would come from the French government, whereas the other half would be in the form of suppliers' credits.

According to estimates made by the government, capital repayments on external loans totaled the equivalent of US$17.2 million during the 1964-69 period; interest payments in the same period amounted to US$4.9 million. In the absence of further information, external debt outstanding at the end of 1969 was presumed to be about US$69.7 million (US$86.9 million contracted minus US$17.2 million capital repayments). In 1969 debt service payments amounted to US$7.5 million, or 8.7 percent of the estimated receipts from merchandise exports in 1968.

On August 21, 1971, the government approached its major external debtors with a request for a moratorium on all payments due of interest and principal on external debts contracted before 1971. The government requested a debt rescheduling based on a three-year grace period on all payments followed by a ten-year repayment period.

On January 27, 1972, the governments of France and West Germany agreed to reschedule the bulk of their debt maturing in 1972. On their medium- and long-term government and government-guaranteed credits to Cambodia, the French and West German governments agreed to reschedule amounts equal to 80 percent of the installments of principal due in calendar year 1972, and Cambodia was to pay on schedule the interest and the remaining 20 percent of the principal due. The United States embassy in Phnom Penh estimated that this rescheduling would in

1972 afford relief to the country's balance of payments of approximately US$2.25 million.

The rescheduled amounts (the equivalent of US$2 million from France and the equivalent of US$250,000 from West Germany) would be repaid over six years after a two-year grace period, at an interest rate of 3 percent. The United States Agency for International Development reported, in a statement prepared for use before the United States Congress, that to the best of its knowledge Cambodia was not paying, and did not intend to pay, its 1972 debt obligations to Yugoslavia (amounting to about US$2,250,000) and to other East European creditors (the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany)—amounting to about US$2.3 million.

CHAPTER 12

AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY

The dominant economic resources of the Khmer Republic in 1972 continued to be its soil and its fish; the known exploitable mineral resources were limited. The Mekong River and its tributaries had considerable, but as yet untapped, potential for hydroelectric generation and irrigation. The country's manpower resources were almost entirely devoted to agriculture, chiefly the cultivation of wet rice, and to handicraft production. Only to a minor extent were they employed in industrial enterprises.

By mid-1972 two years of hostilities had seriously affected exploitation of many of the country's resources, some of which had suffered loss or damage. Manpower assets had been reduced disproportionately by the repatriation of many Vietnamese who had been important as skilled labor and commercial fishermen (see ch. 2). The movement of people to urban areas did not appear to have resulted in widespread unemployment.

The most notable direct war damage to natural resources was to rubber plantations and their processing facilities. All the major plantations had ceased operations, having important consequences for the country's economy through a loss of exports. More important to the average Khmer was the approximately one-third reduction in land planted with rice, as the result of military operations, local insecurity, a shortage of labor for planting and harvesting, and the loss of some ricegrowing land to enemy control. The output of other annual crops, both food and industrial, declined roughly a third also, for the same reasons; however, fruit production was little affected. The numbers of livestock, primarily draft animals, had been reduced considerably by theft or slaughter.

Cambodia's large forest resources covered over half the country's area, with the greatest unexploited stands in the inaccessible mountain areas. The forests were important to the people for firewood, which had become scarce for many farmers. Use of wood for fuel accounted for about half the normal forestry production and probably continued to do so without significant reduction because of the war. The other half, comprising timber, charcoal, and wood oils, declined by 60 percent or more because of insecurity in commercially exploited forestry areas.

The freshwater fish of the Tonle Sap and of Cambodia's rivers were an important, long-exploited natural resource that provided the standard and preferred protein in the Khmer diet. The trend of production of the Tonle Sap fisheries had been downwards in the 1950s and 1960s; the numbers of fish declined, and some change in species was observed. There was no general agreement on the possible reasons advanced: silting of the lake, overfishing, destruction of plant life, cutting of the inundated forest around the lake, and a rise in the temperature of the water owing to a drop in the low water level.

Warfare had caused a decrease in the freshwater fish catch of about 40 percent. This was partly owing to repatriation of the Vietnamese who had been prominent as entrepreneurs in inland commercial fishing. Marine fishing was little affected and was expected to increase with the introduction of modern deep-sea equipment. Marine fisheries resources were believed excellent, especially at the northwestern end of the Khmer coastline.

In 1969 Cambodia's small industrial sector, principally devoted to the processing of food and raw materials, contributed 19 percent of the country's gross national product (GNP), compared with 38 percent by the agricultural sector. The war affected industrial establishments in a very uneven manner. The few large state-owned factories and mixed state-private enterprises, some of which were located in the countryside for access to raw materials, had suffered more seriously than the much more numerous, and smaller, privately owned plants. Production at most private plants, heavily concentrated in the Phnom Penh area, continued close to prewar levels. The country's fertilizer, cement, and oil refinery plants had been heavily damaged, and its paper plant was in enemy-held territory. The output of manufacturing generally had fallen because of shortages of raw materials and of labor.

Expansion of the armed forces to about 200,000 by the end of 1971 created a drain on the country's manpower that resulted in a labor shortage in agriculture. Industry experienced manpower problems also for the same reason and because of the loss of skilled Vietnamese workers. The effects on artisans and handicraft workers were unknown.

Although the republican government had not by mid-1972 issued a formal policy or a new plan for development of the country's resources, governmental statements reflected its intention to achieve social goals through mechanization of agriculture, development of irrigation and power, promotion of certain crops and industries, and agrarian reform. None of these aims was described in detail, and with the exception of advocating continuance of work on water resource plans and the multinational Prek Tnaot (Prek Thnot) project for power and irrigation, the government was concentrating on short-range objectives of increasing the production of food, primarily to meet the demands of the greatly enlarged population of Phnom Penh.

AGRICULTURE

Land Use and Development

Although the Cambodian economy was disrupted by warfare in 1970, agricultural production was the largest single element of the gross national product (GNP) and the main source of materials for domestic industrial processing as well as for export (see ch. 11; ch. 13). Agriculture was characterized by abundance of land relative to population, about 85 percent of which lived in a conservative rural society that continued to practice traditional farming techniques. Cultivation centered on a single annual crop of wet rice utilizing the seasonal, fairly regular flooding that occurred in parts of the Cambodian Basin and the less dependable precipitation (see ch. 2). The annual cycle left time to tend livestock, to fish, to raise vegetables and other crops, and perhaps to seek work for wages in the city when farm work was slack.

The areas subject to annual flooding were cultivated, however, only in part. Most of the land deeply inundated around the Tonle Sap, and some along both the Tonle Sab and Mekong-Basak rivers, was swampland and forest. Beyond the swamp areas the very gradual incline of the land toward the center of the Cambodian "saucer" made retention of water, whether from shallow flooding or from rainfall, adequate in quantity and duration for the growing of wet rice.

Agriculture was using about 8.5 million acres of land in 1969, or approximately 70 percent of the unforested area of the country. Expansion of agriculture through exploitation of untilled land was therefore possible. Extension of rice growing, which occupied 7.5 million acres of the land under cultivation and more than 70 percent of the economically active population, was, however, limited by climatic conditions, especially rainfall, and the scarcity of soils suitable for traditional farming practices. Increasing the output of rice by expanding the area planted appeared to observers to be less promising than the introduction of institutional and technical changes to increase yields on land already under cultivation.

Rubber and pepper plantations were found where favorable soil and climatic conditions existed; neither was extensive in area. The rubber-tree plantations, established originally by French capital, covered about 150,000 acres in areas where the redlands were the prevailing soil type, mainly in Kampong Cham Province (see ch. 2). Rubber was the country's second largest export in value before 1970. The pepper plantations, established chiefly by Chinese entrepreneurs, were found principally in Kampot Province in the hills inland from the coast of the Gulf of Thailand. Small coconut palm plantations were also found in the same area, but nearer the coast.

About 850,000 acres were devoted to fruit, vegetables, and other field crops, of which the most important was corn (maize), grown on about 300,000 acres. Many farmers grew sugar palms, tobacco, and a variety of supplementary food crops, and a relatively small number grew industrial crops, such as cotton and jute.

An estimated 33 million acres, over half of the area of the Khmer Republic, was forested. The major reserves in the mountainous southwestern part of the country had been little exploited, but forests in the populated central region were, in general, depleted.

Cambodia had extensive inland waters, principally comprising the Tonle Sap but also including the Mekong River and its tributaries. These contained a large quantity of fish of many varieties. Freshwater fish were slowly decreasing in numbers, however, and by 1969 inland fishery had become less productive.

Except on the plantations and in commercial fishing and forestry, agriculture in all its varied activities was carried on by all members of the farm family. The average landholding for a family was about five acres in 1969, although holdings were often fragmented. The small proportion of large landholdings (more than 50 acres) were for the most part in areas recently opened to cultivation.

The usual farm family used fairly simple agricultural implements, mostly made locally of wood and light in weight by western standards but well suited to the farmer's needs and to the light weight of his draft animals. In addition, the farmer took care of the initial processing of his rice harvest, and many processed sugar-palm juice and other local products for their own use or for sale. Since most farmers used no chemical fertilizer and pesticides and met their own seed requirements from their own crops, they were largely independent of outside sources of supply for farming needs. The serious deficiency for many farmers was the lack of water during the dry season, for human and animal needs as well as for subsidiary crops growing during that time. Scarcity of firewood was a problem in densely populated areas.

The Khmer Loeu (see Glossary) in the upland area of the eastern and northeastern parts of the country generally practiced the shifting type of agriculture that is characteristic of various tribal groups throughout Southeast Asia. Plots of land were cleared and planted for the short period of their productivity, then abandoned for new plots to repeat the process. Such farming usually provided only a bare subsistence level for the people. The country's forest resources were being reduced somewhat by this type of agriculture, not only by the clearings for fields but also for temporary settlements. The succeeding growth of trees was also of less valuable species than those of the original forest cover (see ch. 2; ch. 4).

About 80 percent of rice farmers owned the land they cultivated, usually through inheritance in the long-settled areas. Some ownership also was passed by purchase. Title to new owners was granted by the government on a basis sanctioned by custom in which the tiller of new or abandoned land was entitled to ownership. It appeared that, although real property was considered surety for the almost permanent indebtedness of the average farmer, foreclosure was very rare. This was partly because the creditor was often a Chinese merchant who did not hold Cambodian citizenship and as a foreigner could not own land (see ch. 8). Another reason for absence of land seizure for debt was the mobility of the farming population in a country with a favorable ratio of land to people; even though the best land was fully occupied, land was available to a farmer for a new start elsewhere.

Cadastral surveys were undertaken by the French authorities but were not kept up-to-date. For example, by the mid-1960s in one area to the west of Phnom Penh, where plots had apparently changed hands repeatedly, land records were thirty years out of date. A small percentage of landowners rented additional land from others, sometimes as sharecroppers on the basis of an equal division of the crop. In such cases, the landlord was a local farmer. The number of landless tenants was very small.

The effect of war on land tenure and the abandonment of land by refugees was unknown in mid-1972. Property owned by Vietnamese was affected by a government announcement in May 1970 that all property of those Vietnamese leaving the country would be confiscated and their homes given to Cambodians or put at the disposal of the military authorities. After the declaration of martial law in June 1970, confiscation of property of ethnic Khmers was usually a part of the sentence imposed by military tribunals upon those found guilty of such charges as treason. The government's attitude towards Cambodians impressed into service by the communist forces was one of clemency, and there were by mid-1972 no reports of confiscation of property of those who had returned to the side of the government (see ch. 14).

River Development

In 1972 the Khmer Republic was continuing the Cambodian membership in the Committee for Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin (usually known as the Mekong Committee), established in 1957 as a formal mechanism for cooperation in water resource development among the governments of the riparian states of Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). The first comprehensive study of the river's potential for the generation of power, flood control, and irrigation was published by the committee's secretariat in July 1970. Two major mainstream projects were listed for Cambodia in what was called the Indicative Basin Plan. They were located at Sambor in Kracheh Province and Stoeng Treng in Stoeng Treng Province. There appeared to be general agreement on the technical feasibility of both projects and their desirability for long-term economic development. It was recognized, however, that numerous problems of funding in relation to benefits would have to be worked out and, further, that there were important ecological considerations involved that had received very little official attention.

The Mekong Committee also investigated a scheme to construct a barrage across the Tonle Sab River northwest of Kampong Chhnang that would permit utilization of the lake as a storage reservoir. One of the objectives of the barrage was to raise the low-water level of the Tonle Sap and consequently reduce the migration of fish from the lake at low water, which one investigation group believed responsible for the great reduction in the fish catch since the early 1950s.

Under the overall scheme a Mekong tributary stream project was started in 1969 on the Prek Tnaot River in Kampong Spoe Province, designed for irrigation, power generation, and flood control. When its final stage was completed, it would irrigate about 100,000 acres. The Mekong Committee also had under consideration two other multipurpose projects of the same type. One was proposed for Batdambang Province on the Stoeng Sangke River; the other was to be on the Stoeng Chinit River, a northern tributary of the Tonle Sab River. The two projects when completed would irrigate some 275,000 acres. Three single-purpose irrigation projects were completed by the Cambodian government independently before 1970; they irrigated about 200,000 acres, or about 3 percent of the ricegrowing land.

Major Crops

The effects of warfare on agricultural production in the Khmer

Republic could only be generally estimated in 1972. A record crop was reported in the crop year 1969/70; it had been almost completely harvested before the outbreak of hostilities in March 1970. Subsequently, however, the overall area under cultivation in government-controlled territory was estimated to have decreased by about one-third in the two crop years between 1969/70 and 1971/72. The reduction in rice acreage in particular meant a serious loss of output, especially because planting decreased most in the higher yield areas of Batdambang Province. Some of the reduction of rice output in the 1970/71 and 1971/72 crop years, however, was due to less favorable climatic conditions (see table 6).

Rice

The Khmer have cultivated rice in much the same manner for centuries along the Mekong River and around the Tonle Sap and their tributaries, wherever conditions permitted. One result was the creation of hundreds of crop strains of varying characteristics as the farmers sought to adapt the crop to local requirements. There was little introduction of new or improved seed, and most strains were of relatively low yield. Another consequence of the large number of varieties was inconsistency of the product and a lowering of the quality of the final product—milled rice.

Table 6. Khmer Republic (Cambodia), Output of Major Crops, Selected Years, 1956–72
(in thousands of metric tons)

Crop	Crop Year 1956/57	1966/67	1969/70	1970/71	1971/72*
Rice	1,986	2,457	3,814	2,732	2,379
Corn (red and white)	121	136	137	122	106
Mung beans	14	19	34	20	18
Vegetables	80	200	235	118	106
Fruit	190	160	245	245	245
Palm sugar	25	38	34	23	22
Sugarcane	25	55	59	30	26
Oil-bearing crops	16	39	38	29	26
Fibers	5	14	20	14	10
Rubber	32	51	46	9	0
Tobacco	5	11	16	10	9
Pepper	1	2	2	2	2

* Projections by United States embassy, Phnom Penh, April 1971.

The long process of selection and adaptation resulted in one remarkable strain of rice unique to the lower Mekong-Tonle Sap area—the so-called floating rice. This strain, grown also in the delta region of South Vietnam inhabited by the Khmer, has the property of adjusting its rate of growth to the rise of the floodwaters (in extreme cases growing two to three feet a day) so that its grain heads remain above water. Perhaps because of this growing, the rice harvested after the water recedes (or from boats, if the grain ripened before then) has a higher moisture content than other varieties of rice and because of extra time needed for drying produces a greater percentage of broken grains than other types. The milled rice has a distinctive reddish color, from which it is known as "red rice" in South Vietnam, where it has ranked lowest in taste preference. It has a low yield, probably less than half that of most other rice types, but it can be grown on land for which there has been no other use of any kind and with little expense, for the seed is broadcast on the ground before flooding without any preparation of the soil. In the early 1970s floating rice was grown on about 15 percent of the land devoted to rice in Cambodia.

Wet rice grown in small paddy fields accounted for about 80 percent of the total rice acreage. Because of the absence of large-scale irrigation and dependence on annual flooding and precipitation, only one crop a year was produced. Slightly more than half of the wet rice cultivated in 1970 was estimated to be rain fed, for which the growing season was normally from June to December. The rest of the wet rice was grown on land covered by flooding and grew from July to February. A small amount, perhaps 5 percent of the rice land, was used for dry rice cultivation.

Little had been done to raise the yield of rice by irrigation, use of chemical fertilizers, or improvement of seeds and implements. As a result, average yields were low, under half a ton an acre. Average yields in Batdamdang and Kampong Cham provinces, however, were half again as high because of better soil fertility and, in the case of Batdambang, larger average landholdings and the greater use of mechanical implements for cultivation.

Rubber

The country's rubber plantations felt the effect of the war in Vietnam before the extension of hostilities to Cambodia in 1970. The production of rubber decreased in 1969 because of defoliation damage, which brought claims for damage of US$8 million by plantation owners against the United States government (these were under study in 1972). Subsequently, the warfare that began in 1970 did major damage both to the plantations and to their processing installations and equipment and virtually eliminated the production of rubber in Cambodia.

Before 1970 rubber production was high in quality and yield per acre, and various forms of the product were competitive in world markets. Five French companies held 70 percent of the 150,000 acres in rubber trees, and the balance was state owned and privately owned. The plantations occupied most of the land suitable for rubber in Kampong Cham Province. Rotanokiri Province in the extreme northeast of the country also had soils suitable for rubber cultivation. Expansion to that province, however, has been hindered by unfavorable security conditions, by its sparse population (which cannot furnish the necessary labor force), and partly by the prevalence of malaria.

Corn

Corn was the most important field crop in Cambodia, grown on about 300,000 acres. It was developed by the French as an export crop and reached a peak production of 400,000 tons in 1937. It went out of cultivation during World War II but was reintroduced in the late 1940s; since that time production has been somewhat erratic. Two varieties are grown, white for domestic consumption and red (sometimes called yellow) for export. The chief corn-growing areas are in the mid-Mekong River provinces, where the crop grows on levee soils and the better drained, lower lying land adjacent to them. Yields are relatively low, about a ton per acre. Corn instead of rice is the staple food of some of the upland Khmer Loeu.

Other Crops

In the fifteen years before 1970 vegetable production increased rapidly. Both acreage and output nearly tripled during that time, mostly in family plots, although some expansion of truck gardening occurred in the more heavily populated areas around Phnom Penh. This increased production added a supplement to the Cambodian diet and also provided an item for export. Available statistical data did not show the varieties of vegetables produced or the relative importance of any in consumption or export. The production of vegetables, however, was known to have been seriously affected by hostilities.

The country produced a wide variety of tropical fruits, such as bananas (the largest single item of fruit grown), oranges (which were second), pineapples, mangoes, grapefruit, lemons, litchis, durians, and many others. Oranges were grown in Batdambang Province on a sufficient scale to permit some export. The cultivation of fruits was little affected by the war, and the value of fruit output was expected in 1971 to rise from about one-quarter to about one-third of the value of total agricultural production, even though their cultivation took only about 3 percent of the cultivated area.

A brown nonrefined sugar was produced from sugar palms (*tnaot*), 2 million of which were found throughout the country's cultivated area, making the species a characteristic feature of the landscape. About one-third of these palms was tapped annually—by puncturing the flower pistils at the top of the trees—although in some regions the proportion reached three-quarters. Each palm yielded from 600 or 700 to almost 1,000 pounds of juice. About 100 to 150 pounds of sugar were obtained after reduction of the juice by boiling. The twice-daily collection of juice from the tops of trees fifty or sixty feet high (extending over a three- to five-month period) and the time required for collecting firewood for boiling down the sap made the production a highly labor-intensive undertaking. Sugarcane in the late 1960s was grown on about 15,000 acres. It was generally raised in small patches and was used raw.

Oleaginous crops grown in Cambodia included peanuts, sesame seeds, soybeans, and castor beans. By 1970 peanuts accounted for well over half the output as the acreage and production of the other crops declined. All were used as a source of edible oil and, except the small output of castor beans, also entered into Cambodia's export trade. Production of these crops was affected by the war and was expected to be about one-third less in crop year 1971/72 than in crop year 1969/70. In addition, there was an estimated production of 2 million coconuts in 1970; there was a strong domestic demand for their oil. Some coconut plantations had been established along the coast of the Gulf of Thailand below the Cardamom Mountains where growing conditions were favorable. Because of this location, the war affected coconut production less than the other oleaginous crops.

Cotton, jute, kapok, and ramie were the chief industrial fiber crops, with some production of kenaf and a continuing, though declining, household production of silk. Kapok was the only fiber crop that entered Cambodia's export trade; the rest was used for domestic consumption. Jute for example, was the raw material for the sacking used in the rice export trade. Jute was grown chiefly in Batdambang Province; kapok, along the middle Mekong River stretches; and cotton, in Kampong Cham and Batdambang provinces. The production of cotton was severely reduced by the outbreak of fighting, with the result that the crop projection for 1971/72 showed a 90-percent decrease from 1969/70.

The acreage planted to tobacco more than doubled during the 1960s. The output increased in rough proportion but was still inadequate for domestic consumption. Before 1970 the crop was almost equally divided between dark and light tobacco varieties; production of dark tobacco was affected relatively little by the warfare, but that of the light variety was expected to be reduced by three-quarters in estimates for the 1971/72 crop year. This was owing to the greater concentration of light tobacco cultivation in Kampong Cham Province, where it was grown as an industrial crop, the dark tobacco being grown generally throughout the country for local processing and use.

Pepper production has declined since World War II, in both acreage and output, because of labor and fertilizer shortages and plant disease. Pepper is grown on the Gulf of Thailand side of the mountains of the southwestern province of Kampot, where the rainfall and temperature are adequate for the woody pepper vines. Production requires a considerable amount of labor for a good yield; it is almost entirely in the hands of Chinese. Cambodian pepper was almost all exported. Because of the location of the plantations their production was not affected by the military operations that started in 1970.

Cambodian farmers customarily grew a wide range of food crops of some importance as supplements to their diets or, where possible, gathered wild fruits or berries for food or for medicinal use. Cassava (manioc) was widely grown for the nutritious starch produced from its root. Enough coffee was produced by the mid-1960s to meet the greater part of domestic requirements, and tea production had been started.

Livestock

Animal husbandry is an important economic activity in Cambodia, which farmers carry on for the most part as a sideline. Between 1955 and 1969 the numbers of cattle and water buffalo doubled, and those of swine and poultry tripled, placing livestock in third place in importance in the agricultural sector, after rice and fruit. Recorded cattle exports in 1969 were third in value, after rice and rubber. Considerable numbers of cattle were smuggled into South Vietnam as well.

Animal husbandry as practiced in Cambodia was small scale, except for water buffalo raising by the Chams (see Glossary). Its main objective was to meet the farmer's requirement for draft animals. Cambodian cattle—of local origin crossed with the Indian zebu variety—also produced meat of good quality. Oxen were preferred for draft work, and the farmers normally kept only a minimum number of cows.

Feed for both small and large livestock consisted of such byproducts of cultivation as rice straw, rather than any specialized feed or pasturage. On this diet the animals tended to be light, and the manure obtained from them was relatively small in volume and low in effectiveness as fertilizer. Little information was available on the economic significance of the swine and poultry kept by

Cambodian farmers; there were reported in 1968 to be 1.2 million hogs and 5.8 million fowl in the country.

The effects of the war on livestock in government-held areas could be only roughly estimated, but a reduction of 15 percent was believed to have occurred in 1970 and again in 1971 as the result of the slaughter or theft of many cattle. Legal exports of cattle and water buffalo were also estimated to have dropped in 1971 by about 75 to 80 percent since 1969.

Fisheries

Freshwater fish—chiefly caught from the Tonle Sap and from the Tonle Sab and Mekong-Basak rivers and consumed fresh, salted, smoked, or made into fish sauce and paste—was the preferred source of protein in the Cambodian diet (see ch. 5). A combination of ecological factors in the Tonle Sap, especially the feeding and spawning environment of the lake's inundated forest, has resulted in an exceptionally high concentration of fish (see ch. 2). A decline in the fish catch in the Tonle Sap has occurred, however, since 1939. A reported change in species to smaller and less valuable varieties has been attributed to several causes by foreign analysts. One cause advanced was fishing during high water on the lake—nominally prohibited, but nonetheless practiced, as a conservation measure during the spawning season. Others were silting of the lake, lumbering in the inundated forest, ecological changes affecting flora serving as food for fish, and a rise in water temperature because of shallow water at low level.

Marine fishing was less well developed, although in the 1960s diesel-powered fishing boats equipped with dragnets came into more common use in exploiting the fish resources of the Gulf of Thailand. In 1969 marine fishing produced about 20,000 tons of fish, much of which was exported. Fishing was best in the northern part of Cambodian waters in the shelter of the Cardamom Range during the dry monsoon winds.

Through the 1960s fishing contributed slightly more than 2 percent of the gross national product (GNP), less than either forestry or livestock raising; about two-thirds was from freshwater fisheries. In 1969 domestic needs were apparently met from the catch of about 67,500 tons that year from the lakes and rivers. Exports of freshwater fish and fish products steadily declined during the 1950s and 1960s and were comparatively insignificant by 1969.

Inland fisheries were exploited by individuals for subsistence and, at certain times of the year, by commercial fishermen. The government undertook various measures to regulate freshwater fishing and to derive revenue from it. For example, although there was no closed season on the Tonle Sap for individual fishermen, commercial fishing was forbidden during high water. The government retained ownership of fishing sites and auctioned fishing rights in specified areas of the lake for a period of two years to contractors. The same practice was followed for fishing rights along the major rivers.

Before 1970 most commercial fishermen were Vietnamese or Cham. In many cases they were financed by Chinese and sometimes employed Cambodian labor. Many Vietnamese were repatriated in 1970; the effect on commercial fishing was not reported, but the repatriation was presumably one of the factors in the decline of production of freshwater fish to an estimated 41,000 tons in 1971.

The marine catch declined in 1970 by about 25 percent (to 15,000 tons) from the preceding year, but because of the introduction of deep-sea trawlers the catch for 1971 was projected to rise to about 34,000 tons. There were some shrimping activities, and a small part of the fish catch was canned or turned into fishmeal (see Industry, this ch.).

Forestry

A forest inventory carried out from 1960 to 1964 showed about 33 million acres of forest resources of different varieties but a lack of such valuable timber species as teak (see ch. 2). These resources were classified by the government into reserved and protected categories for control of cutting and for revenues from concessions by auction or lease. Timber and firewood were the main forestry products. Production of timber was fairly stable during the 1960s, averaging somewhat more than 333 million cubic meters annually between 1960 and 1968. Firewood production ran less, averaging during the same period about 279 million cubic meters. (In the late 1960s firewood production almost equaled that of timber.) Other forest products included charcoal, wood oil, resin, bamboo, and rattan. Timber exports were almost entirely in the form of logs; sawn lumber was about 10 percent of the exports. Some charcoal, resin, and wood oil were also exported.

Beginning in 1970 hostilities and insecurity in the forestry regions caused a marked decline in government-controlled forestry production (in 1970 it dropped at least 60 percent as compared with 1969). Export of forest products in 1970 amounted to about one-third that of the previous year, and projections for 1971 anticipated further declines in both production and exports. Alternative sources of supply existed in government-held areas but were situated principally in the unexploited and almost inaccessible Cardamom mountain region in the southwestern part of the country.

Agricultural Policies

In 1967 the Cambodian government adopted a five-year plan for the 1968–72 period (see ch. 11). The plan reflected the priority accorded to the agricultural sector of the economy by the government. A state of stagnation had characterized that sector, by far the most important of the economy, in the 1960s. Initially, the plan proposed that agriculture and industry share evenly in investment spending, each receiving 25 percent. Within agriculture, emphasis was to be on the use of fertilizer. Later, the proportion of funding for agriculture was increased, and emphasis was shifted to water policy.

The five-year plan listed development of Cambodia's major crops, after rice, in the following order of descending priority: rubber, corn, cotton, sugarcane, tea, and coconut. Encouragement of the use of fertilizers, pesticides, machinery, and better seeds was provided for, and, to some extent, was started through the establishment of research stations, pilot farms, and limited extension service facilities. Agricultural credit organizations were expanded. A farmers' bank (Agricultural Credit Bank) was set up in 1969 to supplement the unsuccessful previous efforts (through government organizations and cooperatives) to relieve farmers from dependence on local merchants for credit.

Several Cambodian universities offered training in various branches of science and technical studies related to agronomy, forestry, fisheries, and tropical culture. One, the University of Batdambang, offered courses in the food industries. The University of Agronomic Science had 119 students in the school year 1969/70. It was not known to what extent enrollment of students in the armed forces had reduced the numbers of those studying agriculture (see ch. 6; ch. 14).

The republican government had not issued a comprehensive statement on agricultural policy by mid-1972. Its short-range objectives were to increase the production of food, especially livestock, fish, and vegetables, for the greatly enlarged population of Phnom Penh and the protection of construction work at the Prek Tnaot multipurpose project. Certain committees established under the decree of general mobilization in the latter half of 1971 were assigned responsibility for planning and carrying out these tasks. Other committees were given assignments of a longer range nature, such as mechanization policy for agricultural work with the objectives of increased plantings and better yields of rice; exploitation of water resources for irrigation and fish breeding; and the exploitation of coconut palm land (the government called the coconut palm the industrial tree of the future for Cambodia).

One committee was charged, in general terms, with agrarian reform, which was described as aimed at rational exploitation for better yields to contribute to improvement of the living standards of Khmer farmers. It was evident that the government envisaged eventual implementation in the agricultural sector of the economy of a wide range of technical, financial, and institutional measures; they were not known in detail in mid-1972.

INDUSTRY

In 1969 manufacturing and construction accounted for about 18 percent of Cambodia's gross national product (GNP); an additional 1 percent was attributable to energy and water, whereas only a negligible amount was contributed by the mining sector. This total of 19 percent for industry compared with the 9 percent that industry contributed in 1955. Industry grew rapidly in the 1960s, especially in the food and raw material processing sectors, which together accounted for about 70 percent of industrial production in government areas in 1970. By the beginning of 1970 there were eighteen larger scale industrial plants in the country and about 3,300 medium- and small-scale ones. Thirteen of the larger establishments were owned by the government, and five were mixed state-private enterprises; all produced import-substitution goods. Private interests owned and operated the balance of industry, mainly engaged in the processing of agricultural products. Industry, however, was still a minor factor in the national economy, limited by the small size of the domestic market, lack of mineral resources, and lack of skills (see ch. 11). Handicraft industry remained important in terms of employment, but no statistics were available on its contribution to production.

Manufacturing

Several agricultural products were processed for local consumption and for export. Husking of rice was carried on in the 1,468 rice mills reported in 1970 (all small scale and mostly located in villages). Rice processing was generally of low efficiency, in part because of variations in size and type of rice kernels that resulted in a large proportion of broken grain, reducing the value of the grain. Because the mills were small, further processing of the byproducts of milling (such as for the recovery of oil from rice bran) rarely occurred.

Before hostilities began in 1970, rubber was processed into smoked sheets and concentrated latex by facilities established on the plantations. The quality of the product was high, and most was exported; export certificates for specific qualities were issued by a rubber research institute attached to the University of Kampong Cham. Before 1970 about 5,000 tons of rubber were consumed in Cambodia. A modern state-owned automobile and truck tire and tube factory was opened in 1966. Some rubber was also fabricated domestically into various consumer items.

There were some thirty-five small plants in 1970 that processed the crude palm sugar. In the 1960s a plant was built to refine this product into a crystalline white sugar for domestic consumption, but it ran into technical problems and subsequently turned to imported brown sugar for raw material. Production at the end of the 1960s was below domestic needs and was high in cost.

Part of the extensive freshwater fish catch was processed by a considerable number of small establishments into fish paste, a staple of the Cambodian diet. A state-established fish cannery and fishmeal factory processed a portion of the saltwater fish catch. Most of the latter was exported, but some change in distribution had taken place by 1972 as some of the catch was transported to Phnom Penh to meet food requirements there.

Vegetable oil production, estimated at 10,000 tons annually in 1970, sufficient for domestic consumption, was carried out by a number of small plants. Peanuts were the principal raw material; however, rice bran was used in a modern oil mill with an annual capacity of 3,000 tons. The processing of animal products was insignificant. Livestock was exported live, and most meat was eaten fresh. Slaughtering was done locally and, in the case of cattle, was usually done by Chams or other non-Khmer because of the Buddhist precept against killing. Such inhibitions were not as strong against the slaughter of hogs and poultry (see ch. 7).

About 500 small-scale sawmills operated seasonally throughout the country before 1970, producing lumber for small workshops and enterprises making furniture and various articles of domestic use. A modern state-owned plant also produced plywood, some of which was exported. A modern paper plant, also state-owned, met about one-third of the country's paper requirements. It used bamboo and rice straw from local sources as well as imported raw materials. This plant was in territory controlled by opposition forces in 1972, and nothing was known about its operating status.

Tobacco was processed in both traditional and modern industrial ways. Small dealers made cigarettes locally; however, more important were the three factories that were manufacturing about 4,000 tons of cigarettes a year at the time the armed conflict began in 1970. At that time also the country had 162 leaf-drying ovens.

At the beginning of 1970 there were two integrated cotton-ginning and cotton-spinning factories. Both were state owned. One was located at Batdambang; the other, at Kampong Cham. They produced about 3,000 tons of yarn annually using domestic cotton. In addition, there were about sixty-five weaving mills, all privately owned. Several of these mills were of considerable size, and two had dyeing and finishing facilities. These were also used to process the output of other mills. Knitwear was produced by about twenty small factories in the Phnom Penh area. Silk weaving was a handicraft industry, mainly for making material for the Cambodian national dress. A jute mill was in operation in Batdambang Province utilizing domestic jute and kenaf. It manufactured about 5 million sacks annually, somewhat less than half the domestic requirement. It also produced string and canvas as byproducts.

The beverage industry included a large state-owned distillery near Phnom Penh and a state-owned brewery at Kampong Saom. Several small private distilleries also existed but had to sell their products to the state, which maintained a monopoly over alcoholic beverages. Domestic rice, corn, and palm sugar are used in the manufacture of alcohol and spirits. (The brewery, however, has depended on imported materials). Three large private firms manufactured most of the soft drinks consumed domestically.

Other industry of some importance included a state-owned cement plant in Kampot Province. It used chiefly local limestone and clay and as of 1969 was producing about 60,000 tons of cement annually, approximately one-third of the country's requirements. Expansion of production capacity to over 100,000 tons was underway at that time, but later data on output were unavailable. A state glass factory was in operation on the outskirts of Phnom Penh. Much of its production consisted of glass bottles for the beverage industry. Three small private plants also turned out glass products. Another state factory, also located in Kampot Province, produced and bagged phosphate fertilizer obtained by grinding phosporite from nearby deposits.

Mining

Limestone, clay, and phosphate rock were extracted from deposits in Kampot Province. Otherwise, Cambodia's limited mineral resources were not exploited for industrial use. The phosphate rock mined was relatively low in phosphate content and, at the rate of extraction in the late 1960s, the known deposits were estimated to be adequate for another decade of mining at the most.

Zircons, sapphires, and rubies were mined in Batdambang and Stoeng Treng provinces. As much as 80 percent of them were estimated to be smuggled out of the country; there was some cutting of gem stones, but their use within Cambodia for jewelry was minor. Small quantities of pagodite (agalmatolite), a soft compact stone that can be carved and stained, was also mined. Salt was produced by solar evaporation in the vicinity of Kampot, in the southern coastal area of the country, reportedly in sufficient amount to meet domestic requirements. Production statistics were not available.

Fuel and Power

Cambodia lacked known deposits of fossil fuel—petroleum, natural gas, and coal—although exploration for offshore deposits of petroleum was started in 1969 (see ch. 2). About half of the forestry production of the country was used for fuel in the form of firewood and charcoal (see Agriculture, this ch.). Wood fuel was used in small-scale manufacturing and processing, such as in the concentration of sugar palm juice for the production of crude sugar. An oil refinery at Kampong Saom started production in early 1969; it was designed to refine 600,000 tons of imported crude oil annually, which would ensure domestic supplies of petroleum products. Some products for which there was little demand in Cambodia were to be exported (see ch. 13).

Installed electric generating capacity was estimated in 1969 to be about 76,000 kilowatts, but plants were then reported operating well below their rated capacity. Distribution by the major commercial supplier in Phnom Penh, which accounted for 75 percent of the country's consumption of electricity, was complicated by the use of different type and phase grids for the electricity produced by the company's two thermal plants. Because of breakdowns in the distribution system, voltage fluctuations, and the high cost of the electricity, almost all industries in Phnom Penh and elsewhere had installed their own diesel-powered generating units. The extent of private production of electric power was reflected in the consumption pattern of the commercially distributed power. It was estimated that in 1969 lighting and home use took 70 percent of the total; street lighting, 3 percent; and industry, only 18 percent.

In 1968 the country's first hydroelectric generating facility started operation at Kirirom, on the eastern edge of the Elephant Mountains, and was supplying the Phnom Penh area sixty-eight miles to the northeast. All other generating facilities were thermal or diesel units. In 1969 the country's total generating capacity was adequate, both for the needs at the time and for the immediate future—with the exception of Kampong Saom, where further industrial expansion was planned. Generating capacity and power output were, however, also affected by the war. A major loss was the destruction of the Kirirom facility during the latter part of 1971. As far as was known in mid-1972 this generating plant had not been repaired.

Government Policies

Until the start of the country's first five-year plan in 1960 industrial development was left to the private sector. The five-year plan (1960–64) provided for establishment of state enterprises and also mixed enterprises financed by combined state and private capital. The second five-year plan (1968–72) emphasized the development of agriculture rather than industry and had as a main objective the promotion of industries aiding the increase of agricultural output. Industrial crops and the industries relying on them for exportable products were given an important place, as were industries that would supply such products as implements and pumps for agriculture. By the end of 1969, however, no action had been taken to carry out the second five-year plan other than the initial listing of industrial projects considered useful as contributing to the attainments of its objectives.

In early 1970 war put the economy in a greatly changed situation. The manufacturing sector was seriously affected; moreover, instead of carrying forward projects for industrial development, the new republican government sought to utilize manufacturing capacity, as far as possible, in support of its war efforts—for example, the production of material for military uniforms by textile plants.

By the end of 1971 industrial output had fallen between 20 and 50 percent—according to varying estimates—because of shortages of raw materials and labor; enemy control of some plants such as the paper mill; and direct war damage to others, including the cement plant, phosphate plant, a cotton mill, and the oil refinery. In general, industrial production in Batdambang and Phnom Penh continued as well as the supply of materials and labor permitted. In September 1971 an attack on the Prek Tnaot power and irrigation project destroyed the equivalent of US$1.5 million in equipment but did not damage the construction work.

The republican government had not announced a new general industrial policy by mid-1972. Some aspects of the government's attitudes toward industry and industrial development were, however, reflected in the assignments made to various committees in the latter half of 1971 under the general mobilization decree of June 1970 (see ch. 14). One was charged with "rapid and effective action" in the determination of national economic policy relative to foreign capital investment. The guidelines furnished to this committee noted that revision of the Khmer Republic's regulations on the subject should make them more flexible. Other committees were set up to deal with such problems as the supply and distribution of water and electricity and the production of pharmaceuticals. Another committee was given the task of effecting improvement of administration in the state-owned enterprises, taking note of the Yugoslav system of paying civilian or military appointees on a sliding-scale basis designed to encourage increase of productivity. Still other committees were to concern themselves with continuation of work on natural resources, especially petroleum, and on current and proposed dam projects.

The June 1970 general mobilization decree stated that "In time of danger, all economic resources considered necessary for national defense shall be relinquished to the state in accordance with requisition regulations." There had been no report of government action under the decree by mid-1972, however.

LABOR

Structure of the Labor Force

The 1962 census showed an economically active population of 2.5 million persons of age ten or more, comprising 1.5 million men and 1 million women (see ch. 2). The great majority, 80 percent, were engaged in agriculture. About 94,000 were employed in the extractive, manufacturing, construction, and utility fields; of these, over 68,000 were in manufacturing. No breakdown was available indicating whether employment was in the traditional or modern segments of the economy. Other categories of economic activity included 144,000 persons in commerce, banking, insurance, and real estate; 29,000 in transportation, warehousing, and communications; 187,000 in services; and 38,000 in unclassified occupations.

More recent statistics on industrial employment were incomplete. In 1967, 33,302 employees were estimated to be working in 3,290 manufacturing establishments, but the size of the establishments was not defined. In 1968 the eighteen larger scale manufacturing enterprises set up under state and mixed ownership employed about 6,500 people. In 1970 total employment in modern industrial enterprises was estimated at about 10,000. This same estimate stated that handicraft industries employed as many as 100,000 people.

Industrial employment was largely concentrated in and around Phnom Penh, and some was found in other urban centers where state-owned or certain private enterprises were located. Employment in privately owned enterprises was greatest in the Phnom Penh area and in the other main centers of industry in Batdambang and Kampong Cham. Industrial development at the port of Kampong Saom was expected to transform it into a major center of employment.

Before 1970 there was little unemployment in Cambodia, as far as could be determined, other than that among the educated people who considered few employment opportunities outside the government as suitable. Underemployment existed to some extent in the one-crop agricultural sector, but there was also a shortage of agricultural labor during the harvest season when labor requirements reached their peak. Most rice farmers engaged in other activities that provided income or additions to the family diet, such as fishing or making palm sugar, and were occupied with various tasks during the approximately seven months of the year when rice growing did not require their full-time attention.

Handicraft artisan employment provided extra income for many farm families, but relatively few village dwellers were wholly dependent on such nonagricultural income. The pursuit of crafts or the practice of other skills requiring special training or talents was usually part time, as in the case of carpenters or musicians. Only women were engaged in the weaving of cotton cloth or the silk cloth used for the traditional Khmer dress.

Craftsmen included artisans in gold and other metals and makers of rice sickles and farm implements. Pottery making was a local industry in those areas with suitable clay deposits. Certain localities made specialties, such as a kind of ornamental collar for oxen made in a small village east of Phnom Penh and vended throughout southeastern Cambodia.

Labor regulations before March 1970 obliged prospective employers to give preference in recruiting to Cambodian nationals. Thirty percent of the employees of a given enterprise might be foreigners; this limit might be exceeded by governmental authorization. A survey of 417 industrial enterprises in Phnom Penh in the late 1960s showed that 81 percent of their labor force was Khmer; 12 percent, Chinese; and the rest, Vietnamese and other minorities. Women employees constituted 24 percent of the surveyed labor force. The survey did not indicate the types of position or pay grades of the Khmer and non-Khmer elements of the labor force (see ch. 3).

The local supply of labor and the level of skills were problems in establishing industral enterprises outside Phnom Penh and the other areas of relative industrial concentration. The Cambodian worker tended to be relatively immobile, and special incentives were used to induce workers to go to a new location such as Kampong Saom where difficulties in obtaining labor existed. For the large state-owned enterprises a work force was built up by training workers on the job, with the help of foreigners, or by sending Cambodians abroad, who after receiving their training then returned home to train others.

Warfare caused a labor shortage in Cambodia. The rapid expansion of the armed forces was accomplished in part by the diversion of industrial workers from productive employment as well as the enlistment of students (see ch. 14). Vietnamese workers, who were apt to be in the category of skilled workers, were interned or repatriated. One account noted that the departure of Vietnamese had resulted in a sharp decline in such services as mechanical and electrical repairs. Another report stated that Vietnamese internees in Batdambang in the latter part of 1971 were still employed during the day as mechanics and in other crafts.

The refugees from farming areas who swelled the population of the Phnom Penh area and of other urban centers were generally underemployed rather than unemployed. By the latter half of 1971 most had found some form of employment, often at very low wages insufficient for daily necessities. The details of employment were not reported.

In the areas outside government control, much of which was sparsely populated, communist authorities were reported to have mobilized some thousands of Cambodians as auxiliaries for labor in support of their troops. Others were enrolled in communist-controlled military organizations (see ch. 14). There were no reports available on the effect of the war on the labor force of the rubber plantations, which had ceased production of liquid latex, and of the initial processing that had been carried out on the estates.

Wages and Benefits

In 1971 the average per capita income in Cambodia was estimated at the equivalent of US$136 (see ch. 11). Little of the average farmer's income accrued in the form of cash receipts from sale of agricultural products, partly because of low net return after payment of high interest loans. Supplemental income was quite common, earned from seasonal engagement in handicraft manufacture, work for wages as pedicab drivers or on the docks of Phnom Penh, and sale of surplus livestock (although raising money by the sale of oxen or land was a last resort).

The Cambodian government established minimum wages for labor in 1959. By the latter half of 1969 the prescribed minima varied by location and by the age and sex of the individual. The highest minimum at that time was 25 riels (for value of riel—see Glossary) per day for an adult male worker in Phnom Penh, and the minimum daily wage for a female worker was 21 riels. Both rates applied to workers over eighteen years of age; the minimum for minors (without a stated distinction between male and female workers) between fifteen and eighteen years of age was 18 riels a day, and for those between twelve and fifteen it was 15 riels. Lower rates were in force for other parts of the country. There was no information, however, on observance or enforcement of minimum wages.

As the cost of living rose in 1970 and 1971, minimum wages rose also. The government first raised salaries and wages of its employees in late 1969, the greatest increase being in the lower grades, and by 1971 it had increased the basic minimum wage to 45 riels per day. By early 1972 the effect of general price increases had been to raise the minimum daily wage for unskilled labor to 60 to 80 riels (see ch. 13).

Basic industrial wages paid in Phnom Penh in 1969 ranged from less than 750 riels per month to more than 5,000 riels monthly, according to a survey of industrial establishments there. Five percent of the men surveyed were in the lowest wage bracket, and 8 percent were in the highest. Two wage brackets, those from 750 to 1,250 riels and 1,250 to 2,500 riels, each accounted for slightly more than one-third of the labor force, and the remaining 20 percent received between 2,500 and 5,000 riels per month. Family allowances were paid to male workers in addition to wages. A married man then received 15 percent of his wage, and an additional 5 percent for each child under the age of sixteen.

In early 1972 average wages had also increased; for a month of twenty-six working days, skilled labor earned from 3,000 to 3,500 riels. More experienced skilled labor received by that time as much as 10,000 riels a month in the privately owned industrial sector. Wages paid to laborers employed in the state-owned enterprises were reported to be somewhat less.

State-owned enterprises provided their workers with fringe benefits, paying the medical and hospitalization expenses of employees and one-half of such expenses for their dependents. As an additional benefit, about one-half of the labor force of these establishments received housing and utilities (electricity and water) free of charge. The extent of such practices in the private industrial sector was not known.

Labor Policies of the Khmer Republic

The constitution adopted in May 1972 expressed the responsibility of the state toward its citizens' standard of living, freedom of enterprise, access to employment, social benefits, and implied right to organize trade unions. As regards employment, Article 17 of the constitution declared that the state shall seek to create employment for all citizens. All citizens should have free access to all employment and should suffer no restrictions other than their own merit and competence and have a right to social insurance benefits and other social benefits provided by law. It provided further that freedom of trade union action shall be regulated by law. These provisions did not appear in the earlier constitution of the kingdom, although the concepts did not appear to be inconsistent with the social and economic philosophy of the preceding royal government (see ch. 8; ch. 9). No implementing legislation, where it was called for, had been reported enacted by mid-1972.

Under the enlarged interministerial committee for general mobilization, established in the latter part of 1971, a committee was set up with responsibility for help and assistance for the unemployed, among other things. Another committee had the more general assignment of research into formulae to make real the Khmer image of the "worker-consumer"; the guidelines included the principle of the right to work. Labor organizations were mentioned as one of the bases for formation of groups that might be active in maintaining friendly relations with the Khmer Republic. The various committee assignments implied labor goals and activities of a broad social nature; however, the exact nature of these remained to be defined.

CHAPTER 13

TRADE AND TRANSPORTATION

A sharp fall in exports took place in 1970, and a nearly complete halt occurred in 1971; both were directly attributable to the war. Communist action resulted in the interdiction of rice shipments to Phnom Penh and to other urban centers (ultimately necessitating the prohibition of rice exports). Rubber estates were occupied by the Communists, which brought a large decline in rubber production and export. Large-scale economic assistance secured from the United States and aid from Japan and other nations indicated in 1972 the country's wartime dependence on friendly countries for the imports necessary for economic survival.

The nation's foreign trade emergency in the early 1970s was a wartime aggravation of a basic problem. The country's fundamental trade deficit had persisted since 1955, when the joint arrangement covering monetary, customs, and foreign economic affairs between France and the former Associated States of Indochina (Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam) was canceled. In 1972 Western economic analysts assessed as bleak the country's prospects for solving this underlying dilemma in a postwar return to normalcy.

The country's prewar basic exporting pattern had been one of selling food crops and other agricultural products to less developed countries, either directly or through trade and transshipment centers, and selling rubber to industrialized countries. In return, the country bought manufactured products from the developed countries. After the outbreak of war in 1970 the government of Premier Lon Nol initiated extensive efforts to strengthen the economic relations of the Khmer Republic (Cambodia), especially among neighboring Asian noncommunist nations. These efforts were directed more toward obtaining aid in the war against the Communists than toward the immediate development of new trading partners. They did, however, accentuate a trend underway in the late 1960s away from the prominence placed by Prince Norodom Sihanouk on trade with Asian communist countries.

As part of this emphasis by Prince Sihanouk, from 1966 until 1969 a substantial portion of the country's rice surplus—usually its major foreign exchange earner—had been diverted from sale abroad to supplying Vietnamese communist forces in sanctuary bases in the country's eastern areas. This was done with Prince Sihanouk's knowledge and with the participation of a large portion of the governmental military and civilian apparatus. The trade—legal and publicly known but not admitted until 1969—had cost the country millions of dollars in foreign exchange earnings. It was widely reported in 1970 that Prince Sihanouk's deposition was caused at least in part by his role in this trade.

After agriculture, domestic trade provided a livelihood for the largest segment of the population. Most enterprises were small; hundreds consist of only one individual or of one family's members. Wholesale trade in both domestic and imported products was dominated by the Chinese. Chinese also owned and operated most of the retail shops in Phnom Penh and in provincial urban centers and market towns, and in the villages the shopkeeper was usually a Chinese or a Sino-Cambodian. Each urban center had one or more marketplaces. The majority of the stallkeepers were women, as were most of the peddlers and soft-drink vendors found in these centers.

The buying and selling of rice and farm produce, livestock, poultry and poultry products, fish and fish products, charcoal, firewood, sugar, textiles, tools, and miscellaneous household articles accounted for the bulk of internal trade. Any surplus rice was generally sold by the farmer himself to a rice merchant. Other farm and fishery produce was usually sold by a member of the producer's family either directly to consumers or to dealers in the town marketplace. Sugar and domestically manufactured consumer goods and tools were distributed by wholesalers in Phnom Penh to wholesalers and retailers in provincial centers; wholesalers in turn sell them to retailers in the market towns and villages. Most of the imported foods and consumer goods were marketed in Phnom Penh.

During the early 1970s the domestic marketing system became seriously disrupted. Communist troops repeatedly cut the main roads leading to the capital and attacked barges on the waterways. Rice deliveries to Phnom Penh became slow and uncertain, and prices first soared and then remained high. Consumer goods shortages, however, were alleviated to some extent by imports from the United States under the United States Commodity Import Program. Distribution of goods from Phnom Penh to rural areas was made equally difficult.

The country possessed a moderately developed road network and a fairly extensive inland water transport system; until fighting erupted in 1970, it was served by two rail lines, centered in Phnom Penh. There was also domestic and international air service. Transportation in the territory controlled by the republican government, in which the major part of the transportation system was located, was seriously affected by the hostilities; the effects in communist-held areas was not known. In 1972 transport by road and waterways, except for purely local traffic, required operation on a convoy basis in order to maintain domestic distribution of food and necessities for the economy, support military operations, and assure the arrival of vital imported military and civilian supplies. By 1972 both railroad lines were effectively out of operation; this lack of rail service had reduced the use of the port of Kampong Saom (Sihanoukville) and had forced a change in the transportation of imports to river and overland routes to Phnom Penh (see ch. 10).

FOREIGN TRADE

Exports

From 1952 through 1969 virtually all exports were agricultural products. Two-thirds of export earnings usually came from rice and rice products, rubber, and corn and corn products. Except for rubber, half the rate of growth of the total value of exports during the 1952–69 period was because of the increases in world market prices, particularly as regards rice. Over the entire period the principal exports showed an average annual growth rate, expressed in volume, of 1.7 percent for rice, 1.6 percent for corn, and 7 percent for rubber.

From 1965 the country's export earnings, however, had been stagnant or declining. In the case of rubber, the fall in export earnings until 1969 was caused by a decline in world market prices. In 1969 a further decline in rubber earnings occurred, despite improved world market prices. This was caused by a drop in production after defoliation of rubber plantations, which reportedly was connected to some extent with the war in the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). The decline in export earnings of rice in the late 1960s reflected a fall in production yields, and the declining trend of export earnings from corn could be attributed to the lack of export incentives (see ch. 12).

The total value of the country's exports amounted to the equivalent of US$81 million in 1968, about the same as in 1967. Foreign exchange realizations from all commodities exported fell precipitously in the three-year period from 1969 to 1971. In the 1969 the value of exports declined by nearly 20 percent to US$66 million, largely because of the poor rice harvest of that year, which reduced rice exports sharply (see ch. 12). In the following year, as the war affected exports, total earnings fell to US$41 million. The export of natural rubber ceased shortly after March 1970, and rice exports, the leading foreign exchange earner, were virtually eliminated by the end of 1971. Trade in other commodities was similarly disrupted, although the fall in earnings sustained was less substantial.

In mid-1972 detailed statistical data on the country's exports were available only through 1968. In that year export earnings largely reflected the output of the main and traditional export commodities—rice and rice products, rubber, and corn and corn products—whose respective shares in total exports in 1968 were 40 percent, 21 percent, and 7 percent (see table 7). Other exports included lumber, livestock, pepper, green beans, kapok, sesame, soybeans, and fishery products.

The principal export destinations in 1968 were South Vietnam, Senegal, Hong Kong, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) (see table 8). The main markets for rice and rice products were Senegal, the PRC, Hong Kong, and Singapore. The exports of rubber were made predominantly to France, the United States, and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). Singapore and Hong Kong were the principal markets for corn, and the export trade in lumber was almost completely with the PRC. Pepper was exported mainly to France, and livestock exports were made chiefly to the PRC and Hong Kong.

Table 7. Khmer Republic (Cambodia), Exports, 1965–68
(in percent)

	1965	1966	1967	1968
Rice and rice products	49	33	43	40
Rubber	33	37	25	21
Corn and corn products	8	15	6	7
Vegetables	..*	..*	2	5
Livestock	1	2	3	3
Lumber	1	2	2	3
Kapok	1	4	2	2
Pepper	2	3	2	2
Miscellaneous	5	4	15	17
Total	100	100	100	100

* Less than one-half of 1 percent.

Source: Adapted from *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 1969*, New York, United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1971, p. 135.

Imports

There were, for various reasons, some changes in the composition of imports during the 1952–69 period. Because of new industries going into production, a degree of substitution of domestic produc-

Table 8. Khmer Republic (Cambodia), Destination of Exports, 1965–68
(in percent)

	1965	1966	1967	1968
Republic of Vietnam	..*	..*	6	17
Senegal	3	9	15	14
Hong Kong	8	7	19	11
People's Republic of China	6	8	8	10
France	14	16	9	8
Singapore	15	20	10	8
Japan	5	7	3	4
Italy	1	2	2	3
United States	3	2	3	2
Soviet Union	1	1	1	2
United Kingdom	2	2	3	2
Czechoslovakia	1	2	3	1
India	3	..*	2	1
Democratic Republic of Vietnam	2	2	1	1
Others	36	22	15	16
Total	100	100	100	100

* Less than one-half of 1 percent.

Source: Adapted from *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 1969*, New York, United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1971, p. 136.

tion for imports occurred in the case of foods and beverages and in textiles, particularly for cotton cloth, but also, starting in 1967, for gunnysacks. The establishment of new industries was also reflected in the relative increase in imports of machinery and equipment in this period. A slump in private construction caused a relative decline in imports of cement. About the only component of imports with a generally stable growth trend was petroleum products, indicating the growth of road transport.

Imports, which totaled the equivalent of US$83 million in 1967, increased by 8 percent in 1968 to about US$90 million and by a further 11 percent in 1969 to US$99 million. They declined in 1970, however, by 31 percent to US$69 million, as a result of the decision of the authorities to protect international reserves in the light of sharply declining foreign exchange earnings.

In mid-1972 detailed statistical data on the country's imports were also available only through 1968. In that year imports comprised a wide variety of manufactured and processed commodities, of which chemicals, machinery, and textiles were the most important (see table 9).

France was the country's most important single supplier of imports in 1968 (see table 10). Japan, second in importance during most of the latter 1960s, provided 23 percent of the imports in 1968, up from the previous year when its share was 16 percent. Imports from the PRC, which had reached a peak in 1966 when they constituted 16 percent of total imports, declined in 1967 to 9 percent and in 1968 dropped further to only 6 percent.

Table 9. Khmer Republic (Cambodia), Value of Imports by Commodity Group, 1967 and 1968
(in thousands of riels)*

Commodity	1967		1968	
Food products				
Dairy products	105,824		91,098	
Cereals	70,940		75,356	
Sugar	17,747		31,747	
Total food products		194,511		198,202
Petroleum products		324,008		287,423
Chemicals		479,423		661,501
Paper and paper products		21,024		37,259
Textiles				
Cotton cloth	139,470		97,237	
Thread	39,653		74,447	
Other	32,566		194,061	
Total textiles		211,689		365,745
Cement		105,473		88,664
Manufactures of metal		122,484		176,067
Machinery				
Industrial	430,133		417,206	
Electrical and equipment	250,232		211,167	
Total machinery		680,365		628,373
Railroad vehicles		81,509		162,979
Automotive equipment				
Rubber tires and tubes	47,677		74,483	
Passenger cars	73,578		126,124	
Trucks	46,659		20,145	
Motorcycles and parts	59,411		112,350	
Total automotive equipment		227,325		333,102
Iron and steel		283,126		349,306
Miscellaneous		634,200		754,804
Total		3,365,137		4,043,424

* For value of riel—see Glossary. Values are given in riels because a multiple exchange rate system was in effect in these years. Quantities imported at a given rate are unknown.

Source: Adapted from *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 1969*, New York, United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1971, pp. 132–134.

Table 10. Khmer Republic (Cambodia), Source of Imports, 1965–68
(in percent)

Country	1965	1966	1967	1968
France	20	26	31	30
Japan	17	14	16	23
Singapore	4	5	9	8
People's Republic of China	14	16	9	6
Federal Republic of Germany	4	4	4	5
United Kingdom	5	4	5	4
United States	3	3	3	4
Hong Kong	2	2	3	2
Italy	1	1	1	2
Pakistan	1	3	3	2
Yugoslavia	2	3	3	2
Netherlands	2	2	2	1
Indonesia	3	2	2	0
Soviet Union	3	3	2	0
Others	19	12	7	11
Total	100	100	100	100

Source: Adapted from *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 1969*, New York, United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1971, p. 136.

The United States government agreed in 1971 to a substantial program for financing the country's essential imports. Under the program, which totaled US$79.2 million in fiscal year 1970/71, United States surplus agricultural commodities valued at US$9.2 million were to be provided. Another US$50 million was committed under a regular commodity import program, and US$20 million were pledged, under a special reimbursement procedure, for other imports.

Utilization of this aid, however, was slow. The delay was mainly because of the unfamiliarity of Cambodian importers with the new sources of supply and because of difficulties in establishing commercial links. In addition, substantial delays were encountered in effecting reimbursement from the United States.

An additional US$37.1 million was furnished under the United States economic aid program in fiscal year 1971/72. Of this amount, US$20 million were provided as a cash grant. In addition, an agreement in January 1972 called for surplus agricultural commodities valued at US$14.1 million to be provided during 1972.

Trade with Communist Countries

In the early 1960s the country's foreign trade with communist countries grew markedly, from the equivalent of about US$10 million in 1961 to over US$44 million in 1965. Of this rise, the growth of trade with the PRC accounted for half. In 1966 trade with communist countries was US$44 million, of which trade with the PRC provided over US$24 million. By 1969, as the country increasingly moved away from Prince Sihanouk's emphasis on trade with communist countries, total trade with these areas had dropped back to about US$10 million, and trade with the PRC had shrunk to around US$5 million (see table 11).

Table 11. Khmer Republic (Cambodia), Trade with Communist Countries, 1966–69
(in millions of dollars)

	1966	1967	1968	1969
Imports from the Soviet Union	2.4	1.3	0.7	0.7
Exports to the Soviet Union	0.6	0.7	2.1	0
Balance	– 1.8	–0.6	1.4	–0.7
Imports from the People's Republic of China	18.7	8.7	6.7	4.6
Exports to the People's Republic of China	5.7	6.6	9.0	0
Balance	–13.0	–2.1	2.3	–4.6
Imports from Eastern Europe	8.4	5.1	3.0	2.7
Exports to Eastern Europe	5.4	5.5	4.0	1.9
Balance	– 3.0	0.4	1.0	–0.8
Imports from communist countries*	31.3	16.7	10.9	8.0
Exports to communist countries*	12.7	13.9	15.8	1.9
Balance	–18.6	–2.8	4.9	–6.1

* Total figures include trade with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), and the Mongolian People's Republic (Mongolia); trade with Yugoslavia is not included.

Administration of Foreign Trade

Exchange control and quantitative import restrictions have been in force virtually since the country attained independence in 1953. The National Exchange Office was established in 1955 as an agency of the National Bank of Cambodia to control all transactions in foreign exchange (see ch. 11). Import controls consisted of the allocation of certain amounts of foreign exchange for particular commodities and the reallocation of these amounts to applicant importers on the basis of competitive bids. Until 1963 export and import of merchandise were conducted by a half-dozen large firms, mostly European, as well as by a large number of small businesses, most of which were owned by Chinese.

With the creation of the National Export-Import Corporation (Société Nationale d'Exportation et d'Importation—SONEXIM) in 1964, foreign trade was nationalized. All exports were conducted through the new state corporation, as were all imports, with the exception of a relatively small amount classified as "imports without foreign exchange." This arrangement was meant originally to provide for personal imports by nonresidents, but it later came to include a certain number of other imports, including automobiles and machinery, that, although probably illegal, were tolerated.

Since all other imports were conducted, at least in form, by SONEXIM, that agency was able to deal with the overvaluation of the currency evident in the continuing strain on the balance of payments (see ch. 11). The device employed took the form of graduated surcharges levied on imports by SONEXIM, which put the proceeds into a special fund; SONEXIM used the fund to subsidize exports. SONEXIM was thus enabled to procure commodities for export (mainly rice, rubber, and corn) at prices substantially higher than the official par equivalent of world market prices.

The import surcharges were relatively high, but they were applied to only about 25 percent of the foreign exchange allotted by SONEXIM for imports. The greater part of foreign exchange was used for imports that were brought in at the official rate without a surcharge. These included a large number of items—imported by SONEXIM for the account of the final users, including state industrial enterprises—for which a domestic price was fixed by the government. A small part of imports was subject to an ad valorem surcharge. Because some of the lists were partly overlapping as far as types of goods were concerned, this system was to a considerable extent subject to administrative decision and consequently open to fraud. Substantial time was also wasted on procedures.

After the nationalization of foreign trade, several public agencies were established to work in association with SONEXIM in the field of importing by purchasing goods from SONEXIM and distributing them wholesale or retailing them. Neither SONEXIM nor the new public wholesaling agencies started with much business competence. Their commercial margins of profit were officially fixed at generous levels—varying between 8 percent and 23 percent depending on the commodity— which did not induce efficiency or do much to advert the possibility of goods being imported far below requirements or, alternatively, far in excess of needs. One result was that commodities were not always available in the official market. On the other hand, however, differences arose between SONEXIM and the public wholesaling agencies about paying the cost of keeping unsalable inventories.

The government had acknowledged by 1969 that the experience with SONEXIM had not been a satisfactory one, particularly with regard to its importing function. Proposals were advanced to reintroduce direct purchases abroad by the government agencies and state enterprises of raw materials and equipment that they used, on the grounds that they would be better equipped to select among offers from foreign bidders the type of equipment best suited for their purposes. Moreover, as regards private industrial imports as well as commercial imports for general consumption, it was recognized that in most cases bidding documents had continued to be prepared and orders were placed by the industrial users or private wholesalers themselves and that the function of SONEXIM was essentially that of an unnecessary intermediary.

In the field of exports the record of SONEXIM was more ambiguous. Exports, mainly of rice, substantially increased after the creation of SONEXIM, and the government considered that for the country's two largest export items—rice and rubber—SONEXIM had performed a useful function. The advantages of a state trading corporation in conducting trade with communist countries—with whom trade grew considerably in the 1960s—were also recognized.

During 1970 the role of SONEXIM in foreign trade was reduced drastically, although it remained responsible for the import of all goods financed with official foreign exchange, making it the officially designated channel for imports financed under the United States commodity import program. The creation on March 1, 1972, of the Exchange Support Fund (ESF), as part of the National Bank of Cambodia, for the financing of all commodities not imported under bilateral assistance programs seemed further to restrict SONEXIM to this one remaining role (see ch. 11).

As part of a reform of the foreign exchange and trade system announced in late October 1971 and in order to promote efficient import operation, the government decreed that importers would be permitted to trade with foreign countries only if they assumed corporate status. The required minimum equity capital of such a corporation was to be 5 million riels (for value of riel—see Glossary); 51 percent of the equity was to be held by Cambodian nationals, and one-third of a board membership had to be Khmer.

DOMESTIC TRADE

Volume and Composition

Domestic commerce accounted for an estimated 21 percent of Cambodia's national product in 1969. It was second in importance to agriculture and, as did agriculture, grew relatively slowly during the 1960s (see ch. 11). Government statistics for domestic trade in 1969 showed an almost even division between local and imported products, imported foods having a slight margin. The volume of trade in products of local manufacture, however, recorded a consistent, although small, increase during the 1960s, whereas the volume of trade in imported goods was characterized by fluctuations.

Domestic trade consisted, in essence, of the exchange of agricultural products for consumer goods, and rice was the dominant item among the products traded. Goods bought by the individual farm family, such as cloth, salt, fish paste, bicycle tires, and cigarettes, included also handicraft items and modern manufactures, but statistical information was lacking to indicate the relative importance of the two categories. Western analysts of the Cambodian economy have observed that the domestic market was small and that its size and the relative self-sufficiency of the economy were important limitations on industrialization.

Trade Structure

Small-scale manufacturing was common, and production, wholesaling, and retailing were frequently combined in a single business enterprise. Nevertheless, wholesale and retail functions were rather well differentiated. Although wholesalers might make direct sales at their central places of business, very few of them established branch retail outlets of their own, and the bulk of their selling was to retailers.

Wholesale Trade

Most wholesaling was done in Phnom Penh, the center where almost all goods from abroad were received and where processed raw materials destined for export were gathered. The Phnom Penh wholesalers, who were mostly Chinese, maintained close working relationships not only with the Chinese commercial houses in Saigon, Hong Kong, and Singapore but also with the many Chinese merchants in the Cambodian interior, especially those in the provincial capitals.

The provincial towns have had, in varying degrees, an independent existence as centers of provincial administration and small-scale industry, and they often derived much of their importance as staging and distribution points for goods on their way to and from Phnom Penh. In these towns the differentiation between wholesalers and retailers was less distinct than in Phnom Penh. Wholesalers acted as retailers and also sold in job lots to local retailers and village merchants in the smaller communities. They also acted as intermediaries for the assembling of local products, such as rice, palm sugar, and lumber, and other goods for sale to the wholesale, retail, and export trade in Phnom Penh.

The rice that reached Phnom Penh, for example, typically moved from the farmer to the local rice mills into the hands of the provincial wholesalers, who in turn disposed of it to the Phnom Penh trade (see ch. 12). In some cases the wholesaling step was bypassed. Large restaurants, for example, often brought their rice directly from mills in bulk quantities at wholesale prices, and in the provinces the rice miller might sell directly to the retail merchant.

Wholesalers were almost always involved in the ownership of storage warehouses and in transportation. In addition, they often financed elements of the trade with which their wholesaling operations were, in one way or another, identified.

Retail Trade

Retailing was carried on almost entirely in small establishments operated by individual proprietors, by stallkeepers in the urban and village markets, and by street vendors. The exception was Phnom Penh, where retail establishments of considerable size and complexity.

Every village and city had its open-air marketplace. Each vendor who set up a stand paid the local government a tax for the privilege. In larger cities the open-air market was also the commercial hub of the Western-type retail shops. The sale of agricultural produce in the markets was mainly conducted by the farmers who produced it; for products that were removed from the source of production—textiles, for example—the vendors were, as a rule, Chinese, Sino-Cambodians, Vietnamese, or Indians.

The typical Cambodian village was made up of a few hundred to about 1,000 persons. Each village supported from one to four stores, at least one of which was a small Chinese retail shop where simple farm implements, home necessities, and provisions might be obtained. The store buildings were sometimes two stories in height with family quarters on the second floor, but more often they had only one story, a room or two being set aside from the family living area for the exchange of goods.

Nearly all the farmer's basic needs were satisfied within the confines of the village, but occasionally he left the village for a brief journey to town, usually the provincial capital, to sell farm produce or to exchange it for goods not locally available. These trips often lasted several days. Folklore is replete with embellishments of the wonders of these trips, reflecting the cultural variation between rural and urban life. The cool season, beginning in December, was a special time for travel.

In the marketplace, full-scale bargaining was the general practice. When a merchant quoted a price, it was merely an opening price, and any customer offer was to be regarded only as an opening offer.

Price markups were high. Many of the products were under price control, but the ceilings were difficult to enforce and were often evaded. The usual administrative problems characteristic of price control were compounded by the inadequacy of enforcement personnel. Wholesale prices, especially of imported goods, were more easily controlled.

The Trading Community

The Chinese

Although the Chinese first came to the country centuries ago, the major movement took place during the past 100 years. Many settled in Phnom Penh, working at whatever occupations were available until they had accumulated enough capital to start their own business enterprises. Others roamed the countryside as itinerant peddlers and eventually established small stores throughout the rural areas.

In 1972 the Chinese occupied a dominant position in commerce, but the government has had a longstanding policy to bring about a transfer in the control over trade from the Chinese to Cambodian citizens, particularly those of Khmer descent (see ch. 3). Cambodian firms were favored by the government in both domestic commerce and controls over foreign trade, and certain restrictions were placed on the commercial activities of noncitizens, a category that included many Chinese. Sino-Cambodians who could opt for Cambodian citizenship were able to operate without the hampering restrictions placed on Chinese.

The Cambodians (Khmer)

Traditionally, the Cambodians looked disparagingly on business and commerce, preferring to engage in vocations that had greater prestige, such as farming and government service. After World War II, however, as a reflection of rising commercial consciousness accompanying the growth of nationalism, a considerable number entered commercial and industrial occupations on a full-time basis. The government sought in every possible way to encourage this trend. Laws were passed that required foreign-owned firms to hire a high percentage of Cambodian nationals and to train apprentices for assumption of technical and administrative responsibilities. As more apprentices were trained, the provisions of these laws were more and more stringently enforced.

In addition, Cambodians who entered business were favored in many ways. During the Sihanouk regime, the government started a program of making capital available to Cambodians as one mechanism for enlarging their direct participation in domestic trade and for freeing the local consumer and producer from dependence on Chinese and Vietnamese middlemen (see ch. 11). Nevertheless, the traditional resistance to participation in commerce has proved difficult to overcome completely, and the Cambodians do not play a dominant part in domestic trade.

Other Ethnic Trading Groups

Other ethnic groups in the trading community were the Vietnamese, the Cham, and the Indians. Their influence on the pattern of trade was small in comparison to that of the Chinese and the Sino-Cambodians, but it was nevertheless significant. The Vietnamese functioned as small shopkeepers and in service vocations, such as electrical and vehicle repair and tailoring. They handled a large part of the internal trade and engaged extensively in market gardening in the vicinity of Phnom Penh, disposing of their produce in that city's public markets. The part played by the Vietnamese in commerce was reduced substantially by the repatriation of many to South Vietnam after the outbreak of fighting in Cambodia in early 1970 (see ch. 2; ch. 14).

Role of the Government

The government in 1972 played a minor direct role in domestic trade. In 1969 state-owned organizations accounted for 1 percent of the commerce reported, and mixed state-private establishments transacted 19 percent; the remaining 80 percent was in private hands.

As part of a 1969 reexamination of economic policies, the Cambodian government decided to abolish the state-owned retail outlets that had been set up in the mid-1960s as part of Prince Sihanouk's nationalization program (see ch. 3). The decision was carried out in 1970, and the government left domestic trade to private and mixed ownership. This decision, however, did not affect the continuance of other governmental functions related to commerce, such as the registration and inspection of local business firms; promulgation and enforcement of weights, measures, and quality standards; price controls; warehousing and storage regulations; sanitary regulations in public markets; registration of trademarks; and collection and publication of domestic trade statistics.

Effects of the War on Domestic Trade

The pattern of trade was disrupted by the hostilities that erupted in March 1970. The capacity of internal communications was greatly affected by military operations and by security considerations, which required convoy operations on land routes as well as on the Mekong River accesses to Phnom Penh. There was also the overriding requirement of assuring the food supply for the increased population of Phnom Penh, and trade was affected by a decline in industrial production.

The fragmentary descriptions available of the commercial elements of convoy cargoes did not permit any conclusions on the changes in domestic trade brought about by these circumstances. Local trade conducted in markets by peddlers or in village shops presumably continued much as before, although perhaps in a more restricted way.

There were no details available on trade in the areas not under control of the republican government in mid-1972. Communist forces were known to have organized the movement of foodstuffs and other goods to their troops. The republican government maintained that such items as rice, pepper, and salt, as well as cattle, had also been shipped to North Vietnam.

Prices

When hostilities began, there were relatively ample stocks of imported (including military consumption goods from South Vietnam) and domestically produced goods on hand. There was no rush by the general population to buy goods for purposes of hoarding, speculation, or security. Because of the disruption of transportation, however, there was strong pressure at first on the prices of such daily necessities as rice, fruit, vegetables, meat, and charcoal, and prices for these goods rose as much as 100 percent in the first six months after March 1970. Thereafter, rises in prices took place in response to the supply situation, although at a slower rate of increase; there were also periods of little movement or of slight temporary decline.

The government officially attempted to control the prices of key domestic commodities, such as rice, sugar, salt, charcoal, and gasoline, but found it impossible to enforce the controls; by the end of 1971 the price of top-quality rice was almost double the official price, and that of salt was four times the official price. During the latter half of 1971 the government, in order to ensure an adequate supply of basic agricultural commodities, decided to establish and to maintain minimum security stocks rather than to exercise direct control over the prices of the commodities. There were no reports on operations of the stocks by mid-1972.

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
THAILAND
LAOS
SOUTH VIETNAM
GULF OF THAILAND
Railroad
Principal road
Trail
Major airfield
Seaport
Ruins
City
National capital

Figure 5. Khmer Republic (Cambodia), Principal Transportation Routes, 1972

The official Phnom Penh general price index for February 1971 showed a rise of 49 percent for the working class (for which food costs were given a relatively heavier weight) and 35 percent for the middle class, as compared with the previous year. A monthly price index (December 1969 equaled 100), maintained by the American embassy in Phnom Penh, showed increases similar to those in the Cambodian government's statistics. The highest general index—and also the highest food index—in the embassy's series before April 1972 was recorded in October 1971, when the general index stood at 244. It declined thereafter to 193 in April 1972. Foreign observers noted that price increases had been less pronounced in the provincial cities than in the capital, but there were no available data for cities other than Phnom Penh.

TRANSPORTATION

Roads

The main road system was planned and built by the French before World War II as part of the Indochinese network. The only important addition to mid-1972 was the construction in the late 1950s of a highway from Kampong Saom (then Sihanoukville) to Phnom Penh, which was financed by United States aid (fig. 5). Other road construction has been mainly earthen trails built by local authorities or the Cambodian armed forces. The second five-year plan (1968-72) did not provide for the construction of additional highways.

The country's total road network was somewhat over 12,100 miles in 1969 (see table 12). Of the total mileage, national and provincial highways, centered on Phnom Penh and the provinces surrounding the capital, constituted somewhat less than one-third. Local and military roads made up the remainder. Only about 25 percent of the roads had improved surfaces—asphalt, gravel, or laterite.

Maintenance of the roads was reported to be minimal, largely the repair of damage caused by the rainy season and floods to road surfaces, embankments, and bridges. Wartime conditions had further reduced maintenance operations. Bridges were numerous on some routes; there were, for example, fifty-nine bridges in the 145-mile length of the Kampong Saom-Phnom Penh highway. Responsibility for maintenance of national highways was in the Ministry of Housing, Public Works, Posts, and Telecommunications. Provincial and local authorities carried out maintenance work on other roads.

The number of vehicles in use in Cambodia increased nearly 10

Table 12. Khmer Republic (Cambodia), Road System, Selected Years, 1955-69
(in miles)

	1955	1960	1965	1969
Class				
National highways	2,214	2,212	2,220	2,627
Provincial highways	986	986	1,037	1,060
Local roads	663	1,563	4,388	6,766
Military roads	0	0	0	1,672
Total	3,863	4,761	7,645	12,125
Surfacing				
Asphalt	982	1,295	1,531	1,632
Gravel	1,090	879	747	790
Laterite	309	214	366	580
Earth	819	810	751	1,158
Trails	663	1,563	4,250	7,965
Total	3,863	4,761	7,645	12,125

percent annually in the ten years ending in 1969. At that time four-wheeled vehicles numbered 36,348, consisting of 25,366 private cars, 9,626 trucks (more than half of them of five-ton capacity or more and including a considerable number powered by diesel engines), and 1,356 buses. Other vehicles included 16,170 motorcyles and scooters, 94,000 motorbicycles, and 2,170 three-wheeled vehicles (used as local passenger buses as well as for the transport of freight). Traffic on local roads included oxcarts and bicycles.

Vehicles used for passengers and freight transport were privately owned and operated. Maximum fares and freight rates were set by the government, which also licensed local and intercity buslines. Taxation of vehicle fuel was heavier for gasoline than for diesel fuels. The lower cost of diesel fuels was a factor in the increasing use of diesel power in trucks and buses.

Road transportation assumed a critical importance after warfare started in early 1970. The republican government commandeered taxis and truck to move troops to combat zones and continued to use them until military transport equipment was delivered through military aid channels (see ch. 14). Communist attacks closed many roads, and by the end of 1970 a large number of bridges and several hundred miles of roadway in areas under control of the republican government had been destroyed. The major bridges around Phnom Penh remained intact, however, despite attempts to damage or destroy them. Bailey bridges were installed in a number of places to replace destroyed permanent structures; some of these structures were rebuilt or repaired if practicable. Reopening of land communication routes was a major objective of the military operations undertaken by republican military forces through 1971 (see ch. 14).

The road system became the economic lifeline between Phnom Penh and the major rice-producing area around Batdambang when the railroad between the two cities was cut shortly after hostilities began. In mid-1971 rice from Batdambang was delivered by road convoy to the capital every two or three days if military activities permitted. An average convoy comprised over 100 trucks and thirty to forty trailers, which transported from 1,000 to 1,500 tons of rice and some vegetables, cotton, and livestock. Road transport, combined with water tranport, also replaced railroad communications between Kampong Saom and Phnom Penh. National Highway 1 linking Saigon and Phnom Penh became a major route for military supplies, which were also brought in by convoys when security permitted.

Territory under communist control in mid-1972 contained a minor portion of the country's land routes, which had been poorly developed along the Vietnamese border, especially in the northeastern provinces of Mondol Kiri and Rotanokiri. The Ho Chi Minh Trail complex ran southward in the general vicinity of the border with South Vietnam and through these two sparsely populated provinces, which had been effectively controlled by the Communists for several years (see ch. 14).

Water Transport

Inland Waterways

Cambodia's extensive inland waterways were historically of importance in the domestic trade of the country. The Mekong and Tonle Sab rivers and their numerous tributaries and the Tonle Sap (Great Lake) provided avenues of considerable total length, although the navigable length varied with the seasonal changes of precipitation and flooding (see ch. 2). At high water nearly 1,000 miles of waterways were navigable by motor launches. In some areas, especially west of the Mekong River and to the north of the Tonle Sab River, the villages were completely dependent on waterways for communications.

Both passengers and freight were transported on numerous launches, junks, and barges, some of which operated on regular passenger routes licensed by the government. Passenger traffic was estimated to have been about one-half to three-quarters that of the railroads in 1968. The freight carried could not be estimated with accuracy but was considerable in view of the approximately

120,000 tons of registered capacity of vessels over sixteen tons using inland waterways. Passenger and freight craft were privately owned and operated. Maximum freight rates were established by the government.

Inland waterway transport was also disrupted by the hostilities. Losses of craft and damage to vessels in several localities were reported, but the extent of destruction and interdiction of usual routes was not known in detail in mid-1972.

Ports

In 1960, when the port of Kampong Saom (then called Sihanoukville) was completed with French assistance, Cambodia acquired for the first time a seaport entirely under its control. By 1964 tonnage handled there exceeded that of Phnom Penh, which had previously handled all of Cambodia's international commerce (see table 13). The port at Kampong Saom was designed with a depth of thirty-two feet to allow access to vessels of 10,000 to 12,000 deadweight tons. By 1969, however, silting had reduced the available draft to twenty-one feet. Berths, warehouses, and equipment were estimated to give the port the capacity to handle about 1 million tons of cargo a year, excluding crude oil for the refinery, which was handled through the refinery's sea lines located seven miles north of the port.

Phnom Penh, 208 miles from the mouth of the Mekong, remained an important port for international commerce as well as for internal waterborne communications. Its proximity to the chief centers of consumption and production gave it some advantages over Kampong Saom, but its capacity was restricted by its limited mooring facilities and even more by the shallow water depths both at the city's port and in the river's estuary. On an average, vessels calling at Phnom Penh were of 2,000 to 2,500 deadweight tons and usually no more than 4,000 deadweight tons.

Utilization of the country's two ports was immediately affected by the outbreak of warfare in 1970. Initially, Kampong Saom was rendered almost useless by the interdiction of road and rail links with Phnom Penh, but later some cargo was unloaded and transhipped over land and water routes. The rapprochement between Cambodia and South Vietnam that occurred in 1970 removed political obstacles to the transit through South Vietnam of vessels bound for Phnom Penh and helped in improving the security of this traffic (see ch. 10). The Cambodian and South Vietnamese navies were cooperating in convoy operations on the Mekong River, where vessels were subject to frequent attacks by rocket and machinegun fire from positions along the banks. Full responsibility

Table 13. Khmer Republic (Cambodia), Volume of Traffic at the Ports of Phnom Penh and Kampong Saom, 1960–69
(in metric tons)

Year	Phnom Penh	Kampong Saom	Total
1960	842,000	34,700	876,700
1961	741,000	95,500	836,500
1962	898,000	166,300	1,064,300
1963	962,500	369,600	1,332,100
1964	707,800	714,800	1,422,600
1965	595,400	754,600	1,350,000
1966	517,100	548,500	1,065,600
1967	535,200	545,200	1,080,400
1968	453,100	747,800	1,200,900
1969[1]	227,700	358,300[2]	586,000

[1] For nine months.

[2] Excluding 392,000 tons of oil delivered directly to a refinery located seven miles north of Kampong Saom.

for the Cambodian portion of the river was shifted to the Cambodian navy in late 1971.

Railroads

The country had two rail lines, both originating from Phnom Penh, totaling some 400 miles of single, meter-gauge track. They constituted a state-owned autonomous enterprise. One line, 239 miles long, from Phnom Penh northwest to Paoy Pet on the Thai border, was built by the French between 1930 and 1940. The Phnom Penh-Kampong Saom line, 168 miles long, was constructed between 1960 and 1969 with assistance from France, West Germany, and the PRC. The rolling stock supplied for the new line, such as diesel-electric locomotives, diesel switch engines, boxcars, and tank cars, almost doubled the railroad's inventory.

The two parts of the rail system served different freight transportation needs. The older line was overwhelmingly dependent on highly seasonal agricultural production in the Batdambang region; 90 percent of its freight moved from that area to Phnom Penh. Road transport appeared to compete successfully with this line for freight moving in the opposite direction. The Kampong Saom-Phnom Penh line served the export-import traffic, including the import of petroleum products; in fact, the line extended north of the port of Kampong Saom and reached the refinery. The two lines had different load limits; those on the older line were lower because of lighter rails and the weakness of various structures, such as bridges. A fully loaded freight car from Kampong Saom was not allowed past Phnom Penh; cars for through traffic had to be less than fully loaded.

War damage to the railroads, caused by mine explosions, removal of track, and destruction of bridges, was extensive. Both lines were eliminated as fully operating components of the communications system in the area under control of the republican government soon after hostilities broke out in 1970. By mid-1972 only the westernmost section of the older Phnom Penh-Paoy Pet line—the portion between Batdambang west to Paoy Pet at the Thai border—was reported running with any regularity. The line between Phnom Penh and Kampong Saom was entirely inoperable at that date. Details of loss or damage to rolling stock and such other equipment as signalling apparatus were not known.

Civil Aviation

Cambodia established a national airline, Royal Air Cambodge, in 1956, with a 40-percent French interest. In 1969 it owned and operated three aircraft, which flew domestic and international routes in the Far East. At that time a number of international airlines also served Phnom Penh's Pouthichentong airport, principally handling tourist traffic, which increased rapidly in the 1960s. Other international airports were located at Siemreab and Phsar Ream (for Kampong Saom), but they were not entirely up to international standards and were not capable of handling jumbo jets such as the Boeing 747.

The only scheduled domestic service in 1969 was between Phnom Penh and Siemreab, near which the Angkor Wat ruins are located. Service to the other twenty-three domestic airports listed in operation in 1969 was administrative, military, and private. Air traffic was almost entirely passenger; only a very small amount of freight was carried.

Royal Air Cambodge became Air Cambodge in 1970; also, in 1970 the airline discontinued service to Hanoi and Canton. In mid-1972 flights were scheduled to Bangkok, Hong Kong, Saigon, and Singapore. Domestic service was expanded by Air Cambodge, and several small airlines were also established to connect the capital with various provincial cities.

Pouthichentong International Airport also served as the main base of the Cambodian air force and was subject to sporadic attack after the war started (see ch. 14). This airport was operating in mid-1972, but that at Siemreab was closed to civilian traffic in late 1971. Of the domestic airports, the one at Stoeng Treng was the only one of consequence to have fallen into enemy hands by mid-1972 (see ch. 14).

SERVICES

The Ministry of Housing, Public Works, Posts, and Telecommunications operated the country's postal, telephone, and radio-telephone services, both domestic and international. Mail was handled by fifty-eight post offices in 1968 (more recent information was not available), and the volume of international mail reported was then several times that of domestic mail. Telephone service was provided in the urban centers through an estimated 8,500 telephones in use in 1971. Intercity communications were carried out by radio-telephone circuits. Phnom Penh was the center of international radio-telephone, telegraph, and teletype circuits for communications with Paris, Tokyo, Singapore, Hong Kong, Bangkok. and Saigon; in addition, there was an international telex (two-way teleprinter) connection in the capital. The government recognized the desirability of improving internal communications as an element of its defense organization and planned to expand telephone and radio links with pilot villages that were planned for the areas surrounding Phnom Penh.

SECTION IV. NATIONAL SECURITY

CHAPTER 14

NATIONAL DEFENSE AND INTERNAL SECURITY

Much of the Khmer National Armed Forces (Forces Armées Nationales Khmères—FANK), consisting of the army (by far the largest component), the air force, and the navy, was engaged in mid-1972 in active combat within Cambodia. Their opponents were chiefly units of the army of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) and forces of the communist Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam; together these forces were estimated to total about 60,000 men. Republican troops were also fighting units of the so-called Cambodian People's National Liberation Armed Forces of the government-in-exile of Prince Norodom Sihanouk (see ch. 10). The pro-Sihanouk forces were roughly estimated at 15,000 men.

The FANK was being assisted directly by ground troops of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), as well as by South Vietnamese air and riverine naval units and by the United States Air Force. The military situation of the Khmer Republic in mid-1972 appeared to be serious, and the republic had lost control of about half its territory and an estimated 20 percent of its population.

At the time of the deposition of Prince Sihanouk as chief of state in March 1970, the country's armed forces consisted of about 35,000 men. They were lightly armed and generally inexperienced in combat except for some action during the 1960s against the domestic communist opponents of Prince Sihanouk. Dependence upon various foreign sources for matériel had resulted in a mixture of equipment, much of it obsolescent.

The warfare that erupted in early 1970, following Sihanouk's ouster, found the new government militarily unprepared, and it appealed for foreign military assistance. The principal immediate response from its neighbors was by South Vietnam, which made available ethnic Khmer troop units from the South Vietnamese Civilian Irregular Defense Groups, furnished weapons and supplies captured from North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces, and provided training facilities within South Vietnam for Cambodian troops.

The United States resumed military assistance in response to the Cambodian government's request; a previous program had been terminated in 1963 by Prince Sihanouk (see ch. 10). This resumed assistance was continuing in 1972, and a further grant aid program had been proposed by the United States administration for its fiscal year 1972/73. United States aid consisted principally of matériel and training supplies; no ground combat troops were involved, these having been specifically prohibited under legislation enacted in 1971 by the United States Congress. The administration, delivery, and end use of military assistance were handled by a military equipment delivery team attached to the United States embassy in Phnom Penh.

In late April 1970 United States and South Vietnamese forces entered southeastern Cambodia for the stated principal purpose of destroying North Vietnamese matériel, supplies, and headquarters believed to be located in sanctuary areas in that part of the country. The operation was also assisted by the Thai air force. United States ground forces were withdrawn in June 1970. South Vietnamese military operations have continued at varying intensity but have been affected by traditional Khmer-Vietnamese animosity, which has proved an obstacle to effective military cooperation.

Domestic training of the armed forces, which had risen in number to about 200,000 by 1972, was a continuing, unsolved problem; there were in addition about 140,000 paramilitary troops. Facilities in Cambodia were still inadequate and, pending completion of new training centers, the government was by mutual agreement relying on facilities in neighboring countries, chiefly South Vietnam.

The top echelons of the FANK command staff remained much the same as at the time of Prince Sihanouk's deposition; they reportedly still held the loyalty of the Cambodian soldier. Organizationally, the FANK retained the characteristics it had inherited from the period of French direct influence, which continued through 1971 when the French training mission was disbanded.

The burden on the economy in 1972 of supporting the FANK and the paramilitary forces and of maintaining the war effort was considerable. It had created a shortage of manpower, and a massive budgetary requirement that government revenues could meet only in part (see ch. 11).

The Cambodian government issued a number of decrees related to internal security soon after the deposition of Prince Sihanouk. These and subsequent decrees proclaimed: the indefinite application of martial law; the general mobilization of the Khmer population (which implied participation in some sort of defense capacity by most of the population and, consequently, the applicability of emergency legal procedures to them); the reorganization and functioning of police power; and the administration of justice. As a result, for most of the population in 1972, civil statutes and normal judicial procedures had been largely suspended.

BACKGROUND

A modern military force called the Royal Cambodian Army was organized in 1946. Its officers were all French, and it constituted part of the general colonial forces of France, but in 1949 an accord with France provided for command by Cambodians. At Cambodian independence, proclaimed in 1953, full control of the army passed into Cambodian hands; nevertheless, by mutual agreement, French advisers and technicians remained, and provision was also made for command of units by French officers if considered necessary. In 1954 naval and air forces were established, and the country's combined military forces were then renamed the Royal Khmer Armed Forces (Forces Armées Royales Khmères—FARK). They retained this name until the deposition of Prince Sihanouk in 1970, when they were again renamed, this time as the Khmer National Armed Forces.

Prince Sihanouk's foreign and domestic policies during the 1960s directly affected the size, equipment, and operations, as well as the indoctrination and training, of the FARK. By the end of the decade the cumulative effect was discontent with these policies and with the prince's regime itself. This discontent in the high command, allied with similar sentiment in other influential sectors of the country, was a factor leading to the deposition of Prince Sihanouk on March 18, 1970, and the proclamation of the republic in October 1970 (see ch. 9). The armed forces, hastily enlarged, were to face an entirely new politicomilitary situation and responsibilities.

Equipment and supplies for the FARK during the Sihanouk period came from various sources at different times, largely related to shifts in Prince Sihanouk's foreign policy. From 1953 to 1963 the United States was the major source of military aid; the program was suspended in 1963 at the prince's demand. This assistance totaled US$91.2 million from 1953 until the last deliveries were made in fiscal year 1964/65. French military assistance—other than training and advisory activities—had decreased after Cambodia's independence. The French continued, however, to dominate military training until late 1971. During the 1953-63 decade a United States Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) provided specialized training in the use of United States-supplied equipment and assisted in staff planning. After the 1963 suspension of military assistance from the United States, communist-bloc countries, particularly the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, became the chief source of military matériel for Cambodia through 1969.

At the same time, a change in Cambodian economic policies resulted in a reduction in domestic budgetary allocations for the FARK, although the level of defense expenditure was high in comparison with most developing countries. The result was a situation that sometimes left the army without enough gasoline for its vehicles and with an ill-assorted and obsolescent stock of weaponry.

There were also clear indications of army discontent with Prince Sihanouk's policies. Nevertheless, the FARK regarded itself as the preserver of the Sihanouk regime. During the second half of the 1960s the army undertook operations against dissident groups in many different parts of the country. The dissidents, who were called Khmers Rouges (Red Khmer), or simply rebels, were active principally in the northeastern and northwestern parts of the country.

Other FARK operations involved the Khmer Serei (see Glossary), an anti-Sihanouk group operating mainly outside Cambodia. During the 1960s the Cambodian government reported border violations by Thailand and South Vietnam, which caused Cambodian casualties, for which Prince Sihanouk held the Khmer Serei responsible. In the mid-1960s the government estimated that there were about 600 Khmer Serei within the country. It also estimated that there were another 2,000 to 3,000 in South Vietnam —including ethnic Khmer in regular units trained by the United States. The government considered both the Khmer Serei and the Khmer troop units as a threat to its internal security (see ch. 3).

FARK operations against the Khmers Rouges started after a peasant uprising in Batdambang Province in April 1967, which the government believed was communist instigated. It announced pacification of the region by July, but by the end of the year new disorders—again attributed to the Khmers Rouges—had broken out; within another year dissidence had affected eleven of the nineteen provinces.

The pattern of FARK military operations against the dissidents was seasonal; government troops launched offensives against scattered small bands of rebels during the dry season, chasing them back into more densely wooded terrain and the mountains from which they had emerged in the previous wet season (see ch. 2).

The dimension of the operations is indicated in official government claims that during six months in 1969 the rebels' casualties were: 130 killed, 100 wounded, and thirty captured; another thirty turned themselves in. Government losses were not made public. The government's policy toward defectors from the rebel forces (known as ralliers) was one of selective reconciliation; for example, in late 1969 two members of the Khmer Serei who had defected were commissioned as FARK lieutenants.

During the 1960s the FARK numbered about 35,000 men; of these, 32,000 were in the army, and the rest were in the navy and air force. It was entirely volunteer force, supplemented by about 75,000 men in paramilitary, reserve, and police organizations. Pay and conditions of service in the regular forces were relatively good by Asian standards. Provisions of a conscription law enacted in 1954 were invoked only twice—both times soon after its enactment—to obtain certain specialists. Military schools and training facilities furnished a regular, though small, increment of trained officers and men. For example, twenty-six officers were graduated in December 1969 from the Royal Military School at Phnom Penh, which was founded by the French in 1946.

Civic action projects were an important part of the FARK's activities from 1958 through 1969. The military forces built roads and bridges and constructed schools, dams, and airfields; most of this work was located in the border areas. The military were assigned the major responsibility for aspects of various development projects that Prince Sihanouk initiated with the announced intent of improving living conditions. As part of one such project, started in December 1969, to exploit gemstone deposits in the region of Samlot in Batdambang Province, the military forces were given the task of constructing an infirmary, a government building, and a primary school.

The FARK did little more than monitor the activities of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong (see Glossary) communist forces in Cambodia in line with Prince Sihanouk's policies during the early and mid-1960s. At this time the Communists, both North Vietnamese and Viet Cong, were being supplied with modern Chinese and Soviet matériel; this was landed at Sihanoukville (renamed Kampong Saom after Sihanouk's deposition) and transported from there to its recipients in their zone in eastern Cambodia. The cooperation of the FARK was essential to this activity.

Foreign communist forces, initially Viet Cong but later mainly North Vietnamese, made progressively greater use during the 1960s of Cambodia's northeastern and eastern provinces for operations against South Vietnam. It was only in early March 1968 that Prince Sihanouk publicly admitted that the Viet Cong had infiltrated Cambodia; however, according to an official publication of the Khmer republican government in 1970, the infiltration had started "toward" 1962, and by the end of 1969 there were 50,000 troops on Cambodian territory, which was used as a staging and supply area and for recuperation and hospitalization. The southern parts of the large-scale communist offensives of early 1968 in South Vietnam were made possible by this use of Cambodian territory and by the supplies reaching communist troops through it.

North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong military occupation of the Cambodian areas bordering South Vietnam resulted during the 1960s in the withdrawal of Cambodian administrative organizations or in their reduction to ineffectiveness in many areas. It appears, however, that before 1970 the Vietnamese Communists made no effort to establish political or administrative bodies in these areas. Their objectives were apparently purely military and, as long as the modus vivendi with Prince Sihanouk worked to their satisfaction, there was no requirement for political control. There seems to have been no effort by the Vietnamese communist forces to provide military support to the Khmers Rouges, probably because actions taken by the Khmers Rouges irritated the prince and might imperil Vietnamese use of Cambodian territory.

Before March 1970 the emphasis in public releases of Sihanouk's government when dealing with border incidents was on Cambodian losses from United States and South Vietnamese actions; from 1962 to 1969 there were said to have been 292 Cambodians killed and 690 wounded, both military and civilian, in addition to considerable material damages. Prince Sihanouk's attitude, however, had shifted in the late 1960s. The last authorized Communist Chinese arms delivery for the North Vietnamese arrived at Sihanoukville in April 1969. In an effort to apply pressure on the North Vietnamese, delivery was held up until about the following September and was then stretched out over a six-month period (see ch. 10). The attitude of the FARK also appears to have changed in the late 1960s, and there were reports that Cambodian forces were involved in small operations against the Communists in conjunction with South Vietnamese troops that had entered Cambodia.

The high command of the FARK remained unchanged in the decade of the 1960s. Lieutenant General Lon Nol was in operational control of the armed forces throughout the period while Prince Sihanouk was in effective control of national policies affecting the military establishment (see ch. 9). Although discontent within the army over Sihanouk's policies gradually grew—for example, budget allocations were considered inadequate—Lon Nol kept the army loyal to the prince. The general appears to have been able to inspire loyalty from both troops and officers and even though critics disparaged his peasant origins, this was apparently not a handicap within the FARK because not only were the men and noncommissioned officers of similar origin but, according to a 1967 private survey, 60 percent of the cadet officers were also from the same social stratum (see ch. 4).

Thus Lon Nol was in a position to ensure army support for efforts to change the policies and, if desired, the actual leadership of the royal government. He seems to have been aware of moves toward such a change in government in late 1969 and entered into negotiations at the end of that year with Son Ngoc Thanh, the leader of the Khmer Serei, to ensure support of the ethnic Khmer troops under Thanh's control who were serving at the time in South Vietnam (see ch. 9).

ARMED FORCES OF THE KHMER REPUBLIC

Mission

After the deposition of Prince Sihanouk in March 1970, the Cambodian government emphasized its intention to assume, as soon as it had the capability, total responsibility for the defense of the country against external aggression. It reaffirmed the country's longstanding policy of neutrality and nonalignment and its demands for respect of Cambodia's territorial integrity (see ch. 10). The government took a number of actions in domestic affairs and foreign relations to increase the capability of the Cambodian military establishment. Official pronouncements in early 1972 added the objective of improvements in the army to turn it into an efficient, disciplined, and well-equipped force capable of achieving victory to win back the population and territory still in enemy hands.

As the armed forces expanded after March 1970, the army element evolved into two organizational components. The first consisted of the regular forces, comprising the general reserve (main force) and territorial units of the regular forces. The second was known as the paramilitary forces. The mission of the general reserve was maneuver and combat, and that of the territorial forces was static guard duty; the responsibility of the paramilitary forces was local defense. The FANK mission also included police functions in maintaining security, the primary responsibility for this being assigned to the army's provost marshal and the military police.

General mobilization was ordered by the government in a decree issued on June 25, 1970. It stated that Cambodian citizens of both sexes between the ages of eighteen and sixty were to join the nation's defense forces and that in time of danger economic resources were to be relinquished to the state in accordance with requisition regulations. The general mobilization decree formed the basis for expansion of the armed forces and their auxiliary organizations to the levels required to fulfill their assigned military roles.

Subsequently, FANK general headquarters was assigned major responsibilities in the series of fifty-three ministerial committees set up during 1971 to carry out the political, economic, and cultural measures by which the government sought to achieve the goals of its general mobilization plan (see ch. 8; ch. 11). The chief of the general staff was made the second-ranking member of each of the committees (under the prime minister, who was chairman). The assistant chiefs of staff for operations and logistics were usually also members. Other FANK staff officers and officers of the technical services attached to the Ministry of National Defense were assigned to serve on subcommittees and working groups established for specified tasks. Many of these were of an economic development nature, and only a relative few were directed primarily to military objectives. These dealt with village self-defense, security of development projects, and the improvement of cooperation between military forces and the people.

The FANK role and mission envisaged by the government required enlarged training facilities and new equipment, neither of which could be supplied through Cambodian resources on the scale and in the time required because of enemy attack. The government sought and obtained military and economic assistance from abroad, including substantial aid from the United States. Although the government, as a matter of policy, has not wanted foreign troops on Cambodian soil, its lack of military capability has obliged it to accept the presence of friendly South Vietnamese military units operating within Cambodia (see ch. 10).

The economic dislocation resulting from warfare in Cambodia, such as disruption of transport, has required the FANK to undertake an important role in supporting the economy, particularly in organizing and protecting the movement of goods. Both waterborne and land shipments have required convoy operations through contested territory (see ch. 5; ch. 11). In 1971 the army provided security for the harvesting of rice in the western part of the country; similar security conditions apparently prevailed in 1972.

The small naval and air force arms of the FANK, essentially adjuncts to the ground forces, were mainly concerned with tactical support to the ground forces and the provision of transportation.

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The naval force operated for the most part on the rivers, but it also patrolled Cambodian territorial waters in the Gulf of Thailand; its primary mission was security of military and commercial convoys on the Mekong River between Phnom Penh and the South Vietnamese border.

Guard duty and defense of locally important facilities, such as schools and factories, were the responsibilities of territorial and paramilitary units that were formed within the FANK through the enlistment of students, teachers, and factory employees. Units formed in this way were described as stationary commando forces assigned to the defense of their buildings. Factory personnel not formally incorporated in any FANK units were also expected to join in such defense.

Organization

The government issued a decree on March 12, 1972, vesting combined policy direction and operational control of the country's military establishment in the chief of state, who was designated as supreme commander and chief of staff of the FANK. He was to be assisted in these duties by a national council for security, the duties of which were not announced. The Council of Ministers formed later in the same month included a minister of state in charge of national defense who, like the chief of state at the time, was a general officer of the FANK. Two other ministries were assigned responsibilities bearing on defense and security: the Ministry of Interior, Security, Religious Affairs, Veterans, and Tourism and the Ministry of General Mobilization.

During the regime of Prince Sihanouk the minister of national defense did not exercise operational control over the FANK but was responsible for the administrative and support services of the armed forces. The result of this unusual arrangement was that the command structure headed by the chief of staff and the general headquarters did not include most of the technical military services, which in most military establishments are subordinate to staff sections or organized as special staffs.

During the Sihanouk period, a military officer was usually appointed to serve as a minister and as chief of staff concurrently, as a solution to problems that might arise from the division of responsibilities between ministry and headquarters. The Khmer Republic continued to follow the same principle until 1971, the only difference being that the minister was a deputy chief of staff. His duties as minister were administration of the military pay system and coordination of military support activities. In 1971 a reorganization of the FANK placed support services under headquarters.

As far as was known in mid-1972, the FANK general headquarters in Phnom Penh remained organized along the conventional French pattern of numbered bureaus under the chief of staff. The bureaus were responsible for personnel, intelligence, plans and operations, logistics (to which the support elements had been moved from the ministry), information and morale, and security. Army, air force, and navy headquarters were subordinate to the general headquarters. Military schools and, probably, training centers completed the headquarters staff organization.

The chain of command of the army units ran for some operations and units from general headquarters directly to the commanders of the military regions into which the country was divided (see fig. 6). The main force units (general reserve) in each region remained under FANK general staff control, whereas the territorial force, although equally a part of the FANK, was under the regional commander. Large-scale operations requiring command and staff organization beyond the normal headquarters complement of a region were provided with additional personnel by the general staff on an ad hoc basis.

The FANK command established arrangements for liaison with South Vietnamese and United States headquarters in Saigon and with the South Vietnamese Army (Armée de la République du Viet-Nam — ARVN) operating on Cambodian territory. South Vietnamese operations, however, were generally undertaken independently, but there was Cambodian representation in a joint headquarters in Tay Ninh, South Vietnam. Information was not available on liaison and coordination arrangements, neither in tactical support of FANK nor in strategic bombing, with the air force commands of the United States, South Vietnam, and Thailand in their operations in Cambodia.

The effect of the expansion of FANK (a sixfold increase between 1970 and 1972) on its organizational structure was most marked in its ground forces, which accounted for almost all of the increase. The basic organizational unit remained the battalion. The standard complement was 500 men, but some had as few as 250. Tactical requirements, however, by the end of 1970 resulted in the consolidation of battalions into brigades and brigade groups. Infantry and paratroop brigades appeared to be of four battalions each. Reference was also made in early 1972 to an infantry division of unspecified strength. Troop units larger than battalions, for which no total strength was made public, were presumably in the main force units under the operational control of FANK general headquarters. Territorial force units probably were of battalion size, and the paramiltary and militia forces were organized into companies, platoons, and squads. Combat units, such as ar-

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
THAILAND
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PREAH VIHEAR
STOENG TRENG
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PHNOM PENH
KANDAL
PREY VENG
SVAY RIENG
① ODONGK MEANCHEY
② VIHEAR SUOR
KAOH KONG
II
TAKEV
GULF OF THAILAND
KAMPOT
PHNOM PENH SPECIAL MILITARY REGION
International boundary
Province boundary
Military region boundary
● Headquarters
Ho Chi Minh trail complex (generalized)
NVA-VC control or contested (generalized)

Note--Southern border area, under NVA-VC (see Glossary) control since March-April 1972 offensive, expected to revert to government control or contested status upon NVA-VC return to their previously controlled areas to the northeast.

Government forces and dissidents hold enclaves or contested areas outside their nominal control.

Figure 6. Khmer Republic (Cambodia), Military Regions and Areas Under Government and Dissident Control, July 1972

tillery and armor, were organized into battalions, but special purpose organizations and such support units as engineers were referred to publicly only as "units."

The command and staff elements of the FANK expanded in size and rank as the armed forces grew larger. The officer corps was increased by the commissioning of noncommissioned officers and student volunteers. The grades of career officers were also raised as their command responsibilities became greater. Before March 1970, for example, the air force was commanded by a lieutenant colonel; the same officer was promoted to brigadier general from colonel in December 1971 as commander and chief of the air force headquarters. Similar promotions occurred in the navy and in the medical corps. The previous patterns of rank and command continued, however; battalions were usually commanded by majors.

The new formations of brigades were under lieutenant colonels or majors.

Manpower

In March 1970 there were 27,000 to 28,000 nominal combat troops in the FARK. All of its 32,000 to 35,000 men were volunteers lightly armed with a mixture of weapons and equipment, and with little combat training or experience. Within a few days the successor government announced its intention to recruit an additional 10,000 men.

This initial expansion was quickly achieved by volunteers of students and other young intellectuals and by integrating constabulary units and some police into the military organization. The government also appealed to former members of the FARK to return to service in the national forces and issued calls for the mobilization of farmers in an armed militia and for the formation of partisan groups, including women and children.

Later in 1970, the Cambodian government publicly announced a total of 210,000 men as its force-level goal for the FANK by the end of that year. Navy and air force manning was limited by the availability of major items of equipment, for which the only source was foreign military assistance. By early 1972 the FANK had grown to a reported force of approximately 200,000 men, and another 140,000 were in popular self-defense forces. Almost all were in the army; the navy's strength was about 5,000 men, and that of the air force, about 5,000. These increases in the army were achieved by enrolling volunteers only, who were to serve for the duration. The general mobilization decree of June 25, 1970, had provided for universal service, but its provisions had not been enforced by early 1972.

Recruitment for the territorial force component of the FANK under the operational control of the military region commanders was handled locally. Territorial units were formed and paid by their commanders and tended to be regional organizations. Reports of the strength of these forces may have been inflated, judging from reports of "phantoms" on the FANK payroll—nonexistant soldiers for whom commanders were drawing pay and allowances. An unconfirmed newspaper report in early 1972 stated that the government's corrective action had resulted in abolishing some thirty battalions previously carried on the rolls of the FANK.

The creation of a regular militia and local defense groups was undertaken after the mid-1970 promulgation of the general mobilization decree, which furnished the legal basis for paramilitary units. These local defense groups succeeded partisan formations for which the government had initially appealed. By the end of

1971 paramilitary units had enrolled 140,000 volunteers. They were unpaid and presumably engaged only part time in their military duties, although details of their service were not available.

By the beginning of 1972 a large segment of the male working-age population had been mobilized for military service, with the result that Cambodia had an overall labor shortage; however, because of the disruption of the economy and destruction of much of what industrial capacity Cambodia possessed, the shortage of labor had not by itself produced serious economic consequences (see ch. 11). In most cases the popular defense forces had been organized for local duties, and this had not necessarily removed workers from their places of employment. Moreover, not all of the increase was accounted for by new recruits, since the army had absorbed existing police and constabulary units, which probably totaled some thousands.

The Cambodian government as of early 1972 continued to exclude two groups from service in the FANK: members of the National Assembly (by their own decision), and members of the monastic brotherhood (*sangha*—see Glossary). Service in the FANK carried with it in early 1972 the loss of suffrage—a practice inherited from the previous regime. This had caused the FANK high command to protest and to demand that soldiers be granted the right to vote.

The sizable Cambodian minority in South Vietnam, known as Khmer Krom (literally, lowland Khmer), located chiefly in the Mekong delta area, and a smaller minority in Thailand provided some manpower for the expansion of the Cambodian armed forces. Some were already trained and serving in organized units in these countries; some were recruited and trained there. The most important were the battalions of Khmer Krom that were a part of the South Vietnamese Civilian Irregular Defense Groups. Several of these battalions volunteered for service in Cambodia and were airlifted to Phnom Penh by the South Vietnamese in May 1970. Other Khmer Krom units followed, and all were integrated into the FANK. A smaller group of ethnic Khmer, consisting of four battalions totaling about 2,000 men, was originally formed in the same delta area of South Vietnam and known as the Khmer Kampuchea Krom was engaged by the Cambodian government as a mercenary force.

Training

Military training facilities in Cambodia were originally designed and equipped for the FARK and were inadequate for combat training of larger armed forces outfitted with new equipment. FARK training had been at a relatively low level and mostly for guard and civic action assignments. The FARK was said by one observer to have received no real basic training, and the newly redesignated FANK was poorly qualified to undertake an extensive training program at the same time as it was called upon to fight.

In the initial expansion of the army, individuals considered officer material were put through training courses of a few weeks to six months at the military academy in Phnom Penh. By the end of 1970 several thousand such officers had been trained, and they were commissioned at ranks dependent upon their previous education, their standings in final examinations, and their military fitness. During this period and, through 1971, assistance to the military, naval, and police training schools was provided by French military mission instructors.

The South Vietnamese and Thai governments undertook training of Cambodian ground forces in 1970 in their respective countries. As the procedure developed in South Vietnam, entire battalions were airlifted one at a time to training centers in the delta area. At the end of a twelve-week period of basic training, the battalion was returned by air to Cambodia supplied with United States individual weapons and personal equipment. United States Army personnel were reported to have coordinated the training at one facility, which was stated to be capable of handling four battalions at a time. Between mid-1970 and early 1972 some 50,000 Cambodians had received training, chiefly in two such centers in South Vietnam. This training continued in early 1972 at an average rate of 5,000 soldiers a month.

Cambodian air force personnel were also trained outside the country, principally in Thailand, where two groups of pilots had been commissioned by the end of 1971. Training of navy officers, including some women, continued at the Cambodian naval base at Chruoy Changvar across the river from Phnom Penh. At the completion of a six-month course, the graduates were commissioned as ensigns for service in the naval force or in the marine battalions attached to it. French instructors served at the base through 1971, by which time several hundred officers had completed the course.

Capabilities and Morale

The Cambodian armed forces, with little preparation, undertook military operations in 1970 against hostile forces of much greater experience and initially of greater size. Fighting, usually on a small scale, quickly spread to almost all parts of the country.

In the first part of 1971, however, the new Cambodian army scored victories even though it was reported that only one-fourth to one-third of its troops were well armed and adequately trained. The government claimed that considerable losses had been inflicted on the enemy, but much of these were attributable to air support of ground troops; Cambodian losses were, according to the government, about one-tenth of those of the enemy. One operation designed to reopen a highway toward the coast, south of Phnom Penh, was described by a foreign observer as properly planned and organized in both its military and psychological warfare aspects.

The victories were overshadowed later in 1971 by a serious military setback in a major operation named Chen-la II, which was intended to clear the highway connecting Phnom Penh with Kampong Thum. The failure of this large-scale offensive was ascribed by foreign military sources to tactical shortcomings in the face of a highly mobile enemy, logistics deficiencies, and a shortage of experienced commissioned and noncommissioned officers. The Khmer government was said to have recognized these weaknesses and to be giving priority attention in early 1972 to corrective measures. Before Chen-la II foreign observers had noted, for instance, the army's lack of training in counterguerrilla tactics.

Offensive operations were undertaken chiefly by the FANK's general reserve (main force) units, usually as independent Cambodian actions and usually in the area west of the Mekong. Defensive activities involved both the general reserve and territorial forces and, depending upon circumstances, paramilitary, militia, and civilian auxiliary forces. Foreign observers have noted that Cambodian troops when properly led and equipped have fought aggressively in defense of their country.

There was very little information available in 1972 on the capabilities of the naval and air force arms of the FANK. The air force was reported to have flown more sorties in 1970 than would be expected of a force of its size. In early 1971, however, its tactical element was virtually wiped out on the ground by an attack on the Phnom Penh airport, its main base. By the end of 1971 some new transports and helicopters had been received through foreign military assistance programs.

High morale characterized the volunteers of 1970 and early 1971. The generally serious military situation facing the government and its armed forces, which incurred considerable losses in the reverses during the latter part of 1971, caused some decline. This had not, however, caused large-scale desertions, and Cambodian troops reportedly remained dogged and loyal.

Desertions during part of the Chen-la II operation in late 1971, when the FANK was encircled, were said by a government official to have been high, although no figures on the number of troops involved were released. An explanation of the desertions was that soldiers had withdrawn without regard to the plan of the military commander. The high command ordered an investigation and stated that the group of soldiers was to be sent to a special military training center. Communist broadcasts in early 1972 claimed that "several thousands" had deserted from the FANK, but there was no substantiation of this claim.

The government and general staff imposed severe sanctions on misbehavior by troops, especially in such flagrant violations of the standards of military propriety as looting of civilians. There appeared to be no exact equivalent in the FANK of chaplains in the Western sense. The government was known in 1971 to be seeking secondary school students for the army whose responsibilities would be to explain Buddhism (see ch. 7).

Military Pay

The details of the pay and allowances of the FANK in 1972 were not available. The pay scales of the FARK, in which a recruit reportedly received the equivalent of US$30 per month in pay and allowances, appear to have been continued at least initially by the FANK. Assuming that the republic's budget for 1971 was drawn up on the basis of a paid FANK strength of 210,000, pay, supplements, and family allowances would average about the equivalent of US$500 per man per year. In addition, the budget provided a sizable sum for allowances for special assignments, presumably of officers, but details were not given. The pay and allowances for the air force and for special units in the FANK, such as the Khmer Krom, were not known.

The FANK's method of handling pay and allowances created two problems: "phantoms" on the military payroll for whom the commanders drew pay; and the difficulty encountered by some individuals in receiving regularly the amounts to which they were entitled. Reports state that on some occasions, at least, soldiers' dependents accompanied them into combat because separation from the head of the household would mean the end of their support.

Insignia and Awards

The FANK has retained the French system of silver and gold colored bars for rank insignia of commissioned officers below general officer rank. The insignia were worn on shoulder boards or suspended from a button or pocket. The rank of general and flag officers was indicated by stars—one for brigadier general or commodore and two for major general. The air force and navy used appropriate devices on rank insignia to distinguish their services from the army. Officers' dress caps bore the republic's national coat of arms adopted in 1971.

The republican government, in addition to replacing the monarchy's coat of arms, flag, and national anthem, created new awards and citations for FANK units (see ch. 8). The highest distinction for a combat unit was the Banner of Victory—the first recipients were two brigades of infantry and paratroops. The Order of the Republic was a unit citation, which might be given simultaneously with other awards. The republic also established the National Defense Medal in three orders: division, army, and republic. Information was not available on other decorations, awards, and orders conferred on individuals for general services to the state.

Veterans

The government initially established a commissariat-general for former servicemen in late 1970 and placed it, with the commissariat-general for war victims, under the commissariat-general for general mobilization. Little was known about the policies and operations, but funds provided in the 1971 budget indicated a limited activity for both. In the cabinet formed in early 1972, veteran's affairs were placed under the Ministry of Interior, Security, Religious Affairs, Veterans, and Tourism (see ch. 8). Military hospitals, such as the main FANK medical facility in Phnom Penh, provided medical care for the wounded. The government was reported to have established programs for wounded soldiers in 1971, but no details were known of their nature and scope. The government's pension system provided for retirement and disability payments for military as well as for civil service and police members, including provisions for widows and minor orphans. The details of its operations, as regards military recipients, were not known in 1972 (see ch. 5).

Foreign Influence and Assistance

France

A century of French training of the Cambodian armed forces, which ended only in 1971, left a lasting impression on the FANK; and French concepts of doctrine, tactics, and organization of headquarters, staffs, and units were dominant in 1972. French military equipment was used until independence, and France was an important source after the United States military assistance program ended in 1963 (see ch. 10). During the 1964–70 period the French supplied vehicles, aircraft, patrol craft, ground-to-air missiles, and equipment for manufacturing military uniforms and boots. During this period almost all were sales to the government; only a small part was furnished as grant aid.

United States

The position of the United States as of mid-1972 with respect to military assistance and action in the Khmer Republic was set forth in a statement by President Richard M. Nixon to Congress in February 1972. In it he characterized United States efforts as limited, requested, supportive, and defensive. The statement declared that Cambodian requests for assistance had not included the deployment of United States troops and that United States policy did not include the presence in Cambodia of any United States ground combat troops; it did include, however, the conduct of air interdiction missions against enemy personnel and supplies, with the approval of the Cambodian government (see ch. 10).

The first United States military assistance to Cambodia was provided by a 1950 agreement with France and the three states of Indochina under terms of the Mutual Security Act of 1949. After Cambodian independence a bilateral treaty on military assistance was signed in 1955, but this ended in 1963 at Cambodian request (see Background, this ch.).

In April 1970 the Cambodian government asked the United States for arms and military equipment. The initial response of the United States was the announcement that weapons captured in South Vietnam would be supplied to Cambodia. These were mainly Communist Chinese-made AK–47 rifles delivered by the South Vietnamese. Added to AK–47s already in Cambodian hands, through diversion of Chinese Communist arms shipments from Sihanoukville, according to reports, this weapon constituted a major item of FANK equipment by late 1970. The resulting requirement for ammunition made it necessary to manufacture AK-47 rounds in the United States—under a contract paid for from military assistance funds made available by executive determination.

Grant military assistance to Cambodia started before mid-1970 when the United States supplied small arms, mortars, and other equipment following a presidential determination that eventually provided US$8.5 million for the purpose. An agreement regulating military assistance was signed by the two countries on August 19, 1970, and the amount of assistance provided for fiscal year 1970/71 was US$183 million; additional grants from excess stocks amounted to US$7.1 million. For fiscal year 1971/72 military assistance increased to an estimated US$200 million. Of the US$300 million of military aid requested for fiscal year 1972/73 in early 1972, US$209 million was to be grant military assistance.

The 1972/73 proposal provided for an increase in the FANK, purchase of long leadtime items of equipment, and the funding of operating costs required to support an active combat situation. The force goal for FANK, though not officially announced, was understood to be 220,000. In addition to infantry, equipment, aircraft, river patrol and landing craft, ammunition, and other items, the program included the construction of three training facilities within Cambodia to allow the FANK to conduct its own training. It did not include pay for the FANK.

The management and operation of the United States military assistance program for Cambodia was different in 1972 from that of similar programs in other recipient countries. One reason was the limitation imposed by legislation on total United States official personnel in all categories to a maximum of 200 at any one time. Legislative enactments also limited the number of third-country nationals paid out of United States funds to eighty-five (see ch. 11). To administer the program in Cambodia, a military equipment delivery team was established, initially composed of sixteen people attached to the United States embassy in Phnom Penh. Administrative and backup responsibilities were assigned to a group in Saigon, originally numbering forty-four, to support those in Cambodia. The organization for administering the program in Cambodia was later changed to a section in the embassy there, but support continued by the United States military headquarters in Saigon. In early 1972 there were ninety-seven United States military personnel in Cambodia, sixty-two of whom were on the military equipment delivery team.

The United States played only an indirect role in the training of Cambodian troops in South Vietnam. One of the two bases in the southern part of the country used for this purpose was a former camp for United States Special Forces units, which continued to furnish some personnel. Some other United States Army services also participated in training activities in a coordinating capacity. The United States indirectly financed South Vietnamese military personnel involved and material costs of the training program through its support of the South Vietnamese defense budget.

In addition to material supplied under the military assistance program, the United States entered into agreements that would, in effect, support the FANK budget. Two agreements concluded in 1971 and 1972 for the delivery of surplus agricultural commodities to Cambodia, provided that 80 percent of the local currency generated would be used for purposes of common defense. It was understood that this part of the proceeds from the sale of the commodities—equivalent to US$18.1 million—would be used to pay FANK salaries (see ch. 11). Also in 1971 the United States concluded an agreement with Cambodia to finance US$70 million worth of goods under the Commodity Import Program, which would generate local currency equivalent to about US$67 million to be used for Cambodian military personnel costs (see ch. 13).

The United States continued tactical and strategic air operations in Cambodia in 1972. Missions were mounted from outside the country, and no United States aircraft or supporting units were based in Cambodia. Units of the United States Navy cooperated with other friendly naval forces in patrolling the Gulf of Thailand off the Cambodian coast.

South Vietnam

South Vietnam's role in the Cambodian war has had two major facets: the training of Cambodian forces (battalions of the FANK and some navy and air force personnel), which started soon after March 1970, and active combat operations. It has also provided ethnic Khmer forces from South Vietnam. For training purposes, instructors, transportation to and from training areas, and medical personnel for dispensaries have been furnished. This has been done under an agreement between the two countries by which the Cambodian government reimbursed the South Vietnamese for the use of the training sites and for the rations consumed by the FANK troops while in training.

Military operations by ARVN in Cambodia started soon after the change of the Cambodian government in March 1970. ARVN's peak strength in Cambodia was reported to have been 43,000 in June 1970. The political implications of ARVN operations on Cambodian territory were settled by an agreement reached between the two governments (see ch. 10).

The traditional differences between the Khmer and the Vietnamese have resulted in incidents during ARVN operations that affected the local Khmer population. At Cambodian government request the South Vietnamese government agreed to take action at the local level to investigate, identify, and punish the perpetrators. No information was available, however, on ARVN actions to carry out this agreement. As a measure to reduce frictions, the Cambodians also detailed religious and political advisers to ARVN units in Cambodia, although it was not known how widespread or effective this practice had become in mid-1972.

ARVN operations in Cambodia were usually unilateral, although there were some reports of joint operations with Khmer forces. They took place in the southeastern and central-eastern portions of Cambodia with the objective of destroying the rear area bases of the Vietnamese communist forces operating in South Vietnam (see Background, this ch.). The main concentrations of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong in Cambodia were in these areas, and the ARVN bore the main burden of the fighting there. In late 1970 South Vietnam requested that the Cambodian government pay between US$3 million and US$4 million as reimbursement for

ARVN's expenses and to set up a fund for food expenses for ARVN in future operations. The claim was settled as a part of an agreement between the two countries.

Thailand

Thailand has extended some military assistance to the Cambodian government since the two countries resumed diplomatic relations in May 1970 (see ch. 10). The first step was a Thai announcement that battalions of volunteers of Khmer descent in Thailand would be sent to Cambodia (the United States agreed to furnish arms and equipment for these volunteers).

In September 1970, however, Thailand stated that it would not consider the sending of army troops except in a dire emergency. The Thai have provided other military aid, including air operations (at the request of the Khmer government), repair of Cambodian aircraft, furnishing of some river patrol boats, and medical assistance.

Other Countries

In April 1970 the Cambodian government announced its willingness to accept unconditional aid from any source to combat aggression, and by the end of 1970 a number of countries—including Australia, Japan, the Republic of China, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, and the United Kingdom—had furnished small amounts of equipment, uniforms, prefabricated bridges, medicines, and humanitarian assistance. Indonesia undertook the training in Indonesia of 360 FANK noncommissioned officers in commando techniques and counterinsurgency warfare. Australia and New Zealand have also provided some military training.

ARMED FORCES IN CAMBODIA HOSTILE TO THE KHMER REPUBLIC

Armed forces in Cambodia hostile to the Khmer Republic in mid-1972 consisted of two main categories. The first were troops, essentially of Khmer ethnic origin, of the National United Front of Cambodia (Front Uni National de Kampuchéa—FUNK). The other which was commonly designated Viet Cong, included North Vietnamese Army forces and the forces of the communist Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, (collectively, NVA-VC).

FUNK Forces

Prince Sihanouk first announced his intention of forming a "liberation army" in a communiqué issued from Peking on March

23, 1970, less than a week after his disposition. Since then he has referred to this force as the Cambodian Liberation Armed Forces, the National Armed Forces, or the National Liberation Armed, Guerrilla, and Militia Forces. Their actual composition was unknown. Peking and Hanoi have usually referred to all antirepublican forces as the Cambodian People's National Liberation Armed Forces; whether the term included NVA-VC forces in Cambodia remained unclear.

Some antirepublican Cambodian forces, including commanders, were former Khmer Rouges and communist party leaders who had earlier been in the underground opposition to Prince Sihanouk. Before 1970 the strength of the Khmers Rouges was usually estimated at about 3,000 men, who were widely scattered. By the end of 1971 a frequent estimate was 15,000; the increase was attributed by antirepublican media to peasant response to appeals made in the prince's name. One Western report estimated that another 18,000 Cambodian peasants were involved in supply operations for forces opposing the FANK; however, it was not known whether these included individuals assisting or impressed by the NVA-VC.

By 1972 FUNK forces were believed to have military command organizations in Cambodia, but their locations and levels were unknown. Prince Sihanouk's government-in-exile in Peking announced in March 1972 the membership of the military high command of his "liberation" forces in Cambodia. Its commander-in-chief was listed as Khieu Samphan, a deputy prime minister and minister of national defense of Sihanouk's regime. It was widely believed in Phnom Penh, however, that Khieu was one of the three opposition leaders in the National Assembly who had been executed by a Sihanouk order in 1967.

From the fragmentary information available, it appeared that the composition and the operation of the antirepublican armed forces differed by area. In western Cambodia, where the Khmers Rouges had formerly been active, they were reportedly all Cambodian units. In eastern Cambodia, where the NVA-VC armed forces were in virtual occupation, Cambodian formations provided the cadre and were organized and commanded by NVA-VC staff. They were apparently either inserted into NVA-VC units or were used as auxiliaries.

Cambodian units formed under Vietnamese tutelage included guerrillas for village defense, local force units for district and provincial control, and main force units for service on any front. Reports of refugees and deserters stated that impressment as well as recruitment were practiced to fill the ranks. Cambodian-speaking Vietnamese residents were also reported to have joined such units in western Cambodia in order to avoid internment by the government. Those Cambodians who were in command positions were reported to be dominated by the more experienced Vietnamese. Morale was low, especially in the more populous regions where Khmer-Vietnamese animosities caused friction and sometimes armed clashes. The Khmer government has reported considerable numbers of defectors. There was little evidence, despite communist claims, of the combat activities or effectiveness of these Cambodian, or mainly Cambodian, units.

The People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) have, according to Prince Sihanouk, entered into formal agreements for assistance to his military forces. The prince announced—in 1970—that three divisions of regulars, or 30,000 men, were to be entirely equipped by the Communist Chinese and that a militia force of 10,000 would be equipped by North Korea. No details were made public on the carrying out of these agreements. He has likewise stated that aid was being furnished by Cuba.

North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong Forces

Neither the North Vietnamese government nor the communist Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam had admitted by mid-1972 that any of their armed forces were in Cambodia. Such action as these forces have been involved in have been attributed to the Cambodian People's National Liberation Armed Forces.

The Khmer government has consistently used the term North Vietnamese-Viet Cong to designate the hostile NVA-VC military forces on Cambodian territory. References during the 1960s by Prince Sihanouk to the communist military presence in Cambodia were usually to Vietnamese guerrillas. In early 1969, however, he declared that Viet Cong were on Cambodian soil and, later that year, said that Vietnamese communist forces generally numbered some 40,000 (see Background, this ch.) The Vietnamese were by that time in military, as well as administrative, control of the two northeastern provinces of the country, Mondol Kiri and Rotanokiri.

By early 1972 Vietnamese forces in Cambodia were estimated to number over 60,000 men; many of them were veteran, experienced troops. They had extended effective control to roughly half of Cambodia north of the so-called Lon Nol Line, an imaginary line running generally southeasterly from Batdambang Province through Siemreab Province north of the Tonle Sap, and then through Kampong Thum and Kampong Cham Provinces; part of this area was, presumably, occupied directly or jointly by Khmers Rouges forces (see fig. 6). It is however, an area of sparse population containing only about 20 percent of the country's people (see ch. 2). There were Vietnamese forces also in varying numbers in some of the provinces south of the line.

No detailed data were available on the composition of these Vietnamese forces, whether they were North Vietnamese Army regular troops, communist South Vietnamese units nominally subordinate to the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, or mixtures of the two. Also unclear was the composition of their combat, command and staff, logistics, or medical organizations; a mid-1970 estimate classified a third of the total at the time as combat troops and the other two-thirds as support elements. Cambodian government military reports, however, had identified divisional and regimental units of the North Vietnamese Army among the forces with which the FANK was in combat.

The attacks by ARVN and United States forces on Vietnamese troops in eastern Cambodia in April and May 1970 resulted in the westward extension by the NVA–VC of their area of operations. This movement brought them into areas somewhat more heavily populated than their former sanctuary areas but did not offer many strategic targets. Their tactics were mainly harassment, seizure, and then withdrawal to rebuild supplies. This caused considerable local security disruption and allowed them an opportunity to recruit Cambodians, but military actions were usually small scale. By 1971 North Vietnamese forces to the north of Phnom Penh controlled the provincial capital of Kracheh, which was thought in 1972 to be the site of communist political and military headquarters within Cambodia. In the delta region they operated in much of the countryside, at times to within several miles of Phnom Penh.

Pro-Sihanouk broadcasts and press statements have indicated the goal of these operations to be a military victory permitting the return of the prince to a liberated country. Western assessments have varied considerably. One view has been that the Communists were attempting to take over all Cambodian territory east of the Mekong River in order to establish a corridor along the border with South Vietnam. Another was that their basic interest was protection of weapon and food supplies along the border and that operations farther west in Cambodia were diversionary actions by small units to keep the FANK dispersed and unable to offer effective opposition.

INTERNAL SECURITY

Security in Government Areas

A national state of emergency was proclaimed by the government of the Khmer Republic in October 1971; it continued in 1972 to be the basis for the government's enforcement of police and judicial measures to maintain security in the areas it controlled. Constitutional rights were suspended by the proclamation, which was preceded by a declaration of martial law in June 1970, and by subsequent acts of both the executive and legislative branches of the government to meet the internal security problems arising from the change in government and the spread of military activities.

National Police

At the time of the change of government in March 1970, law enforcement was the responsibility of the Royal Khmer Police, under the direction of a secretary of state for surface defense, who was subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior. It was a loosely centralized force that acted as the single authority through which all of the country's law enforcement activities were managed. It included the National Police, patterned after the French Sûreté; the Municipal Police (in Phnom Penh); rural Town Police; and the paramilitary Surface Defense Force—a constabulary composed of the Provincial Guard and the Chivapul, a local volunteer militia. The Surface Defense Force was originally an auxiliary military force set up to aid the army in suppression of insurgency. In 1955 it was assigned to police duties and after 1960 was used as a constabulary, providing during the 1960s what little police protection or attention was given to the villages.

The police were reorganized in May 1970, at which time most of the component forces were transferred to the army as a means of meeting urgent needs for military manpower. The Surface Defense Force was integrated with the armed forces; its personnel were transferred into the military police. The Town Police were transferred into the FANK infantry. Later in 1970 the Municipal Police of Phnom Penh was disbanded and replaced by National Police personnel.

After the institution of martial law in June 1970, the provost marshal and military police of the FANK handled the general maintenance of order, including security and traffic control. The National Police pursued general inquiries and police matters involving judicial and economic considerations, continuing to act essentially as a bureau of investigation and surveillance modeled on the French Sûreté. Its organization in Phnom Penh was the same as that of the former Municipal Police, consisting of ten precincts under a central commissariat.

The National Police was administered by a general directorate subordinate to the minister of interior, security, religious affairs, veterans, and tourism. Its authorized strength was 3,592 in 1971; the details of organization and deployment were not known. Its predecessor's national headquarters contained five main sections: criminal, economic, immigration, administrative, and special police. Stated responsibilities of the National Police in Phnom Penh implied a greater concentration of activities in the special police field, commonly covert operations concerned with subversion, sources of dissidence, and the security of government officials and installations.

The powers of the security forces were broadened considerably by a decree on security measures issued in December 1971, allowing detention of suspects whether Cambodian or foreign (there was no mention of warrants), searches under warrant, and inspections day or night and prohibiting political meetings—except with prior permission—and antigovernment demonstrations.

The general mobilization decree of June 1970 (see Armed Forces of the Khmer Republic, this ch.) made all Cambodian citizens between the ages of eighteen and sixty members of some form of defense organization and further provided that all those in defense capacities would be subject to military laws and regulations and responsible to military tribunals. Martial law was already in effect, and in theory it would appear that the provisions of civil statutes on internal security matters were superseded to the extent that military regulations covered them. Presumably also the military police were made responsible for a wider range of security duties as a result of the decree. There was no information on the organization, strength, or deployment of the FANK military police in 1972.

Judicial System

The composition and competence of the courts were set forth in the 1972 Constitution (see ch. 8). The penalties that might be imposed by the courts were classified as either criminal or correctional punishment, and each category was subdivided into three degrees of ascending severity. Court procedures followed the French system, in which the prosecutor was the key figure.

The court system included military tribunals, which after March 1970 became prominent as the government brought legal action against those charged with treason. Martial law was decreed by the government to take effect June 1, 1970, and to continue for the period in which the nation was declared in danger. This decree assigned to military courts of the armed forces the responsibility of hearing, judging, and sentencing individuals charged with specified acts of rebellion, desertion, corruption, and various acts of aid to the enemy and disturbance of public order. The sentences listed were death by shooting, imprisonment for life at hard labor, and imprisonment for five to twenty years at hard labor. Reduction of sentences was permissible in case of findings of extenuating circumstances. The sentences were final and without appeal except for the death penalty, which might be appealed to the chief of state through the ministers of national defense and justice.

Information on the functioning of the regular courts in dealing with charges other than those related to security was not readily available in 1972. It appeared probable that military courts handled the bulk of cases brought for trial because many would arise from the provisions of the decrees on general mobilization of martial law and result from the responsibilities of the FANK military police for the maintenance of civilian order, including traffic control. In July 1970 the government abolished the High Council of the Magistracy provided by the constitution to guarantee the independence of judges. This action was reported to have been taken because the council had long undermined the authority of the minister of justice.

The Penal System

There was no information available on the size and administration of the Cambodian prison system in 1972. Prisons had been located in Phnom Penh and in some provincial capitals, and in addition a prison camp was maintained on an island in the Gulf of Thailand offshore from the town of Keb in Kampot Province. The prison system was administered by a director subordinate to the minister of interior, security, religious affairs, veterans, and tourism. The capacity of prisons was unknown, as was the security afforded by the facilities.

Security in Insurgent-Controlled Areas

There were only sketchy descriptions of local administrative organizations established in areas controlled by the Vietnamese and Cambodian Communists. Such organizations usually were reported to include committee members responsible for security. Their functions, and the means by which they were carried out, were not described. Communist activities appeared largely military in nature, and it was probable that their security organization was a branch of their military services, designed to serve military requirements. Their functions in population control and economic affairs were not known.

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GLOSSARY

bodhisattva—One destined to become a buddha (enlightened one); a person who has achieved enlightenment but defers achieving nirvana in order to help others achieve it.

Cham—Also known as Khmer Islam; a Muslim minority people. Sometimes also called Cham-Malay.

jataka—Story or body of stories about earlier incarnations of Gautama before he became the Buddha. Many popular animal fables are included within the repertory.

karma—Fate or destiny. Also, Buddhist religious doctrine that the ethical consequences of one's acts in present and past incarnations determine one's lot in future rebirths.

Khmer Issarak—Anti-French, nationalist movement organized in 1946; within a year split into factions, and by independence all but one of them were incorporated into Prince Sihanouk's political structure; the only dissident group, under Son Ngoc Thanh, became known as the Khmer Serei (*q.v.*).

Khmer Loeu—Upland Khmer, comprising several ethnolinguistically diverse groups living in Cambodia, mainly along the northeastern and eastern frontiers.

Khmer Serei—Free Khmer. An anti-Sihanouk group under Son Ngoc Thanh's leadership emanating from the anti-French resistance movement called the Khmer Issarak (*q.v.*); in armed opposition to the Sihanouk regime from 1959 on but dissolved itself shortly after the deposition of Prince Sihanouk in March 1970.

NVA-VC—Acronym for the North Vietnamese Army forces and the forces of the communist Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, which were commonly designated Viet Cong.

Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam—Political arm and the self-styled government of communist insurgents in South Vietnam (Viet Cong, *q.v.*); until June 1969 known as the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam—NFLSV.

riel—The Khmer Republic's currency unit: divided into 100 sen. Since October 29, 1971, its exchange rate adjusted by the National Bank of Cambodia according to market fluctuations; the initial rate set on October 29, 1971, was 140 riels to US$1. In

June 1972 rate was 186 riels to US$1. Past exchange rates: 35 riels to US$1 (January 1955 to August 1969); devalued on August 18, 1969, to 55.54 riels to US$1. For details see ch. 11.

sangha—Brotherhood of Buddhist monks; the Theravada Buddhist clergy.

Viet Cong—Contraction of Viet Nam Cong San, meaning Vietnamese Communists or Vietnamese communism. As used in the Khmer Republic, the term applies to South Vietnamese communist troops operating in South Vietnam and on Cambodian territory as well.

Viet Minh—Originally a broadly based Vietnamese nationalist organization in armed opposition to both the French and Japanese; by 1951 taken over by Communists. As used in the Khmer Republic, the term applies to Vietnamese communists—North Vietnamese in particular.

wat—Buddhist temple complex; group of Buddhist religious buildings enclosed by a wall.

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